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PREFACE 
As per current scenario corporate restructuring is one of the most widely used strategic tools. 
In daily news we come a cross frequently with the headlines of merger, acquisitions, 
takeover, joint venture, demerger and so on. Since last two decades as especially after, the 
liberalization and consequent globalization and privatization have resulted into tough 
competition not only in Indian business but globally as well. 
 The main objective of any company is profitable growth of enterprise to maximize the 
wealth of its shareholders. Further, to achieve profitable growth of business it is necessary 
for any company to limit competition, to gain economies of large scale and increase in 
income with proportionally less investment, to access foreign market, to achieve 
diversification and utilize underutilized market opportunities. In order to achieve goals, 
business needs to remain competitive and work towards its long term sustainability. 
Corporate restructuring has facilitated thousand of companies to re-establish their 
competitive advantage and respond more quickly and effectively to new opportunities and 
unexpected challenges. Under different dynamic situations as laid above, a profitable growth 
of business can achieved successfully if as a strategic tool merger is adopted. The most 
remarkable examples of growth and often the largest increases in stock prices are a result of 
mergers and acquisitions. M&A’s provide tremendous opportunities for companies to grow 
and add value to stake holder’s wealth. M&A’s increase value and efficiency and thereby 
increase holders value. M&A’s is a generic term used to represent many different types of 
corporate restructuring exercises. 
In order to avoid difficulties it is necessary to carry out initial investigation in various areas 
like growth potential, profitability, strength in terms of skills and capabilities, financial 
projections of the impact and value of merger, etc., need to be systematically thought out 
and planned. 
The main objective of any merger activity is profitable growth of business to maximize 
wealth of its stakeholders. The trend towards globalization of all national and regional 
economies has increased the intensity of mergers, in a bid to create more focused, 
competitive, viable larger players, in each industry. If an industrial want to survive, it has to 
excel and compete successfully both with multinational competitors in internal as well as 
international markets. Merger of companies are implicit in free enterprise system because of 
their obvious advantages infusion of better management and healthy growth of capital 
market. Thus, the concept of merger has assumed greater significance as offering number of 
opportunities. 
This research study is divided into six chapters. First chapter is on the introduction. The 
second chapter covers conceptual framework of corporate restructuring. There are 
considerable changes in accounting aspects relating to merger, accounting standards and 
legal acts like in Companies Act 1956; FERA1973 has been replaced by FEMA 1999, in 
MRTP Act etc. This chapter also covers laws relating to merger in UK and USA as well. 
Third chapter tells all about the review of literature based on study conducted on this subject 
and it’s related by numbers of researchers in India and abroad in different countries. Forth 
chapter is of research methodology. Basically three financial tools like RONW, MVA and 
EVA are covered along with certain ratios for study. Fifth chapter is about analysis of 
selected mergers in manufacturing industries at company and industry level. Finally, sixth 
chapter is all about findings, suggestions and conclusions. The Bibliography shall be 
followed by these chapters.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The main objective of any company is sustainable growth of business to maximize the 
wealth of its stakeholders. Due to liberalization, privatization and globalization the 
competition in Indian business market becomes very tough. This leads the necessity for 
small and medium size companies to reduce competition, expansion of business, modern 
technologies with less investment. This is possible by way of corporate restructuring in 
the form of merger, acquisition, takeover, consolidation, reverse merger, demerger etc. 
One of the significant objectives of any sovereign is to achieve high rate of economic 
growth. For achieving this, it keeps reviewing and improving its policies from time to 
time and introduces various measures, both at micro and macro levels. It also requires 
various regulatory measures to channelise all economic efforts to achieve its social and 
economic objectives and to prevent unhealthy practices entering in to its economic 
system which is detrimental to public welfare.  
 
In pursuance of these objectives, restrictions in India were placed on the corporate sector 
as per the provisions of various laws and regulations like Monopolistic and Restrictive 
Trade Practices, Industrial licensing policy etc. The MRTP Act 1969, placed restrictions 
on the expansion of an enterprise, establishment of new enterprise, division of  
undertakings, consolidation of undertakings and acquisition and transfer of shares of 
undertakings in order to check concentration of economic power, control the growth of 
monopolies and prevent various restrictive trade practices likely to result from operation 
of economic system. The provision of FERA, 1973 placed restrictions on foreign 
investments in the country. These restrictions remained in vogue for over two decades 
and proved incompatible in keeping pace with the global economic developments to 
achieve the objective of faster economic growth. So, the government had to review its 
entire policy framework and initiate economic liberalization measures. 
 
Though government began initiating steps towards liberalization in the post 1985 period, 
the real opining up of the economy started wit the statement on industrial policy made in 
June 1991. This statement indicated continuity with change, the main thrust being on 
relaxation in industrial licensing, foreign investments, transfer of foreign technology and 
 4
monopolies and restrictive trade practices laws. Since1991, there have been many 
industrial and economic reforms which have striven to clear the obstacles to faster the 
industrial development. MRTP Act has been amended and most of the sections restricting 
the expansion of company’s have been deleted. Changes have also been made in FERA 
to permit foreign direct investment. The new Act, Foreign Exchange Management Act, 
1999 (FEMA) has been introduced. Industrial licensing has been abolished in almost all 
industries.    
Table 1.1 
Number of M & A Announcements in India: 1992-2002 
 
YEAR Number of M & As Percentage 
1992 135 - 
1993 288 113.30 
1994 363 26.00 
1995 430 18.50 
1996 541 25.80 
1997 636 17.60 
1998 730 14.80 
1999 864 18.40 
2000 1062 22.92 
2001 1279 20.40 
2002 1558 21.80 
2003 1905 22.46 
2004 2376 24.72 
 
Chart:- 1.1 Number of M & A Announcement in India 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Indian economy is currently witnessing a sea change from the controlled to the market 
driven environment. Increasing shareholder values is the golden rule which Indian 
corporate are increasingly focusing on, as a means and end to survive and grow under the 
fast changing economic scenario. Merger and acquisition activity has become a part and 
parcel of the corporate and professional life. M&A is a sporadic event and there is very 
little scope for companies to learn from their past experience. Therefore, to determine the 
success of a merger, it has to be ascertained if there will be any economic gain from 
mergers. Post-merger economic gain will be generated only if the two companies are 
worth more together than apart. The basic motive of M&A can be understood as an 
attempt to create value. There are many reasons that appear to apply to each merger. 
Among the explanations offered at various times has been exploitation of economies, 
synergy, acquisition of market share, growth, diversification, tax advantage etc. Most 
mergers are controlled by multiple motives rather than single a one. However, many 
motives are characterized as having a hidden agenda (not expressed) or fake motive 
(intending to mask real ones). Many motives may not be consistent over time but shift, 
change character, emphasis and priority in the course of time. 
 
An acquisition involves acquiring ownership in the tangible and intangible assets of the 
business. An acquisition is the purchase, by the company of the controlling interest in the 
share capital of an existing company. When a company is acquired by another company, 
the acquiring company has two options: The first is to merge both the companies into one 
and operate as single entity and the second is two operate the takeover company as an 
independent entity, may be with changed management and changed policies. The first 
option is known as merger and second option is known as takeover. 
 
The merger has been defined as arrangement whereby the assets of two or more 
companies become vested in, or under the control of one company (which may or may 
not be one of the original two companies), which has its shareholders, all or substantially 
all the shareholders of the two companies. It may also include fusion of two or more 
companies in to another.  
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In a merger one of the two existing companies merges its identity in to another existing 
company, or one or more existing companies may form a new company and merge their 
identities in to the new companies by transferring their businesses and undertakings all 
other assets and liabilities to the new companies (i.e. merged company). The shareholders 
of companies (s) whose identities have been merged (referred here as merging 
company(s) ) get substantial shareholding in the merged company based on the share 
exchange ratio incorporated in the scheme of merger as approved by majority of 
shareholders of both merged and merging companies. 
 
The situation may be illustrated as under: 
Assume there are two companies X and Y which decide to merge: 
 
Option one:    Where X company merges in to Y Company 
                       Combined merged company emerged Y Ltd. 
 
Option Two:   Where Y company merges in to X Company 
                        Combined merged company emerges as X Ltd. 
Option Three:  X Company and Y Company both merged to form a new          
                        Company Z. combined merged company emerges as Z Ltd.    
 
Amalgamations the legal process by which two or more companies join together to form 
a new entity, or one or more companies are blended with another and as a consequence, 
amalgamating company loses its existence and its shareholders become shareholders of 
new company or amalgamated company. 
 
As per Companies Act, 1956 (legislation that facilitates amalgamation), the terms merger 
and amalgamation are synonymous and not defined anywhere in the Act. Sections 390-
396 A of Companies Act define statutory provisions relating to these terms. As per the 
mandatory Accounting Standards AS-14 issued by the institute of Chartered Accountants 
of India (ICAI), amalgamation pursuant to the provisions of Companies Act or any other 
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statute, which may be applicable to the companies. Two methods of amalgamation are 
contemplated in AS-14: 
a) Amalgamation in the nature of merger 
b) Amalgamation in the nature of purchase 
 
Amalgamation in the nature of merger is an organic unification of two or more entities or 
undertakings or fusion of one with another. Amalgamation in the nature of purchase is 
where one company’s assets and liabilities are taken over by another and lump-sum is 
paid to the former by the latter. Both these amalgamations are within the purview of 
Sections 390-396 A of Companies Act. 
 
As per Income Tax Act, 1961, merger is defined as amalgamation under section 2 (1B) 
with the following 3 conditions to be satisfied: 
1) All the properties of amalgamating company (s) should vest with the 
amalgamated company after amalgamation. 
2) All the liabilities of Amalgamation Company (s) should vest with the 
amalgamated company after amalgamation. 
3) Shareholders holding not less than 75% in value or voting power in 
amalgamating company(s) should become shareholders of amalgamated 
company after amalgamation. 
 
Takeover is a general term used to defined acquisitions only and terms, acquisition and 
takeover, can be used interchangeably. A takeover may be defined as series of 
transactions, whereby, a person, individual, group of individuals or a company acquires 
control over the assets of a company, either directly by becoming the owner of those 
assets or indirectly by obtaining control of the management of the company. 
 
Takeover may be of the different types depending upon the purpose of management for 
acquiring a company. 
 
 8
1) A takeover may be straight takeover which is accomplished by the 
management of the company by acquiring shares of another company with the 
intention of operating ‘taken over company’ as an independent legal entity. 
2) The second type of takeover is where ownership of company is captured to 
merge both companies into one and operate as single legal entity. 
3) A third type of takeover of a sick company for its revival. This is accomplished 
by an order of Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) under 
the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 
4) The forth kind is the bail-out-takeover, which is substantial acquisition of 
shares in a financially weak company, not being a sick industrial company, in 
pursuance to a scheme of rehabilitation approved by public financial institution 
which is responsible for ensuring compliance with provisions of Substantial 
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Regulations, 1997 issued by SEBI which 
regulate the bail-out-takeovers. 
 
The regulatory framework for controlling takeover activities of a company consists of 
Companies Act, 1956, Listing Agreement and SEBI Takeover Code. Section 372 A of 
Companies Act is applicable to acquisition of shares through a company. The takeover of 
listed companies is also regulated by Section 40 A and 40 B of Listing Agreement which 
seek to regulate takeover act ivies by imposing certain requirements of disclosures and 
transparency. The Securities and Exchange Board of India had earlier issued SEBI 
(Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1994 which was repealed 
by SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 issued on 
20th February, 1997 and further amended on 28th October, 1998.      
 
Therefore, there is a need to study motives for mergers and acquisitions which can be 
helpful in assessing the scope and degree of their financial success. Many researches have 
been conducted in US and U.K. in this regard. However, a comprehensive empirical 
study is lacking in India. This study attempts to fill this void in the Indian context.  
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OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
In the context of the above stated need the following objectives have been formulated in 
the study: 
(i) To evaluate the pre and post-merger performance of the merged companies using 
the value added metrics of corporate performance such as Economic Value Added, 
Market Value Added and Return on Net Worth. 
(ii) To examine the motives of corporate mergers in India as avowed in their merger 
schemes and to assess if, motives as avowed in the schemes have been fulfilled or 
not. 
(iii) To evaluate the pre-and post-merger financial performance of merged companies 
and examine the influence of motives variables on mergers on mergers such as 
 a) Profit maximization 
      b)  Growth  
       c) Tax Consideration 
       d) Diversification 
       e) Leverage 
(iv) To suggest appropriate strategy for merger and acquisition of Indian industry. 
 
HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY 
To accomplish the objectives of the study, the following null hypotheses have been 
developed for empirical testing: 
H.1 Mergers and acquisitions do not result in value addition to existing              
shareholders. 
H.2   Merger in India is not predominantly horizontal. 
H.3   There is no difference between pre- and post-merger performance of merged 
companies under the study period. 
H.4 Synergy in profits, acquisition of market share, tax consideration and diversification, 
all do not result in value addition to existing shareholders. 
H.5 There is no significant difference in the value addition to the existing shareholders 
due to Growth and Leverage. 
H.6 Motives as avowed in the merger schemes have not been effected after mergers. 
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THE SAMPLE & DATA COLLECTION 
This study includes companies which have undergone merger during the period 1st April, 
1999 – 31st March, 2000. The empirical analysis of all individual merger events has been 
carried out pre-merger and post- merger to give a somewhat clear picture of their success 
or failure. There are about 196 merged companies in India during about period. Out of 
which the sample has been consist of selected merged manufacturing companies for 
which data available for the entire period of the study. 
 
Table: 1.2 
Industry wise classification 
Sr.No. Industry 
No. of 
Companies
 M& A 
No of 
Companies 
Selected 
1 Chemicals, Petrochemicals 13 8 
2 
Electric, Electronics, 
Hardware 17 9 
3 Fertilizers, Pesticides 6 3 
4 Miscellaneous 52 13 
5 Packaging 8 4 
6 Paper & Pulp 4 1 
7 Pharmaceuticals 15 6 
8 Steel, Engineering 6 4 
9 Tea-Coffee 6 3 
10 Textiles 7 3 
11 Treading 4 2 
12 Cement 2 - 
13 Entertainment 1 - 
14 Finance & Investments 39 - 
15 Food Products 5 - 
16 Transport 11 - 
  Total 196 56 
 
The financial and non-financial data used in the study has been mainly drawn from 
Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) ‘PROWESS” and Capitaline Database of 
Capital Market, which is also considered as the most reliable Indian corporate database. 
Prowess contains a highly normalized database for over 13000 companies in India. This 
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database is supplemented with powerful analytical software tools to enable extensive 
research. 
 
TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYSIS 
This study has made the following analysis in terms of the objectives: 
 
Post-Merger EVA Analysis    
The onset of liberalization in the last ten years has shifted the focus of corporate goals to 
enhancing shareholder value. So, post-merger analysis of merged companies has been 
carried out in terms of value addition to shareholders. For this purpose, two method of 
measuring shareholder value have been employed. Firstly, broad measures comprising 
the value added twins namely, Economic Value Added (EVA) and Market Value Added 
(MVA) and secondly, the traditional measures of Return on Net worth (RONW) have 
been applied. 
 
EVA, a new performance metric popularized by Stern Stewart of U.S. has started gaining 
popularity as a superior tool for measuring corporate performance. EVA indicates the 
amount of economic value created in any single accounting period and is simply stated as 
the amount a company earns in excess of its capital. 
 
EVA = Net operating profits after taxes- Cost of capital employed 
           = NOPAT – COCE  
Where, 
NOPAT- Profit after tax after subtracting tax adjusted interest 
COCE- Weighted average cost of debt and equity capital X capital employed 
 
While EVA measures shareholder value addition in terms of operating performance, its 
twin measure, MVA measures the markets’ assessment of firm’s value. 
 
MVA = Market value – Capital employed of company 
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The relatively narrower measure of shareholder value creation is Return on Net worth 
(RONW) which is profit after tax divided by shareholders wealth in the company i.e. paid 
up capital + free reserves. This measure nets out the recommitted payment obligations to 
all classes of creditors and focuses only on wealth created for residual claimants 
 
Broadly, 
  
                                     Profit after tax 
          RONW =          ------------------     x  100 
                                        Net Worth 
                
                                           PAT 
                         =             ---------     x  100 
                                           NW 
 
Pre-and Post-Merger Analysis 
Last but not the least, pre and post-merger analysis has been carried out (for the sample 
merged companies whose schemes have been procured) in terms of motives of mergers 
with the objective to financially assess if, motives, as avowed in the merger schemes have 
been achieved or not. Six variables have been selected as motives of mergers namely, 
 
a)   Profitability 
b)    Growth 
c)    Tax Advantage 
d)    Leverage 
 
I Profitability Ratios 
♦ Return on capital employed (profit before interest after tax/ total capital employed) 
♦ Gross profit margin (Gross profit / Net sales) 
♦ Return on Net Worth (Profit after tax / Net worth) 
♦ Dividend payout ratio (Dividend per share / Earning per share) 
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♦ Expense ratio (Operating expense / Net sales) 
♦ Earning per share (Profit after tax / No. of equity shares) 
                                                 
II Growth                               
                                                    Net assets in the beginning -1 
   Growth in net assets =             ----------------------------------- 
                                                       Net assets at the end   
  
III Tax Advantage 
                                                              Tax paid  
   Effective rate of tax =                      ---------------         x  100 
                                                          Profit before tax 
IV Leverage Ratio 
Total Debt / Total Equity 
 
                                                     Profit before interest and tax 
 Interest Coverage =                  ------------------------------------- 
                                                     Interest 
 
Apart from the variables explained above, some more financial variables have been 
included for in-depth motives analysis. These are determined with the help of following 
ratio: 
 
1    Price earning ratio (P/E ratio) 
2    Liquidity ratio  
3    Gearing ratio 
4    Current ratio  
 
Method of Analysis 
Using value added metrics following analysis has been carried out for selected companies 
for four post merger years. 
(1) Intra-company comparison is carried out over post merger period to see if shareholder 
value has improved over the post merger period. 
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(2) Inter company comparison is carried out for average post merger period to know who 
are the gainers in this detritus of shareholder value after merger. 
(3) Intra-industry comparison is carried out over post merger period to see if shareholder 
value has improved over the post merger period. 
(4) Inter industry comparison is carried out for average post merger period to know who 
are the gainers in this detritus of shareholder value after merger. 
 
For this purpose, absolute EVA and MVA data have been converted in to relative figures 
using following formula: 
 
                                       EVA 
 EVACE   =                   --------- * 100 
                                          CE 
Where,  
 
EVACE: Economic Value Added as a percentage of capital employed. 
EVA:      Economic Value Added 
CE   :       Capital Employed 
 
Regression Analysis 
To study the impact of merger on firm’s performance, the regression analysis is also 
carried out for pre merger and post merger performance of sample companies. 
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CHAPTER PLAN  
 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter includes the brief evolution of M&A’s in India, significance of the study, the 
objectives of the study, the hypothesis, the samples and date collection, tools and 
techniques for analysis and limitation of the study. 
 
CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS  
In this chapter, conceptual aspects of merger, acquisition, takeover, consolidation, reverse 
merger, demergers etc. are discussed. Various Indian and global laws and statues having 
a bearing on merger process have been outlined and trends traced. The procedure for 
merger, determination of share exchange ratio, the relevance of appointed date and 
effective date and other related issues have also been covered. 
 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
This chapter contains a comprehensive review of various research studies conducted in 
and out of India. Research literature, out of India, especially in US and UK covers almost 
every aspect of mergers and acquisitions such theories of firm conceptualized into 
motives of mergers, their empirical investigation, performance measures using share 
price and accounting data, empirical examination of financial characteristics of acquired 
and acquiring firms and determinants of aggregate merge activity. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
AN ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC VALUE ADDED BASED ON MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 
This chapter includes the historical evolution of corporate performance metric 
popularized by Stern Stewart of US, namely Economic value added (EVA) and its twin, 
Market value added (MVA). After giving the rationale of its use and its superiority over 
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other performance metrics like Earning Per Share (EPS) & Return On Net Worth 
(RONW), the detailed theoretical methodology regarding its computation has been 
discussed. 
 
Chapter V 
AN ANALYSIS OF FINANCAL PERFORMANCE 
This chapter specifies the process of sample selection, data collection and the financial 
variables included along with the methodology adopted for their computation. The 
second section gives the empirical results and last section discusses their interpretation 
and conclusions. 
Chapter VI 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND SUGGESTIONS 
This chapter highlights general criteria, summary, findings and suggestions of the study. 
Also, suggested path for the improvement and future areas for research. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
♦ Impact of mergers on financial performance of companies due to certain other factors 
such as change in industry, economy, and stock market have not been covered by this 
study. 
♦ This study is based on secondary data and secondary data has its own limitations. 
♦ This study is limited to the merger of the selected companies and the findings can not 
be generalized to whole industry. 
♦ There are many approaches to measure the impact of merger on financial performance 
of the company. There is no unanimous opinion among the experts. So the researcher has 
taken the approaches, which might be appropriate for the study.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Business is subject to number of competitions forced by various factors like the 
bargaining power of suppliers and buyers, the threat of new entrants, the threat of 
substitute products and services and rivalry among the existing competitors. In all these 
situations the main objective of any company is profitable growth of enterprise to 
maximize the wealth of its shareholders. Further, to achieve profitable growth of business 
it is necessary for any company to limit competition, solve the problem of slow growth, 
to gain economies of large scale and increase in income with proportionally less 
investment, to establish a transnational bridgehead without excessive start-up cost to gain 
access to foreign market, to achieve diversification and utilize underutilized market 
opportunities. Due to numerous and fast economical developments, and rapid regulatory 
changes, it become indispensable for even small companies to grow up rapidly without 
using large resources like new technology, upgraded plant and machinery, least 
knowledge updating to achieve effective reduction in cost and saving in time. In order to 
achieve goals, business needs to remain competitive and work towards its long term 
sustainability. Fuehrer, the liberalization and consequent globalization has resulted into 
tough competition not only in Indian business market but globally as well. 
 
In response to these pressures, an increasing number of companies around the world are 
dramatically restructuring their assets, operations and contractual relationships with 
shareholders, creditors, and other financial stakeholders. Corporate restructuring has 
facilitated thousand of companies to re-establish their competitive advantage and respond 
more quickly and effectively to new opportunities and unexpected challenges. Corporate 
restructuring has had an equally profound impact on the many more thousands of 
suppliers, customers and competitors that do business with restricted companies. In a 
rapidly changing world, companies are facing unprecedented turmoil in global markets. 
Several competition, rapid technological change, and rising stock market volatility have 
increased the burden on companies to deliver superior performance and value for their 
shareholders. 
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Generally most of the corporate growth occurs by internal expansion, when a company’s 
existing divisions grow through normal capital budgeting activities. Nevertheless, if the 
goals are easily achieved within the company, it may mean that the goals are too small. 
Growth opportunities come in a variety of other forms and a great deal of energy and 
resources may be wasted if an entrepreneur does not wait long enough to identify the 
various dynamic which are already in place. 
 
Under different dynamic situations as laid above, a profitable growth of business can 
achieved successfully if as a strategic tool merger is adopted. The most remarkable 
examples of growth and often the largest increases in stock prices are a result of mergers 
and acquisitions. M&A’s provide tremendous opportunities for companies to grow and 
add value to stake holder’s wealth. M&A’s increase value and efficiency and thereby 
increase holders value. M&A’s is a generic term used to represent many different types 
of corporate restructuring exercises. 
 
However, as every coin has second side potential gainful merger activity do fail for 
varied reasons such as failing to anticipate and define problem, failing to attempt or 
success in solving problem. Merger activity is also subject to certain challenges like due 
diligence, cultural factors, implementation and integration. 
 
In order to avoid difficulties it is necessary to carry out initial investigation in various 
areas like growth potential, profitability, strength in terms of skills and capabilities, 
financial projections of the impact and value of merger, etc., need to be systematically 
thought out and planned. 
 
The profitable growth of the business can be achieved “internally” by developing and 
introducing new products or by expansion of capacity of existing product(s). However, 
under different dynamic situations like fast economical changes, technological 
developments, rapid regulatory changes and emergence of new competitive factors 
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merger as external strategic tool for profitable growth of business is gaining popularity, 
resulted into merger activity rose to unprecedented levels since last few decades. 
The main objective of any merger activity is profitable growth of business to maximize 
wealth of its stakeholders. The trend towards globalization of all national and regional 
economies has increased the intensity of mergers, in a bid to create more focused, 
competitive, viable larger players, in each industry. If an industrial want to survive, it has 
to excel and compete successfully both with multinational competitors in internal as well 
as international markets. Merger of companies are implicit in free enterprise system 
because of their obvious advantages infusion of better management and healthy growth of 
capital market. Thus, the concept of merger has assumed greater significance as offering 
number of opportunities, especially in the context of the ongoing program of 
liberalization and globalization. 
 
The present chapter purports to discuss the conceptual framework of mergers and 
acquisitions (Mass) whining the board parameters of corporate restructuring taking place 
in India and Abroad with a view to enhance shareholder value. In common parlance, the 
terms mergers, acquisitions, amalgamations and takeovers are often used 
interchangeably. However, in different circumstances, some of these terms carry different 
meanings. So, for the sake of clarity, it is necessary to discuss the meaning of these terms 
in details.  
 
CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITIES IN INDIA 
Restructuring of business is an integral part of the new economic paradigm. As controls 
and restrictions give way to competition and free trade, restructuring and reorganization 
become essential. Restructuring usually involves major organizational change such as 
shift in corporate strategies to meet increased competition or changed market conditions. 
This activity can take place internally in the form of new investments in plant and 
machinery (green field investments), research and development at product and process 
levels, hiving off of non core activities, divestitures, sell offs, demergers act.  It can also 
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take place externally through mergers and acquisitions (Mass) by which a may acquire 
another firm or by forming joint ventures with other firms. 
The process of economic liberalization and globalization that swept the Indian economy 
in 1990’s created a highly competitive business environment forcing Indian companies to 
restructure their operations. This restructuring process has result in rise in strategies like 
mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, collaborations, consolidation, diversification etc. 
Domestic firms have taken steps to consolidate their position to face increasing 
competitive pressures and Macs have taken this opportunity to enter Indian Corporate 
Sector. The different forms of corporate restructuring are summarized in Table: - 2.1 and 
explained in brief thereafter. 
  Table:­2.1   
Different Forms of Corporate Restructuring 
EXPANSION CONTRACTION 
CORPORATE 
CONTROL 
Merger Demerger Going Private 
Amalgamation Spin Off Equity Buyback 
Absorption Equity Curved Out Anti takeover Defenses 
Tender Offer Split Off Leveraged Buyouts 
Asset Acquisition Split Up Exchange Offer 
Joint Venture Divestures Proxy Contests 
-- Asset Sale Change in Ownership 
Structure 
-- -- ESOP 
-- -- MLPs 
 
Expansion 
Expansion is a form of restructuring, which results in an increase in the size of the 
company. It may be in the form of merger, amalgamation, absorption, joint venture offer, 
asset acquisition, tender offer. 
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Merger 
When two or more companies decide to combine their business by forming a single 
company it is called merger. A merger can take place either as an amalgamation or 
absorption. 
 
Amalgamation 
This involves fusion of two or more companies where the companies lose their individual 
identity and a new company comes into existence to takeover the business of companies 
being liquidated.   
The merger of Brooke Bond India Limited and Lipton India Limited resulted in 
formation of a new company Brooke Bond Lipton India Limited. This form of 
restructuring is mostly applied to combine companies of same size. 
Absorption 
 In absorption, one company purchases the business of another company. This involves 
fusion of a small company with a large company where the smaller company cases to 
exist after the merger. In case of merger of HDFC Bank and Times Bank, after the 
merger Times Bank ceased to exist while HDFC Bank continued in expanded form. 
Joint venture 
This involves two or more companies enter into an agreement to provide certain 
resources for the achievement of particular common business goal. It involves 
intersection of only a small fraction of the activities of the companies involved and 
normally for a limited time period. The co-ventures distribute profit earned from joint 
venture according to pre-arranged ratio companies coming together and forming a new 
company whose ownership is changed. Generally this strategy is adopted by MNCS to 
enter into a foreign market. DCM group and DAEWOOMOTORS entered into a joint 
venture to form DCMDAWEOOLTD to manufacture automobiles in India.  
Asset Acquisition 
This involves purchasing of assets of another company. The assets may be tangible assets 
like factory building, plant machinery or intangible like patent & brands. 
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The acquisition of the cement division of Tata Steel by Lafarge of France. Lafarge 
acquired only the 1.7 million tone cement plant and its related assets from Tata steel. The 
assets being purchased may also be intangible in nature. For example, Coca-Cola 
purchased soft drinks brands like Thumps Up, Limca Gold Spot etc. from Parle by paying 
Rs. 170 crore to Parle. HLL bought the brands of Lakme. 
Tender Offer 
This involves making a public offer for acquire management control in that company. 
Takeover by Tata Tea of Consolidated Coffee Ltd (CCL) is an example of tender offer 
where more than 50% of shareholders of CCL sold their holding to Tata Tea at the 
offered price which was more than the investment price. 
Contraction 
This is a form of restructuring which results in a reduction in the size of the company. It 
can be in the form of demergers, spin-off, split-ups, equity carve-out, and divestiture or 
asset sale. 
Demergers 
Demergers mean split or division of a company. Such divisions may take place for 
various reasons internal or external. An internal factor generally consists of split in the 
family rather than lack of competence on the part of management. For example, DCM 
Ltd. was divided into four separate companies which are being managed by different 
family members of Late Shriram. 
 
There are generally the following types of demergers; 
Spin-offs 
This type of demergers involves division of company in which a company distributes all 
of the shares it own in a subsidiary on a pro-rata basis to its own shareholders. Hence, the 
shareholders proportional ownership of shares is the same in the new legal subsidiary as 
well as the parent company. The new company run business independently from the 
parent company and has its own management.  By this way, both the companies’ i.e. 
holding as well as subsidiary company exist and carry on business. For example, Kotak 
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Mahindra Capital Finance Ltd formed a subsidiary called Kotak Mahindra Capital 
Corporation by spinning off its invest division. 
Split-Ups 
This type of demerger involves the division of the parent company into two or more 
separate companies where parent company ceases to exit after the demerger and only the 
new off springs survive. A split- up involves the creation of new class of stock for each 
partner operating subsidiaries, paying current shareholders a divided of each new class of 
stock and than dissolving the parent company. Stockholders in the new companies may 
be different as shareholders in the parent company may exchange their stock for stock in 
one or more of the spin-offs. 
 
The Andrapradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) was split- up in 1999 as part of the 
Power Sector reforms. The power generation business and the transmission and 
distribution were transferred to two separate companies called APGENCO and 
APTRANSCO respectively. APSEB ceased to exist as a result of the split-up. 
Split- offs 
Under this type of demerger a new subsidiary company is to be formed to takeover the 
operations of an existing division. A part of the shareholders of the parent company 
receives shares in new company in exchange of shares in parent company. A split- offs 
does not lead to any cash inflow to the parent company. This results into decrease in the 
equity size of parent company. 
Equity Carve Outs 
This is similar to Spin Offs, except that some part of shareholding of this subsidiary is 
offered to public through a public issue and the parent company continues to enjoy 
control over the subsidiary company by holding controlling interest in it. 
Divestiture 
This is a sale of undervalued segment of a company which is non-strategic or unrelated to 
the core business for cash. The company uses this sale proceeds for investment in 
potentially higher return opportunities. 
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Asset Sale 
This involves sale of tangible or intangible assets of a company to generate cash. The 
company may than distribute the cash to its shareholders and go out of its existence or 
use it to purchase other assets. 
Corporate Controls 
A company can also go for restructuring without purchasing new company or selling 
existing company or part of it. It is by obtaining corporate control over the management 
of other company. Control is the process by which managers influence other members of 
company to implement the organizational strategies. Following are various techniques of 
obtaining corporate control. 
Going private 
It refers to transformation of public company in to privately held company. It involves 
purchase of entire equity interest in a previously public corporation by a small group of 
investors. Thus, it involves buying back the all outstanding shares from the markets and 
converting a listed company into a private company by buying back the entire 
outstanding share from the markets. 
Equity buyback 
This involves the company buying its own shares back from the market. This leads to 
reduction in the equity capital of the company. This, in turn, strengthens the promoter’s 
controlling position by increasing his stake in the equity of the company. It is use as a 
takeover defense to reduce the number of shares that could be purchased by the potential 
acquirer. Sterlite industries had proposed a buyback of its shares through the open market 
to acquire a maximum of 25 percent of the equity. 
Anti takeover defenses 
With a high level of hostile takeover activity in recent years, takeover defenses, both 
premature and reactive, have been resorted to by the companies. Premature defenses, also 
called preventive defenses are employed to prevent a sudden, unexpected hostile bid for 
gaining control of the company. When preventive takeover defenses are not successful in 
fending off an unwanted bid, the targets implements post-bid or reactive defenses. These 
takeover defenses intend to charge the corporate control position of the promoters.                                          
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Leveraged buyouts (LBO) 
This involves rising of capital from the management to acquire a company on the strength 
of its assets. This is a financing technique where debt is used in a acquisition of a 
company. The term is often applied to a firm borrowing fund to buy back its stock to 
convert from a publicly- owned to privately-owned company. A management buyout is a 
LBO in which managers of the firm to be taken private are also equity investors. 
 
Exchange offers 
It provides one or more classes of securities, the right or option to exchange part or all of 
their holdings for a different class of securities of the firm. 
 
The terms of exchange offered necessarily involve new securities of greater market value 
than the pre-exchange offer announcement market value. Exchange offer involves 
exchanging debt for common stock, which increase leverage, or conversely, exchanging 
common stock for debt, which decrease leverage. This helps a company to change its 
capital structure while holding the invest policy unchanged. 
Proxy contests 
A proxy contents is an attempt by a single shareholder or a group of shareholders to take 
control or bring about other changes in a company through the use of the proxy 
mechanism of corporate voting. In a proxy fight, a bidder may attempt to use his or her 
voting rights and garner the support from the other shareholders to expel the incumbent 
board or management. 
Changes in Ownership Structure 
This represent the fourth group of restructuring activities which results in the 
restructuring the ownership of a company. A company’s ownership structure affects, and 
is affected by other variables and these variables also influence the market value. These 
variables include the levels of principal-agents conflicts and information asymmetry and 
their effects on other variables such as the firm’s operating strategy, dividend policy and 
capital structure. The various techniques of changing the ownership structure are 
explained below. 
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Employee Stock Option Plan (ESOP) 
An employee stock option plan (ESOP) is a mechanism whereby a company can make 
tax deductible contribution of cash or stock in to a trust. The assets are allocated the 
employees and are not taxed until withdrawn by them. ESOPs are involved in mergers 
and LBOs in two ways as a financing vehicle for the acquisition of companies, including 
through LBOs, and as an Anti take over defense. 
Master Limited Partnership (MLPs) 
A master limited partnership is a type of limited partnership whose shares are publicly 
trade. The limited partnership interests are divided in to units which trade as shares of 
common stock. In addition to tradability, it has the advantage of limited liability for the 
limited partners. 
 
This kind of structure is however not prevalent in our country through there was a move 
some time back to design necessary regulatory framework for floating such 
organizations, particularly in the context of divergent needs of IT sector. 
 
MERGER 
Background 
Indian corporate world has witnessed major changes in the last decade. Thanks to the 
government’s policy of liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy.  
 
Starting with the opening of the economy the much-needed impetus was rightly described 
of restructuring. Throughout 1998, most of the firms went ahead- with mergers, 
acquisitions, sell-offs and spin-offs. 
 
Corporate restructuring activity is so far in the post-liberalization period. Entry of the 
MNCs in to the country which are eyeing India as a sourcing base particularly in the 
labor-intensive industries fueled the domestic industry to focus on their core 
competencies. This clearly gives the MNCs an edge over the local players. In India, given 
the upsurge in the restructuring activities the opening up of the economy big business 
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houses in India started formulating strategies so as meet competition from domestic as 
well as the international players. 
 
As the current wave of mergers in India is the first of its kind, international experience 
are relied upon to understand the issues relating to mergers in a historical perspective. We 
don’t really understand why merger activity is so volatile. If mergers are prompted by 
economic motives at least one of these one of these motives must be “here today and 
gone tomorrow.” 
 
Indian corporate sector are undergoing structural changes in the post liberalization period. 
Competitive pressures are high not only due to deregulation but also due to globalization. 
As a part of the restructuring programmed. Merger has been defined as an arrangement 
whereby the assets of two or more companies become vested in, or under the control of 
one company (which may or may not be one of the original two companies), which has as 
its shareholders, all or substantially all the shareholders of the two companies. It may also 
include fusion of two or more companies into another. In a merger, one of the two 
existing  companies merge its identify into another existing company, or one or more of 
existing companies may form a new company and merge their identities into the new 
company by transferring their businesses and undertakings including all other assets and 
liabilities to the new company (i.e. merged company). The shareholders of companies 
whose identities have been merged (referred here as merging companies) get substantial 
shareholding in the merged company based on the share exchange ratio incorporated in 
the scheme of merger as approved by majority of shareholders of both merged and 
merging companies. 
The situation may be illustrated as under: 
There are two companies X and Y which decide to merge: 
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Option 1: Where X Company mergers into Y Company. 
                    Combined merged company emerges as Y Ltd. 
Option 2: Where Y Company merges into X Company. 
                    Combined merged company emerges as X Ltd. 
Option 3: X Company and Y Company both merge to form 
                     a new company Z. 
                    Combined merged company emerges as Z Ltd.  . 
 
Thus, merger is a marriage between two companies of all most of same size. It is thus a 
combination of two or more companies in which one company remains in existence in its 
own name and the other ceases to exist as a legal entity. The survivor company acquires 
assets and liabilities of merged companies. Generally, the company which survives is the 
buyer which retains its identity and Seller Company is extinguished. 
Indian Scenario  
During the licensing era, several corporate sectors had indulged in unrelated 
diversification depending on the availability of the licenses. The corporate sector thrived 
in spite of their inefficiencies because the total capacity in the industry was restricted due 
to licensing. The corporate sectors, over a period to time, become unwieldy conglomerate 
with a sub optimal portfolio of assorted businesses. The policy of decontrol and 
liberalization coupled with globalization in the economy has exposed the corporate sector 
to severe domestic and global competition. This has been further accentuated by the 
recessionary trend which resulted in falling demand, which in turn resulted in over 
capacity in several sectors of the economy. The industry is currently engaged in efforts to 
consolidate themselves in areas of their core competence and divest those businesses 
where they do not have any competitive advantage. 
 
The actual wave in the Indian context, however, started after code was felt by the 
regulatory authorities. Prior to 1994, the Murugappa group, the Chabbria group and the 
RPG group, had sought to build industrial empires through merger. They followed the 
prevailing industries practice of building a conglomerate of diverse businesses into one 
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group. In recent times, mergers have attempted to restructure firms and achieve 
economies of scale to deal with an increasingly competitive environment. 
The Underlying Logic of Merger   
The efficiency theories under mergers suggest that mergers provide a mechanism by 
which capital can be used with more efficiency and the productivity of the company can 
be increased through “economies of scale”. The theory of differential efficiency states 
that if the management of the company “A” is more efficient than that of company “B” 
and if “A” acquires “B” The efficiency of the company “B” is likely to be brought up to 
the level of company “A”. According to this theory, the increased efficiency of company 
“B” is considered to be the outcome of merger. 
 
Another important theory of mergers is the “synergy theory” which states that when two 
companies combine, they should be able to produce a greater effect together than what 
the two operating independently could. It refers to the phenomenon of two plus becoming 
five. This synergy could be “financial synergy” or “operating synergy”. 
 
V (A+B) > V (A) +V (B) 
Where; V (A+B): Value of the combined companies 
V (A): Value of the company “A” 
V (B): Value of the company “B” 
 
A merger of two companies should be invariably result in a “ positive”  i.e. it should 
result in increased volume of revenue from the combined sales or decreased operating 
cost or decreased investment requirements. If the effects are neutral i.e. no change is 
effected over the standalone position, the whole labor of merger excessive would go 
waste. On the other hand, if the combined effect is “negative” the merger may even prove 
fatal later. 
 
The increased outflows from the merged entity over that of the total output of the units 
when they were operating individually is more due to operation of either “economies of 
scale” or “economies of scope”. The nature of “economies of scale” may be different: 
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Some merger look for cost-based economies of scale: some may look for revenue-based 
economies of scale, defense-based economies of scale etc. Similarly, “economies of 
scale” is varied in nature: Cost-based economies of scope, revenue-based scope and 
diversification –based economies of scope. 
 
TYPES OF MERGERS 
From an economic stand point, different types of mergers can be grouped on the basis of 
their stage of economic activity and the degree of relatedness of the firm. 
 
Horizontal Merger 
It is a merger of two competing firms. Which are at the same stage of industrial process 
both the firms belong to the same industry i.e. merger is between business competitors, 
such as manufactures of the same type of products or distributors selling competition 
products in the same market area. The main purpose of such merger is to obtain 
economies of scale in production by eliminating duplication of facilities and operation, 
broadening the product line, reducing investment in working capital elimination of 
competition reduction in advertising costs, increase in market segments and exercise of 
better control in the market. A company manufacturing washing machines and taking 
over a company manufacturing audio system will be horizontal merger as both are 
companies in the consumer durable market. For example, merger of TOMCO by HLL is 
horizontal merger. 
 
Horizontal mergers generally account for majority of merger cases. These are defended 
on the grounds that they permit efficiency gains by exploiting economics of scale, 
avoiding duplicate expenditures ect. Also, they raise seller concentration thus enhancing 
opportunities for exercise of market power. The number of films in an industry is 
decreased by horizontal mergers and this may make it easy for the industry members to 
collide for monopoly profits. Hence, the major concern in such mergers is from an anti-
monopoly point of view. So these types of mergers are regulated by the government. 
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Weinberg and Blank define horizontal merger as follows: 
A takeover or merger is horizontal if it involves the joining together of two companies 
which are producing essentially the same products or services or products or services 
which compete directly with each other (for example, sugar and artificial sweeteners). In 
recent years, the great majority of takeovers and merger have been horizontal. As 
horizontal takeovers and mergers involve a reduction in the number of competing firms 
in an industry, they tend to create the greatest concern from anti-monopoly point of view 
on the other hand horizontal mergers and takeovers are likely to give the greatest scope 
for economies of scale and elimination of duplicate facilities. 
Vertical Merger 
It involves the integration of companies having supplementary relationships either in 
production or distribution of products or services. In such cases, both the companies have 
different level of production processes either of same line of business. In vertical 
mergers, the acquiring and target companies are in the same industry with strong buyer-
supplier relationship. The target company is either a supplier or buyer/customer of the 
acquiring company. Vertical merger is generally undertaken when market of intermediate 
product is imperfect. It called backward integration when company expands backward 
towards the source of raw material and forward integration when it moves forward in the 
direction of customer. For example, RPG groups’ merger with Harrison Malayalam Ltd. 
Gave it control over rubber, a major tire input for the other group company- Ceat  Ltd. 
This was vertical backward integration. The effect of such mergers is generally to 
improve efficiency through improving the flow of production and reduction of 
stockholding and handling costs. 
 
Thus, vertical mergers help to ensure a smooth source of supply or an outlet for product 
or services. Merger of Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd, By Reliance Industries is also 
vertical merger with backward linkage. Also, global mergers between AT & T and TCL 
and Time Warner and Turner are good instances of vertical integration.   Shunned by 
local distributors AT&T acquired cable operators TCL to link its long distance carrier 
lines to industrial homes and business establishments without the aid of local distributors. 
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Similarly, combing the production unit, Time Warner with the distribution network of 
Turner, broadcasting could create vertical integration. 
 
Weinberg and Blank define vertical merger in the following manner: 
“A takeover or merger is vertical where one of the two companies is an actual or potential 
supplier of goods or services to the other so that the two companies are both engaged in 
the manufacture or provision of the same goods or services but at different stages in the 
supply route (for example, where a motor car manufacture takes over a manufacturer of 
sheet metal, or a car distributing firm). Here, the object is usually to ensure a source of 
supply or an outlet for products or services, but the effect of the merger may be to 
improve efficiency through improving the flow of production and reducing stockholding 
and handling costs. Where, however there is a degree of concentration in the markets of 
either of the companies, anti-monopoly problems may arise” 
                                                
Co generic Merger 
In these mergers, the acquirer and target companies are related through basic 
technologies, production processes or markets. The acquired company represents an 
extension of product line, market participants or technologies of the acquiring companies. 
These mergers represent an outward movement by the acquiring company form its 
current set of business to adjoining business. The acquiring company derives benefits by  
exploitation of strategic resources and form these mergers is high because these 
transaction offer opportunities to diversify around a common core of strategic resources 
Western and Mansinghka  classified congenerric  mergers into product extension and 
market extension types. When a new product line allied to or complimentary to an 
existing product line is added to existing product line through merger, it is defined as 
product extension merger. Similarly market extension merger helps to add a new market 
either through same line of business or adding a field both these types bear some 
common elements of horizontal, vertical or conglomerate merger. For example, merger 
between Hindustan Sanitary ware Industries Ltd and Associated Glass Ltd is a product 
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extension merger and merger between Cimmco Ltd and Xpro Ltd contains elements of 
both product extension and market extension merger. 
Conglomerate Merger 
These mergers involve firms engaged in unrelated type of business activities i.e. the 
business of two companies are not related to each other horizontally (in the sense of 
producing the same or competing products), nor vertically (in the sense of standing 
towards each other in the relationship of buyer and supplier) in a pure conglomerate, 
there are no important and technology. In practice, however there are no important 
common factors between the companies in production marketing, research and 
development and technology. In practice however, there is some degree of overlap in one 
or more of these common factors. Conglomerate merger are unification of different kinds 
of business under one flagship company. The purpose of merger remains utilization of 
financial resources, enlarged debt capacity and also synergy of managerial functions. 
However, these transactions are not explicitly aimed at sharing these resources, 
technologies, synergies or product market strategies. Rather, the focus of such 
conglomerate mergers is on how the acquiring firm can improve its overall stability and 
use resources in better way to generate addition revenue. It does not have direct impact 
on acquisition of monopoly power and is thus favored through out the world as a means 
of diversion. 
Reverse Merger 
In the conventional method, the sick company is absorbed by the profitable one (called 
normal merger). On the other hand, if reverse situation takes place i.e. if sick company 
extends its embracing arm to the profitable company and in turn absorbs it in its fold this 
action is called reverse merger. Reverse merger is thus a merger of healthy company to a 
loss making company as compared to a normal merger where weaker units merge to 
stronger ones. The deal is generally followed by a change of name and brings major tax 
benefits for the profit making unit along with retention of its goodwill. It gives the profit 
making company an automatic tax entitlement benefit of carry forward and set off of 
losses without complying with provision of Section 72A of Income Tax Act. It is also 
resorted to for other reasons such as to save tax on stamp duty, to save on public issues 
expenses. To obtain quotation on stock exchange ect. The financial institutions which act 
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as operating agency for the sick company suggests this remedy between two companies 
in the promoter group thus attempting to control the growing sickness in a process of 
quick and enduring solution. The financial institutions have spearheaded this concept and 
their support ensures the smooth passage of the scheme before various authorities. In 
essence, it can be said that reverse mergers are rehabilitation oriented scheme adapted to 
achieve quick corporate turnaround. 
 
Moreover, with amendment in Sick Industrial Company Act, 1985 effective from 1st 
February, 1994, reverse mergers are being allowed by BIFR. The first case of reverse 
merger formulated by BIFR envisaged the merger of healthy company Sagar Real Estate 
Developers Ltd. With sick textile company SLM Maneklal Industries Ltd as 
rehabilitation cum revival package for the sick company. This was followed by merger of 
healthy Kirlosker Oil Engines Ltd with ailing Prashant Khosla Pneumatics Ltd. Then, 
there were many other reverse mergers which include merger of Eicher Tractors Limited 
with loss making Royal Enfield Motors Ltd, merged entity being called Eicher Limited 
(1996) ect. 
 
Many times, reverse mergers are also accompanied by reduction in the unwieldy capital 
of the sick company. This capital reduction helps in writing off of the accumulated losses 
and other asses which are not represented by the share capital of the company. Thus, a 
capital reduction cum rehabilitation scheme (byway of reverse merger) is an ideal 
antidote for the sick company. For example, Godrej Soaps Ltd. (GSL) (with pre-merger 
turnover of 436.77 crores) entered in to scheme of reverse merger with loss making 
Gujarat Godrej Innovative Chemicals Ltd (GGLCL) (with pre-merger turnover of 60 
crores) in 1994. The scheme involved reduction of share capital of GGICL from Rs. 10 
per share to Re.1 per share and later GSL would be merged with 1 share of GGICL to be 
allotted to every shareholder of GSL. The post-merger company, Godrej Soaps Ltd ( with 
post-merger turnover of 611.12 crores ) restructured its gross profits of 49.08  crores 
which led to an effective tax burden of Rs.105 crores and net profits of Rs. 48.03 crores, 
higher than GSL’s  pre-merger profits of 25.30 crores. The amalgamated company, 
GGICL reverted back to the old name of amalgamating company. Godrej Soaps Ltd. 
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Thus, this innovative merger which was by way of forward integration in the name of 
GGICL was competed with the help of financial institution like IDBI, IFCI, ICICI, UTI 
etc. All financial institution agreed to waive penal interest. Liquidate damages besides 
funding of interest, reschedule outside loans and also lower interest rate on term loans. 
However, there is a danger of violation of sprits of provision of Income Tax Act, 1961 
which might invoke McDowell principle if such exercise if reverse merger is carried out 
solely for the purpose of tax saving of amalgamated/merged company. Reverse mergers 
in such eases are looked down upon as opportunist mergers. 
Demerger 
It has been defined as split or division. As the name suggests, it denotes a situation 
opposite to that of merger. Demerger or spin off, as called in US involves splitting up of 
conglomerate (multi-divisions) of company into separate companies. This occurs in cases 
where dissimilar businesses are carried on within the same company, thus becoming 
unwieldy and cyclical almost resulting in a loss situation. Corporate restructuring in such 
situations in the form of demerger becomes inevitable. Merger of SG Chemicals and dyes 
Ltd with Ambalal Sarabai Enterprises Ltd (ASE) had made ASE big conglomerate which 
had become unwieldy and cyclic, so demerger of ASE was done. 
  
Apart from core competencies being main reason for demerging companies according to 
their nature of business, in some cases, restructuring in the form of demerger was 
undertaken for splitting up the family owned large business empires into smaller 
companies. The historical demerger of DCM group, where it split into four companies ( 
DCM LTD, DCM Shriram Industries Ltd., Shriram Industrial Enterprise Ltd and DCM 
Shriram Consolidated Ltd ) is one example of family units splitting through demergers. 
Such demergers are accordingly, more in the nature of family settlements and are affected 
through the courts order. 
 
Thus, demergers also occur due to reason almost the same as mergers i.e. the desire to 
perform better and strengthen efficiency, business interest and longevity and to curb 
losses, wastage and competition. Undertakings demerge to delineate business and fix 
responsibility, liability and management so as to ensure improved results from each of the 
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demergerd unit. Demergers are skin to the survival of the fittest ideology i.e. if one unit is 
making profit and other unit is making loss thus eroding its profits, alienate the loss 
making unit. 
 
As per Section 2(19AA) of Income Tax Act, 1961, demerger, in relation to companies 
means transfer pursuant to Scheme of Arrangement as per section 391-394 of Companies 
Act by a demerged company of one or more undertakings to any resulting company in 
such a manner that: 
 
(1) All property of undertaking being transferred by demerger company immediately 
before demerger become property of resulting company by virtue of demerger. 
 
(2) All the liabilities of the undertaking being transferred by demerged company 
immediately before demerger become liabilities of resulting company by virtue of 
demerger. 
 
(3) The property and liabilities of the undertaking (s) being transferred by the demerged 
company are transferred at values appearing in its books of accounts immediately before 
the demerger. 
 
(4) Shareholders holding not less than three fourths in the value of shares of Demerger 
Company become shareholders of resulting company (s) by virtue of demerger.  
 
(5) Transfer of undertaking is on going concern basis. 
 
(6) The demerger is in accordance with the condition, if any, notified u/s Sec 72A by the 
Central Government. 
 
Demerged company, according to Section 2 (19 AA) of Income Tax Act, 1961 means the 
company whose undertaking is transferred, pursuant to a demerger to a resulting 
company. 
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Resulting company, according to Section 2 (41A) of Income Tax Act,1961 means one or 
more company ( including a wholly owned subsidiary there of ) to which the undertaking 
of the demerged company is transferred in a demerger, and the resulting company in 
consideration of such transferred  of undertaking, issues shares to the shareholder of the 
demerger company and includes any authority or body local authority or public sector 
company or a company established, constituted or formed as a result of demerger. 
 
Merger through BIFR 
The Companies (Amendment) Act, 2001 has repealed the Sick Industrial Companies 
(Special Provisions) Act (SICA), 1985 in the order to bring sick industrial companies 
within the preview of Companies Act, 1956 from the jurisdiction of SICA, 1985. The Act 
has introduced new provision for the constitution of a tribunal known as the National 
Company Law Tribunal with regional benches which are empowered with the powers 
earlier vested with the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). 
 
Before the evolution of SICA, the power to sanction the scheme of amalgamation was 
vested only with the High Court. However, Sec 18 of the SICA, 1985 empowers the 
BIFR to sanction a scheme of amalgamation between sick industrial company and 
another company over and above the powers of High Court as per section 391-394 of the 
companies Act 1956. The amalgamations that take place under SICA have a special place 
in law and are not bound by the rigors of Companies Act, 1956 and Income Tax Act, 
1961. 
 
There is no need to comply with the provision of Sec 391-394 of Companies Act, 1956 
for amalgamations sanctioned by BIFR. The scheme of amalgamation however must be 
approved by shareholders of healthy company after getting approval from BIFR. Sec 72A 
of the Income Tax Act has been enacted with a view to providing incentives to healthy 
companies to take over and amalgamate with companies which would otherwise become 
burden on the economy. The accumulated losses and unabsorbed depreciation of the 
amalgamating company is deemed to be loss or allowance for depreciation of the 
amalgamated company. So, amalgamated company gets the advantage of unabsorbed 
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depreciation and accumulated loss on the precondition of satisfactory revival of sick unit. 
A certificate from specified authority to the effect that adequate steps have been taken for 
rehabilitation or revival of sick industrial undertaking has to be obtained to get these 
benefits. Thus, the main attraction for the healthy company to takeover a sick company 
through a scheme of amalgamation is the tax benefits that may be available to it 
consequent to amalgamation. The approach usually followed is to quantify the possible 
tax benefits first and then get an order as part of rehabilitation package from BIFR. Once 
BIFR is convinced about the rehabilitation benefits, it passes an appropriate order see that 
benefits of tax concession properly ensue to the transferee company. 
 
Section 18 of SICA provides for various measures to be recommended by the operating 
agency in the scheme to be prepared by it for submission to the BIFR concerning the sick 
industrial unit. Before the amendment in 1994, under SICA only normal amalgamation 
(of sick company with healthy one) was possible and the SICA Act did not provide for 
reverse merger of a profitable company with sick company. Now the amended Sec 18 of 
the Act contains provisions for effecting both normal and reverse merger. It provides for 
the amalgamation of sick industrial company with any other company any other company 
with the sick industrial company 
 
LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR MERGER  
A step by step procedure for merger (amalgamation) is detailed below. 
 
Thorough study of the firm being merged 
This not only includes financial analysis but also recent and likely future government 
policies, product profile, location of the factory, and economy of scale. 
Examination of object clauses 
The memorandum of association of both the firms should be examined to check if the 
power to amalgamate is available. Further, the object clause of the merged firm should 
permit it to carry on the business of the merging firm. If such clauses do not exit, 
necessary approvals of the shareholders, boards of directors and CLB are required. 
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Intimation to stock exchanges  
The stock exchanges where the merged and merging firms are listed should be informed 
about the amalgamation proposal. These proposals should be mailed to the concerned 
stock exchanges. 
Approval of the draft amalgamation proposal by the Respective Boards 
The Respective Boards of directors should approve the draft amalgamation proposal. The 
board of each company should pass resolution authorizing its directors/ executives to 
pursue the matter further. 
 
Application to the High Court 
The Respective Boards of each company should make an application to the High Court so 
it can convene the meetings of shareholders and creditors for passing the amalgamation 
proposal approval once the draft of amalgamation proposal. 
Dispatch of notice to shareholders and creditors 
In order to convene the meeting of shareholders and creditors a notice and an explanatory 
statement of the meeting, as approved by the High Court, should be dispatched by each 
company to its shareholders and creditors so that they get 21 days advance intimation. 
The notice of the meeting should also be published in two newspapers (One English and 
One Vernacular). An affidavit confirming that the notice has been dispatched to the 
shareholders/creditors and that the same has been published in newspapers should be 
filed in the court. 
Holding of meeting of shareholders and creditors 
A meeting of shareholders should be held by each company for passing the scheme of 
amalgamation. At least 75 per cent (in value) of shareholders, in each class, who vote 
either in person or by proxy, must approve the scheme of amalgamation. Likewise in a 
separate meeting, the creditors of the company must approve of the amalgamation 
scheme. Here, too at least 75 percent (in values) of the creditors who vote, either in 
person or by proxy must approve of the amalgamation scheme.   
Petition to the courts of confirmation and passing of court orders 
Once the amalgamation scheme is passed by the shareholders and creditors, the 
companies involved in the amalgamation should present a petition to the court for 
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confirm ting the scheme of amalgamation. The court will fix a date of hearing. A notice 
about the same has to be the published in two newspapers. It has also to be served to the 
Regional Director, CLB. After hearing the parties concerned and ascertaining that the 
amalgamation scheme is fair and reasonable, the court will pass an order sanctioning the 
same. However, the court is empowered to modify the scheme and pass orders 
accordingly. 
Filing the order with the Registrar 
Certified true copies of the court order must be filed with the Registrar of companies 
within the limit specified by the court. 
Transfer of assets and liabilities 
After the final orders have been passed by both the High Courts, all the assets and 
liabilities of the merging firm will, with effect from the appointed date, have to be 
transferred to the merged firm. 
Issue of share and debentures 
The merged firm, after fulfilling the provisions of the law, should issue share and 
debentures of the merging firm. (Cash payment may have to be arranged in same cases.) 
The new shares and debentures so issued will then be listed on the stock exchange. 
Scheme of Merger / Amalgamation 
 Whenever two or more firms agree to merger with each other they have to prepare a 
scheme of amalgamation. The merged firm should prepare the scheme in consultation 
with its merchant banker(s) / financial consultants. The main contents of a model scheme 
are as listed below: 
Determination of Transfer Date (Appointed Date) 
This involves fixing of the out-off date from which all properties, movable as well as 
immovable and rights attached thereto are sought to be transferred from the merging firm 
to the merged firm. This date is known as transfer date or the appointed date and 
normally the first day of the financial year of the preceding, the financial year for which 
the audited accounts are available with the company. 
Determination of Effective Date 
The date is determined by the time all the required approvals under various statutes, viz., 
the Companies Act, 1956, the Companies (court) Rules 1959; Income Tax Act, 1961; 
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Sick Industrial Companies (special provisions) Act, 1985; are obtained and the transfer 
vesting of the undertaking of merging firm with the merged firm take’s effect. This date 
is called effective date. A scheme of amalgamation normally should also contain 
conditions to be satisfied for the scheme to become effective. 
 
The effective date is important for income tax purposes. The Companies Act does not 
provide for such a date but it is a practical necessity so that a court passing an order under 
Section 394 (2) dealing with vesting of properties in the merged firm has before it a 
meaningful date contained in the scheme serving the purpose and in the contemplation of 
the applicant companies who are free to choose any date which will be a binding one. 
While sanctioning the scheme the court also approves this date. The effective date may 
be either retrospective or prospective with reference to the application to the court. The 
effect of the requirement is that a mere order for the transfer of the properties/assets and 
liabilities to the merged firm would cause the vesting only from the date of order. For tax 
considerations, the date mentioned in the order of vesting is of material consequences. 
 
(1) The scheme should state clearly the arrangement with secured and unsecured creditors 
including the debenture holders. 
(2) It should also state the exchange ratio, at which the shareholders of the merging firm 
would be offered shares in the merged firm. The ratio has to be worked out based on the 
valuation of shares of the respective companies as per the accepted methods of valuation, 
guidelines and the audited accounts of company. 
 
(3) In case where the merged firm or its subsidiaries hold the shares of the merging firm 
the scheme must provide for the reduction of share capital to that extent and the manner 
in which the compensation for share held in the merging firm should be given. 
 
(4) The scheme should also provide for transfer of whole or part of the undertaking to the 
merged firm, continuation of level proceeding between the merging and the merged firm, 
absorption of employees of the merging firm, obtaining the consent of dissenting 
shareholders.                                
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THE RULES FOR SUCCESSFUL MERGER 
 Peter Drucker identifies a financial stimulus for mergers activity and sets forth a set of 
rules for successful mergers: 
 
(1) Acquirer must contribute something to the merging firm. 
(2) A common core of unity is required. 
(3) Acquirer must respect the business of the merging firm. 
(4) Within a year or so, acquiring firm must be able to provide top management to the 
merging firms. 
(5) Within a first year of merger, management of both firms should receive promotions 
across the entities. 
 
ANALYSIS OF MERGERS 
There are three important steps involved in the analysis of mergers: 
 
(1) Planning. 
(2) Search and Screening 
(3) Financial Evaluation 
 
Planning 
The merged firms should review its objective of merger in the context of its strengths and 
weaknesses and corporate goals. This will help in indicating the product market strategies 
that are appropriate for the company. It will also force the firm to identify business units 
that should be dropped and those that should be added. 
 
Planning merger will require the analysis of industry specific and the firm- specific 
information. The merged firm will need industry data on market growth, nature of 
competition, entry barriers, capital and labour intensity, degree of regulation. 
 
Information needed about the merging firm will include the quality of management, 
market share, size, capital structure, profitability, production and marketing capabilities. 
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Search and Screening 
Search focuses on how and where to look for suitable candidates for merger. Screening 
process short-lists a few candidates. 
 
Merger objectives may include attaining faster growth, improving profitability, 
improving managerial effectiveness, gaining market power and leadership, achieving cost 
reduction. These objectives can be achieved in various ways apart from mergers alone. 
The alternatives to merger include joint ventures, strategic alliances elimination of 
inefficient operations, cost reduction and productivity improvement, hiring capable 
managers. If merger is considered as the best alternative, the merged firm must satisfy 
itself that it is the best available option in terms of its own screening criteria and 
economically most attractive. 
Financial Evaluation 
Financial evaluation of a merger is needed to determine the earnings and cash flows, 
areas of risk, the maximum price payable to the merging firm and the best way tp finance 
the merger. The merged firm must pay a fair consideration to the merging firm for 
merging its business. In a competitive market situation with capital market efficiency, the 
current market value is the correct and fair value of the share of the merging firm. The 
merging firm will not accept any offer below the current market value of its share. The 
merging firm may in fact, expect the offer price to be more than the current market value 
of its share since it may expect that merger benefits will accrue to the merged firm. A 
merger is said to be at a premium when the offer price is higher than the merging firm’s 
pre-merger value. The merged firm may pay the premium if it thinks that it can increase 
the merging firm’s after merger by improving its operations and due to synergy. It may 
have to pay premium as an incentive to the merging firm’s shareholders to induce them to 
sell their shares so that the merged firm is enabled to obtain control of the merging firm. 
  
ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC GAINS AND COSTS FROM MERGERS 
When firm A acquires firm B it is making a capital investment decision and firm B is 
making a capital divestment decision. What is the NPV of this decision to firm A? What 
is the NPV of this decision to firm B? 
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To calculate the NPV to company A, we have to identify the benefit and the cost of 
merger. The benefit of merger is the difference between the PV of the combined entity 
PV   and the sum of present value of the two entities if they remain separate PV (A) + PV 
(B) Hence, 
                                   Benefit = PV (AB) –PV (A) +PV (B) 
 
The cost of merger, from the point of view of firm A, assuming that compensation to firm 
B is paid in cash, is equal to the cash payment made for merged firm B less the present 
value of firm B as a separate entity, Thus, 
                                     Cost = Cash – PV (B) 
The NPV of merger from the point of view of firm A is the difference between the 
benefit and the cost as defined above so,  
 
                    NPV to A = Benefit – Cost 
                                     = [PV (AB) – (PV (A) + PV (B)] – [Cash + PV (B)] 
 
The NPV of the merger from point of view of firm B is simply, the cost of the merger 
from the point of view of firm A. Hence, 
 
                                     NPV to B = (Cash + PV (B)) 
 
Illustration 
Market value of Sona Ltd. is Rs. 500 crores and market value of Rupa Ltd. Is Rs. 200 
crores. If both these firms merge, then benefit will be Rs. 50 crores. Sona Ltd. Proposes 
to offer Rs. 230 crores cash as compensation to merged Rupa Ltd. Calculate the NPV of 
the merger to the both firms from the point of view of Sona Ltd. And Rupa Ltd. 
 
We will refer Rupa Ltd. as R and Sona Ltd. as S for calculation. 
                                    PV(R) = Rs. 200 crores. 
                                    PV(S) = Rs. 500 crores. 
                                    PV of benefit from merger = Rs. 50 crores. 
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Therefore, 
                                   Cost = Cash – PV(R) 
                                             = Rs. 230 crores – Rs. 200 crores 
                                             = Rs. 3o crores 
                                   NPV to Sona Ltd. = Benefit – Cost.  
                                              = 50 – 30 
                                              = Rs. 20 crores 
 
                            NPV to Rupa Ltd. = Cash – PV(R) 
                                          = Rs. 230 crores – Rs. 200 crores 
                                          = Rs.30 Crores 
 
Answer 
On account of merger NPV of Sona Ltd. Will be Rs. 20 crores and that of Rupa Ltd. will 
be 3o crores. Thus total benefit from merger is Rs. 50 crores. From the above Illustration 
it is clear that both the companies cab benefit from such merger. 
Mode of Payment in Merger 
This is most complex part of a merger deal and can be extremely difficult to decide 
whether payment of purchase consideration should be in all-stock deal the best; or is an 
all cash deal? If neither, then what is the optimum mix of the two? 
 
The novelty is in the components of the mode of payment that has changed drastically. 
Cash deals are easy. There is a simple transfer of shares for cash and ownership is 
transferred.  
 
In a stock deal however, the status is slightly hazy. We have seen; where the stakeholders 
of the firm initially meant to be brought out, later end up owning a majority of the 
merged firm’s shares. Paying by stock means an inherent acceptance of the risks that 
come with the value that might come along. 
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Unfortunately in India, corporate and the media tend to focus only the amount of the deal 
and not the break-up of the components in it. 
 
Cash vs. Stock: The Trade-Offs 
The basic difference is that in all cash deals, the merged firm’s shareholders take on the 
risk that expected aggregate synergy value will be less than the total price (market + 
premium) paid. However, in the merged and merging firms, shareholders own the shares. 
 
The general trend till recently was that the merger was literally juggernaut as compared to 
the merged. Even all stock deals in such cases meant that the merged would end up with a 
close to negligible pare of the combined firm’s shares. However, a more recent trend is of 
financing such mergers with stock, especially in large deals. Risk for the target 
shareholders is high in such cases. 
   
Pre-Decided Shares or Pre-Decided Value    
It isn’t as simple as cash or stock. In a deal that involves stock, the management also has 
to decide if it is a pre-decided value of shares that will be exchanged as consideration. 
 
The merits and demerits of each are discussed below. 
 
Pre-decided shares 
The number of shares to be transferred is pre-decided here. The monetary value of the 
merger fluctuates with movement in the share price of the acquirer. In fact, both sets of 
shareholders are affected by these fluctuations. However, the affected on both goes n 
tandem with the proportion in which share are held while the VAS may not remain 
constant or as expected, the proportion in which it is shared. The biggest risk to the 
shareholders of the merging from the pre-announcement value. 
 
Pre-decided value 
Alternatively a monetary value could be pre-decided and the number of shares could be 
calculated based on the stock price prevailing on the closing date. This is a relatively 
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ambiguous (or at least highly contingent) method; as the holding or ownership pattern of 
the new company is unknown till the closing date. Hence, the merged firm bears all the 
risk here and the merging firm appropriates all the VAS. 
 
A recent trend has been sighted where underwriters pitch in and agree to takeover the 
inherent risk in case the share price fluctuates beyond a particular range. This could. In a 
way, be termed as a middle path where the advantages of both the above method trend 
tend to be realized. 
 
What issues should be board consider? 
We have seen that the mode of payment can have an almost sensational effect on the 
value to both the merging and merged. Both firms should therefore consider this factor in 
their strategic game plan before consider this factor in their strategic game plan before 
reaching a final conclusion settlement. 
 
Issues for the merged firm 
The Board should be able to justify the payment they are committing to make and 
specifically out line the synergy or other value it hopes to generate from the deal. There 
are essentially two areas that a merged needs to look into: Estimation of the value of the 
merger’s shares and Risk perception. 
 
 
The decision-process in all cash deal is fairly simple. Can the management of the firm 
generate profits, the NAV which is greater than the amount offered? This usually is not 
the case as it wouldn’t be up for grab at a premium if its stand-alone value were higher. 
However, all cash deals are rare and the inclusion of stock in the payment usually 
complicates the decision-process. The merging firm also needs to value the merged 
firm’s shares, as they would be shouldering the risk in the future. So, essentially the 
Board of the target goes through pretty much the same process as that of the merged and 
in a way endorses the view of the latter by agreeing on the stock as a part of the deal. 
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In the short it would only be wise to say that there is no one optional strategy to structure 
the payment of a merger deal. Individual firms need to decide what suits their strategic 
intent and situation the best considering their liquidity position, perception of risk, market 
feelers and risk taking capacity. The most important factor, however, is the relative 
bargaining power that each of the players in a merger deal hold; a force that could render 
all technical valuation and analysis utterly useless. 
 
So, an all stock deal, a all cash deal or the optimum mix of the two deal---- what  is the 
best---- the choice is at hand of firms.  
 
SOURCES OF GAIN THROUGH MERGER ARE AS FOLLOWS 
 
Strategy  
In general strategy means plan of action or bunch of actions to achieve desire objectives 
and targets. The company should develop and adopt such long term and short term well 
planned strategies on various issues so that it becomes the main source of gain through 
merger. The main concerns for the formulation of strategies includes: while going for 
merger the company should develop a new strategy, vision and mission. The company 
should also plan to achieve long term strategic goals. The company should acquire 
capabilities in new industries and to obtain dynamic talent for fast moving industries and 
add capabilities to expand role in a technology advancing industry. 
 
Economies of scale 
The larger size is always thought to be better in industrial world. The lower operating 
cost advantage by spread out the total fixed cost over a larger quantum of output is one of 
the main sources of gain through merger. 
This can be achieved by number of ways. 
 
The company can achieve cut in production cost by implementing cost control and cost 
reduction techniques and also due to large volume of production. The companies can also 
take advantage of economies of large scale by combine R&D operations, increased sales 
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force, and strengthens distribution system. The company can go for broaden product line 
and cut overhead cost up to great extent due sharing of central services like accounting 
and finance, administration and office expenses, executive and top level management, 
sales and promotional activities and so on. The company can provide one stop shopping 
for all services ad can offer complementary products. Thus, economies of scale may 
result in several critical activities, mainly production, marketing, finance. 
 
Advantages of large scale 
One of the main out come of any merger is resulting in to larger size company. 
Obviously, the larger size company can gain number of advantages over smaller 
company. 
 
It is possible for large size company to afford huge investment in high tech equipments. 
This is because the large size company can spread use of expensive equipments over 
more units or divisions. 
 
In order to take advantages of economies of large scale the company produces large 
quantity of output. This makes possible to get quantity discounts on bulk purchases. The 
company can also employ best practices and better utilization of various resources. 
 
It is possible for large size company to have better operating efficiencies by controlling 
and improving the management of receivables, inventories, fixed assets, etc. and by faster 
tactical implementations. It is also possible for large company to offer good incentives 
and other benefits to workers and employees of the company. 
Market expansion 
It becomes possible for a merged company to gain a greater share of a market, or to gain 
entry in to new market or to prevent or to restrict the entry of the new company by 
acquiring new capabilities, managerial skills, applying broad range of capabilities and 
managerial skills, acquiring capabilities in new industry and to obtain new talent for fast 
moving industries. 
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The competitive pricing policy is perhaps the only tool in a market with limited product 
differentiation. The company having larger market share may be in dominating position 
to drive prices and its related forces. Due to the merger the company can increased 
market shares and obtain opportunities to access new markets. 
Competition 
It is rightly said that 21st century is full of competition. This is due to rapid development 
in the field of technology, transportation, infrastructure, communication and other 
facilities. In order to face and fight successfully it is necessary for a company to take 
measures like to achieve critical mass before rival, preempt acquisitions by competitor 
and compete on EBIT growth for high valuations which is possible by merger. 
Customers 
In any business customer is always king. The success and existence of any business is 
largely depends on customers and their attitude and approach towards the business. The 
merger activity provides opportunities to develop new customer relationships. The 
combine company can meet customers demand for wide range of services with good 
quality, as per given schedule and at competitive price. This helps to develop good 
cordial relationship with new and potential customers and to maintain smooth relation 
with existing customers. 
Technology 
Merger and acquisition makes possible for the merged company to enter in to techno base 
dynamic industries to seize the opportunities in industries with developing technologies. 
It also leads to go for new R&D capabilities and to acquire technology for lagging areas. 
A merged company can adjust to deregulations- relaxing of Government barriers to 
geographic and product market extension. It helps to eliminate industry excess capacity 
which helps to cut cost. 
Shift in product strategy 
Shift from over capacity area to area with more favorable sales capacity. Exit a product 
area that has become commodities to area of specialty. 
 
 
 54
Industry roll-ups 
Taking fragmented industries, and because of improvement in communication and 
transportation, rolling up many individual companies in to larger firms, obtaining the 
benefits of strong and experienced management teams over a large number of small units. 
Globalization 
Merger can be use as tool to face international competition and to establish presence in 
foreign market and to strengthen position in domestic market. Especially large size, 
economies of scale, diversification product differentiation and reduction in systematic 
risk and dependence on export due to merger is helpful to face global competitions. 
 
DUBIOUS REASONS 
Diversification 
Diversification is yet another major advantage especially in conglomerate merger. The 
argument is that a merger between to unrelated firms would tend to reduce business risk, 
which in turn, reduces the discount rate/ required rate of return of the firm’s earning and, 
thus, increase the market value. In other words, such mergers help stabilize or smoothen 
overall corporate income which would otherwise fluctuate due to seasonal or economic 
cycles. In operational terms, the greater the combination of statistically independent, or 
negatively correlated income streams of the merged companies, the higher will be the 
reduction in the business risk factor and the greater will be the benefit of diversification. 
 
However, individual shareholders on their own can also attain such diversification. 
Therefore, the financial managers should ensure that merger should not be at a cost 
higher than the one at which shareholders would have attained the same risk reduction by 
diversifying their individual investment portfolios, corporate diversification should be 
less expensive than personal diversification. 
 
Lower   Financing Costs 
The consequence of larger size and greater earning stability, many argue, is to reduce the 
cost of borrowing for the merged firm. The reason for this is that the creditors of the 
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merged firm enjoy better protection than the creditors of the merging firms 
independently. 
 
If two firms, A&B, merge the creditors of the merged firm (call it firm AB) are protected 
by the equity of both the firms. While this additional protection reduces the cost of debt, 
it imposes an extra burden on the shareholders; shareholders of firm A must support the 
debt of firm B, and diversification. In an efficiently operating market, the benefit to 
shareholders from lower cost of debt would be offset by the additional burden borne by 
them- as a result there would be no net gain. 
 
Earning Growth 
A merger may create the appearance of growth in earnings. This may stimulate a price 
rise if the investors are fooled. Suppose, in case of firms A & B. Firm A has superior 
growth prospects and commands a price per share Rs. 50, and firm –B on the other hand, 
has inferior growth prospects and sell for a price per share Rs. 25. The merger is not 
expected to create any additional value. Based on the pre-merger market prices the 
exchange ratio is 1: 2, that is one of share of firm A is given in exchange for two shares 
of firm-B.  
 
If the market is smart the financial position of firm A, after the merger, even through the 
earnings per share rises, the price-earnings ratio falls because the market recognizes that 
the growth prospects of the combined firm will not be as bright as those of firm-A alone. 
So the market price per share remains unchanged Rs. 50. Thus, the market value of the 
combined company is simply the sum of the market value of the merging firms. 
 
If the market is foolish it may regard increase in earning per share as reflection of true 
growth. Hence, the price- earnings ratio, the market price per share of firm A will rise. 
This will lead to an increase in total market value. 
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Thus, if the market is foolish, it may be mesmerized by the magic of earning growth. 
Such an illusion may work for a while in an efficient market, as the market becomes 
efficient and the illusory gains are bound to disappear. 
 
LIMITATIONS OF MERGERS 
We have seen the benefits that companies can achieve through merger. However, merger 
suffers from certain weaknesses also in particular cases. The chief ones are discussed as 
under:  
 
(1) A merger may not turn out to be a financially profitable proposition in view of non 
realization of potential economies in terms of cost reduction. 
(2) The management of the two firms may not go along because of friction. 
(3) Dissenting minority shareholders may cause problems. 
(4) It may attract government anti- trust action in terms of the MRTP Act, 1969. 
 
REASONS FOR THE FAILURE OF MERGERS 
Most corporate mergers have failed….. very high rate of merger failure…… rampant 
merger failure in US and Europe. Indeed, 83 per cent of mergers failed to produce any 
benefits and over half actually ended up reducing the value of the firms involved. The 
following are the stymies that come in the way of successful merger process. 
 
Culture Clash 
The cultures of the firms may not be compatible and compete for dominance. If the battle 
is drawn out, the businesses of the both companies suffer while attention is diverted to the 
contest. If the culture of one of the firms is totally subsumed, it may destroy a key 
element of its prior success. 
 
Premium too high  
 Particularly in hostile takeovers, the acquirer may pay too high a premium. While the 
shareholders of the merging firm, particularly if they receive cash, do well, the continuing 
shareholders are burdened with overpriced assets, which dilute future earnings. 
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Poor Business Fit 
The conglomerate mergers of the 1960s are the most cogent examples, but the lessons 
seem to be forgotten periodically. Technology mergers where the architectures did not fit 
are a 1990s example, such as the rush by some firms to merge internet firms or other new 
era businesses they did not understand. 
 
Management’s Failure to Integrate 
Often the merger’s concern with respect to preserving the culture of the merging firm 
results in a failure to integrate, with the merging firm continuing to operate as before and 
many of the expected synergies not being achieved. 
 
Over Leverage 
Cash mergers frequently result in the acquirer assuming too much debt. Future interest 
costs consume too great a portion of the merging firm’s earnings. An even more serious 
problem results when the merger resorts to cheaper short-term financing and then has 
difficulty refunding on a long-term basis. A well-throughout capital structure is critical 
for a successful merger. 
  
Boardroom Schemes 
When mergers are structured with 50-50 board representations or substantial 
representations from the acquiring company, care must be taken to determine the 
compatibility of the aspect of the merger can create or exacerbate a culture clash and 
retard or prevent integration. All too often, the continuing directors fail to meet and 
exchange views until after the merger is consummated. 
 
In Merger Government Policies ---- A Major Facilitator 
Government largely is the major role player in the destiny and direction of the business in 
any nation. The impact of the policy changes and reforms of the government are always 
resembled by the performance of business. The upsurge in the restructuring activity is 
clearly an indication of the reforms that the government has initiated in the early 1990s. 
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The opening up of Indian economy and the increasing number of global players entering 
into India are the major reasons for Indian corporate restructuring. 
 
The opening of the economy has brought many things for the corporate India. With 
increased exposure to international markets many firms suddenly saw profitable 
opportunities for their business. The new opportunities brought cheer for some, for some 
it meant struggle for survival as many global players entered the country and competition 
increased. The impact of the reforms was widespread and forced a number of changes in 
the operating environments of firms and the way they approached business itself. 
 
The greatest impact is felt on competition rather than on any other aspect of the field. 
Before the liberalization one could hardly see any innovative product or service be it the 
private sector or from the public sector. The entry has changed completely the Indian 
corporate. The reforms and relaxation of entry norms for passenger car ventures brought 
to the country a variety of models of international quality standards and the competition 
and lowering of import duties on commodities brought the prices of the cars in link with 
the global prices.  
 
Corporate sector in India operate in a way in which they felt more comfortable. The 
corporate sector has dominated the markets and management’s never bothered about the 
need to change. With the entry of investment funds and foreign players the corporate 
sector has suddenly felt the need for change in its style of functioning and their scale and 
standard of operations are closer to the global levels than ever before, thank to the 
reforms. 
 
A classic example in this context would be that of Reliance Industries and Indian 
Petrochemicals Ltd. (IPCL) with the reforms came the reduction of import duties on 
major polymers and synthetic fibers signaling the death of smaller corporate sectors with 
uneconomic capacities. Smarter corporate sectors like Reliance and IPCL realized that 
the key was to restructure by upgrading their capacities to global levels along with the 
improvement in the production efficiencies. Today, these corporate sectors are 
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comparable with the best in the world and now in such a position that they could weather 
any changes without much damage. 
Series of reforms such as the formulation of the takeover code, simplification of he laws 
on mergers/ amalgamations and the toning down of the MRTP Act, all set off a series of 
restructuring efforts among corporate sector. The liberalization of foreign investment 
norms and the entry of the foreign players into Indian through a joint venture or 
investment added the spice in the restructuring. 
 
MNCs who were in search of an excellent sourcing zone for the Asian countries suddenly 
found a heaven with the opening of the economy. Whatever the consequences might be 
the government went ahead with the reforms that the majority of business house were 
waiting for. In an attempt to adjust to the new global environment that the corporate are 
exposed to they speeded up the restructuring activity as they rightfully identified the need 
for such a move. 
 
 Mergers Norms May Be Softened In India 
 Merger is set to get a boost in last budget to facilitate India current spree of corporate 
restructuring and consolidation. The government seems to be favorably inclined to wards 
further simplification of the existing norms. Some of the areas set to change include 
permitting firms to consolidate through special resolutions. Further, in line with changes 
made for venture capital funds in fiscal 1999-2000, approval where the financial 
Institutions are supervising the amalgamation plan. Corporate sector has been demanding 
a reduction in the levels of clearances for mergers/ amalgamations, in line with the 
demands raised by the venture capital funds, in fiscal 1999-2000 for single clearance 
windows, following which SEBI was made the sole regulator for the SEBI registered 
venture capital funds. A similar change is bound to happen as part of the simplification of 
norms and reducing the duplicity of the regulatory authorities on mergers/ 
amalgamations. The governments also likely to align the management control threshold 
with the ownership threshold prescribed for availing tax benefits. 
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The Indian Evidence So Far Seems To Be Fairly Positive 
In maturity stage achieving economies of scale in research, marketing and production 
some mergers of smaller firms by larger firms take place to provide management skill 
and a broader financial base. 
 
Most mergers experiences positive consequences in India. Some reasons for successful 
mergers are listed below: 
 
First & foremost reason for this could be that the real big mergers have been within 
cohesive business group, and not between corporate sectors from diverse cultures. 
 
A classics example in this context would be that of Reliance Petroleum Ltd. (RPL) with 
Reliance Industries Ltd. (RIL) in 1992. Another example is Hindustan Lever Ltd. (HLL) 
with Brooke Bond Lipton India Ltd. (BBLIL) in 1996. 
 
Second reason is that in India the most mergers usually of the larger firm is designated as 
the merged firms and the smaller firms as the merging firm. 
Third is that earn substantial premiums trend of returns to targets has been upward. The 
reasons for the upward time trend may be summarized. 
 
Fourth is that in India government norm and policies are very soft and optimum to the 
corporate sector are of international size as a result of their tendencies to merge and yet 
there is a need for mergers as part of the growing economic process before Indian 
corporate sectors can compete with global giants. All the mergers undertaken by such 
corporate sectors of international size become successful. 
 
Fifth one for, in most Indian mergers in target shareholders evidence is “probably 
understates the total gains to these shareholders.” overall the shareholders of targets 
benefited by a substantial degree. 
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Sixth one for, In India most mergers between merged firms & merging firm has 
preliminary communications. 
 
Seventh one for, in most Indian mergers is critical for quantifying in communications to 
board of directors, shareholders, analysts and financial markets. 
 
Eighth for, most Indian merger is communications to internal stakeholders and external 
stakeholders. Newly combined firms must develop a strategy for performance 
measurement rollout and then communicate these measures throughout the organization. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
ACQUISITION 
An acquisition involves acquiring ownership in a tangible property and/or intangible 
property. In the context of business combinations, an acquisition is the purchase by one 
company, of controlling interest in the share capital of an existing company.  
An acquisition may be effected by either of the following:  
 
(1) An agreement with the person holding majority interest in the company management. 
(2) Purchase of new shares by private agreement. 
(3) Purchase of shares in the open market (open offer). 
(4) Acquisition of shares in the capital of a company by means of cash, issuance of share 
capital etc. 
(5) Making a buyout offer to general body of shareholders. 
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When a company is acquired by another company, the acquiring company has two 
options: The first is to merge both the companies into one and operate as single entity and 
the second is to operate the taken over company as an independent company, probably 
with changed management and changed policies. The first option is known as merger and 
the second option is known as takeover. 
 
AMALGAMATION 
Amalgamation is an arrangement or reconstruction. It is a legal process by which two or 
more companies join together to form a new entity or one more companies are to be 
absorbed o blended with another. As a result, the amalgamating company loses its 
existence and its shareholders become shareholders of new company or the amalgamated 
company. In case of amalgamation, a new company may come into existence. 
 
According to Halsbury’s Law of England, amalgamation is the bending of two or more of 
existing companies into one undertaking, the shareholder of each blending company 
becoming substantially the shareholder of company, which will carry on blended 
undertaking. There may be amalgamation by the transfer of one or more undertaking to a 
new company or transfer of one or more undertaking to an existing company. 
Amalgamation signifies the transfer of all or some part of assets and liabilities, of on or 
more than one existing company to another existing company or two or more companies 
to a new company. Incorporation of a new company to effect amalgamation is 
permissible. So, a new company may be formed for takeover of old companies. 
Amalgamation, however, doesn’t involve formation of a new company to carry on the 
business of an old company. It is the  description of transactions which, however carried 
out, result in substitution of one corporation for two or more uniting companies in effect 
of separate sets of members of uniting companies into a single set of members of one 
corporation. Amalgamation thus means mixing up more uniting together. 
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As per Companies Act, 1956, legislation that facilitates amalgamation in India, the terms 
merger and amalgamation are synonymous and defined anywhere in the Act. Sections 
390- 396 A of Companies Act defines statutory provision relating to these terms. As per 
the mandatory Accounting Standards AS-14 issued by ICAI, amalgamation   means an 
amalgamation pursuant to the provisions of Companies Act or other statute, which may 
be applicable to the companies. Two methods of amalgamation are contemplated. 
 
Amalgamation in the nature of merger 
Amalgamation in the nature of merger is an organic unification of two or more entities or 
undertakings or fusion of one with another. It is defined as an amalgamation which 
satisfies the following conditions. 
 
(1) All the assets and liabilities of Transferor Company become, after    amalgamation, 
the assets and liabilities of Transferee Company. 
 (2) Shareholders holding not less than 90% of the face value of equity shares of 
Transferor Company (other than equity shares already held by Transferee Company 
therein) become equity shareholders of the transferee company by virtue of 
amalgamation. 
(3) The consideration is received for the amalgamation by those equity shareholders of 
Transferor Company who agree to become equity shareholders of Transferee Company 
by issue of equity shares in Transferee Company, except that cash may be paid for any 
fractional shares. 
(4) The business of the transferor company is intended to be carried on, after the 
amalgamation, by the transferee company. 
(5) No adjustment is intended to be made in the book value of the asset and liabilities of 
the transferor company when they are incorporated in the financial statements of the 
transferee company except to ensure uniformity of accounting policies. 
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 Amalgamation in the nature of purchase 
Amalgamation in the nature of purchase is where one company’s assets and liabilities are 
taken over by another and lump sum is paid by the latter to the former. It is defined as the 
one which does not satisfy any one or more of the conditions satisfied above. 
 
Both these amalgamation are within the purview of Section 390-396 A of the Companies 
Act, 1956. 
 
It has been laid down by the Supreme Court in General Radio and Appliance Company 
Ltd. V. M. A. Khader that after the amalgamation of two companies, the transferor 
company ceases to have any identity and the amalgamation company acquires a new 
status and it is not possible to treat the two companies as partners or jointly liable in 
respect of their assets and liabilities. The rue effect and character of amalgamation largely 
depends upon the terms and conditions of the scheme of merger. 
 
As per Income Tax Act, 1961, merger is defined as amalgamation under section 2 (1B) 
with the following three conditions to be satisfied: 
All the properties of amalgamating company (s) should vest with the amalgamated 
company after amalgamation. 
All the liabilities of amalgamating company (s) should vest with the amalgamated 
company after amalgamation. 
Shareholders holding not less than 75% in value or voting power in Amalgamation 
Company (s) should become shareholders of amalgamated companies after 
amalgamation. 
This does not however include shares already held by shareholders of amalgamating 
companies in the amalgamated company. Amalgamation does not mean acquisition of a 
company by purchasing its property and resulting in its winding up. According to income 
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Tax Act, exchange of shares with 90% of shareholders of amalgamating company is 
required. This demarcates clearly from acquisition. 
 
TAKEOVER  
Acquisition can be undertaken through merger or takeover route. Takeover is a general 
term used to define acquisitions only and both terms are used interchangeably. A 
takeover may be defined as series of transactions whereby a person, individual, group of 
individuals or a company acquires control over the assets of a company, either directly by 
becoming owner of those assets or indirectly by obtaining the control of management of 
the company. Takeover is acquisition, by one company of controlling interest of the 
other, usually by buying all or majority of shares. Takeover may be of different types 
depending upon the purpose of management for acquiring a company. 
 
A takeover may be straight takeover which is accomplished by the management of the 
taking over company by acquiring shares of another company with the intention of 
operating taken over company as an independent legal entity. 
 
The second type of takeover is where ownership of company is captured to merge both 
companies into one and operate as single legal entity. 
 
A third type of takeover is takeover of a sick company for its revival. This is 
accomplished by an order of Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) 
under the provisions of Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985. 
 
The forth kind is the bail-out takeover, which involves substantial acquisition of shares in 
a financially weak company, not being a sick industrial company, in pursuance to a 
scheme of rehabilitation approved by public financial institution which is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with provisions Substantial Acquisition of Shares ad Takeovers 
Regulations, 1997 issued by SEBI, which regulates the bail-out-takeover. 
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The regulatory framework for controlling takeover activities of a company consist of 
Companies Act, 1956, Listing Agreement and SEBI Takeover Code. Section 372 A of 
Companies Act is applicable to acquisition of shares through a company. The takeover of 
listed companies is also regulated by Section 40A and 40B of listing Agreement which 
see to regulate takeover activities by imposing certain requirements of disclosures and 
transparency. The Securities and Exchange Board of India had earlier issued Substantial 
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Regulations, 1994 which was repealed by 
Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Regulations, 1997 issued on 20th 
February, 1997 and further amended on 28th October, 1998. 
Takeover bid 
This is a technique for affecting either a takeover or an amalgamation. It may be defined 
as an offer to acquire shares of a company, whose shares are not closely held, addressed 
to the general body of shareholders with a view to obtaining at least sufficient shares to 
given the off error, voting control of the company. Takeover bid is thus adopted by 
acquiring its controlling interest. 
 
While a takeover bid is used for affecting a takeover, it is frequently against the wishes of 
the management of Offeree Company. It may take the form of an offer to purchase shares 
for cash or for share exchange or a combination of these two forms. Where a takeover bid 
is used for effecting merger or amalgamation, it is generally by consent of management 
of both companies. It always takes place in the form of share for share exchange offer, so 
that accepting shareholders of Offeree Company become shareholders of Offeror 
Company. 
 
Takeover and Merger 
A transaction or series of transactions by which a person acquires control over assets of 
the company is called takeover. On the other hand, an arrangement whereby the assets of 
two companies vest in one is known as merger. The distinction between merger and 
takeover has been pointed out in the following manner: 
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“The distinction between a takeover and merger is that, in a takeover, the direct or 
indirect control over the assets of the acquired company passes to the acquire; in a 
merger, the shareholding in the combined enterprises will be spread between the 
shareholders of the two companies.” 
 
In both cases of takeover and merger, the shareholders of the company are as follows: 
 
 
(1) Company should takeover or merge with another company only if in doing so, 
it improves it’s profits earning potential measured by earning per share and  
(2) The company should agree to be taken over if and only if shareholders are 
likely to be better off with the consideration offered, whether cash or securities 
of the company, than by retaining their shares in the original company. 
 
Types of takeover bid 
There are two types of takeover bid 
1. Friendly takeover bid  
2. Hostile takeover bid 
 
Friendly takeover 
Takeover takes place generally through negotiations i.e. with willingness and consent of 
acquirer company’s executives or board of directors. Such takeover is called friendly 
takeover. This takeover is through negotiating and parties do not reach an agreement 
during negotiations, the proposal of takeover stands terminated and dropped out. Friendly 
takeover bid is thus with the consent of majority or all of the shareholders of target 
company. 
 
Hostile takeover 
When a company does not propose to acquire another company but silently and 
unilaterally pursues efforts to gain controlling interest in it against the wishes of the 
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management, it is called an attempt at hostile takeover. There are various ways in which 
the acquire company may pursue the matter to acquire controlling interest in another 
company. These acts are called takeover raids or hostile takeover bids. These raids, when 
organized in a systematic way, are called “takeover bids” and company to be taken over 
is called Target Company Both the raids and bid lead to takeover or merger. A takeover 
is hostile when it is in the form of a raid. In the other words, when there is no mutual 
understanding between acquired and taken over company, it is termed as hostile takeover. 
 
Hostile takeovers are small but significant part of global M&A market. They are 
frequently used in developed markets of US and UK to unlock value for shareholders. 
They have beneficial impact on the economy. They keep the company management on 
guard and compel them to perform at higher levels of efficiency. They encourage 
optimum utilization of resources. For minority shareholders, hostile takeovers are again 
beneficial since they ensure that management works for improving shareholder value. 
However, hostile takeovers are fought over long period of time on different battle 
grounds starting from court room to media with the help of army of professional lawyers, 
investment bankers, corporate financiers etc. Due to this time consuming nature of Indian 
rules and regulation, there have not been too many hostile takeovers in the Indian context. 
In the late eighties, for the first time, Swaraj Paul brought this form of corporate 
expansion with his takeover bid of DCM and Escorts but did not succeed. This was 
followed by various takeover bids made by NRI’s such as Hinduja’s raided and took over 
Ashok Leyland,Chhabaria group acquired stake in Shaw Wallace, Mather and Platt, 
Hindustan Dock Driver, Dunlop India etc. Various industrial groups also made an attempt 
at hostile takeovers. Goenkas of Calcutta took over Ceat Tyres in late eighties and 
Mahindra  & Mahindra tookover Guest Keen Williams Ltd (GKW) and Allwyn Nissan 
Ltd. India’s biggest corporate entities, Reliance Ltd., Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. 
(TISCO), ITC etc have been involved in takeover attempts. Tata Tea in 1988 made public 
offer to take over consolidated coffee Ltd. And were successful in acquiring 50% stake. 
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Until the new SEBI Takeover Code In 1997, Indian corporate managements could freely 
block transfer of share ownership to potential takeover tycoon. Swaraj Paul made an 
attempt with Escorts in 1988 and Dhirubhai Ambani was successful with Larsen and 
Toubro (L&T). There was no way anyone could try majority stake, outvote existing 
management at Annual General Meeting and replace it. Even if raider kept on buying in 
secondary market using intermediary to disguise intentions, the financial institution sided 
the existing management. 
The new SEBI Takeover Code, 1997 has however changed things. Now the company’s 
management can not block shares. Anyone can buy 10% of shares and then after making 
open public offer acquire another 20% with financial institution supporting them, they 
can ouster existing management but not without giving them notice in the form of open 
public offer to take remedial steps, may be in the form of counter offers. So mechanism 
of takeover in India is such that any management short of 30% could lose control if 
support of financial institutions is not available or there is less cash to make counter bids. 
  
LAWS AND STATUTES IN INDIA 
Mergers and takeovers are regulated by various enactments as amended from time to time 
through various prescribed provision made therein. Various statutes which govern 
mergers and takeovers are given as under: 
Laws governing Mergers 
Various laws governing mergers in India are as follows: 
Companies Act, 1956 
Although amalgamation or merger is not defined anywhere in the Act it is understood to 
mean an arrangement by which transfer of undertaking is effected. The relevant 
provisions dealing with schemes of arrangement, amalgamations and mergers are 
continued in seven sections of the act, namely, Sec. -390-396A, all of which are included 
in chapter V of Companies Act,1956. 
Sec 390:  This section incorporates in itself the definitions of expressions: company, 
arrangement etc. 
Sec 390 (a): Defines the word company as any company liable to be wound up 
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Sec 390 (b): Here, the expression arrangement is defined to include reorganization of 
share capital of company either by consolidation of different kind of shares division of 
different class of shares or by both ways. 
Sec 390 (c): According to this sub-section, unsecured creditors who may have filed suits 
or obtained decrees shall be deemed to be of the same class as other unsecured creditors. 
This is clarification amendment to clarify that decree holder unsecured creditors have no 
special rights over unsecured creditors. 
Sec 391: This section incorporates the procedure to be followed by the company to obtain 
power to compromise or make arrangement with creditors and members. 
Every person having a pecuniary claim against the company capable of estimate is a 
creditor. 
Sec 41 of companies act defines member as: 
The subscribers to the memorandum of company shall be deemed to have agreed to 
become member of the company and on its registration, shall be entered as members in 
its register of members. 
Every other person who agrees in writing to become member of a company and whose 
name is entered in its register of members shall be member of company. 
Sec 391 (1): As per this sub- section, procedural aspects for effecting a compromise or 
arrangement are 
Compromise or arrangement must be proposed between company and its creditors or any 
class of them or its members or any class of them. 
An application to the court should be made by one of the following persons: creditors, 
members or in case of company which is being wound up, by the liquidator. 
 
The court will order a meeting to be called, held and conducted in such a manner as the 
court directs of the creditors or class of the creditors or the members or class of the 
members. 
Sec 391(2): This sub-section spells the consensus that emerges from the meeting of 
members or creditors, as the case may be. If the compromise or arrangement is approved 
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by    majority representing  three fourth in value of creditors or class of creditors or 
members or class of members as case be, present and voting either in person or proxy, 
then, subject to the sanction of court, the said scheme of compromise or arrangement will 
be binding on all the creditors or class of creditors or members or class of members and 
also by the company or in the case company is being wound up by  liquidator and 
contributories of the company. 
Sec 392:  This section defines the power of the High Court to enforce compromise or 
arrangement. It provides the following: 
 Sec 392(1) 
(a)  After sanctioning the schemes of compromise or arrangement u/s 391, court shall 
have power to supervise the carrying out of compromise or arrangement. 
(b) The court may, either at the time of making the order or any later time, give any 
directions or make modifications in compromise or arrangements may deemed required. 
Sec 392(2):   If compromise or arrangement sanctioned u/s 391can not be worked 
satisfactorily or without modifications, court may make an order for winding up of the 
company. 
Sec 393: This section incorporates the extent of disclosure norms to be observed during 
the scheme of compromise or arrangement with creditors or members. 
Sec 393 (1): This sub-section provides the extent of disclosure norms to be observed 
while proposing scheme of compromise or arrangement. It requires that every notice 
calling a meeting of creditors or members must be accompanied by the statement 
containing following information: 
Following are terms of compromise or arrangement and their effects. 
 
Any material interest of director, managing director or manager of the company in any 
capacity. 
Effect of these interests on compromise or arrangement if any, and how it is different 
from interest of other persons. 
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In every notice of meeting given in advertisement, indicate notification of place and 
manner in which creditors or members can obtain copies of such statement. 
 
Sec 393(2): This provides that where compromise or arrangement affects the rights of 
debenture holders, the statement must give similar information and explanation with 
respect to trustees of any deed for securing issue of debentures. 
Sec 393(3): This provides that every creditor or member on making an application in the 
manner indicated in notice of advertisement to be furnished a copy of statement free of 
charge. 
Sec 393(4): This indicates a penalty in the form of fine extendable up to Rs. 5000 for non 
compliance of this section by the company or an officer. 
Sec393(5): This provides that any director, managing director or trustees for debenture 
holders shall be punishable with fine up to Rs. 500 if he fails to give notice to the 
company of such matters as relating to himself as may be required for the purpose of this 
section. 
Sec 394: This section defines provisions for facilitating reconstruction and amalgamation 
of companies. 
The words reconstruction or amalgamation has no definite legal meaning. Reconstruction 
is where company transfers its assets to a new company with substantially the same 
shareholders. Amalgamation is merger of two more companies whose shareholders are 
issued appropriate number of shares in the new company. 
Sec 394(1) 
(a): This sub- section elaborates the power of the court while considering a scheme of 
compromise or arrangement which is in the nature of reconstruction or amalgamation and 
involves transfer of property and liability of one company to another. 
(b): Even reconstruction or amalgamation may involve arrangement or compromise with 
members or creditors as the case is. 
(c): The pre-requisite for invoking the power of the court u/s 394 is an application to be 
made to court u/s 391 i.e. for all cases of reconstruction and amalgamation; first an 
application has to be made to the court u/s 391. 
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(d): A reading of section 391 with section 394 proves that starting point of any form of 
restructuring viz arrangement, compromise, reconstruction or amalgamation is drawing 
up of a scheme. 
 
Sec 394(2): This sub-section provides that an order transferring property or liability 
passed by the court u/s 394 results in property transferred to and vest in transferee 
company and liability transferred to and become liability of transferee company and in 
case any property is ordered to be free from charge, then by virtue of compromise or 
arrangement, it cease to have effect. 
Sec 394(3): This sub-section provides that within 30 days of making of an order under 
this section, every company, in relation to which order is made, shall have to file a 
certified copy with registrar for registration. 
Sec 394(4): This sub-section defines the word transferee company which does not 
include any company other than a company within the meaning of this Act. However, 
Transferor Company includes any body corporate notified by the central government. 
Sec394A: This sub-section was introduced by Companies (Amendment) Act, 1965 
making it obligatory for the court to give notice to the Central Government of every 
application made to it u/s 391 or 394 and take into consideration the representation made 
by government before passing any order on proposed compromise or arrangement or 
scheme of amalgamation. 
Sections 390-394(along with sec.394A) cover the complete gamut of legal and procedural 
aspects of laws governing corporate restructuring. The remaining sections 395, 396 396A 
are enacted to deal with specific situations. 
Sec395: This section states the powers and duties of acquire shares of shareholders 
dissenting from the scheme or contract approved by majority. 
Sec 395(1): As per this sub-section, under a scheme or construct, if an offer made by 
transferee company to shareholders of transferor company is approved within four 
months of making the offer by 90% in value of shares involved (other than shares already 
held), the acquiring company can give notice within further two months to dissenting 
shareholders unless otherwise specified by the court. 
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Sec.396: This section incorporates special provisions for amalgamation in national 
interest by the central government. 
Sec 396(1): As per this sub-section, if central government is satisfied that amalgamation 
is in public interest, it may, by notification in its official gazette, order the same provide 
for amalgamation of two companies in to single company with such constitution, 
property, power, rights, interests, authorities, privileges, and with such liabilities, duties 
and obligations as may be specified in the order. 
Sec396(2): As per this sub-section, the order of Central Government may provide for 
continuation by or against transferee company of any legal proceeding pending by or 
against transferor company and may also contain such consequential, incidental and 
supplementary provision as may, in opinion of central government, be necessary to give 
effect to amalgamation. 
Sec396A: This section spells out the laws relating to preservation of books and papers of 
amalgamated company. The books and papers of company which has been amalgamated 
or whose shares have been acquired by another company shall not be disposed off 
without prior permission of central government and before granting such permission, 
Central Government may appoint a person to examine the books or papers or any of them 
for the purpose of ascertaining whether they contain any evidence of commission of an 
offence in connection with promotion or formation or the management of affairs of the 
first mentioned company or its amalgamation or acquisition of shares. 
Subsequent to amendments in Companies (Second Amendment) Act, 2002, a National 
Company Law Tribunal has to be established which shall be vested with the powers 
currently vested with the High Courts pursuant to the provisions of section 390-396A 
under chapter V of Companies Act, 1956. 
 
Industries (Regulation and Development) Act, 1951(IRDA1951) 
This is “An Act to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries” 
Chapter iii-C of this Act contains provisions for reconstruction of such companies where 
management or control of industrial undertaking is taken over as per direction of central 
government. The provisions of this act have a very restricted applicability in case of 
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mergers. An application u/s 391 of Companies Act, initiating a merger proposal can not 
be proceeded with, where permission of High Court has been granted u/s 18FA of this 
Act to appoint any one to takeover the management of individual undertaking on the 
application of Central Government for the purpose of running or restarting it. However, 
the Central Government may review its order at the request of the parties to proceed with 
the scheme of merger. There is no requirement to get a new license as license of 
amalgamating company is treated adequate for amalgamated company since takeover of 
all assets includes license also. 
  
Income Tax Act 1961 
Acquisitions - An Income Tax Perspective 
Under the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act) tax is levied on a “person” in respect of income. 
Person is defined as an individual, a company, a firm an association of persons or a body 
of individuals whether incorporated or not. Company includes Indian companies and 
foreign companies. The category of person influences the tax treatment and the tax rates. 
The residential status of the person influences the scope of income liable to tax in India. 
 
An acquisition by way of merger/ amalgamation would typically raise questions 
regarding the tax implications on: 
 
The continuity or otherwise of the tax benefits in the hands of the acquirer company that 
were enjoyed by the acquired company in respect of its business incomes/expenses. 
 
(1) The gains from sale/ transfer of the assets/ undertaking of the acquired company. 
 
(2) Allotment of shares in the acquirer company to shareholders of the acquired company. 
 
(3) The above would principally impact the income-tax provisions relating to 
computation of Income from profits & Gains of Business impacting 
- Expense claims 
- Exempt incomes 
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(4) Income under the head Capital Gains arising from transfer of capital assets of the 
acquired company for shares in the acquirer company. 
 
Tax impact on the amalgamating company & its shareholders:- 
Gains on transfer of Capital Assets – Not liable to tax 
For the purpose determining taxable capital gains under the Act, the transfer of capital 
assets by the target company to an amalgamated company is not an Indian company. 
Such transfers enjoy total exemption from capital gains tax. 
 
Exchange/sale of shares 
Pursuant to amalgamation shareholders of the target company would become the 
shareholders of the amalgamated company by receiving shares, in lieu of their existing 
shareholding. Typically, such an exchange is transfer. However, Act does not regard it as 
a transfer, where the exchange is in consideration of allotment of shares in the 
amalgamated company and such company is an Indian company any cash or other benefit 
given, fully or partially, in exchange for the shares would result in taxable capital gains. 
 
Post amalgamation where shareholders subsequently decide to sell the share of the 
amalgamated company (acquired pursuant to the merger), the gains on sale would be 
liable to tax as capital gains. For computing such capital gains, the cost of acquisition and 
the period of holding would be as under: 
 
Cost of acquisition of their original holding in the amalgamating company prior to the 
amalgamation; and  
Period of holding would include the period the shares of the amalgamating company 
were held before the amalgamation. 
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Tax impact on the amalgamated company:- 
Expenses in connection with amalgamation 
Typically, certain costs like stamp duty, court fees, consultancy fees, ect. Incurred to 
effect a merger may be significant. The Act allows the amalgamated company to claim 
on a deferred basis, the expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively for the purpose of 
the amalgamation. The deduction allowed is 1/5th of such expenditure over a period of 5 
successive years, starting with the year of amalgamation. 
 
Issue/Allotment of shares – whether liable to Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) 
As per the Act, certain distributions, payments, etc, made by a company are deemed to be 
dividends in the hands of the receiver, companies are liable to dividend distribution tax at 
specified rates on dividends, including deemed dividends. A view may be possible that 
issue/allotment of shares of the amalgamated company to the shareholders of 
amalgamating company may constitute deemed dividend and accordingly be liable to 
DDT payable by the amalgamated company. 
 
However, the Central Board of Direct Taxs (CBDT) has clarified that where a company 
mergers with another company in a Scheme of Amalgamation, the provision relating 
dividend distribution {Section 2(22) (a) or (c) of the Act} are not attracted.  
 
Thus, the amalgamated company would not be liable to DDT on such allotment of shares. 
 
Values of acquired assets 
Cost of acquisition for purpose of subsequent sale where the capital assets acquired 
pursuant to amalgamation, are subsequently sold/transferred by the amalgamated 
company, the same triggers a tax incidence. However, a relaxation has been provided to 
neutralize the impact of amalgamation on (a) cost of acquisition; and (b) period of 
holding. Accordingly; 
 
Cost of acquisition would be the same as the cost of such asset in the hands of the 
amalgamating company; 
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The holding period would include the period for which the asset was held by the 
amalgamating company. 
 
The above helps retain the characterization of the gain, viz, short term or long-term, thus 
ensuring a tax neutral charge in respect of the tax rates. 
 
Cost of depreciable assets for claiming depreciation 
The owner of a capital asset is entitled to claim depreciation on the tangible and 
intangible assets being used for the purpose of the business. As per the Act, depreciation 
is claimed on the written down value (WDV) of the assets. Rates of depreciation are 
prescribed for specified blocks of assets and assets. 
 
Pursuant to an amalgamation, the amalgamated Indian company becomes the Owner of 
the assets and thus entitled to claim depreciation. 
 
The cost of the block of assets taken over by the amalgamated company shall be the 
WDV of that block as per the Act, in the hands of the target company as on the last day 
of the preceding previous year. It is on this value that the amalgamated company would 
be entitled to claim deprecation under section 32 of the Act. 
 
Any goodwill or intangibles recognized in financial statements as a result of mere 
accounting entries shall not form part of the block of assets eligible for deprecation. 
 
Depreciation Claims 
Other than the asset values for purpose of deprecation as discussed above, the following 
may also be noted: 
Depreciation for the year in which amalgamation takes place. Typically an amalgamation 
would take place during the course of a taxable year. Depreciation is allowable on a pro-
rata basis to both the amalgamating and amalgamated company in the ratio of number of 
days for which they use the    unabsorbed depreciation for prior years 
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In the Finance Bill, 2007, has proposed to extend the benefit of carry forward and set-off 
of accumulated business losses/depreciation to a public sector undertaking engaged in the 
business of operation of aircraft with one or more public sector undertakings engaged in 
similar business. This proposal is intended to facilitate the merger of Indian Airlines and 
Air India. The summarized conditions are: 
 
(1) Conditions to be complied by the amalgamating company. Compliance with the 
following is required to be determined as on the Appointed Date. 
 
(2) The amalgamating company should own an “industrial undertaking” or ship or hotel 
or be a banking company. The term industrial undertaking engaged in – the manufacture 
or processing of goods; the manufacture of computer software; the business of generation 
or distribution of electricity or any other form of power; the business of providing 
telecommunication services; mining; construction of ships, aircraft or rail system. 
 
(3) The amalgamating company should have been engaged in the business for at least 3 
years during which the business loss or depreciation have been accumulated. 
 
(4) At least 75% of the book value of the fixed assets held by the amalgamating company 
should have been held by it for 2 consecutive years prior to the date of amalgamation. 
 
(5) Conditions to be complied by the amalgamated company. The amalgamated company 
should hold at least 75% of the book value of the fixed assets of the amalgamating 
company for at east 5 consecutive years from the date of amalgamation. 
 
(6) Carry on the business of the amalgamating company for at least 5years. 
 
(7) Fulfill prescribed conditions to ensure the revival of the business of the amalgamating 
company viz, the amalgamated company should achieve the level of production of at 
least 50% of the installed capacity of the undertaking of the amalgamating company 
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before the end of 4 years from said minimum level of production till the end of 5years 
from the date of amalgamation. 
 
The conditions prescribed above require compliance over a period of time in order to 
avail the benefit of carry- forward and set-off of accumulated business losses and 
unabsorbed depreciation of the amalgamating company. 
 
In case the above conditions are not complied with, the benefit claimed would be taxed in 
the hands of the amalgamated company in the years in which any of the conditions 
mentioned above are contravened. 
 
There is no restriction of time for purpose of carry forward of unabsorbed depreciation, 
though unabsorbed business losses cannot be carried forward for more than 8 assessment 
years immediately succeeding the assessment year for which the loss was first computed. 
 
Treatment of Unabsorbed Business Losses and Depreciation In Computation Of 
Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) 
 
Minimum Alternate Tax (MAT) is payable by companies both foreign and domestic, @ 
10% of book profits (including applicable surcharge and education cess). Book profit is 
derived by adjusting (positively and negatively) the net profit as per the profit & loss 
A/C.One of the negative adjustments is on the book values of unabsorbed business loss or 
depreciation, whichever is less. In case the book value of either the accumulated business 
loss or unabsorbed depreciation is nil, no amount would be reduced from the book profit. 
 
Other than the above, in post amalgamation a situation may arise where the book loss of 
the amalgamating company ceases to be recognized as loss brought forward in profit & 
loss account of the amalgamated company, it having been adjusted in the capital account. 
 
In the absence of a brought forward business loss/ depreciation, as belonging to the 
amalgamating company, in the profit &loss A/C of the amalgamated company the tax 
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authorities may be reluctant to allow the negative adjustment to the book profits for 
purposes of MAT. Subject to the facts of a case, it may be possible to contest the denial 
of the adjustment on merits.   
 
Return of Income for the year of merger 
 In case the approval for the merger is not granted by the jurisdictional High Court by the 
date of filling of the Returns of income of amalgamating and the amalgamated company, 
both the companies would need to files their Returns of Income as if the amalgamation 
has not taken place. 
 
Due disclosure by way of note should be made in the return of income stating that the 
return shall be appropriately revise after the approval of the Scheme of Merger is 
obtained from the High Court. 
 
 
Taxability of bed debts of the amalgamating (target) Companies in the hands of the 
amalgamated company 
Debts provided for and considered in computing income of the amalgamating 
predecessor company, may be claimed as a deduction by the amalgamated company if the 
same become irrecoverable subsequently. 
 
Continuing benefits in respect of certain expenses in the hands of the amalgamated 
company: 
 
Expenses related benefits  
Specified expenses are eligible for amortization over a prescribed period and deductible 
accordingly from the taxable income. 
The amalgamated company is entitled to continue to claim the benefit of the unamortized 
expenses of the amalgamating company over the unexpired period in respect of 
Preliminary Expenses; expenditure on Scientific Research; Capital expenditure on family 
planning. 
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The unamortized expenditure on acquisition of patent or copy rights or know-how would 
be eligible as a deduction to the amalgamating company. Where, however, the 
expenditure is incurred after March 31, 1998, the same shall be regarded as intangible 
assets eligible for depreciation accordingly. 
 
Income related benefits 
As per the law on date, the Act permits the amalgamated / resulting company (in case de-
merger) to continue to avail the tax holiday of he amalgamating company (or de-merged 
undertaking) for the unexpired period of the holiday. 
 
The finance Bill, 2007 proposes to altogether withdraw the continuity of the unexpired 
tax holiday for specified undertaking in the hands of the amalgamated/ resulting 
neutrality of corporate re-structuring. There is no similar amendment proposed for 
purpose of specified industrial undertaking and it may therefore be assumed that such 
amalgamated/ resulting companies may continue to enjoy the unexpired tax holiday post 
amalgamation/de-merger of such specified industrial undertakings. 
 
Other than the above proposed withdrawal, the existing provisions of the Act do not 
expressly permit the amalgamating/de-merger company to claim the tax holiday for the 
year in which the amalgamation/de-merger takes place Also, there is no provision that 
entitle the amalgamated/resulting company to claim the same in the year of the 
amalgamation/de-merger. To this extent, the tax holiday for the year of amalgamation/de-
merger is lost. It may be recalled that for purpose of depreciation claims for the year in 
which the Merger/De-merger takes place, both the amalgamating and the amalgamated 
companies can claim depreciation on a proportionate basis for the number of days of use 
of the assets. 
 
Share Buyout  
Acquisition by purchase of shares is the simplest from of re - organization. If involves 
take-over without following the Court procedure under section 391-394 of the 
Companies. Act. The shares are sold and registered in the name of the purchasing 
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company or on its behalf. The selling shareholders receive either cash compensation or 
shares in the acquiring company as consideration for their shareholding. 
 
Typically a foreign company buys out the shares of Indian company from the 
shareholders of the Indian company. Where the foreign company acquires 100% of the 
shares in the Indian Company, it results in Indian company becoming a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the foreign company. The relevant tax implications are as under: 
 
Gains on transfer of shares – Taxability in the hands of the shareholders 
The consideration for exchange of shares in the target company flows directly to the 
shareholders in the form of cash, equity shares, and the like. Any non-cash consideration 
in lieu of the shares transferred is taken at the fair market value. 
 
The exchange of shares would trigger a taxable gain, short-term or long-term, in the 
hands of the shareholders who would be liable to pay tax accordingly based on the period 
of holding of the shares transferred.  
 
 
Tax implications on the company after change in shareholding: 
 
Treatment of unabsorbed losses  
A change in shareholding in certain circumstances disentitles a closely held company 
carrying forward and setting off its losses. 
 
The Act provides that in case of a company not being a company in which public are 
substantially interested where a change in shareholding has taken place in a previous 
year, no loss incurred in any year prior to such previous year shall be carried forward and 
set off against the income of the previous year unless on the last day of that previous year 
and on the last day of the previous year in which the loss was incurred the shares of the 
company carrying not less than 51% of the voting power were beneficially held by the 
same person. 
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The exceptions to the above rule are: 
(1) Where a change in shareholding takes place on account of the death of a shareholder, 
or transfer shares by way of gift to any relative of the shareholder: or 
(2)  Any change in the shareholding of an Indian company, being a subsidiary of a 
foreign company, arising as a result of amalgamation or de-merger of the foreign 
company provided that 51% of the shareholders of the amalgamating or de-merger 
foreign company continue to remain the shareholders of the amalgamated or the resulting 
foreign company. 
The provision applies to all losses, including losses under the head capital gains. 
However, it does not affect the set off of unabsorbed depreciation. 
 
Assets values 
There would not be any change in cost of assets pursuant to the share buyout. 
 
Depreciation claims 
Unabsorbed depreciation would be carried forward and be eligible for set-off, 
notwithstanding any change in the shareholding pursuant to the buyout. Further, there 
would not be any change in the depreciation claim to be made in the year of the share 
buyout. 
 
Expenses incurred on transfer of shares 
The expenses incurred on buy-out of the shares may have to be treated as capital 
expenditure. 
 
Takeover code 
Where the Indian company is a listed company is a listed company, the foreign company 
would have to make a public offer for the acquisition of the shares under the guidelines 
prescribed under the SEBI Takeover Code. 
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De-merger 
Where a company has a business housed with other businesses under the same entity, the 
target business may be de-merged into resulting company not foreign acquisitions. 
 
In case of an acquisition by a foreign entity, the stock of such resulting company may be 
acquired by the foreign company. Alternatively, the de-merger can be structured to vest 
the target business in a foreign acquirer’s pre-owned resulting company. Typically the 
acquirer would need an Indian SPV to acquire the target business through de-merger.  
 
Tax impact in the hands of De-Merged Company & its Shareholders 
 
Gains on transfer of capital assets- Not liable to tax 
Any transfer of a capital asset by the de-merged company to the resulting company under 
the Scheme of de-merger is exempt from capital gains tax, if the resulting company is an 
Indian company. 
 
Issue/Allotment of shares – Not liable to tax 
Under the Scheme of de-merger, the shareholders of de-merged company are issued 
shares in the resulting company on a proportionate basis. 
 
Akin to amalgamation the Act provides that any transfer or issue of shares by the 
resulting company to the shareholders of de-merged company in consideration of the de-
merger would not be liable to tax in the hands of the shareholders under the head capital 
gains. 
 
The cost of acquisitions of shares in the resulting company shall be the amount, which 
bears to the de-merged company, same proportion as the net book value of the 
undertaking bears to the net worth of the de-merged company immediately before such 
de-merger. 
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Tax impact on the resulting company: 
 
Issue/Allotment of shares – whether liable to DDT 
Pursuant to a de-merger, distribution of shares by the resulting company to the 
shareholders of the de-merged company (regardless of a reduction of capital in the de-
merged company) shall not be treated as deemed dividend. Accordingly, the resulting 
company will not be liable to any DDT on such issue of shares.                 
 
Asset values 
Actual cost of assets under the scheme of de-merger, all the assets and liabilities of the 
de-merged company (relating to the undertaking or division) are transferred to the 
resulting company at book value. In consideration of acquisition of such assets, the 
resulting company issues shares to the shareholders of the de-merged company. 
 
“Actual cost” is defined as actual cost of the assets to the owner reduced by cost met 
directly by any other person or authority. Accordingly the cost of the assets acquired by 
the resulting company would be the fair value of shares issued to the shareholders of the 
de-merged company. 
In order to prevent step up without recognition of gain, the cost of the capital assets in the 
hands of resulting company is restricted to mean the cost actually incurred by the de-
merged company as if the de-merged company had continued to hold the capital asset for 
the purposes of its own business. 
 
Cost of depreciable assets 
Under the Scheme of de-merger, all the assets (including depreciable assets) of the de-
merged company (relating to the unit/undertaking) are transferred to the resulting 
company. 
 
The WDV of the block of assets acquired by the resulting company would be the WDV 
of such assets of the de-merged company immediately prior to the de-merger. 
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Depreciation claims 
Depreciation under Act is allowed at prescribed rates with reference to WDV of the 
specified block of assets. 
 
Depreciation in the years of de-merger 
 In the year of de-merger, depreciation is allowable on pro-rata basis to the de-merged 
and resulting company in ratio of number of days for which they use the assets. 
 
Expenses in connection with de-merger 
Similar to the allowance for claim of the expenses on amalgamation, the resulting 
company may claim a deduction of 1/5th of the expenditure incurred wholly and 
exclusively for the purpose of de-merger, over a period of 5 successive year beginning 
from the previous years in which the de-merger takes place. 
 
Treatment of the accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation 
The accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation of the undertaking/unit of the de-
merged company as belonging to the resulting company would be determined as under: 
(1) Accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation directly relatable to the undertaking or 
the division transferred of the de-merged company would be deemed to be those of the 
resulting company. 
 
(2) Where the accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation is not directly relatable to 
the undertaking or the division transferred than the same would be allocated to the 
resulting company on a proportionate basis, viz, in the proportion of the assets of the 
undertaking retained by the de-merged company and transferred to the resulting 
company. The portion of accumulated losses/unabsorbed depreciation so allocated to the 
resulting company would be deemed to be those of the resulting company. 
 
The term accumulated loss and unabsorbed depreciation have been defined to mean so 
much loss or depreciation which remains to be allowed, if de-merger had not taken place. 
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It may be noted that unlike amalgamation, there is no provision relating to de-merger 
which requires that the undertaking transferred should continue to be owned by resulting 
company. 
 
Continuing benefits in the hands of the resulting company 
The provisions relating to continuity of tax holidays in case of de-merger of specified 
undertaking/industrial undertakings are similar as is prescribed in the case of 
merger/amalgamation. Relevant discussion section 2 may accordingly be referred. 
  
Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969(MRTP Act, 1969) 
This is an “Act provide that operation of economic system does not result in the 
concentration of economic power to the common detriment, for the control of 
monopolies, for the prohibition of monopolistic and restrictive trade practices and for 
matters connected therewith or incidental there to” Powers of the act have been curtailed 
by the amendments made by MRTP (Amendment) Act, 1991. Chapter 3 of MRTP Act 
which allowed scrutiny and clearance of merger proposals has been deleted to a great 
extent. Later, in the ruling of HLL-TOMCO merger case in 1992, Supreme Court of India 
stated that prior approval of government is not required for amalgamations following 
amendment to MRTP Act. The commission has now powers post facto to investigate if 
merger have had any adverse effect. 
Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act 1985, (SICA, 1985) 
 This is an “Act to make in public interest special provision with view to securing the 
timely detection of sick and potentially sick companies owing industrial undertaking, the 
speedy determination by board of experts of preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other 
measures which need to be taken with respect to such companies and expeditious 
enforcement of the measures so determined and for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto. An industrial company will be deemed to be seek industrial company 
if it has been registered for at least five years and has accumulated losses more than or 
equal to its net worth at the and of any financial year. Once a company becomes sick 
company, it will be referred to BIFR, which may as per section 18 sanction its merger 
with a healthy company for its revival. The sanctioned scheme must be approved through 
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a special resolution by the shareholders of the healthy company. This Act also provides 
for hearing the views of employees, particularly of transferor sick company who may 
anticipate uncertainty on merger, and the scheme once sanctioned will be binding on 
them. 
 
The Competition Act, 2002 
The Competition Act was enacted “to provide, keeping in view the economic 
development of the country, for the establishment of a Commission to prevent practices 
having adverse effect on competition, in markets, to protect and sustain competition in 
markets, to protect the interest of consumers and to ensure freedom of trade carried on by 
any other participants in markets, in India, and for matters connected therewith incidental 
thereto” This Act, primarily deals with regulation of combinations (more generally, 
mergers), in order to prevent anti-competitive practice abuse of dominant positions of an 
enterprise which affects free competition. It contains a prohibition against a combination, 
which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse affects on competition also has 
provisions requiring pre-notification of combinations form through acquisitions, mergers 
or amalgamations. 
 
Laws Applicable To Takeovers 
In Indian context, there are separate legislations applicable for takeover of public limited 
companies quoted Stock Exchange. These are: 
Clauses 40A and 40B of the Listing Agreement the company entered in to the Stock 
Exchange SEBI’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Regulations, 1997 
Takeover and Listing Agreement Exemptions: Clauses 40A and 40B of Listing 
Agreement Clause 40A deals with substantial acquisition of shares and requires the 
offeror and the offeree to inform the stock exchange when such acquisition results in an 
increase in the shareholding of the acquirer to more than 10% clause 40B deals with the 
takeover offers. A takeover offer refers to change in management, clause 40B also 
provide an exemption to the schemes by BIFR. There is no provision under clause 40B 
for exemption of non BIFR companies. 
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Securities and exchange board of India (SEBI) (substantial acquisition of shares and 
takeovers) regulations, 1997 
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) is “an Act to provide for the 
establishment of a board to protect the interest of investors in securities and to promote 
the development of and to regulate the securities market and for maters connected 
therewith or incidental thereto” The SEBI’s Substantial Acquisition of Shares and 
Takeovers Regulations, 1994 are a first and significant step in laying down rules to be 
followed when corporate takeover is planned. Regulation 3 of Substantial Acquisition of 
Shares and Takeovers Regulations, 1994 provides that chapter 3 of the Regulations 
(relating to takeovers) would not apply to acquisitions of shares pursuant to a scheme of 
amalgamation u/s391 and 394 of Companies Act, 1956 and to the acquisition of shares 
pursuant to a scheme framed under the Sick Industrial Company (Special Provision) Act 
by BIFR. 
These regulations remained in force till 20 February, 1997 when revised Substantial 
Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers Regulations, 1997 were reinforced to regulate the 
takeover bids. The main objectives of these regulations are to provide greater 
transparency in acquisitions of shares and takeovers of companies through a system of 
disclosure of information. It provides that any acquirer holding 10% or less of voting 
rights in capital of company shall acquire further shares only from shareholders of the 
company by making public announcement in the following way: 
 
Appoint a merchant banker in category one holding a certificate of registration granted by 
SEBI who is not an associate of group of acquirer or target company. 
 
The public announcement shall be made not later than four working days of entering into 
an agreement for acquisition of shares. 
 
Copy of public announcement must be submitted to SEBI through merchant banker at 
least two working days prior to such issuance. Also, copies should be sent to all stock 
 91
exchanges on which shares are listed and to Registrar’s office of the company for being 
placed before Board of Directors of the company. 
 
Public announcement shall be made by the acquirer in all the editions of one English and 
Hindi daily each with wide circulation and one vernacular newspaper of the place where 
shares of that company are listed and traded. It must be ensured that, announcement, any 
other advertisement, circular, brochure, material or letter of offer issued after acquisition 
of shares do not contain any misleading information. 
 
The other disclosures in this announcement include the offer price, number of shares to 
be acquired from the public, identity of acquirer, purpose of acquisition, future plans of 
acquirer, if any, regarding the target company, change in control of target company if 
any, procedure to be followed by the acquirer in accepting shares tendered by the 
shareholders and period within which all formalities pertaining to the offer will be 
complete. 
 
The offer price in the public announcement is not approved by SEBI but has to be 
justified in the offer document after taking into consideration the relevant parameters. In 
order to cover the events and market functions just prior to the public announcement, the 
concept of average of daily high and low of the closing prices of shares during the two 
weeks preceding the date of public announcement has been included in determining the 
offer price. In case were target company’s shares are frequently traded on Stock 
Exchange, the offer price is the higher of average of weekly high and low of closing 
prices of shares as quoted on Stock Exchange during the twenty six weeks prior to date of 
public announcement and average of daily high and low of closing prices of shares during 
the two weeks preceding the date of public announcement. The offer price of infrequently 
traded shares is determined by taking into consideration the negotiated price under 
agreement, or parameters like return on net worth, book value of shares of Target 
Company, earnings per share and price earning multiple vis-à-Vis the industry average. 
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Within fourteen days from the date of announcement, a draft of letter of offer at 
minimum price has to be filed with SEBI through merchant bankers and twenty one days 
thereafter, the letter of offer shall be dispatched to shareholders. Within twenty one days 
of submission of offer, SEBI may specify some changes which have to be incorporated 
before dispatching to shareholders. 
 
The offer at minimum price should be to acquire an aggregate minimum of 20% voting 
capital. If the offer results in decreasing public shareholding to less than or equal to 10% 
of voting capital of the company, then acquirer can make another offer. This offer can be 
made within three months from close of public offer to acquire remaining shares at same 
price, or disinvest, or offer for sale, or issue fresh share capital to public within six 
months, such number of shares so as to satisfy Listing Agreements. 
 
The acquirer, under regulation 28 is required by way of security for his performance, to 
deposit is an Escrow Account such sum as specified in the form of cash deposit, bank 
guarantee or deposit of acceptable security. No public offer, once made can be withdrawn 
except under special circumstances. 
 
LAWS OUTSIDE INDIA 
Laws in US 
Mergers and acquisitions continue to be an important phenomenon in the US economy. 
Their continued presence has created tremendous interest in this topic. Despite US being 
a free economy, laws have been framed from time to time to regulate these activities 
coinciding with the merger waves. Congress has, on three occasions tried to deter the 
growth of corporate size and power, in 1890 with the passage of Sherman Act, in 1914 
with the passage of Clayton Act and in 1950 with Celler Kefauver Amendment of Sec 7 
of Clayton Act. 
 
In US, Securities and Exchange Commission regulates the conduct of takeovers. The 
justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission regulate economic and anti-trust 
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issues. Many industries have their own regulatory bodies, such as the Federal Reserve 
Board (banking), the Federal Communications Commission (Broadcasting), the inter 
State Commerce Commission (railroads and trucking) and the Transportation Department 
(airlines). 
 
The major antitrust regulations of US which have a bearing on merger are contained in 
the following statutes: 
 
The Sherman Act, 1890 
This Act, which prohibits any restraint on trade or attempt to monopolistic trade, was 
passed in the midst of greatest merger wave of US’s history. Although not directed solely 
at mergers, one of the goals of Sec 2 of the Act was to stop creation of monopolies 
through mergers as was occurring in numerous industries at that time. But the Act could 
not prevent mergers that brought together companies of less than monopolistic 
dimensions. Recognition of this fact contributed to the impetus behind the second major 
effort to curtail corporate power in 1914. 
 
The Clayton Act, 1914 
Section 7 of the Act prohibits mergers that would substantially lessen competition or tend 
to create monopoly. More specifically, the section prohibits full or partial acquisition by a 
commercial corporation of the stock or assets of another, engaged in commerce in the 
country, if the effect of such an acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or 
tend to create monopoly. The prohibition applies to horizontal, related and conglomerate 
acquisitions. The various statutory rules are enforced by the Federal Department of 
justice (FDU) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Prospective mergers have to be 
notified to these agencies. Both agencies then investigate and if necessary, initiate 
proceedings in federal courts. The FTC also has various appeal procedures involving the 
administrative law courts and independent FTC commissioners. 
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Merger Guidelines, 1968 
In 1968, Department of Justice issued merger guideline which made it difficult for 
horizontal and vertical mergers in adjacent stages of production and distribution to take 
place. This had the effect of encouraging conglomerate acquisitions. According to FTC 
commission statistics, conglomerate acquisitions which accounted for 3% acquisitions in 
1940’s and 1950’s rose to 49% by mid 70s. 
 
The 1968 guidelines specified the following thresholds: 
(1) Horizontal Merger 
If the four firm concentration ratios are less than 75%, a merger upto 30% of acquirer and 
10% of acquiree might not be challenged. If four firm concentration ratios are more than 
75%, the percentages fall to 15% and 1% respectively. 
 
(2) Vertical Merger 
Where supplying firm has at least 10% of sales in its market and purchasing firm has at 
least at 6% of total purchases in that market, the merger will challenged. 
 
(3) Conglomerate Merger 
Where reciprocal buying and market dominance occurs, the merger will be challenged. 
 
The Williams Act, 1968 
This Act regulates tender offers with the help of Security and Exchange Commission. It 
imposes obligations on both offeror and targets and prevents secret accumulation of large 
securities by requiring acquisition of 50% or more of voting shares to be disclosed within 
ten days. Williams Act defines that when a tender offer commences, the information to be 
disclosed includes sources of funds and the purpose of the offer. Tender offer must be 
open for twenty business days and revised offer kept open for another ten business days. 
Williams Act imposes obligations on targets in response to tender offer. It requires the 
targets to inform its shareholders of its position on tender offer within ten business days. 
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Targets management must disclose any conflict of interest and also refrain from any 
materially misleading statements. 
 
Harr-Scott Rodino Anti Trust Improvement Act, 1976 
This Act of 1976 brought an improvement on Clayton Act, 1914 to lighten antitrust laws. 
Merger transactions in which parties have significant assets or sales are regulated by this 
Act. It requires such parties to notify the Department of Trade (DOT) and Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) of such a transaction, observe a prescribed waiting period before 
completing them. The Act stipulates a threshold test of applicability based on size of 
parties and a test based on transaction size. It is a two phase process with an initial filing 
and a second request for more elaborate information. 
 
In April 1997, the US government unveiled new merger guidelines issued by FTC. 
Although these guidelines do not have any law backing, they are for government staff 
and lawyers representing merger parties. It is a common phenomenon even in US that 
Companies proposing to merge always argues that their merger will bring about 
efficiency. Under the revised guidelines, the government regulators shall not clear the 
merger proposal unless it passes the test of claimed efficiencies from merger proposing to 
enhance merged firm’s capacity to behave competitively, leadings to higher quality, 
better service, lower prices or new products. 
 
Laws in UK 
Merger and takeovers have been very frequently in UK also. Laws have been enacted to 
control and regulate these business combinations. Although restrictive trade practices 
have been subject of government scrutiny since 1948, mergers have been subject of 
antitrust regulations only since 1965 with the enactment of Monopolies and Merger Act 
during which period the UK government policy has gone through distinct phases. While 
the main trust of antitrust regulation has been maintenance of effective competition, 
many other issues of public interest have been considered relevant in determining 
whether merger should be allowed or not. For the first time, merger can be investigated 
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prior to consumation rather than in effective post-merger evaluation situation in which 
government was never willing to insist on divestiture of private enterprise. 
 
The UK anti-trust regulations are currently dominated by two stage process. The first 
stage is the preliminary screening by Office of Fair Trading (OFT) created under the Fair 
Trading Act. 1973. This stage may be lead to recommendation to the President of the 
Board of Trade for a more detailed investigation by Monopolies and Merger Commission 
(MMC), the second stage. The MMC undertakes such an investigation and presents its 
report to the President, who then accepts or rejects its recommendations. The takeover 
rules are determined by City Panel on takeovers, a self regulatory agency of London 
Stock Exchange. The secretary for Trade and Industry, regulates all UK industries, so 
with single regulatory body, government policies are more likely to be consistent across 
industries. 
 
Fair Trading Act, 1973 
The OFT, created under the Fair Trading Act, 1973, is an independent company watch 
dog and monitors all mergers proposals or actual mergers in U.K. From its initial 
screening of a merger proposal, the OFT has to determine whether it is merger situation 
qualifying for investigation by MMC after taking into consideration the various factors 
and the presents government policy. Over the years, there has been shift of emphasis 
between competitive and non competitive factors. In period 1965-1973, government 
encouraged consolidation of UK firms in order to enhance their international 
competitiveness to build national champions. This led to policy of benign “indifference” 
towards mergers which decreased competition in UK. In the period 1974-83, the policy 
was changed. Most of the mergers, including conglomerates were rigorously scrutinized 
and some even disallowed. More recently, the approach seems to be dilution of 
competitive approach. 
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Monopolies and Merger Commission 
In the second stage, MMC, which is an independent advisory body, may present one of 
the following three conclusions to the President for recommendation. 
(1) Merger does not operate against public interest and can therefore be allowed to 
proceed. 
(2) The merger operates against public interest and may therefore be prevented. 
(3) The merger can be allowed subject to adverse effects on competition being remedied. 
 
To conclude, through this concern of anti-trust authorities in UK and US seems to be 
paradoxical for these laisses-faire economies, yet they suggest the amount of authority 
they possess in ensuring competition and fair corporate practices. 
 
VALUATION IN A MERGER: METHOD OF SHARE EXCHANGE RATIO 
One of the most important aspects of merger is valuation of business of business in order 
to determine share exchange ratio in mergers. Valuation of the business is tool to assess 
the worth of a company which is subject to merger or takeover so that consideration 
amount can be quantified and the price of the one company for the other can be fixed. 
Valuation of both companies subject to business combination is required for fixing te 
consideration amount to be paid in the form of exchange of shares. Such valuation helps 
in determining the value of share of acquired company as well as acquiring company to 
safeguard the interest of shareholders of both the companies. There are three methods 
used for valuation of business. 
 
Net asset value (NAV) Method 
Net asset value is the sum total of value of assets (fixed assets, current assets, investments 
on the date of balance sheet less all liabilities including  both current and likely 
contingent liability, debts, borrowings  and preference share capital) Deductions will 
have to be made for arrears of depreciation, arrears of preference dividend etc.. However, 
there may be some modifications in this method and fixed assets may be valued at current 
realizable, (especially real estate and investments), replacement cost ( plant & 
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Machinery) or scrap value(obsolete machinery). The net asset value so arrived is divided 
by fully diluted equity to get NAV per share.  
Following are steps for valuing shares are: 
1. Valuation of assets  
2. Ascertainment of liabilities 
3. Fixation of the value of different types of equity shares 
                Net Assets (All assets valued at appropriate method-all                                                                     
                                Liabilities-Preference shares) 
NAV=            ------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                Fully diluted equity shares                   
 
Yield value method 
This method, also called profit earning capacity method is based on the assessment of 
future maintainable earning of the business. While the past financial performance serves 
as guide; it is the future maintainable profits that have to be considered. Earning of the 
company for next few years are projected (by valuation experts) and simple or weighted 
average of these profits is computed. These net profits are divided by appropriate 
capitalization rate to get true value of the business. This figure divided by equity value 
gives value per share. While determining operating profits of the business, it just is 
valued on independent basis without considering benefit on account of merger. Also, past 
of future profits need to be adjusted for extra ordinary income or loss not likely to recur 
in future. While determining capitalization rate, due regard has to be given to inherent 
risk to each business. Thus, a business with established brands and excellent track record 
of growth and diverse product portfolio will get a lower capitalization rate and 
consequently higher valuation where as a cyclical business or a business dependent on 
seasonal factors will get a higher capitalization rate. Profits of both companies should be 
determined after ensuring that similar policies are used in various areas like depreciation 
stock valuation etc. 
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Market value method 
This method is applicable only in case where shares of companies are listed on a 
recognized stock exchange. The average of high or low value and closing over a specified 
previous period is taken to be reprehensive value per share. 
Now, the determination of share exchange ratio i.e. how many shares of amalgamating 
company are to be exchanged for how many shares of amalgamated company is basically 
an exercise in valuation of share of two or more of amalgamating companies. This is 
done by using the above mention techniques not in isolation but keeping in view board 
objective and other factors. This problem of valuation has been dealt with by Weinberg 
and Blank (1971) by giving the relevant factors to be taken into account while 
determining the final share exchange ratio. These relevant factors have been enumerated 
by Gujarat High Court in Bihari Mills Ltd. And also summarized by the Apex Court in 
the case of Hindustan Levers Employees Union v. Hindustan levers Ltd. (1995) as under. 
 
1. The stock exchange prices of the shares of the companies before the 
commencement of negotiation or the announcement of the bid. 
2. The dividends presently paid on the shares of two companies. It is often difficult 
to induce a shareholder to agree to a merger if it involves a reduction in his dividend 
income. 
3. The relative growth prospects of the two companies. 
4. The cover, (ratio of after tax earnings to dividends paid during the year) for the 
present dividends of the two companies. The fact that the dividend of one company is 
better covered than the other is a factor which has to be compensated to some extent. 
5.  The relative gearing of the shares of the two companies. The gearing of an 
ordinary share is the ratio borrowing to equity capital. 
6. The value of net assets of the two companies. 
7. The voting strength in the merged company of the shareholders of the two 
companies. 
8. The past history of the prices of the two companies. 
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There are, however, no rules framed specifically for the working out of share exchange 
ratio in case of amalgamations. According to Delhi High Court statement:” The valuation 
of shares is a technical matter which requires considerable skill and expertise. There are 
bound to be difference of opinion as to what the correct value of shares of the company 
is. If it is possible to value the shares in a manner different from the one adopted in the 
given case, it cannot be said that the valuation agreed upon has been unfair.” Also, in the 
Hindustan Lever Ltd. Case, Supreme Court held that approved the scheme, and with the 
valuation having been pursued by the Financial Institutions. The crux of valuation has 
been rightly summarized by Nan Stone as “what gets measured gets managed”. On the 
basis of decided cases in courts in India, the following points emerge:  
 
1. In case of amalgamations of companies listed on recognized stock exchanges with 
substantial public holding, the courts have unanimously held that a detailed report of an 
independent expert have also been laid down by the courts. 
2. However, even in the cases of amalgamation of closely held listed companies 
where unanimous approval of share exchange ratio is obtained from shareholders, some 
courts (especially in Calcutta) have not insisted on experts certificate. 
3. In other cases of private listed companies or closely held unlisted companies, in 
case of complete unanimity to the determined share exchange ratio, lack of expert’s 
report is overlooked by the courts. 
 
The Law as it stands in India today, does not make it obligatory for the proponents of the 
scheme of merger to disclose to anyone, the basis on which valuation is done or its actual 
working unless the court specifically insists on it. It is also not necessary to inform the 
shareholders or the creditors of the detailed workings of share exchange ratio. Thus, the 
disclosure of these workings by the company under the present existing scenario is very 
limited. Hence, very few companies bother to inform the shareholders the basis of 
arriving at the share exchange ratio or the swap ratio. 
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SIGNIFICANCE OF APPOINTED DATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE 
Amalgamation of two companies involves transfer of all properties and liabilities of 
amalgamating company to amalgamated company. The date when this transfer takes 
place is a very crucial decision. Compliance of statutory requirements of income Tax Act 
and other Acts are dependent on this date. Since the sanction of scheme completely by 
court may take time (even running up to a few years), the tax liability of the intervening 
period of both companies could be a matter of dispute. The date is also significant from 
the point of view of creditors and shareholders of both the companies 
 
Appointed date denotes the cut off date from which all the moveable or immoveable 
properties, including rights, powers and privileges of all kinds of Transferor Company 
shall be transferred to the transferee company. Unless the court alters the appointed date 
contained in the scheme, the date so contained will be the appointed date and all assets 
and liabilities of Transferor Company shall vest in Transferee Company effective from 
this date. It is the date from which both the companies accounts are closed and audited. 
Also, valuation of assets and liabilities is done for this purpose. It is the date when both 
companies are merged into one i.e. scheme of merger becomes operational. Transfer date 
or appointed date remains on paper if scheme is not approved by three fourth majorities 
of shareholders of both the companies or not sanctioned by the court. However, even if 
scheme is sanctioned by the court, merger does not become effective until certified copy 
of High Court order is filed with Registrar. This is called effective date. Effective date is 
the date on which transfer and vesting of undertaking of Transferor Company takes 
effect. In other words, all the requisite approvals are obtained after company takes effect. 
In other words, all the requisite approvals are obtained after completing all the required 
formalities. Once court gives sanction, merger becomes effective not from date of 
sanction but from the date when it was arrived at. So once the formalities are over, 
merger is effective from transfer date. In majority of merger cases appointed date is fixed 
even in future. The Boards of Reliance Group of Companies announced the merger of 
Reliance Polypropylene and Reliance polyethylene with Reliance Industries Ltd. On 7th 
November, 1994 and proposed the amalgamation to be effective from 1st January, 1995. 
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However, appointed date fixed in past can not be earlier than date of incorporation of 
either of the two companies involves in merger. In case of premises Ltd. The appointed 
date as per the scheme was fixed at 1st April, 1991 where as transferee company was 
incorporated on 28th October, 1991. The appointed date was accordingly modified by the 
court as 28th October, 1991 being date of incorporation of the company. The objection of 
Central Government that appointed date could not be earlier than 9th April, 1992 when 
certificate of commencement of business was issued to Transferee Company was 
overlooked. 
 
Many cases have been cited when disputes have occurred because of confusion over 
these dates. There have been avoidable legal battles on interpretation of these dates. 
Review of merger schemes over last few years show lessons being learnt by drafters of 
these schemes. Now management ensures that appointed date or transfer date is used and 
all references are linked to these dates. Indofil Chemicals Ltd. Was merged with modipon 
Ltd. Vide approval date 1st February, 1986 whereas appointed date was 1st July, 1982. 
Assessing Officer assessed the assesses in respected in income after the appointed date 
and did not allow credit for Advance Payment of Tax (APT) and Tax Deduction at 
Source (TDS) by amalgamated company in its own name. 
 
Income Tax Tribunal held that date of amalgamation was from appointed date and there 
after all assessments would be made by amalgamated company. They considered that 
amalgamation was like transfer of immoveable property, where transfer is not complete 
till registered, but once registered, transfer takes effect from date of sale deed. Similarly 
merger is effective when all formalities are complete (called the effective date) but 
effective from the appointed date which is the date of merger. 
 
Similarly, in Marshall Sons and Company (I) Ltd, the court considered the question of 
determining the appointed date since no specific date was laid by the court sanctioning 
the scheme. It was held that every scheme of amalgamation has to provide a date 
necessarily, with effect from which amalgamation or transfer shall take place. In the 
instant case, a date was incorporated in the scheme. It is open for the court considering 
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the scheme to prescribe any other date for transfer. Since in this case, the court did not 
prescribe any date for giving effect to the scheme, the date contained in the statement 
itself shall be date of transfer or amalgamation. 
 
 
INTERIM PERIOD BETWEEN APPOINTED DATE AND EFFECTIVE DATE 
As stated earlier, an amalgamation, though effective from the appointed date becomes 
operative from the last of the following dates or such other date (effective date) as the 
court may direct, namely, 
 
1 The date on which last of all consents, approvals permissions, 
resolutions, sanctions and orders as mentioned in ithe scheme are obtained or 
2 The date on which certified copies of order of the court under section 
391, 392 and 394 0f Companies Act, 1956 are filed with the Registrar of Companies 
 
Thus, there is a time period between appointed date and date on which scheme finally 
takes effect (i.e. effective date). During this period, 
 
1 The transferor company shall carry on or deemed to have carried on all its 
business and activities and shall hold and stand possessed of and shall be deemed to have 
held and stood possessed of all the said assets on account of and in trust for the transferee 
company. 
2 The transferor company shall carry on its business and activities with 
reasonable diligence and business prudence and shall not undertake any financial 
commitments, borrow any amounts nor incur any other liabilities, issue any additional 
guarantees to its subsidiaries or group companies or any third party or save, as expressly 
permitted by this scheme, and shall not, without the prior written consent of the transferee 
company, deal with the said assets or any part thereof provide that the transferor 
company may create charge over the said assets in favors of the transferor group. 
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3.  
a.  The transferor company shall not make any change in its capital structure either by 
increase, (by issue of equity shares whether by way of public issue, private placement, on 
a rights basis, or issuance of bonus shares, convertible debenture or otherwise) decrease, 
reduction, reclassification, subdivision or consolidation, re-organization, or in any 
manner, which may, in any way affect the equity share exchange ratio, except by mutual 
consent of the board of directors of transferor company. 
 
b. The transferee company shall not make any change in its capital structure by issue of 
any fresh equity shares except by mutual consent of respective Board of Directors of both 
the companies. 
 
4. With effect from the appointed date all the profits or incomes accruing or arising to the 
transferee company or expenditure or loses arising or incurred by the transferor company 
shall, for all purpose, be treated and be deemed to be and accrue as the profits or incomes 
or expenditures or losses of the transferee company, as the case may be.  
 
DUE DILIGENCE 
 
Types of Due Diligence 
Broadly, due diligence practices can be categorized into two types. One is the Anglo-
Saxon” practice. This involves comprehensive legal and financial due diligence and 
significant disclosure before the signing of an agreement. Contrast this with the practice 
in much of the rest of the world, which involves more modest preliminary legal and 
financial due diligence with correspondingly limited disclosure.  
 
Who is involved in due diligence? 
  This includes company employees, the company’s traditional professional advisors and 
those hired for their expertise in certain legal, tax, finance accounting and operational 
issues present in Target Company’s home country. They include financial legal and 
operational professionals.  
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Financial Due Diligence 
Financial due diligence involves critically examining the target legal company’s 
historical, current and prospective operative operating result as disclosed 
/discharged/obtained from the following sources :  
1. Audited financial statements. 
2. Unaudited financial information 
3. Financial information with stock exchanges and regulators regulation 
4. Tax returns 
5. Cash flow statements etc.  
 
Generally, the process starts at a comprehensive analysis of the balance sheet. A review 
of the target firm’s financing and capital structure is very much required. Further, this 
analysis should include details of short-term and long-term borrowings, the percentage of 
debt and equity ratios in the company’s balance sheet, interest and fixed charges coverage 
ratios etc. 
 
Financial due diligence also involves analysis of the cash flow statement. One must not 
forget to examine the quality of company’s relationship with its lenders and an ultimate 
opinion concerning the reliability and credibility of its financial statements. 
 
Legal Due Diligence 
Legal due diligence involves the practices of addressing certain fundamental legal issues 
which includes good compliance practices as per the Companies Act, SEBI Act, Income 
Tax Act and other corporate legislations. Analysis of legal due diligence process could be 
undertaken from the following sources: 
(i) Memorandum of Association 
(ii) Articles of Association 
(iii) Target company’s prospectus 
(iv) Documents filed with Registrar of Companies including Registration 
of Charge 
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(v) Title deeds of properties  
(vi) Tax return and compliance certificate 
(vii) Environmental law compliance 
(viii) Lending agreement, covenants borrowing powers. 
(ix) Compliance with any special industry legislations. 
(x) Labor agreement, compensation etc. 
(xi) Pending litigations 
    
Today’s legal environment has become highly specialized. Today, even midsized deals 
involve battery of corporate tax, real estate, environmental employee benefits, insurance 
and other kinds of legal professionals. Further, legal due diligence requires careful 
attention to actual and threatened litigation. Litigations can emerge from various statutory 
bodies, shareholders, debt holder, suppliers, assistance product liability etc. 
 
Further in the era of increasing regulatory and judicial scrutiny, matters like allegations of 
improper behavior by corporate officers directors and employees, workplace safety 
matters, employee benefits, potential equal opportunity violations ever increasing 
environmental scrutiny may take center stage. 
 
Operational Due Diligence 
Operational due diligence includes investigating the target’s intellectual property, its 
production, its sales and marketing efforts, its human resources and the other operational 
issues. Meaningful generalizations of operational due diligence practice are difficult to 
make as it varies from target. Operational due diligence practices ca be undertaken by 
analyzing the information from he following sources: 
(i) Newspaper and magazines reporting about the target company 
(ii) Available information with trade association’s chambers and regulatory 
bodies. 
(iii) Market reports. 
(iv) Company journals, brochures and websites. 
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(v) Gathering inputs from the market, market experts, suppliers and 
customers 
(vi) Interviewing the employees, ex-employer etc. 
    
One has to appreciate that preparation of any due diligence report is as good as the 
persons who conduct it and the correctness of the information gathered. In the case of 
operational due diligence it is more often very subjective, depending upon the person 
who is interviewed to gather the information and one may be able to only estimate the 
future profitability. The successes of due diligence process will depend on the quality and 
quantity of data collected or supplied. 
 
A Practical Guide to Due Diligence Process 
There are two ways of conducting due diligence: 
(a) Presentation of predetermined data by the seller/target company in a ‘data 
room’; 
(b) Data provided in response to the acquirer’s questionnaire. 
         
In Data Room method, large amount of data is presented to interested parties to study and 
value it and get due diligence conducted. Here mammoth data is provided. Data room 
method has been successfully used for disinvestments by the tender route. By this 
process, the seller is able to ensure that all the bidders are treated fairly and that they are 
given access uniformly to the same data or information. Hence, uniformity of the 
information and documents supplied to all bidders is maintained. 
 
Any discrimination in the supply of information or documents could vitiate the bidding 
process. This applies more to disinvestments by the central or state government or 
government companies, which can be subjected to judicial review under the provisions of 
the Constitution of India.  
 
In other method, a questionnaire is put to target company and on that                              
basis further one-to one negotiations are done. 
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Thereafter a due diligence report is prepared by professionals which can be effectively 
used to negotiate the vexed question of the representations and warranties to be included 
in the sale and purchase or financing agreement, the disclosures that inevitably qualify 
(some if not many of them) and the amount, if any, to be set aside in escrow and on what 
conditions. 
 
Managing the Due Diligence Process 
How do we actually go about due diligence? What kinds of people are involved in this 
procedure? What are the parameters? Let us examine each in some detail. 
 
1. Initial parameters –  
Management requires a preliminary evaluation of the areas of key importance for the 
success of the transaction. This can be continuity of targets, key personnel, suppliers and 
customers after the mergers & acquisitions. 
2.       Selecting due diligence teams – The core team for the conduct of the due 
diligence should consist of:   
                                                     
• Management representatives of the acquirer; 
• Legal counsel; 
• Valuation adviser; 
• Chartered Accountants, company secretaries/Project consultants 
• Technical consultants 
•  Merchant bankers 
  This stage will also involve the coordination plan among the team members, and 
allocating responsibilities and functions. Usually, all external counsels are required to 
execute confidentiality agreements before commencement of the assignment. 
 3.     Preparing and executing preliminary investigation – 
The objective of the preliminary survey is to identify deal-breaking issues upfront before 
money and other valuable resources are committed to detailed investigations. Some of the 
critical issues that may emerge during this exercise are: 
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• concealment of facts and figures; 
• insufficient internal controls; 
• non-compliance of or adventurous interpretations of contracts, legal 
provisions, accounting principles policies or standards; 
• employee retention and core management succession; 
• contingent liabilities; 
• statutory non-compliance; 
• industrial sickness (erosion of net worth); and 
• Legal proceedings. 
 
4.   Detailed due diligence –  
The success of the investigation to make a well- informed decision would lie n a well-
planned, integrated and coordinated detailed enquiry procedures. 
5. Certification of completeness of disclosures – 
 The due diligence team should obtain a declaration or certificate from the target 
company confirming the completeness of the disclosed information and documents, 
and that no material data has been withheld by the target company. 
 
Contents of the Due Diligence Report 
The due diligence report ordinarily contains information pertaining to: 
1. company information; share capital & shareholdings 
2. corporate capacity; 
3. directors, their interests and conflicts, if any; 
4. account & financial statement 
5. statutory compliance with the applicable regulations; 
6. personnel; 
7. compliance with the industrial disputes Act 1947, the payment of Bonus Act 
1965, the payment of Wages Act 1936, the payment of Gratuity Act 1972, the 
Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952, the 
Employees State insurance Act 1948, and the Local Shops and Establishments 
Act; as well as with any industrial settlement award, judgment or order in any 
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labor dispute or litigation; recognized trade unions, retrenchments, lay-off and 
voluntary retirement schemes; and share options, share incentive, profit sharing 
or other incentive schemes for employees;3pension, retirement provident fund, 
superannuation and gratuity schemes; 
8. licenses, permits, approvals and specific  statutory compliance; 
9. intellectual property rights – identifications of all patents, trade marks, 
copyrights, industrial designs, all other forms of registered and unregistered 
intellectual property rights or other form of monopoly or property rights used or 
owned by the target company and rights granted to third parties; 
 
10 industrial property know-how, trade secrets; 
11 infringement of third party rights; 
12 assets- immovable and movable property; 
13 exports and imports, compliance with laws;  
14 litigation-judicial, quasi-judicial, arbitral and other administrative proceedings; 
15 taxation issues – income tax, customs, excise and sales tax; 
16 insurance – quality of insurance cover; 
17 contractual liabilities and commitments; and 
18 Environment-related issues – compliance with law, social issues, and the 
rehabilitation of people likely to be outsider by large natural resources projects. 
 
Due Diligence Check List 
A. Financial Due Diligence 
         
       Financial Information 
1. Year-to-date financial statements, with comparison to same period of prior 
year. 
2. For the past three years, all annual and quarterly financial statements, including 
accompanying schedules, of the company and its subsidiaries (balance sheets, 
income statements, statement of cash flows, and reconciliation of retained 
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earnings). If available, include financial reporting (revenues and costs) by line 
of business and revenues from top ten major accounts. 
3. Current trial balance and other significant financial statements and internal 
financial reports of the company and its affiliates. 
4. List of bank accounts including bank type or account number, and authorized 
signatories. Obtain copies of bank reconciliations for review for all accounts for 
the last two months and each quarter for the last two calendar years. 
5. Bank statements for the last month of the fiscal year-end and of the prior year 
and all months of the current year. 
6. Summary of major accounting policies, nothing any that may be controversial 
or different from the investor country’s generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) or that may not be in accordance it generally industry 
practices. Listing of accounting selective methods, particularly significant 
estimates (e.g., accruals, valuation methods, and depreciation). 
7. All auditors’ and independent certified public accounts’ letters and opinions for 
the company and its affiliates. Obtain auditors’ reports to management 
concerning internal accounting controls and procedures and other matters and 
any management responses thereto and internal memoranda (particularly 
internal audit or regulatory compliance memoranda) concerning the company 
or its affiliates. 
8. Financial projections, if any, for the remainder of the current year and next 
year, including assumptions. Include full-year detailed income statement by 
month, end-of-year estimated Performa balance sheet and cash flow forecast, 
budget for the current year, and comparison of actual versus budget year to date 
for the current year. 
9. Identification and description of all contingent liabilities not reflected on the 
company’s financial statements, established monetary provisions, allowances 
and reserves, and disagreements with company’s outside auditors concerning 
the company’s financial reporting during the preceding two years. 
10. Copies of letters to management relating to the potential improvement of the 
company’s internal control systems together with any reports, letters, or 
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correspondence prepared by accountants of the company or any subsidiaries or 
partnership. 
11. Copies of all tax filings and returns (including shareholder, corporate, or 
partnership) for the last three years, including income taxes, sales, use property, 
employment, and franchise taxes (and any other local taxes). Include copies of 
any correspondence with tax authorities (other than routing transmittals) and 
copies of tax sharing agreements between the company and its subsidiaries or 
affiliates. 
12. All income tax audit results and any communication (documented or oral) from 
the government agencies in all jurisdictions that require tax filings.  
13. Schedule describing ongoing tax disputes ,together with copies of tax authority 
reports, correspondence, and similar matters, with respect to pending tax 
proceedings regarding open years or items for the company or any affiliate. 
14. Prior year’s tax returns for all companies acquired within the past three years 
15. A schedule of shareholder “due to” and “due from” accounts for the last two 
years. 
16. A listing of any significant nonrecurring expenses occurring in the past year or 
current year. 
17. Schedule of accounting firms that have represented the company or any of its 
affiliates in any material matters in the last five years. 
18. A schedule with supporting agreements showing cooperative arrangements with 
suppliers detailing year-to-date payments to be received for the balance of the 
year. 
19. A schedule with supporting agreements showing commission arrangements 
with top ten suppliers detailing commissions received year to date and 
estimated commissions to be received for the balance of the year. 
20. A schedule showing current accounts receivable & payable, accrued expenses, 
and customer deposits 
21. A schedule of property, plant, and equipment; depreciation schedules, and 
amortization schedules. 
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22.  Detailed listing of capital investments that will be made during the current 
fiscal year, especially if not completed as of the date of the company’s most 
recent financial statements. 
23. Reports on the company from any outside consultants, analysts, or others. 
24. Description of contingent liabilities arising from any agreements, severance 
payments for terminated employees, unresolved legal matters, price 
redetermination or renegotiation, sales subject to warranty or service 
agreements, product liability, unfunded pension plan liability, and 
environmental or other matters.   
 
Financing Documents 
1. Any significant debt agreements to which the company or any affiliate is a party, 
such as or revolving loan agreements, bank lines of credit, mortgages, 
promissory notes significant property or equipment leases, and other similar 
agreements and arrangements, and all guarantees by the company or any 
subsidiary together with any interest rate cap, hurdle, swap or other hedging 
mechanism relating to the foregoing. 
2.  Summaries of all evidences of compliance with the agreements described in 
preceding item 1, and any communications regarding defaults, potential defaults, 
or waivers of defaults. 
3. Documents relating to proposed new indebtedness, including but not limited to 
term sheets, commitment letters, draft agreements, and similar documents. 
4. Disclosure documents used in public offerings, state of control, private 
placements of securities, industrial development bond financing or institutional 
or bank loan applications. 
5. Copies of letters of credit, performance guarantees, and bonds. 
6. All pledges, security agreements or other agreements or documents creating or 
purporting to create liens or other security interest in any assets of the company. 
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Properties and Equipment  
1. List of addresses of properties currently owned or leased by the company 
and related documentation. Obtain a summary of the office floor plan, 
facility hours (times and hours per weekday), and revenue generated by 
each facility. 
2. Copies of all deeds or other titles evidencing ownership of the 
properties owned by the company or a subsidiary/affiliate. 
3. For each property owned by the company or affiliate, a copy of the 
latest owner or leasehold title insurance policy issued, as applicable, and 
the most recent survey covering such properties. 
4. Copies of all leases for use of the real property owned or leased by the 
company or any affiliate. 
5. Copies of all mortgages encumbering the properties owned or leased by 
the company or affiliate. 
6. All equipment and auto leases for a period in excess of two years or that 
require payments in excess of an immaterial amount annually. 
7. List of all automobiles, including title documentation. 
8. Plans with respect to any facility closings. 
9. Summary of any construction plans for significant new facilities and 
date on projected construction costs for such facilities and any facilities 
currently under construction. 
10. Copies of all principal trademarks. Licenses, patents, copyrights, 
websites, toll-free telephone numbers, or trade names of the company or 
its affiliates, the expiration dates thereof, and pending applications 
therefore. 
11. Details of recent acquisitions, divestitures, spin-offs, or dispositions of 
assets. 
 
Due Diligence Check List 
B. : Operational Due Diligence 
A  Framework 
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1.   Deal rationale:  
Identify rationale for the transaction (e.g., market, territories, products and product 
development, other strategies for revenue growth, strategies for cost savings). 
2.  Concrete goal: 
 What concrete goals expected to be met, and over what time frame? How will 
achievement of those goals be measured? 
3.   Preliminary plan for achieving goals:  
 Specifically, what is the preliminary plan for achieving the goals out-lined above? 
4.   Drivers of value creation: 
 Based on the above, what is preliminary view regarding the drivers of  value 
creation for the transaction? 
      5.  Most significant hurdles: Preliminary view: 
      What is the preliminary view of the biggest hurdles to achieving   the goals set for the 
transaction? 
      6.   Key due diligence: 
Are these aspects of due diligence, including operational due diligence, that are 
especially critical to the plan for the combined enterprise? 
      7.   Integration plan: 
     How will the due diligence process be developed into an integration plan? Are the 
people and processes in place to make sure there is a seamless transition from due 
diligence to integration? 
8.   Negotiation and pricing strategy:  
How will information and analyses generated through the due diligence processes be 
taken into account in the negotiation and pricing strategies? As the deal negotiations 
precede, will due diligence be appropriately re-targeted along the way? Are the 
people and processes in place to make sure that these things happen? 
9.  Macro framework for due diligence:  
What are the deal team’s key assumptions about macro economic and demographic 
factors that should frame operational due diligence? These include world economic 
growth, trade growth; and population growth, age profile, income levels, and other 
demographic assumptions in the relevant jurisdictions. 
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10. Economic factors affecting the relevant jurisdictions: 
What are the assumptions about economic factors affecting the relevant jurisdictions: 
foreign exchange rates, currency exchange regulations, and fiscal and monetary 
policies, including taxation and import-export? 
      11.  Political factors : What are the assumptions regarding macro-   level 
political/environment/ecological factors, such as political  stability, potential human 
rights issues, environmental or health issues, and community or social development 
obligations?   
 
Analysis of the Value-Creation Process 
Undertake the following analysis for the target company as well as for the combined 
enterprise. 
 
(i)  The Operations Overview Map 
1. On one or more maps, chart the supply chain, facilities, personnel, and 
products and services produced against sales, distribution, and marketing. 
2. On these maps, 
                   analyze the following:   
- Markets, including new markets, for products/services 
- Competitive positioning 
- Distribution channels 
- Marketing strategies 
- Operations and technology strategies 
- Sales/services outlets 
- Planned production 
- Supply and transportation synergies and vulnerabilities 
- Political and macroeconomic trends and vulnerabilities  
- Personnel overlap and shortfall 
- Flow of funds and financing needs, both operating and capital 
expenditures; analyze currency requirements and foreign exchange and 
exchange control risk, as well as taxation and transfer pricing issues.   
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(ii) Marketing, Sales, Distribution and Customer Relationship Management 
1. Product analysis: Describe the company’s                             
products/services. Break down into relevant categories and describe territorial 
markets. Describe uses of the products and assess the qualities of the products 
against those of competitors, including products substitution. Consider the following 
factors. 
-price 
-Quality 
-Service 
-Availability/sales formats 
-Design/engineering features and standards 
-Sales terms (right to return, credit terms, charge-backs, war-    
   ranties) 
-After-sales service, upgrade, follow-on, etc. 
Which of the above are most important to customers in the various markets? In which of 
the above does the company enjoys an advantage sustainable or natural, or is it marginal 
and temporary (can be copied or eroded)? 
 
At what stage of the product life cycle are the various products in their various markets? 
 
Do any of the products of the combined enterprise compete with one another? What is the 
proposed approach to this problem were it exists? 
Are there any known negative qualities associated with the product, such a health risks, 
product liability risk? Or negative environmental or social qualities? 
 
2  Market analyses: demand: How is demand generated, and     on what does the level 
of demand depend? Is it seasonal or cyclical? Is product substitution or technological 
obsolescence a major risk in terms of basic demand? To what extent can the company 
control demand? What are the biggest drivers of changes in demand? 
3.  Market analysis: competitors: Describe the competitive situation by product/market 
and its effect on product design, product mix, marketing and positioning and pricing. 
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4. Market analysis: customers (end users): What is the market, and who are the 
company’s customers? If customers are not end users, this analysis should be done for 
direct customers and at each stage of the distribution chain all the way to end users. 
Break down along all relevant categories (for business: industry, size, profitability, 
outlook; for retail: national, cultural, income level, lifestyle choirs, other demographic 
features), including geographic. For each major category of customer (end user), assess 
prospects and indicate the most significant macro trends that could affect demand. 
Indicate whether customers (end user) relationships tends to be long term, one-off, or 
something in between. Is there dependence on one or just a few customers? 
5. Customer data: What level of information is available and useful, on a realistic 
basis, about customers (and end users, if different) and the market? How much of that 
information is being gathered now? How much of the gathered information is, or should 
be, analyzed for marketing or product design and positioning purposes? What are the 
implications for IT needs, in terms of capture data in a database, data mining, and 
customer relationship management? 
6. Using product/market data to identify synergies (cost reduction, rationalization, 
product extensions): Map existing products and services to existing customers/markets. 
Are there obvious overlaps? Are these obvious product or market extensions? What are 
the implications for production rationalization, cost reduction through efficiencies over a 
greater base, design and production for product extensions? 
7. End-user remote sales: How much selling occurs remotely – by phone, mail, or 
computer? Describe how this works and present volume figures and product/customer 
information. Indicate where sales are direct; by franchise; through wholesale- retail or 
other multi-stage distribution chain; or by some other arrangement. 
8. Point of sale analysis: What exactly happens at the point of sale? In terms of human 
(or other, such as online) interaction. If people are providing a service or assisting at the 
point of sale, describe how they interaction. With customers (on-off versus ongoing and 
personalized), staff turnover, the level of training, and quality control. 
9. Inventory analysis: Analyze inventory levels and mix. What are the levels of stock-
outs, substitutions, and back orders? What is inventory turn at each level and by product 
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category? What is the analysis at each level of fast-moving, slow-moving, and 
obsolescent inventory? 
10. Wholesale comparable analysis: If the company makes a significant amount of sales 
on a whole-sale or other mediated basis, prepare an analysis comparable to that regarding 
the point of sale, sales volume by product, and so on. 
11. Sales and distribution analysis: Based on the above, and as relevant, chart the 
company’s sales through distribution channels, indicating mark-up or other cost at each 
level and the associated method/timing of transport. Does this analysis suggest possible 
cost-reduction and efficiency moves, such as following: 
- Elimination or consolidation of duplicated or overlapping sales/service 
outlets 
- Elimination or consolidation of duplicated or inefficient distribution paths 
- Use of centralized warehousing 
- Creation of additional distribution centers 
- Negotiation of better transport contracts or integration of the transport 
function 
12. Possible weaknesses or anomalies: Is the distribution system subject to channel 
stuffing or “field warehousing”? What portions of sales are made on consignment or on 
approval? What is the experience with returns and change backs? What are the possible 
effects of FIFO/LIFO/average basis accounting as used by the company and others in the 
chain of distribution, such as retailers- for example, what are the dynamic or pressures 
relating to inventory management in different price scenarios? 
13. Sales force analysis: What are the sales channels? Who employs them, or are they 
independent agents/distributors? From the company’s point of view, how are they 
organized (by product, by region, and so on), and how are they compensated (salary, 
commission, and so on)? 
14. Channel management: what are the sales channels? Is there real or potential channel 
conflict, and is it being managed? Does company organization maximize sales overall, or 
are business units competing with each other for the same business? Describe any 
existing areas of channel conflict, and describe the effect of the proposed transaction in 
terms of channel conflict. 
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15. Systems analysis of sales and distribution: What is the state of systems support of 
product or service delivery? Consider physical and logistical aspects such as the 
following: 
- The order-processing and order-fulfillment process from a systems 
perspective. Are there any possibilities for automation or for enhanced 
support of sales personnel? Are sales data fully exploited for marketing 
implications for IT support of this function? 
- The state of inventory delivery to or availability at point of sales: Is that 
inventory sufficient, and is the product mix correct? If the company sells 
through a retailer or other agent, is inventory management executed in a 
coordinated fashion resulting in optimal product delivery and sell-
through? 
-  Are the logistical aspects of product transport and delivery? Optimized by 
actively managing scheduling? 
-   Are the logistical aspects of inventory storage and handling optimized by 
use of coding, warehouse management, standardization of materials and 
packing, and so on? 
- How does information about sales make its way back into inventory 
ordering and management system? How does it make its way back into 
product design and marketing? How frequently and on what basis? 
- Are there opportunities for rationalization of the sales and distribution 
system, such as streamlined order processing; smarter coding and 
packaging; improved tracking; use of computerized stock picking and 
automated packaging; improved IT-based scheduling systems, including 
loading dock scheduling and like; integration of scheduling systems with 
those of transporters; tighter design of inventory management by use of 
current sales date and automatic or rapid replenishment/redirection 
strategies? 
16. System flexibility and responsiveness:  How much flexibility and responsiveness 
is built into the sales and distribution system, and can it be increased (at what cost?) How 
sophisticated is the company’s rapid replenishment capability, how far back into the 
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production process does it go, and what is the customer’s ability to change or cancel 
orders? How does the company deal with unhappy customers or those who change their 
minds after order fulfillment has been completed? What is the IT support for the above? 
17. Outsourcing: If aspects of sales/distributions have been outsourced, describe. What 
are the benefits and possible negative aspects of this out-sourcing? 
18. After-sale 
- What are the company’s responsibilities after sale? 
- What are the company’s policies on returns or exchanges? 
- What are the company’s policies on warranties? What is the associated 
pricing if any? What is the company’s experience? Assess the cost of 
warranties to the company, and analyze the warranty reserve, if any. 
- If the company provides after-sale service, what are the terms and pricing? 
How well is it performed? If there are call centers, are they staffed and 
organized to optimize response against cost, using queuing theory, IT 
support at the phone level, and knowledge management tools to assist 
personnel? Analyze these systems and their cost. 
- If service is at the customer’s location, how is availability and training of 
personnel managed? 
- How is customer satisfaction measured? Be specific. 
19. Brand management: By product or product category, describe the company’s 
branding strategy or other corporate identify as it is intended to be perceived by the 
public, including customers. How is the company’s brand managed across product 
categories and across borders? Is there a corporate brand that serves as an umbrella across 
subsidiary brands? Comment on how the branding online and intra company. Comment 
on how consistent the branding strategy is with the corporate culture, and if there is a 
mismatch, how that is managed. Do any of the aspects of the proposed transaction pose a 
challenge in term of managing brand? and  
20.  Brand product design and positioning: How is the company’s branding strategy 
translated into product or service design and engineering and product positioning, 
including pricing? Does branding strategy and market information get communicated 
 122
effective to R&D, engineering, and others who interact with the public, including 
customer service call centers and the like? 
21. Outside consultants and advertising agencies: Describe the company’s 
relationship with corporate image consultants, PR firms, and advertising agencies around 
the world. Are any firms or individual especially important in this regard? Does the 
company itself do most of the global coordination in house, or do out- siders handle it?    
22. Value of the brand: What is the estimated value of the brand? Does proposed 
transaction pose any threat of diluting brand s for the value? 
23. Implication integration plan: Do any of the above points suggest potential cost 
saving through streamlining of the sales and distribution channels or potential product or 
market extensions, product repositioning, or different or additional branding and 
marketing strategies? 
24.  Implications for projections, negotiation, and pricing:   
How strongly does the information regarding customers, Products, and market support 
deal assumptions about projected revenues? In particular, if revenue growth for     certain 
product lines is assumed, does the information gathered point to clear paths- through 
product or market extensions, acquisition of new customers, or higher sustainable price 
points—through which the increase in revenues can be achieved? Discuss the implication 
for deal negotiation and pricing. 
25 Extraction, manufacturing, or other production of goods and services: Assuming 
the target’s market and planned products/services have been defined above, assess in 
general how well the existing manufacturing or other production system is set up to 
profitably meet market demands (giving effect to possible divestitures for antitrust or 
other reasons). 
26 Geographic map of production capacity: Review the map of productive capacity 
against customers needs on a geographic basis. Indicate overall industry capacity for the 
relevant markets. Tie product sales estimates arrived at above to production capacity. 
27 Process and process unit: Describe the process of production or provision of services 
at a schematic/technical/engineering level. Categorize the work in terms of work flow as 
special order, batch process, line process, or continuous flow analyzes the critical inputs 
into the production process: 
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- Capital investment, know-how, plant design or specialized machinery, 
- Skilled labor, pool of available labor. Is the company’s use of these inputs 
consistent with industry norms? Better? Worse? 
28 Process flow analysis: Within a physical plant or between physical plants and 
including approval processes, transport stages, and all other stages of critical path or 
other comparable basis, with special attention to the following. 
- How production tends to relate to production schedules, and how 
production schedules related to sales forecasts, specific orders, and so on. 
- Defective production, excess production, returned goods, and warranty 
claims. 
- Idle time and downtime, for all reasons (differentiate among reasons). 
- Waste and scrap. 
- At all points in the process, damaged or obsolete stock/inventory. 
- Absenteeism, accidents grievances, overtime, employee turnover. 
- Whether design and ongoing production reflect sophisticated operations 
management tools, such as economic production order quantities, time and 
motion studies, queuing theory, and so on. 
- Capacity / throughput mismatches creating bottlenecks. 
- Bottlenecks due to approval requirements or other management processes 
(especially where approval from 3 different location or time zone is 
required). 
- Excess inventory buildups (with associated working capital cost). 
- Critical inventory and spare parts requirements management against lead 
time (where disruptions in supply will immediate stoppage). 
- Flexibility for product change (for example, setup time required, batch 
size, potential to re-order custom steps toward the end of the production 
process). 
- Associated IT or Other information-based or automated support of the 
process, such as tracking. 
29 Outsourcing: Is some of the production outsourced? If so, describe the extent to 
which the company can control execution against specifications, and how quality control 
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is managed, particularly in light of timing considerations. Assess the pluses and minuses 
of the outsourcing arrangements. Are there potential environment liabilities, social 
obligations, or other costs, liabilities and risks associated with the production 
outsourcing? 
30 Risk analysis based on process flow: Identify the most significant risks associated 
with the process flow and their impact on the business. Is backups work-around or 
replacements available? Is insurance coverage for the risk available on a cost-effective 
basis? What risks cannot be either mitigated or insured against? 
31 Review of physical plant : Describe in detail the physical plant and facilities of the 
company: 
 
- Type 
-  Location 
- Size/capacity/throughput measures 
- Measures of utilization, including as a percentage of    
    Capacity 
-Level of downtime, exclusive of scheduled maintain ace 
- Scheduled maintenance and associated downtime 
- Quality of output 
- Age, original cost and method of depreciation 
- Depreciated (book) value 
- Market (appraised) value 
- If leased, terms of lease 
- Remaining useful life  
- Adequacy of warehousing/storage 
- Associated environmental facilities 
- Social obligations (housing, medical, family care, schools roads, parks, other) 
- Facilities related to social obligations (medical or day-care facilities, other) 
- Materials handling methods (pallets, conveyors, forklifts,    trucks, vacuum or 
magnetic lifting or moving devices) 
- Proximity to transport 
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- Utilities infrastructure support 
- Climate and nature hazards (Flood. Volcano, earthquake, tornado, hurricane, 
rain, snow) 
- Building code and zoning 
- Real estate taxes and other fixed costs 
- State of title (including leasehold title); lines and condemnation proceedings 
- Insurance coverage 
- Safety and security features 
- Maintenance costs; capital improvements  
 
32. Review of machinery and equipment 
        List and describe principal machinery, noting the following: 
- Age ,, original cost, and method of depreciation 
- Depreciation (book) value 
- Market (appraised) value 
- If leased, terms of lease 
- Remaining useful life 
- Maintenance 
- Health and safety issues 
- Auxiliary equipment- tools patterns, materials handling equipment 
33. Quality of technology: Describe the technology used in overall terms: Is the 
company an industry leader in advanced, high-quality technology? Is its applied 
technology the most modern? What is risk of rapid obsolescence? How the technology 
does used rank in terms of production efficiency (inventory, utilities, workers needed, 
maintenance requirement, and periodic capital improvements)? Is there a rival technology 
being utilized or upcoming that will create competitive difficulties for the company or 
render its technology obsolete? 
34. Quality control: What is the company’s quality structure? Are the company’s 
facilities ISO-compliant? What specific quality control measures are used (Total quality 
Management, Statistical Control Processes, Six Sigma, and so on), and what is the 
management structure for dealing with quality control problems? 
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35. Review of engineering platforms and standards: Describe in detail the 
engineering platforms and standards used in production. If it is assumed that the 
production process will be spread among different facilities in order to optimize capacity 
utilization, have the underlying assumptions been identified and checked out –
engineering platforms, measurements and standards, languages used by engineers, and so 
on? How long will it take for manuals, processes and standards to be written down and 
harmonized to enable dispersed production? How will conflicts that arise in this process 
be resolved? 
36. Analysis of capacity on a combined basis: What does the analysis of process flow 
suggest about excess, duplicate, or inadequate capacity at one or more points of 
production? Analyze desirable production capacity, after smoothing within the system, 
against expected sales volume. 
37. Excess capacity: If there is excess capacity, how should the determination to reduce 
capacity be made, and what is the plan for disposition or shutdown? What would be the 
financial consequences (on an accounting and cash basis) of disposition or shutdown? 
38. Additional capacity: If the analysis suggests that additional capacity is required, 
where would it be located and what would it consist of? How long would it take to get 
online? What are the costs? Are there regulatory or other barriers to the planned 
expansion? 
39. Production cost structure analysis: If the analysis suggests the need for 
investments to improve the production cost structure, quantify the cost of those 
improvements, taking into account the time required to effect the changes. Weigh these 
against the expected operating cost reductions. 
40. Tie production to cost accounting: What are the company’s policies for cost 
accounting? Are these consistent with industry norms? Tie these to the process flow 
analysis above, and reconcile for each company in the transaction. What is the 
relationship between fixed and variable costs, the break-even point, and the relation of 
volume variances? Is the company’s production process satisfactorily profitable on a cost 
accounting basis? What is the range for gross margin (by product or product category as 
relevant) based on the price assumptions made in the projections and supported by the 
marketing analysis above?  
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(iii) procurement and Supply-Chain Management- External Infrastructure 
Requirements 
1. Raw materials, intermediate inventory, and supplies needed: Analyze the 
company’s need for raw materials, intermediate inventory, and supplies, based on the 
market and capacity analyses above. Based on the process analysis above, describe 
critical items and associated lead times. 
2. Cost raw materials, intermediate inventory, and supplies: Do raw material, 
intermediate inventory, or supplies needs represent a vulnerability to price volatility or 
constricted supply? Track the percentage relation of these components of production to 
price levels for finished goods, and for each category describe future price trends and 
market conditions. Assess how much risk the company is taking with respect to these 
inputs to the production process. 
3. Supplier analysis: Describe suppliers by category of product and volume. Where 
they located? Are they stable financially? Are there multiple suppliers for specific needs, 
or backup suppliers? Which suppliers are dependent on the company’s business, and to 
what extent? On which suppliers is the company   dependent? 
4. The procurement system: What is the procurement system? 
- How centrally managed is it? 
- Does it balance cost saving and efficiency with design and quality control? 
- To what extent does the company use a formal purchasing manual based 
on order quantities, up-to-date vendor evaluation files (covering delivery on order 
information), and a formal program for reviewing the value and quality of 
purchased materials? What procedures are used in procurement? How are costs 
compared, and hoe is purchase approval given? 
- What are the circumstances in which goods may return? How flexible is 
procurement system in dealing with changes in customer orders or fluctuation in 
sales? 
- Does consolidation or streamlining of procurement represent future 
potential cost savings? If so, quantify. 
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5 Long-term contracts: If there are long-term contracts, describe the process for 
reaching agreement on them, their status, and in what circumstances they would be 
favorable and unfavorable to the company. 
6  Utilities and other infrastructure support: Analyze the company’s need for utilities 
(including water supply) and other infrastructure support, such as transportation and 
communication. Are these facilities all available on an assured basis, or can back-up be 
arranged if there is a problem? Are there potential cost savings here or does infrastructure 
a vulnerability to price volatility or constricted supply? 
7 Support for facility expansion: If there is a decision to expand the facility are 
sufficient supplies of the following available at the selected location? 
- Manpower with the right skill levels 
- Utilities, transportation, communication, and other infrastructure support 
- Raw materials and supplies on a secures and cost- effective basis 
- Real estate at appropriate pricing with appropriate zoning 
8 Supply-chain analysis: Analyze the logistical of supply chain in light of rationalized 
production capacity. Are there potential cost saving in the supply-chain structure, such as 
streamlined order processing; smarter coding and packaging; improved tracking; 
computerize stock picking; auto-mated packing, improved IT-based scheduling systems 
with those of transporters; tighter design of inventory management by use of current 
sales/production data; and automatic or rapid reordering/redirection strategies? 
9  Supply-chain risk analysis: Are there vulnerabilities in the supply chain- to shipping 
disruption, transportation price volatility, currency risks- and if so, is there available 
work-around, or are these risks inherent to the production process? 
10 Collapsing the supply chain: Are there potential efficiencies in combining the 
company’s supply chain to the point of production/shipping with the distribution/sales to 
customers? 
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(iv) Analysis of information, Technology, Communications, and General Systems 
Support of the Vale-Creation process; intellectual Capital and intellectual Property 
 
1. Traditional MIS: Describe the management information systems of the company 
as they relate to traditional NIS functions: payroll, benefits, payables, receivable, cost 
accounting and financial accounting generally. What is the target company’s hardware 
configuration for data processing and for networking? What is the target’s software 
platform-venders, operating systems, database management system, programming 
environments, and software applications-and how integrated is it across company units, 
both functionally and geographically? 
2. Integration for MIS: What does an integration plan for traditional MIS look 
like? Can apply, and are there any items that do not really need to be integrated? What is 
a realistic time frame for MIS integration, and how can functions be maintained with 
minimal disruption for that period? 
3. ERP: Does the company have an ERP system or other partially or fully integrated 
IT system? Which one? Describe implementation, vendor and contracts. 
4. Other valuable IT systems and assets :  Does the company have other valuable 
systems or processes that are IT-based, such as  
- Online order or transaction processing 
- Online search, tracking, or other information-retrieval systems 
- Knowledge-sharing systems, such as a firm intranet or other groupware 
- Engineering platforms such as computer-assisted design systems 
- Computer-based scheduling or routing systems 
- Document production systems that go beyond general office needs 
- Special mathematical or engineering data-modeling or data-processing 
support, such as that required for minerals extraction 
- Decision support systems 
- Robotics 
- Sensing, feedback, and control mechanisms in extraction or production 
- Large database support of, for example, customer relationship 
management or R&D 
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5. System assessment; IT personnel and budget: For any of the items above hat 
are fundamental to the business, a full-scale assessment of hardware (data storage, 
processing, and network) and software adequacy, scalability, and robustness of the 
systems is required. Security and backup are both very important to most of these types 
of systems, as is error-free ordinary operation. For all such systems: What level of 
personnel support is required? What are ongoing maintenance costs? How long to 
obsolescence? Are there multiple systems, and should some standardization be imposed? 
How is procurement managed? 
6. Ownership; vendor relationships: Does the company own the rights to its IT 
systems, or are some aspects of the systems operated under license? What is the 
company’s position in term of vendor lock-in? How vulnerable is it to force and round-
robin upgrades and price increase? Are some aspects of the company’s IT systems 
proprietary to it, and if so , are these proprietary aspects treated as confidential of 
otherwise as protected as they can be from duplication by competitors, including 
departing employees? 
7. Outsourcing: Are any of the company’s IT functions outsourced? Describe the 
arrangements, the vendor (including the vendor’s stability), and the backup and recovery 
systems. Describe the pros and cons of the arrangements. 
8. Systems risk analysis of the IT systems: Describe the systems risk inherent in 
the company’s IT infrastructure and such issues as redundancy, backup, crashes, and how 
often do these occur? What is the tolerance for IT failure in terms of the company’s 
operations? 
9. Intellectual property and know-how; licensing: What intellectual property 
underlies the company’s value-generating processes? Describe these including processes 
or branding concepts that might not be written down or that might not fall within a legal 
definition of intellectual property. Describe all licensing agreements and their terms. 
10. Ownership of intellectual property: Does the company have the right to use of 
its important know-how? What is the risk of infringement claims? How much of the 
company’s valuable know-how is property to the company, and of that how much is 
entitled to legal protection and under what rubric- e.g. trademark and trade name, patent, 
copyright, trade secrets? Has the company taken all appropriate steps to protect its rights 
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in its cross-border implications (in what countries are the company’s intellectual 
properties protected, and so on). 
11. Product development and innovation: Assess the company’s general product 
development and product innovation experience and strengths in design, engineering, and 
general creativity and responsiveness. 
12. Cross-border implications: For each aspects of the constituent companies’ 
important know-how that it is assumed will be applied cross-border after closing: Must 
such know-how be tailored to local needs and conditions? Will the know-how retain its 
protected character it transplanted to the new site? How easy will be for competitors to 
copy the know-how? 
13. R&D generally: How important is R&D to the company and to competitors? 
How does the company’s R&D budget compare to those comparable companies, as a 
percentage of sales and against other measures? How successful is the company at 
turning R&D into valuable products/services over a reasonable period time? How 
integrated is the company’s R&D efforts with its marketing strategy (or how relevant is 
its marketing strategy to its R&D effort)? 
14. R&D facilities and capabilities: Describe in detail the R&D facilities, 
capabilities, and directions of the company and define areas of overlap or obvious areas 
of extension for the combined enterprise. Are there opportunities for cost reduction or 
important new initiatives in combined R&D functions? 
15. IT and intellectual property/know-how overview: Of all of the company’s IT-
based systems and other know-how noted above, are some elements so valuable that they 
constitute a critical aspect of the value proposition? If so, are they fully understood, and 
is their legal status and confidentiality protected as fully as possible? Can the associated 
systems and know-how be successfully scaled and deployed across borders in the 
combined enterprise? 
16. IT systems overview: What knowledge and information requirements of the 
combined enterprise cannot be met through combination and integration of the existing 
information system? What are the budget and timetable for these, and can they be grafted 
into the more basic IT infrastructure? 
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(v) People Analysis: Management Structure. Labor Relations, Corporate 
Culture, Recruitment and Training as Related to Operations 
A. Management structure from an Operational Perspective 
1. Management structure and lines of reporting: Document the official lines of 
reporting, and comment on management communications formats that do not coincide 
with the formal structure. 
2.  Management structure and business units: How does management structure 
translate into operational/production functions, entities, or units such as: 
- Factories/mines/other facilities for extraction/production (manufacturing)  
- Professional and production offices and studios (professional services 
firms, media) 
- Networks and systems (transportation, communication) 
- Sales outlets and customers service centers 
- Corporate office: corporate-wide systems such as accounting and finance, 
legal, information systems, procurement, brand management and 
marketing, engineering, R&D, and quality control  
3. Management operations across borders: Are there any country/regional 
managers? How autonomous is the country manager, and how do country manager roles 
integrate corporate-wide decision making? Are there matrix management structures or 
other processes in place to coordinate country practices and policies within a global 
strategy? 
4. Identifying key personnel (non-management) from an operational 
perspective: Which non-management categories of personnel are key from an 
operational perspective? Consider the following: 
- Creative 
- Writers and editors (media) – Designers (retail/manufacturing) Marketing 
- Scientists and engineers 
:  Systems and operations engineers (airlines, other transportation, telecommunications) 
 : Doctors and other health professionals and researchers (Pharmaceuticals, health care) 
 :   Design engineers (automotive, other manufacturing) 
 :   Software engineers, electrical engineers (information Technology) 
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 :  Mining, construction, mechanical, or other engineers (Extraction, construction, 
manufacturing) 
- Finance/legal/other professionals 
 :  Lawyers, accountants, consultants 
 :  Bankers 
 :  Pilots (for an airline) 
- Sales and customer-relationship-management 
 :  Sales and marketing personnel 
-  Skilled and unskilled production labor 
 : Office staff (for a professional services firm, for Example)- Factory skilled and 
unskilled workers (Manufacturing firm) 
For the target and the combined company, rank the relevant categories, and set forth the 
analysis and implications for integration strategy: 
- Are there individuals or teams in this category so essential that losing 
them after closing would negate the value of deal? Those people can take 
the value of the business with them or become competitors (for example, 
key bankers leaving after a bank is acquired star sales managers leaving an 
advertising agency, the most productive software engineers leaving a 
software development firm). 
- Is one category of personnel so essential that managing that group as a 
whole is key element of the deal (for example, airline pilots for an airline, 
and doctors for a health care organization)? 
- Are replacement personnel available? 
- Will there be personnel redundancies post deal? How will these be deal 
with?  
For existing personnel, consider in general terms their numbers, location, work 
performed, compensation, and terms of employment (including union or other contracts). 
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B. Operational Questions across Categories of Personnel 
   
5. Workers and planned strategic Initiatives: Review all categories of workers in 
light of strategic initiatives for the combined company. Will strategic redirection 
reengineering of processes render some workers unneeded, or will new categories of 
workers be required? 
6. Recruitment and training: How are workers recruited and trained? Is 
recruitment and training appropriately geared to operational needs? 
7. Workers and process review: What are the general terms of employment as they 
relate to process design and other operations matters, such as shift length vacation 
expectations, and flexibility in learning new skills and being rooted into different jobs? 
Will these need to be reconciled between the companies after closing, or reconfigured in 
order to implement new process designs, and if so, how? 
8. Workforce integration: Will there be integration of workforces? If so, what 
impediments are there to smooth integration (such as language barriers)? 
9. Workforce reduction: If a workforce reduction is contemplated, how will that be 
executed, keeping in mind the need to retain motivated staff? How much will it cost-soft 
costs as well as hard costs? 
10. New hires: If the combined enterprise plans relocation or expansion, or if new 
facilities or lines of business are planned, will new employees be required, and are they 
available? 
11. Social obligations: Does the company have social obligations to its workers, such 
as requirements to provide or fund housing, schooling, or medical services? What is the 
basic infrastructure available to employees to meet these needs? How do these 
obligations potentially affect operations? 
C. Corporate Culture and Operations 
Compare the corporate cultures of the parties to the transaction in terms that seem most 
useful to the deal structure and to developing an integration plan from an operational 
perspective. 
12. General aspects of corporate culture: Some markers or attributes that might be 
considered in terms of how employees work together might be these: 
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- Relative rankings of jobs as perceived in the companies, importance of 
formal hierarchy 
- Formality, style of dress, office configuration, open doors or closed doors 
13. Communications formats: What are the formats for various types of 
communications, such as: 
- Meeting scheduled in advance with/without prepared agendas 
-  Impromptu meeting 
- Memos, e-mails, voice mails 
-  Formal reporting lines versus back channels 
-  Formal committees versus ‘kitchen cabinets” 
-  Collaborative work    
14. IT support for communications: Is there adequate IT support for IT-based intra-
company communications (for example, e-mail, an internet, or other groupware is 
important for intra company communication, quality control and promulgation of 
standards, and collaborative design and engineering)? 
15. Knowledge sharing and knowledge management:  What is the attitude about 
information in the enterprise: Is it shared, or do individuals tend to keep their knowledge 
to themselves? If knowledge is shared, is that solely through informal means or by way of 
formal training formats? What are the implications for IT support of knowledge sharing 
and transference (for example, for worker training and rotation)? 
16. Company approaches to systems design: Are employees rewarded for 
exercising initiative or for acquiescence in management instruction? How free do 
employees feel to question their superiors? How comfortable are managers with, 
questions or challenges from those they supervise? 
17. Documentation of systems design: Are work processes and practices fluid and 
open, or do they tend to be rigidly defined rule bound? Do work processes and practices 
tend to be documented, or is there more of an oral tradition? 
18. Conflict resolution and change management in integration planning and 
systems design: How do employees react to things that they don’t agree with? Do they 
have a forum for discussing and resolving issues with management, or will dissatisfaction 
show up in other up in other ways? Are people more or less comfortable with group or 
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consensus decision making in comparison to individual Leadership? How important is it 
that groups validate leaders’ decisions? What is the mechanism for creating “buy-in,” and 
has this process been considered in integration planning at a practical? 
19. Life- balance issues in operations planning: How permissible is it to 
acknowledge the importance of family or personal life, and how flexible is the company 
in accommodating the family and personal lives of their employees? 
 
D. Background Culture Questions Affecting Operations 
 
20. Language: What is the dominant language used for spoken and written 
communications, within the company and with suppliers, customers, and investors? Are 
there enough persons with multilingual capacity to bridge the language gaps? 
21. How things really get done? : Does the background culture accord a significant 
amount of weight to long-term contracts, or are the most importance relationships or 
aspects of relationships likely to be undocumented? A related question: How is business 
agreements reached? Are key decision makers interested in and patient with lengthy and 
detailed negotiations?  Or do they rely more on establishing personal bonds with their 
correspondents? Do people enjoy haggling, or do they avoid it? 
22. Importance of documentation and record keeping: Are things generally 
written down or otherwise recorded and kept? How important is record keeping and the 
memorialization of events and decisions/ How important are formal and written inquiries 
and justifications? To what extent is arbitrariness accepted? 
23.  Transparency to outsiders: Do companies routinely share information with 
outsiders, such lenders, investors, or the press, or are information closely held? What 
types of information are shared with vendors, suppliers, and customers, and on what 
terms? 
24.  Involvement of equity owners: Does the ownership structure of the company 
have an impact on operational decisions- for example, has common ownership resulted 
unfavorable or unfavorable business relationships with vendors and suppliers or 
customers? Is the background culture one in which professional management is given a 
 137
great deal of leeway day to day or one in which equity owners are likely to be involved in 
operational issues? 
25. Attitude toward rules and protocol: Do people tend to follow written rules and 
procedures to the letter or take a more relaxed attitude?  
26. Attitudes toward accounting standards, taxation, and regulatory compliance: 
What is the company’s attitude toward these requirements? 
27. The basis of customer relationships: How would you characterize typical 
business-to-business transactions and business-to-consumer transactions? For example, is 
there more emphasis on a branded or otherwise consistent corporate identity or on 
local/personal relationships? In what circumstances are purchasers entitle to refunds and 
exchanges? What are the most effective channels for marketing and production/company 
communication? 
28. Social contract with workers: What is the background understanding about the 
social contract with workers? Among government, the family, and business, who bears 
the costs of various risks to workers: unemployment, health, family care, retirement, and 
need for retraining? What are the long-term obligations assumed by a company when it 
hires an employee? 
29. Attitude toward change: Is change and rapid response valued, or do people tend 
to value tradition, the status quo, and stability? 
 
Due Diligence Check list 
C: Legal Due Diligence 
(A) Corporate Documents of the Company and Subsidiaries 
(1) The latest Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Companies and its 
subsidiaries. 
(2) Minutes of all Board of Directors, committee and shareholders meetings and all 
circular resolutions passed; 
(3) List of branches and offices in different States from where the business is run. 
(4) Material information or documents furnished to shareholders and to directors 
during the last two years; 
(5) Copy of Annual returns and form 32 filed for the last two years; 
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(6) Copy of charge registered; 
 
(B) Issue of Shares 
(1) Shareholders, debenture holders, if any, information, indicating number of 
shares/debentures held, dates of issuance, and subscribed amount; 
(2) All stock options, stock purchase and other employee benefit plans and forms of 
agreements. 
(3) List of any outstanding stock option; 
(C) Material Contracts an Agreements 
(1) List of banks or other lenders with whom Company has a financial relationship 
(briefly describe nature of relationship-lines of credit, etc.); 
(2) Mortgages, financial or performance guaranties, indemnification, liens, equipment 
leases or other agreements evidencing outstanding loans to which the company is a party 
or was a party within the past two years. 
(3) All material correspondence with lenders during the last three years including all 
compliance reports submitted by the company or its accountants 
(4) List of major clients and their locations. 
(5) Any other material contracts. 
(D) Litigation 
(1) Copies of any lawsuits involving the company or the subsidiaries; 
(2) Summary of dispute with suppliers, competitors or customers. 
(3) Correspondence with auditor or accountant regarding threatened or pending 
litigation, assessment or claims. 
(4) Decrees, orders or judgment of courts or governmental agencies. 
(5) Any settle made in any of the litigations and if so documents relating thereto. 
 
(E) Employees and related information 
(1) A management organization chart and information on managerial personnel. 
(2) Summary of any labour agreement and disputes, if any. 
(3) Notes concerning pending or threatened labor disputes, if any. 
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(4) All employment and consulting with officers, directors, key employees and 
related parties. 
(5) Schedule of all remuneration paid to officers, directors and key employees for 
most recent fiscal year showing separately salary, bonuses and perquisites (i.e. use of 
cars, property, ect.). 
(6) Summary of employee benefits and copies of any provident fund trusts, gratuity 
trusts, pension schemes, and other employee benefit schemes and related documents. 
(7) Confidentiality agreements with employees. 
(F)     Immovable property 
(1) List of all immovable properties owned by the company. 
(2) Documents of title, mortgages, and other security agreements pertaining to the 
properties listed in (1) above. 
(3) All outstanding leases with an original term greater than one year for immovable 
property to which the Company is either a lesser or lessee. 
(4) Documents pertaining to any copyright or patent fillings. 
(G)    Taxation 
(8) Income tax, Sales tax returns for the three years. 
(9) Details of all pending assessments before Income-tax, Sales tax, customs and 
Excise authorities 
(10)  All pending litigation relating to the above taxes and/or 
(11) Evidence of company being up to date on income-tax deduction at source, sales 
tax, service tax, professional tax, payment of provident fund, and other tax payments. 
(H)    Insurance and Liability 
(12) Schedule or copies of all material insurance policies of the company covering 
property, liabilities and operations, including product liabilities, 
(13) Schedule of any other insurance policies in force such as “key man” policies or 
director indemnification policies. 
(14) All other relevant documents pertaining to the company’s insurance and liability 
exposure, including special reserve funds and accounts. 
(I)   Joint venture or collaboration Agreements: Copies of any Partnership agreements 
or joint Venture Agreements or collaboration agreements 
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(J)     Governmental Regulations 
(15) Copies of all permits and licenses necessary to conduct the Company’s business. 
(16) Copies of all approvals received from the Government authorities relating to 
issues of shares to non-residents, export credit obtained etc. 
(17) Copy of all filing with Securities Exchange Board of India and Stock Exchanges 
and Approvals, if any, taken.  
 
    
CONCLUSION 
Merger and Acquisitions are most impotent strategic tools for the corporate restructuring 
of business. The assets and liabilities of acquired company transferred to the acquiring 
company. The basic difference between these two terms is that, in case of merger, the 
merging company loses its identity, while acquiring company maintains its identity. In 
case of acquisition or takeover, however, acquired company maintains its identity, only a 
change in ownership takes place. Both these methods have been traditionally used for 
business consolidations, increasing market share and diversification of risk through 
diversification of operations. 
 
In last two decades M&A activity has been seen across the world for restructuring and 
consolidation in various sectors. In India also after linearization opportunities for external 
growth is increased due to simplified legislation and reduction in control by the 
government. Corporate restructuring activities in Indian industries made business 
combinations effective empower companies to gain core competencies, adopt new 
technology, expansion of business in new market, and to achieve significant growth. 
 
However, it matter of great concern that number of mergers have been resulted in failures 
in spite their best efforts in due diligence pre-deal and post deal require to ascertain what 
determines their success or failure.  
 
In subsequent chapter, review of literature and analyze M&A deal that have taken place 
in India and abroad have been included. Efforts have also been made to examine success 
or failure of these deals.    
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An attempt has been made by researcher to review and locate literature related 
study in this chapter. The relevant studies have been found from the various 
sources, are as below. 
 
OVERVIEW 
Merger and acquisition for long have been an important phenomenon in the US 
and UK economics. In India also, they have now become a matter of everyday 
occurrence. They are the subject of counting interest to different persons such as 
the business executives who are looking for potential merger partners, 
investment bankers who manage the mergers, lawyers who advice the parties, 
regulatory authorities concern with the operations of security market and 
growing corporate concentration in the economy and academic researchers who 
want to understand these phenomenon better.   
 
The 1970s and 1980s was an active era for mergers and acquisitions and for 
research on them in most of the countries. During these decades, economics and 
finances researchers (especially in US and UK) made great strides in 
understanding the operations of capital markets and ways in which causes and 
effects of merger and acquisitions might be model and measure. Hence, a whole 
plethora of research on these and relate issues has been conducted abroad. 
However, not much research available on this topic relevant to the Indian 
conditions since it is relatively a new phenomenon which has gain momentum 
only during the last decade. 
 
An extensive review of literature has been carried out in order to enhance the 
present level of understanding in the area of mergers and acquisitions, gain 
insight into the success of failure of mergers and formulate the problem for 
further research in this area. Broadly, literature review has been done on 
empirical studies in books, journals, published papers etc. In the literature survey 
out of India, the issues covered include theories of the firm conceptualized into 
the motives for merged, their empirical investigation, performance measure of 
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merged firms using share price data and accounting data, empirical examination 
of financial characteristics of merged and merging firms and the determinants of 
aggregate merger activity. These studies have been reviewed and summarized in 
following manner, though very limited has been reviewed on studies conducted 
in India.  
 
STUDIES CONDUCTED ABROAD 
Chart 3.1 presents a bird’s eye view of various aspects relating to mergers and 
acquisitions on which studies have been conducted abroad. These are discussed in detail 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
Chart – 3.1 
Survey of studies on merger 
 
 
 
Theories of  Motives of    Financial  Financial 
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SURVEY OF STUDIES ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
Theories of Firms 
Corporate restructuring attained through M&A, tender offer, joint venture, demerger, 
going private, might be to increase buying power, capturing market and control over 
supply, or to reduce risk by way of diversification. However, one fundamental reason for 
restructuring is to strengthen the present business conditions and help its growth. 
Different theories have been developed by various analysts to explain the motives for 
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such corporate restructuring through M&A activities. These theories are two major 
competing theories of the firms have been evolved in the academic literature and 
empirical evidence in support of both is available. These two theories can be used to 
explain why companies engage in mergers and takeovers and to predict the outcome of 
post-merger performance. 
 
First is the Neo Classical Profit Maximization Theory of the firm which holds that 
competitive markets forces motivate firms to maximize shareholders wealth. The theory 
states that the firms will engage in takeovers if it results in increased wealth for acquiring 
company’s shareholders [Manne (1965)].1 increased shareholders wealth is likely to 
results if acquiring company’s profitability increase after the takeover. The shareholder 
wealth maximization theory thus requires that a takeover should lead to increased 
profitability for the acquiring firm for it to be justified. Profitability can increase through 
the creation of monopoly power, synergies or injecting superior management into the 
acquired firm. 
  
However, a constraint on this motive for takeover occurs when lots of firms compete with 
each other to take over target firms. These firms tend to bid against each other until all 
the potential profit available from monopoly power, synergy, restructuring etc. Is driven 
away [This is the case with perfectly competitive acquisition market as termed by 
Mandelkar (1974)]2 
 
In opposition to the neo classical economists, Robin Marris (1964)3, W.J. Baumol (1959)4 
and others have put forward the Theory of Maximizing Objective of Growth. While each 
of them attribute different behavioral objectives to management (for example, Baumols’ 
sales maximization, Marris growth maximization), they all have recognized the 
separation of ownership and control in a modern public company. The theory therefore, 
holds that beyond achieving a certain satisfactory level of profits, managers will attempt 
to maximize their own self interests and these do not necessarily correspond with 
maximizing shareholders wealth. Management’s self interests include such factors like 
reducing the risk of losing their jobs, increasing their salary levels and increasing their 
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power and job satisfaction. These self interests can be aided by growth in size and 
takeovers are, in practice, the quickest way of growing. Hence, the maximization of 
management growth theory does not necessarily require increased profitability; an 
increase in size and an increase in manager’s benefits are the criteria. This is also because 
level of manager’s salaries and other goals they seek (such as power, prestige etc.) are 
related more to the size of the firm than to its profitability. Market for managers is 
imperfect and managerial promotion generally takes place through bureaucratic and 
political process within the firm, rather than through market. So, managers are more 
likely to increase size of the firm they work for, than to maximize its profitability. 
 
Marris, in his Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism, propounded for the first time 
a theory of takeovers bids. Before his work, there did not exist in literature, any formal 
theory of takeovers i.e. an explanation of what kind of firm is acquired. The literature, 
however, did contain motives usually given for acquisitions which are summarized as 
follows.5 
 
1) Desire to achieve production economies of large scale and multi unit     operations. 
2) Possibility of achieving distribution and advertising economies. 
3) Financial advantages of large size. 
4) Strategic control of patents. 
5) Acquisition of financial resources. 
6) Response to legal and institutional environment. 
7) Tax advantages. 
8) Gain from sale of securities. 
9) Gains to promoters. 
10) Desire to limit competition. 
 
Marris summarized all these motives for takeover in terms of a single variable the 
“Valuation ratio”.6 The valuation ratio “V” at any point of time is defined as: 
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       Stock market value of a firm’s equity capital 
V =    -------------------------------------------------------- 
      Book value of its net equity assets  
  
If assets are valued in the firm’s balance sheet at replacement cost the denominator of the 
above expression reflects the value of economic resources employed by the firm. The 
numerator, on the other hand, reflects stock market’s valuation of earning power of these 
resources under the present management. 
 
Marris suggests that, corresponding to the market’s valuation ratio (Vim) of any firm i, 
there also exists some other firm j’s subjective valuation ratio (Vij) reflecting j’s 
valuation of i if were to acquire i. When Vij is greater than Vim, there are chances of a 
takeover bid. In other words, the theory of takeover bid simply asserts that, other things 
being equal, firm I is likely to be taken over by firm j if j’s valuation ratio for is higher 
than market’s and any other firm’s valuation ratio for i. 
 
In addition to these two theories, two general theories have also being advanced in 
literature to explain the motives of merger/ takeover activity. Williamson’s (1968)7 
Native Trade off Model states that only a small gain in efficiency is necessary to offset a 
relatively large gain in market power and as such mergers are generally beneficial 
because the loss suffered by consumers resulting from an increase in price is more than 
outweighed by gains to producers. This model, which is not without critics, has been 
cited in many US antitrust law suits as justification for mergers. 
 
Gort’s (1969)8 Economic Disturbance Theory is based on the premise that differences 
exist between the shareholders concerning the present value of share because of 
information imperfection as individuals possess different information and asses it 
differently. These differences occur because of economic disturbances such as rapid 
change in technology and share prices. When technology changes are rapid, the product 
life cycle is shortened and past record of the firm becomes less relevant to its future. 
Rapid changes in share prices represent a break with the past leading to a temporary 
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disequilibrium since it takes time for the investor expectations to be realigned to market 
events. Consequently, whenever share price change rapidly; (upward or downward) 
merger activity will increase.   
 
Gort examined whether explanations of mergers, such as pursuit of monopoly power or 
economies of scale, actually explained fluctuations in the level of merger activity. The 
rate of merger was defined as the number of acquisitions to total business firms in a given 
sector.   
 
He tested the hypothesis that frequency of merger was a function of either economic 
disturbances that lead to valuation discrepancies or economies of scale by taking few 
explanatory variables. His results supported the valuation discrepancy hypothesis and 
argued against an important role for economies of scale. 
To sum up, although many contributions have been offered from different perspectives 
and disciplines, researchers have not been able to formulate a general theory of mergers 
and acquisitions.9 
 
Motives of Mergers 
A number of reasons have been advanced and hypothesized in literature as justifications 
of mergers. Classification of merger motives to explain merger activities were found to 
be one of the most difficult and complex task by most of the researchers.  
 
An attempt made by Steiner (1975)10 emphasized on the multivariate nature of motives 
for merger. Depicting mergers as being contingent of actors, climates, motives and 
participants, he classified motives into four categories: Efficiency, inefficiency, strategic 
and monopoly theories. According to him, efficiency occurs if value is increased to 
shareholders. Synergies, economies of scale, acquisition of market share may be strategic 
or even aimed to create monopoly. Inefficiency theories include managerial motives 
which lead to agency problems i.e. mergers may enhance wealth of managers at the 
expense of shareholders. Management may pursue its own aim than that of its 
shareholders. Similarly, an opportunity for managers to indulge in insider trading may be 
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another reason for merger. Fourth kind of motive may be strategic and may include 
acquisition of growth, reduction in capacity and opportunity for accounting 
manipulations. Some of these may lead to increase in value and may overlap with 
efficiency. 
 
In a pioneer compilation of merger studies in seven major countries11 with the same set of 
hypotheses (about determinants and effects of mergers) and methodological 
homogeneity, D.C. Mueller (1980)12 reports three kinds of results: 
 
1) How merging firms differ from the ones that do not merge. 
2) Certain tests of hypotheses concerning determinants of mergers. 
3) Those concerning the effects of mergers. 
 
These results are based on empirical investigations carried out at micro-economic level 
within each country and relate to the merger wave of 1960’s. 
 
          The economic rationale and motivation for the specific hypotheses and issues that have 
been examined in empirical studies across the seven countries have been laid down by 
Hughes, Mueller and Singh.13 They have cited three reasons for comparing pre-merger 
characteristics of various groups of merging and non merging firms.14 Firstly, such 
comparisons are important from the point of view of both economic theory and policy. 
Neo classical economists hypotheses profit maximization as major incentive for takeover 
i.e. takeover mechanism selects profit maximizing firms and punished non maxi misers 
(Mead, 1968).15 On the other hand, managerial theorists such as Galbraith (1967),16 
Marris (1968),17 Mueller (1969)18 hypothesized that takeover mechanism is more likely 
to favor firms who pursue fast growth. So, a comparison of living (none taken over firms) 
and dead (taken over) firms provides evidence on this issue. A comparison of acquiring 
firms as compared to the acquired firms also gives an indication of acquiring firms as 
compared to the acquired. Secondly, with the different economic and institutional 
background, in what way these characteristics differ in each country are of special 
interest and thirdly, a profile of various groups of merging and non merging firms is 
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required for full understanding of subsequent results of determinants and effects of 
mergers. 
 
Hypotheses concerning the determinants of mergers can be classified into various 
categories (Steiner 1975) 19 but the authors have categorized them into three: 
 
(1) The most frequently hypothesized cause of mergers is bring about an increase in 
profits by either increasing market power of the firm or by reducing its cost or both. 
Increasing size or diversification can make various organizational changes more efficient. 
Also, possible tax advantage from mergers has been emphasized as another cause of 
merger activity. 
 
(2) Another hypothesized cause of merger is based on Gort’s (1969) 20 economic 
disturbance theory of mergers. There are differences in individual stockholders 
expectations because of differences in information possessed, evaluation of information 
done and different degrees of optimism. That is to say, merger activity is associated with 
rapid changes in stock market prices. 
 
(3) Finally, the broader set of hypothesized cause of merger is maximization of growth or 
sales based managerial model of Marris (1968) 21 and Baumol (1967).22 The possible 
effects of mergers have been discussed by the authors in terms of three types of mergers, 
namely, horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers. 
 
The cross sectional comparisons of merger statistics done by Mueller (1980)23 produced 
some consistent patterns across countries and some inconsistencies requiring further 
theorizing of the determinants. None of the hypotheses examined received consistent 
confirmation across the seven countries. The conclusion drawn is based on Steiner’s 
electric theory of mergers. “Since no single hypothesis explains all mergers, a variety of 
hypothesis must be assumed to govern.”24 
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On the effect side, the rather consistent lack of evidence that mergers lead to or are 
expected to lead to significant increases in profits is inconsistent with all the neo classical 
theories of mergers. Some form of managerial motives for mergers i.e. pursuit of growth 
is left as sort of residual explanation for why mergers take place. Further, not much 
difference emerged in the result of US and other European countries in spite of the much 
heavier incidences of horizontal merger activity in European countries. Similarly, the 
anticipate differences in results of US and UK (with highly developed stock markets) 
with other countries also did not emerge significant. 
 
Paul Halpern (1983) 25 categorized acquisitions theories in to two classes. The first refers 
to non value maximizing behavior by management of acquiring firms. Acquisitions are 
considered as attempts to maximize growth in sales or assets or to control a large empire. 
Acquisitions of this type have no economic gain to be divided among companies. Given 
the cost of negotiating and the potential problem of co-ordination of expanding corporate 
empire, there is an overall economic loss. The growth maximization hypotheses is more 
likely to occur for acquiring firms that are engaged in conglomerate mergers and have 
active acquisition programs. 
The second class of theories refer to value maximization motivations in which 
acquisitions should meet the same criteria as any other investment decisions. There are 
number of acquisition motivations that are consistent with value of goal maximization. 
The first type refers to financial motivations where acquisition permits a redeployment of 
excess cash held by either acquirer or acquiree. Then, diversification benefits provided by 
the acquisition can reduce the probability of default thereby reducing expected 
bankruptcy costs and increasing debt capacity of new entity. Both of these influences 
would increase market value of equity after acquisition relative to sum of market values 
prior be acquisition. 
 
Another set of motivations is captured by synergy in which an acquisition results in an 
increase in the expected cash flows over their sums as independent firms. These gains can 
occur from economies of scale for horizontal mergers, excess capacity in some factors of 
production (such as managerial or financial control) or economies of scope which 
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generate cost advantage when output is increased by the post-acquisition entity. Finally, 
the achievement of monopoly power through an acquisition is often included in synergy 
class because of expected increase in post-acquisition cash flows. 
 
Another motivation is an attempt by the acquiring firm’s management to take advantage 
of asymmetry in information. This information hypotheses populates that acquire firm 
has information concerning the target firm that is not available to other participants in this 
market and is not reflected in current share price of target firms. 
 
The last set of value maximization acquisition motivations is based on the attempt by an 
acquirer to obtain control of the target. In its most general form, the acquiring firm 
desires control to replace an incompetent management or to force existing management to 
follow profit maximization strategy. The corporate control hypothesis is developed by 
Berk and Means (1932)26 where managers who control the firms make decisions which 
do not maximize the market value of equity to existing shareholders. 
 
This study reviewed the studies that empirically these competitive hypotheses to identify 
whether value or non-value maximizing behavior is the dominant explanation of merger 
activity. 
 
The results of studies by Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978),27 Dodd and Ruback (1977),28 
Bradle (1980) 29 and Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982)30 observed positive and significant 
abnormal performance surrounding the event date, thus concluding that takeovers are 
value maximizing decisions in which markets expect benefits to the bidding firm after the 
tender offer is successfully completed. 
 
Eckbo (1981) 31 and Stillman (1982)32  tested for the existence of monopoly power by 
observing abnormal return performance of horizontal rivals of the target firms involved in 
a merger. Stilman’s study found no evidence consistent with the market power 
motivation for mergers in a sample of sixteen horizontal mergers. Eckbo, applying his 
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methodology to define rival firms to Stillman’s sample found results consistent with his 
large sample. 
 
The tests provided by both these studies cannot however, reject economies of scale cost 
reduction or monopoly power motivations since there is no reason provided as to why 
mergers would be expected to generate benefits to rivals as identified by abnormal gains.  
 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1982) 33 also empirically evaluated the information hypotheses. 
Their results indicated a significant positive return to target shareholders after an 
unsuccessful tender offer in an expectation of a future tender offer. If such an offer is not 
forthcoming (within five years of an unsuccessful offer), the share prices fall back to their 
pre-offer level. If the offer materializes and there is a successful bid, and additional 
significant abnormal return is obtained by target shareholders. Therefore, their evidence 
is inconsistent with the pure information hypotheses. 
 
Brick, Haber and Weaver (1982) 34 empirically explored the financial motives in mergers. 
To isolate effect of diversification from other possible motives for mergers (such as 
operational synergies), they have confined their analysis to conglomerate mergers only. 
Their study analyzed fifty seven conglomerate mergers to investigate the role of leverage 
and diversification in the determination of total merger premium.  The regressions 
performed indicated that significant positive correlation exists between the merger 
premium and diversification. The results corroborated the view that diversification, 
especially in presence of high levels of debts provided a powerful stimulus for mergers. 
 
Another study by Myers and Majluf (1984) 35 suggested a specific financial motive for 
mergers based on a complimentary fit between slack 36 rich bidders (those with low 
gearing levels) and slack poor targets. The study assumed asymmetry in information 
between managers and shareholders, and that manager’s act in interest of existing 
shareholders. The assumption made the form of financing important i.e. the model 
generally predicted disadvantage to equity financing and value to internal financing. 
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Another study by Asquith and Millins (1986)37 confirmed the negative impact of external 
equity financing. According to their theory, the value created through a merger of 
compliments arose from additional positive NPV investment taken up by a merged firm 
that slack poor firm might ignore. The value created here depends on the alternative ways 
of financing target investments. Thus, value will be created in mergers if firms rich in 
financial slack38 acquire slack poor firms. 
 
Robert Bruner (1988) 39 explored the hypothesis that capital structure change provided 
bidder and targets a motive for merger. Their study, in testing capital structure change, 
used both traditional debt to total capital ratio and net debt ratio, 40 a new measure that 
adjusts for cash. It also controlled for the secular rise in leverage of firms over an 
eighteen year observation period and finally explicitly tested for a relationship between 
merger related changes in capital structure and shareholder return. 
 
Their results, conducted on a sample of seventy five bidder target pairs of which forty 
nine were, consummated and twenty six were terminated, are consistent with the financial 
economies motives for mergers. Bidders are relatively unleveled extant and then lever up. 
Merger announcement returns are associated with these changes. 
 
The findings also support the information based theory of Myers and Majluf (1984).41 
before merger, bidders are relatively slacking rich and target slack poor. The strength of 
these differences depends upon whether merger was ultimately consummated or not. 
Successful mergers confirm to the theory more than the unsuccessful ones. The change in 
targets slack because of mergers is somewhat associated to total gains to target and 
bidding shareholders.  
 
Another rationale for mergers, target managerial incompetence or the existence of agency 
costs was empirically evaluated by Ellert (1976) 42 Asquith (1983) 43 and Langetieg 
(1978). 44 Regardless of definition of event dates, all studies using monthly share price 
data observed negative abnormal returns for target firms over periods well before the 
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event date. These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that merger occur to 
discipline target firms management. 
 
Additional evidence on this hypothesis of corporate control was presented by Dodd 
(1977)45 by evaluating abnormal returns for terminated merger proposals. Managers or 
Board of Directors of target firms have veto power of rejecting a merger proposal on any 
grounds or even to maximize the size of premium obtained by target shareholders. In 
either case, management veto must be accompanied by negative abnormal returns and 
relatively stable equity price in the expectation of a new merger or tender offer. The 
study’s empirical evidence was consistent with these expectations; the abnormal returns 
for vetoed mergers at days -1 and 0 were negative and significant. 
 
Amihud and Lev (1981)46 empirically evaluated the managerial motive of reducing risk 
through mergers and their effect on shareholders. Their results found that corporations in 
which ownership was not concentrated engaged in conglomerate merger more often than 
did other corporations. This happened because management of the former firms are not 
closely monitored, and therefore pursue risk reduction activities for their personal 
benefits. Agarwal and Mandelker (1987), 47 on the other hand, reported that large 
ownership positions in their firm’s shares by manager of acquiring firms are typically 
associated with risk increases rather than risk decrease from mergers. Langetieg, Haugen 
and Wichern (1980)48 also found that mergers generally resulted in increase in systematic 
and unsystematic risk for the combing firms. 
 
Lewellen, Loderer and Rosenfeld (1989)49 also empirically evaluated risk reduction 
motive of mergers on a sample of two hundred and three NYSE listed firms that merged 
during the time period 1963-84. Merger related changes in the firm’s risk as reflected by 
changes in variability of acquiring company’s stock returns were measured by the two 
ratios estimated from market model.50 
 
 
 157
(1) DVR (i.e. the ratio of estimated total variance of stock return after the merger to 
the estimated total variance before it) and  
 
(2) DVRR (i.e. the ratio of estimated merger to before merger residual variances of 
acquiring firms’ stock returns). 
 
For the majority of firms in their sample, the results found an increase in total and 
residual stock return risk. In addition, there was very less evidence that risk reducing 
cases were more frequent when senior managers had especially large, own company 
shareholdings. Finally, from the examination of estimates of stock return performance of 
acquiring companies on and around the dates of merger offer announcements and 
approvals, they found no indication that risk reducing mergers in the sample tended to 
occur at the differential expense of shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Further investigation into the rationale for mergers was the empirical analysis of mergers 
as a means of restructuring distressed firms carried on by Clark and Ofek (1994).51 They 
examined a sample of thirty eight takeovers occurring during the time period 1981-88, 
(generally all within the same group) identified as an attempt to restructure distress 
targets. The study used the indicators that focused on post-merger performance of both 
combined firms and target firms alone to test whether the combination of target and 
bidder was a successful method of restructuring the targets. Their results indicated that 
most of the mergers were not successful. Out of the sample of thirty eight takeovers 
classified as restructuring attempts, twenty were termed as failures, nine as marginally 
successful and nine as successful. Nevertheless, the study could not conclude that 
mergers are a poor choice for restructuring distressed targets since they did not analyze 
the success rate for alternative method of restructuring or the consequences of doing 
nothing on total welfare. 
 
Averbach and Reishus (1987)52 carried out an empirical investigation of three hundred 
and sixteen merged firms to examine whether tax synergies are significant determinants 
of incidence and pattern of corporate mergers. 
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 The study compared the tax characteristics of a sample of three hundred and sixteen 
merging firms during the time period 1966-83 to those of a similar sample of non 
merging firms (identical in terms of size and year) chosen at random and using both 
samples, estimated a model of merger activity. 
 
Their results suggested that an increase in interest deduction could not have been an 
important factor influencing merger activity during the period under study. The two 
samples exhibit very insignificant differences in borrowing patterns and model estimated 
by them suggested that low debt ratio is associated with lower probability that firm will 
be acquired. This means that probability that a merger yield corporate tax benefits is no 
higher than probability that random pairing between two firms will produce tax benefits. 
In conjunction to their discovery that significant corporate tax benefits are obtained in 
only 20% of merger cases, these results cast doubt on the claim that taxes have induced 
significant fraction of merge during this period. 
 
Berkovitch and Naryanan (1990) 53 conducted an empirical investigation to distinguish 
among the three major motives that have been advanced in literature: the synergy motive, 
the agency motive and hubris motive. The synergy motive suggests that takeovers occur 
because of economic gains that results by merging the resources of two firms. The 
agency motive suggests that takeovers occur because they enhance the acquirer 
management’s welfare at the expense of acquir’s shareholders. The hubris hypotheses 
suggest that managers make mistake in evaluating target firms, and engage in 
acquisitions even when there is no synergy. 
 
This study used correlation among targets, acquirers and total gains to distinguish among 
these motives. In hypothesized positive correlation between target and total gains in case 
of synergy, negative correlation in case of agency and zero correlation in case of hubris. 
Using sample of three hundred and thirty tender offers during 1963-88, these hypotheses 
were tested for the entire sample and for sub-sample of positive and negative total gains. 
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The results of the study indicated that, on an average, takeovers yield positive total gains 
(in 75% of their sample). In a sub-sample of positive total gains (two hundred and fifty 
two tender offers) correlation between target and total gains was positive, indicating that 
synergy motive dominated. In the sub-sample og negative total gains (seventy eight) ,the 
correlation was negative, indicating that dominant motive was agency. There was 
evidence that hubris existed at least in positive total gains sample. The study concluded 
that while synergy is the reason for majority of takeovers, there is strong evidence that 
many takeovers are motivated by agency hubris also.  
 
An in-depth study of merger motives by Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996)54 in U.K. 
integrated number of hypotheses concerning the different sources of value creation. It 
measured the impact of possible agency conflicts between shareholders and managers on 
the way this value is created and distributed between bidder and target shareholders. They 
developed various hypotheses to investigate the sources of synergy between bidders and 
targets and the impact of ownership structure on the returns to shareholders, on a sample 
of four hundred and twenty nine completed acquisitions in U.K. during 1980-90. The 
various sources of value creation identified by them from the existing literature included 
operational synergies arising from economies of scale and scope or increased monopoly 
power, managerial synergy and financial synergy. 
 
The results of the study confirmed that shareholder wealth experience was indeed 
conditioned by these three broad categories of influences. In particular, financial synergy 
dominated operational synergy. A combination of companies with complimentary fit in 
terms of liquidity slack and surplus investment opportunity was value creating for both 
groups of shareholders. However, when highly rated firms acquired less highly rated 
targets, the acquiring firm’s shareholders experienced wealth losses where as target 
shareholders experienced wealth gains. This result is consistent with acquiring managers 
acting out of hubris. 
 
Further, their results confirmed that ownership structure had significant impact on 
shareholders returns. Large shareholding decreased the return to target shareholders. 
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Equity offers generated smaller wealth gains for both bidders and targets than pure cash 
or hybrid offer. 
 
To sum up, despite many excellent research papers, we still do not fully understand the 
motives behind mergers and tender offer or whether they bring an increase in aggregate 
market values.55 
 
PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
This section reviews the literature to highlight the effect of M&A’s  on the performance 
of merged firms to see if they are value creating activities or not. There are two 
approaches for analyzing post-merger performance vis., analysis based on share price and 
analysis based on operating performance of the concerned firm.  
 
1. Shareholder performance Measures 
Performance measures based on share price data require computation of measure of 
theoretical share price which would exist in case there is no event (i.e. proposed merger). 
The financial theoretical share price is then compare to the equal price and the difference 
is attributed to merger event. This method, referred to as “Events Study” makes an 
assumption of an efficient market framework 56 to measure shareholders return. The 
efficient market hypothesis assumes that investor’s anticipation of future benefits will be 
reflected in the acquiring and acquired firms’ stock prices at the time of merger 
announcement. The evidence whether M&A s creates value for shareholders or not 
comes from events studies, where the average abnormal stock market reaction at merger 
announcement is used as an indication of value creation or destruction. In a capital 
market that is efficient with respect to public information, stock prices quickly adjust 
following a merger announcement, incorporating any expected value changes. Thus, the 
studies based on stock prices measure the impact of M&As on share price returns by 
comparing the combined firms post- merger share price returns with some benchmark 
return based on beta risk and/or broad market indices. 
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For this purpose, a technique called Market Model 57 has been used in most of the 
empirical studies using share price data in US and UK and elsewhere. This model asserts 
that there exists a linear relationship between return on individual security and that of 
market and is given in the form. 
 
                                  Rit = I +i+Rmt +it 
 
                Where, 
                                 Rit = represents return on share I on period t 
                                 Rmt = return on general market index 
                    it = degree to which share varies other than the 
                                      market (Error term) 
  Ii = intercept and slope of linear relationship between 
        Rit and Rmt  
 
Once, the parameters It and Ii are estimated, market model are used to generate estimates 
of residuals around the time of merger announcement. The residuals measure the 
difference the predicted share price estimated by market model and actual share price i.e. 
abnormal gain or loss. 
 
The research studies using this approach have thrown up conflicting findings in UK and 
US. The contrasting findings relate to shareholders return to acquiring firms and to 
overall gain or loss position. The review of these studies is summarized below. 
 
Events studies conducted in U.K. 
Firth’s Study (1976) 58 and Franks, Broyles and Hecht’s Study (1977)59 both used market 
models to establish whether abnormal gains or losses had arisen to merger participants. 
Firth’s study investigated with a sample of two hundred and four merger events covering 
a period of two years i.e. 1973, 1974. Frank’s study investigated the breweries and 
distilleries industries during 1955-72 working on a sample of seventy events. Both these 
studies found that there was little evidence that acquirers lost as a result of acquisitions 
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but there was considerable evidence that acquiree gained from it. The summarized their 
conclusions as under: 
 
1. Shareholders in acquired companies enjoyed abnormal returns averaging 26% 
during four months prior to completion of merger. 
2. During same period prior to merger, shareholders in acquiring companies 
experienced small positive abnormal returns, which were not sustained. 
3. Gains on combined shareholding in acquiring and acquired companies reflected 
net gains from mergers within industry. 
4. Evidence suggested that market began to anticipate mergers at least three months 
in advance before mergers were announced.   
 
The results of both these studies differ from each other in one important aspect. Both 
found substantial gains to acquirees, but Firth study 60 found that as far as acquirers were 
concerned, merger proved expensive. 
 
In a later study, Firth (1980)61 examined the impact of takeovers on shareholders returns 
and management benefits and, some implications for the theory of the firm were drawn 
from the results. Their results showed that mergers and acquisitions resulted in benefits to 
the acquired company’s shareholders and to acquiring company’s managers but losses 
were suffered by acquiring company’s shareholders. The study concluded that overall 
benefits to the economy in terms of share price gains or losses were nil in the sense that 
abnormal gains accruing to acquired companies shareholders were neutralized by losses 
of acquiring companies. 
Table 3.1 highlights the results of the neutral impact of mergers in U.K. during the period 
1969-75. 
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                                 Table: - 3.1 
               Impact of Mergers on the Economy: 
                    Overall Gains/Losses Analysis 
 1 
Offeree  
2 
Offeror 
3    Offeree- Offeror Combined
Mean gain/loss -36.6 1103.6 -1140.2 
No. of losses 224 3 350 
No. of takeovers 434 434 434 
Source: Firth (1980)62 
 
In the sample of four hundred and thirty four companies, in all except three companies, 
abnormal gains accrued to shareholders of Offeror Company. The mean gain of 1103.6 m 
was offset by a loss incurred by majority of offeror companies which totaled 1140.2 m. 
The net impact was a loss of 36.6 m. The study concluded that “this implies that stock 
market is expecting little change in the profitability of firms once they have combined 
any possible benefit in the form of synergy or re-organization of acquired firms are 
presumably being countered by doubts of whether the offeror has access to management 
capable of greatly increasing efficiency and because of costs involved in takeover 
process”.63 
 
Franks and Harris’s Study (1989)64 investigated the wealth gains to shareholders on an 
exhaustive sample of 1898 target firms and 1058 acquirer (bidders) in UK acquisitions 
during the time period 1955-85. The results of the study found that mergers were on an 
average, value creating for shareholders as measured by equity market prices around the 
merger announcement date. Shareholders of target firms gain and bider shareholders gain 
or do not lose. The evidence is similar to that found in US studies. The study found 
higher target wealth gains when bidders held pre-merger equity interest. There was no 
strong evidence, however, that revised bids or contested bids or pre-mrger equity interests 
affected bidder gains around merger dates. 
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The study also compared UK results with US and examined the importance of 
institutional difference between two countries. It also provided an insight into the 
generality of US results. The results suggested that target wealth gains in UK and US 
increase after 1968 and also, if form of offer (tender or other) is controlled, results in US 
and UK are similar.  
 
Limmack’ Study (1991)65 investigated the distribution of returns to shareholders of four 
hundred and sixty two UK companies involved in acquisition during the period 1977-86. 
Three control models have been used in their analysis: the market model with parameters 
identified through ordinary least square regression, a model based on adjusted betas and 
finally, an index relative model. Abnormal returns have been identified around both, bid 
announcement and outcome dates for bidders and targets in successful and successful 
bids. Investigation has also been carried out to measure the distribution of wealth changes 
for bidders and targets separately and both in combination. The results demonstrated that 
although there has been no wealth decrease to shareholders in totality as a result of 
takeover, acquiring shareholders of bidder firms did suffer wealth decreases. On the other 
hand, shareholders in target firms obtained significant positive wealth increases in both 
completed and abandoned bids. The results thus provided conflicting evidence depending 
upon period included in analysis of abnormal return and control model used.   
 
The summarized results of three UK based studies on the market model are given in 
Table below: 
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                                                 Table: - 3.2 
Abnormal Returns for Target and Bidder Shareholders Surrounding UK 
Takeover Announcements 
Study period 
Sample Size 
   Window  Data  Target  Bidder 
1.Firth (1980) 
1969-75 486 
Targets 
Announcement 
Month 
Monthly Returns 28 -6.3 
2. Franks and 
Harris (198) 
1955-85 1445 
targets 
Announcement 
Month 
Monthly Returns 22 0.0 
3. Limmack 
(1991) 1977-86 
462 targets 
Bid Period Monthly Returns 31 -0.2 
    Source: Sudi Sudarsanan, op. cit., 1997 
 
Table: - 3.3 
Post-Merger Performance of Acquirers 
Study period 
Sample Size 
Window Data Bidder 
1.Firth (1980) 1969-75 
434 acquirers 
+1 to 36 Month Monthly -6.3 
2. Franks and Harris 
(1989) 1955-85 1048 
target 
+1 to 24 Month Monthly  0.0 
3. Limmack (1991) 
1977-86 462 targets 
+1 to 24 Month Monthly  -0.2 
    Source: Sudi Sudarsanan, op. cit., 1997 
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Events Studies Conducted in US 
US literature on mergers and acquisitions is voluminous, and the event study 
methodology has its origin in US. There are two sets of empirical evidence, one on 
capital market reactions to take over announcements and other on post merger 
performance of firms. While most empirical researchers are focused on daily stock 
returns surrounding the announcement dates, few studies also look at long run 
performance of acquiring firms after mergers. 
  
Mandelkar(1974)66 is the first researcher to use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
to determine residual returns. He examined the market for acquisitions and the impact of 
mergers on the returns to stockholders of constituent firms. While employing the two 
factor model, the study also examined change in risk in analyzing the impact of mergers 
on stock prices. This study, conducted on a sample of two hundred and forty one 
acquiring firms during the period 1941-1962 found, on one hand the stockholders of 
acquiring firms earned abnormal returns during the pre and post merger periods (as 
compared to other investment productive activities with commensurate risk levels), and 
on the other hand, stockholders of acquired firms earned significant abnormal returns 
(approximately 14%) in the seven months preceding the completion of mergers. These 
results are consistent with the hypothesis of perfectly competitive efficient market (on the 
demand side) for acquisitions and with the hypothesis that information regarding mergers 
is efficiently incorporated in the stock prices. 
 
Ellert (1976)67 in a study of effects of anti-trust action on the performance of merger 
patterns used methods similar to Mandelkar study68 but with a much larger sample for an 
overlapping period. The results of the study found significant positive performance 
before and during the merger month for both, acquired and acquiring firms. The study, 
however, noted that while acquiring firms had positive excess returns prior to mergers, 
these returns occurred long time before they could be attributable to any merger activity. 
Also, while the acquired firm’s experienced marked positive returns in the seven months 
prior to merger completion. The main result of study is that anti- merger action by 
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government has little effect on merger gains and hence is not likely to affect the 
concentration of monopoly power. 
      
Dodd and Ruback (1977)69 used date of public announcement of merger as the event 
date. This study of stock market reaction to tender offers, both successful and 
unsuccessful was conducted on a sample of one hundred and seventy two target and 
bidding firms, of which 72% were merged with five years. The study found that target 
firms earned significant abnormal returns in the month in which the offer was announced 
(approximately 20%), regardless of whether offer was accepted or not. Also, the study 
reported that stockholders of successful bidding firms earned small abnormal returns 
(approximately 2.83%) in the month of announcement of merger. These results are 
similar to those of Mandelker’s study70 since most of the gains from takeovers accrue to 
target shareholders.   
 
This study also conducted an empirical assessment of the market’s reaction to 
unsuccessful takeover attempts. The stockholders of bidding firms which initiated 
unsuccessful tender offers neither gained nor lost: they earned normal returns in the 
offered period. Unsuccessful target, however, earned large significant positive abnormal 
returns of 18.96% in the month in which offer was announced. Furthermore, the price 
changes were permanent since they earned normal returns for five years after the offer. 
 
The findings that acquiring firms earned excess returns corroborated an earlier finding. 
Halpern (1973)71 using a variant of market model found that when he adjusted for the 
general market factors using an industry index and for the relative size of acquiring and 
acquired firms, the gains of the mergers were equally distributed among the participants. 
Halpern concluded that the market for mergers is efficient but not competitive (both the 
acquired and acquiring firms are uniquely suited to one another in some way)   
 
Haugen and Langetieg (1975)72 compared the performance of merged firms with a 
control group of firms of the same industry that did not merge. The study covered fifty 
nine industrial mergers of companies listed on NYSE during the time period 1951-1968. 
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The study detected little evidence of synergism in their sample with focus only on 
changes affected in the risk attributes of distribution of stock returns. If the market is 
efficient, a change in profitability of assets should be quickly capitalized in the price of 
combined company stock. This change was not detected in this study. 
 
Langetieg (1978)73 re-examined the magnitude of stockholder gains from mergers. His 
studies employed two factor models (market and industry factors) to describe the 
stochastic return process in the capital market. The study also introduced a third factor, 
the non merging control group to measure its impact on their performance.   
 
To re-examine the pre and post merger stock performance from the perspective of three 
factor performance indexes, the sample size was restricted to one hundred and forty nine 
single merger events during the time period 1929-1969 
 
The results of the study indicated significant negative post merger performance for 
acquiring firm’s shares cumulating to -0.0659 over the twelve months after the merger. 
The study also found negative abnormal returns for acquired firms during the period well 
before the merger Abnormal returns during the six months preceding the merger were 
significantly positive. For acquiring firms, the pattern was reversed and less pronounced. 
 
Schipper and Thompson (1980)74 evaluated the impact of merger related regulatory 
changes introduced during the high merger activity period of 1960’s on the shareholders 
of the firms that were active in the acquisition programs. The approach was a form of 
events’ study in which the events (announcements of regulatory reforms) were grouped 
according to calendar time. The influence of each individual event was evaluated based 
on a shift parameter introduced into the market model which identified the sub period 
over which the announcement of a particular reform occurred during 1966-70. If the 
regulatory changes reduce the net benefit from future acquisitions, the market value of 
equity of firms with the acquisition programs should fall. Of the four regulatory 
changes,75 the Williams Amendments76 and the Tax Reforms Act 1969 had a negative 
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impact on security prices of the sample of companies involved in the active acquisition 
program. 
 
The study estimated that the impact on the active acquirer’s was -6% for Wiliams Act 
announcement and -1.2% for the Tax Reforms Act. The finding of positive abnormal 
performance associated with the announcement of the acquisition programs and negative 
abnormal performance associated with the regulatory changes is consistent with a 
positive average capitalized value of acquisition program. The evidence is also consistent 
with an extreme form of size maximization hypothesis which suggests that entrenched 
managers seek expansion by mergers to the net detriment of current shareholders.     
 
Asquith (1983)77 also investigated the effect of mergers on stockholders returns. This 
study was extended to include investigation of abnormal returns through out the entire 
merger process for both successful and unsuccessful merger bids starting from 480 
trading days before a merger bid until 240 days after the bid.  Two merger events were 
considered; the announcement date and the out come date of merger. Using a sample of 
three hundred and eleven target firms and one hundred and ninety six bidding firms in 
successful mergers and ninety one target firms and eighty nine bidding firms in 
unsuccessful merger bids, the stock market reaction to event uncertainty was explored i.e. 
the extent to which probabilistic merger announcement was incorporated into security 
price movement was examined.  
 
The results of the study are consistent with the hypothesis that target firms have unique 
resources, which provide synergy when combined across firms. There were stockholders 
gains associated with a merger bid and these gains increased as the probability of merger 
decreased. Most of the gains of mergers went to stockholders of target firms with the 
stockholders of successful bidding firms earning little, If any return. This suggests that 
bidder market is competitive and sources of synergy are unique to target firms. 
 
Asquith and Kim (1981)78 in an earlier study on bondholders’ returns in conglomerate 
mergers concluded a similar behavior of stockholders return. Part of the study which 
 170
investigated the effect of mergers on the bondholders of merging firms opined neither 
gain nor loss for them from mergers. This demonstrated that the stockholders gains are 
not the result of wealth transfers from bondholders but apparently the result of real gains. 
 
Another study at the same time by Malatesta (1983)79 examined the net effect of long run 
sequence of events leading to merger of merger pre se, on shareholders wealth. The study 
developed three hypotheses concerning mergers, namely, value maximizing or 
investment hypotheses, size maximization hypotheses and improved management 
hypotheses. It empirically tested them to see which one rationalizes the results best. The 
appropriate measure of merger related gain employed was cumulative abnormal returns 
in dollar term over a five year time period 1969 to 1974. 
 
The results of the study are consistent with the hypothesis that merger per se have a 
positive impact on acquisition firms shareholders wealth. Cumulative abnormal dollar 
returns to acquired firms over a five month interval ending with the approval 
announcement averaged 19.67 million dollars in their sample which was statistically 
significant estimate. However, acquired firms shareholders apparently suffered wealth 
losses during the period well before a merger. Over the 61 months prior to and including 
the approval announcement, estimated cumulative abnormal dollar returns averaged -9.42 
millions dollars. Hence, the estimated net impact of events culminating in mergers on 
acquired firms’ shareholders wealth is negative. The improved management hypothesis 
predicted these results. 
 
Further, the results indicated that acquiring firm’s stockholders suffered wealth losses 
both immediately before and well before a merger. Over the five month interval ending 
with the approval announcement, Cumulative Abnormal Return over sixty one months 
ending with the announcement was -11.17 million dollars. Both of these estimates were 
statistically significant which led the study to conclude that merger is a negative net value 
project for acquiring firms. 
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Seth’s Study (1990)80 provides a conceptual framework and an empirical methodology to 
assess the extent of value creation in acquisitions. On a sample of one hundred and four 
tender offers which look place between 1962 and 1979 event study methodology was 
applied as a basis for estimating synergistic gains in acquisitions and for testing if these 
gains were equal for related acquisitions. The results of the study found positive and 
significant value creation for all types of acquisition, whether related or unrelated. They 
cautioned researchers as well as practitioners from concluding about the superiority 
related acquisitions as compared with unrelated strategies. Further, they opined that 
performance differences between related and unrelated diversification strategies depend 
upon the basis of classifying firms as following one or the other strategy. This conclusion 
useful to consider the broader question of usefulness of classification schemes. One 
obstacle to classification is presented by the fact that majority of US firms are diversified 
to some degree; hence the task of identifying pattern of relatedness between two 
diversified merging corporations is of immense complexity.  
 
Agarwal, Jaffe and Mandelkar’s Study (1992)81 re-examined the post-merger 
performance of acquiring firms after adjusting for the firm’s size effect and beta risk on 
its exhaustive sample of 937 mergers and 227 tender offers82 which took place in US 
during the period 1955-87. 
 
Their results, based on two alternative methodologies, both adjusted for beta risk and 
market capitalization indicated that stockholders of acquiring firms experienced a 
statistically significant wealth loss of about 10% over five years after the merger 
completion date. The result was robust to a variety of specifications and did not seem to 
be caused by changes in beta. The study, therefore conclude that the efficient market 
anamoly of negative post-merger performance highlighted by Jenson and Ruback 
(1983)83 is not resolved. 
 
Further, the causes for large negative returns after a merger were not known. One 
possibility would be that market was slow to adjust to the merger event. Then, the long 
run performance should reflect that part of Net Present Value of merger to the acquirer 
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which was not captured by the announcement period returns.  However, the results of the 
study were not consistent with this hypothesis also. The resolution of this anamoly was 
left by the study as a challenge for future research. 
  
To conclude, the most frequent finding from the plethora of research in this area in US is 
that shareholders in the acquired firms tend to make gains; the evidence for the 
shareholder’s of acquiring firms is, however, mixed. In a review of empirical evidence on 
shareholders wealth effects of US takeovers, Jenson and Ruback (1983)84 conclude that 
“corporate takeovers generate positive gains; target firms shareholders benefit and that 
bidding firms shareholders do nit lose”. There seems to be no such consensus about UK 
experience. Evidence on acquisition activity in UK is less plentiful. Some of the main 
findings for the US are consistent with detailed study for UK over the period 1955-85 
carried by Franks and Harries (1989). They find that shareholders of target firms’ gains 
from mergers, gains are higher if bid is contested or bidder already has stake in target 
firm before acquisition, bidders out performed in pre-bid period and lost subsequently. 
 
2. Managerial Performance Measures 
In the context of studies based on stock prices, it is generally argued that these cannot 
determine either the extent of real economic gains or the source of such merger related 
gains. Gains from mergers could arise from variety of sources, such as operating 
synergies, tax savings and monopoly rents. To measure these real effects of mergers and 
to determine whether expected gains at the time of merger announcement are actually 
realized or not operating performance of firms is analyses. Studies based on operating 
performance generally focus on various accounting measures of profitability. In 
analyzing the effect of merger profit rate of merging firms before the merger. Any 
changes in performance are then contrasted either with performance in pre-merger period 
or with that of firms not engaged in merger activity or are compared with industry 
benchmark. Performance measure studies based on accounting data summarized below. 
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Studies Conducted in UK 
Singh’s Study (1971)85 examined the performance of firms before and after the merger 
and efficiency of stock market as a means of enabling the resources to move into more 
profitable uses. The study investigated the relationship between market valuation, some 
financial variables (namely, pretax return on net assets, dividend return on equity assets, 
size, liquidity, gearing, retention, growth of net assets ect.) and takeovers. The study 
employed data on a sample of 2126 UK public quoted companies for the period 1948-60 
to examine the characteristics of taken over firms. In addition to the differences in the 
composition of companies examined, the time period and the emphasis placed on 
industry analysis, the study relied primarily on discriminate analysis for testing the 
various hypotheses about takeovers.   
 
The results of the study show that on an average, about 60-65%  of firms which were 
taken over had profitability, growth and valuation ratio lower than their industry average 
indicating that firms which performed better took over worst performing firms. The 
success of merger is questionable as 57% of merged firms in the sample had post-
acquisition profit record which was worse than record of separate firms before merger. 
The study, therefore, concluded that mergers are non-profitable. 
 
Further, the study also concluded that while firms with higher profitability over firms 
with lower, the ability to resist takeover was related to size. The large and medium sized 
firms had a much lower probability of being acquired than small ones, hence it was 
possible for a firm to defeat takeover bids by acquiring other firms itself. 
 
A complimentary study by Utton (1974)86 compared the performance of merger intensive 
group during and after a heavy bout of merger activity for each company with that of a 
group which relied instead on internal growth. The merging company’s average 
profitability was appreciable below that of non merging companies too far below to be 
explained by any of measurement problems presented by the study. Thus, this study, 
deliberately framed to capture the consequences of series of takeovers, yielded results in 
full harmony with those of other complimentary studies for single merger case also. 
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The other two studies of the same type by Kuehn (1975)87 and Aaronovitch and Sawyerr 
(1975)88 showed that mergers and takeovers seldom lived upto the expectation of 
profitability at the time when companies came together. In addition, Kuehn’s study89 also 
examined the relationship between financial variables (like size, growth rate, profit rate, 
retention ratio, and liquidity ect.) and stock market performance of firms taken over and 
not taken over.90 The study was conducted on a sample of 3566 companies which had 
merged or were acquired during the thirteen year period 1957-69. The study concluded an 
inverse relationship between a firms probability of being takeover with its profit rate, 
growth rate and liquidity. Higher the ratios, less was the chance of the firms of being 
taken over. While retention policy of firms seemed to have no effect on firm’s probability 
of being taken over, valuation ratio provided more consistent indicator of the same.  
 
A study of the gains from merger by Meeks (1977)91 assessed the performance of 
mergers, mainly in terms of profitability, though other characteristics of acquiring firms 
were also considered. Two complimentary null hypotheses were also tested. 
 
1 Other things being equal, profitability of merger was on an average no different 
from pre-merger level of participants. 
 
2 Other things being equal, half of mergers experienced an improvement in 
profitability after merger and half a decline. 
The study chose a sample of two hundred and thirty three acquisitions that took place 
during 1964-72. The basic methodology was to compare reported post- merger profits to 
the pre-bid profits of each of merging firms. To allow for changes in profits brought 
about by factors independent of merger, they were calculated relative to the performance 
of company’s own industry. The results of the study accepted the null hypothesis of 
decline in post-merger profitability. In three to five years, this decline was significant at 
1% level and in each post merger year, majority of companies experienced decline. This 
decline although of the same order of magnitude, was however, not found to be 
significant in six-seven years following the merger. This may be due to the small size of 
sample. For the year of merger itself, the study found a significant improvement in 
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profitability, a result that was dismissed due to distortions. Further, the study made 
adjustment for the accounting bias due to revaluation of merged firms and for external 
influences by measuring a firm’s profit rate relative to its industry. The study concluded 
that since the market power of merging firms is unlikely to have declined, the decline in 
profitability could be taken to indicate decline in efficiency.  
 
This study has been followed by many other accounting based studies in UK (Cosh, 
1980, Kumar1984) with the same methodology adopted for comparing pre and post 
merger profitability taking industry performance as benchmark. Cosh (1980)92 concluded 
significant improvement of profitability for post merger companies conducted on a 
sample of two hundred and twenty five companies covering time period 1967-70. 
Kumar’s (1984)93 results on a sample of two hundred aond forty one companies over 
eight year period 1967-74 was consistent with those of Meeks (1977)94. They concluded 
significant decline in profitability after mergers.    
    
Another study by Levin and Aaronovitch (1981)95 examined the financial characteristics 
of the firm with a view to test various hypotheses drawn from the theory of the firm. The 
study empirically analyzed a sample of one hundred and fifty four firms in manufacturing 
and distribution involved in large mergers in UK. It conducted a univariate comparison of 
group averages of financial characteristics of acquiring firms in terms of grouped 
variables corresponding to stock market efficiency hypothesis. The results found no 
evidence of any significant difference between acquiring and acquired firms for the profit 
related variables (rate of return, earning per share) and their growth (growth of rate of 
return, growth in earning per share).  Further, the results showed that both size (measured 
in terms of capital employed) and valuation ratio or price earning ratio discriminated well 
individually between acquiring and acquired firms96 but the results as a whole suggests 
that stock market does not reward only profitability and efficiency. Also, apart from size 
and capital market assessment (in terms of valuation ratio, price earning ratio), acquiring 
firms did not have a distinct set of financial characteristics from those of acquired firms. 
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These results of the study supported the contention that financial characteristics of 
acquiring and acquired firms are not primarily important in explaining merger activity 
involving large firms. There appeared to be little evidence that acquiring firms choose 
less efficiently.  
 
The multivariate results which looked at growth and profitability together found no 
support for acquiring firms having higher growth. There was some evidence of 
immediate investors gain from the higher P/E ratio for the acquired firms. The evidence 
further pointed to mergers as strategic decisions not involving immediate economic or 
financial gains. The study indicated two advantages of size. Firstly, large firms with equal 
efficiency as indicated by growth and profitability had higher valuation ratio than smaller 
firms.97 Secondly, advantage of size was the security from takeover that it brought. Being 
large could insulate a firm from takeover threat arising from small valuation ratio.  
 
To sum up, the verdict of these studies is not wholly averse to mergers. However, it does 
not also show that mergers are effective in improving post- merger performance. 
 
Studies conducted in US 
Empirical research on accounting measures provides results similar to those in UK. These 
are summarized as under. 
 
Kitching’s Study (1967)98 examined the financial performance of companies and also the 
objectives of managers involved, in terms of what they hoped to achieve by merger and 
what extent these objective were realized. The study used two methods to determine 
whether a merger could be classified as success or failure. 
 
a) Survey of management literature and field interviews with executives of twenty 
two companies (covering various industries like textiles, electronics, communications, 
marketing recreation products, food, aviation, tobacco, finance etc.) designed to measure 
manager’s qualitative assessment of success or failure of acquisition program measured 
against original strategy.  
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b) Financial results obtained from the companies in order to compare the actual 
performance with forecasts made before the merger.   
 
This procedure was designed to crosscheck the manager’s subjective judgment on the 
acquisition’s success or failure (though acquisition objectives could sometimes be 
successfully reached without achieving financial targets). The results showed a high 
incidence of failure with certain types of mergers, particularly conglomerate mergers. 
Simple vertical and horizontal mergers were usually successful. Concentric mergers came 
in between these two extremes of success and failures. 
 
The study summarized the primary reasons for failures of mergers to be as below. 
 
1.      The existence of managers of change, that is to say that the managers of one of the 
companies involved in the mergers must be able to deal with the changing circumstances. 
 
2.     The acquisition should be planned as growth diversification strategy rather than a 
mere reaction to an opportunity for buying. 
 
3.       There must be careful analyses of future needs. The study showed that the 
successful companies made a careful analysis of their subsidiary’s future requirement for 
parent company’s funds. 
 
Weston’s Study (1971)99 carried out various tests on the performance of sixty 
conglomerate firms over the period 1958 to 1967. The sample also consisted of two 
control groups one consisting of industrial companies only and the other combining both 
industrial and non industrial companies. The study measured the performance of 
conglomerates in terms of growth per share using the following variables of growth rates: 
(1) Total assets (2) Sales (3) Net income (4) Earning per share (5) Market price based on 
yearly high, yearly low and arithmetic of annual high and low prices. 
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The study found that the earning performance of conglomerates measured by returns on 
total assets and return on net worth was not significantly different from that of all 
manufacturing companies. However, given the unfavorable earning opportunities in 
industries from which conglomerates emerged the performance was favorable. It, 
therefore, concluded that in financial terms, on an average, conglomerates performed no 
better than the average industrial company. What, however, was surprising was the range 
of performance of these conglomerates.100 The great diversity in the conglomerates 
performance had important implications. The results of some mergers were a success, 
other a failure. It was not important to consider mergers and acquisitions as either wholly 
good or bad thing but to be able to different the mergers that have high probability of 
success from that could well fail. The results of financial conglomerates were less 
predictable but the study opined that their criticisms were not substantiated, so there were 
no grounds for raising barriers against them. 
 
Ravenscraft and Scherer’s Study (1987)101 offered an alternative method to the stock 
price analysis for estimating economic effects of merger events. Their study was broad 
range covering an approximate sample of six thousand acquisitions in different lines of 
business with three dimensions of merger performance, namely, survival, profitability 
and R&D intensity. The study showed that acquiring firms in their large sample failed to 
significantly improve operating performance of their acquisitions but paid substantial 
premiums for privilege of trying.  
 
In case of voluntary mergers, once acquisition effects were controlled, tender offers and 
takeovers were followed by neither degradation nor improvement of operating 
performance, where as normal mergers in such case showed definite post-merger 
performance deterioration. For the mergers consummated under pooling of interest 
accounting, pre merger operating income to asset ratio averaged more than ten percentage 
points above peer industry averages. Post merger values of same performance indicator 
for 100 percent pooling lines was1.3 percent points above, 1.6% below and 3.5% points 
above peer industry norms controlling also for shares for 1974, 1976, 1977, respectively. 
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For three years together, pooling merger lines surpasses their peer industry to 0.4% 
points. This represented a sharp drop from pre-merger performance. 
 
This study of matched pre-and post-merger sample confirmed the conclusion that 
profitability dropped sharply after merger. In addition, this sample was compared to non 
acquired firms with similar size and above average profitability for same time period. The 
non acquired firms maintained 40% of supernormal profits while acquired firms kept 
only 10%. The difference between acquired and non acquired profits decline was 
substantially significant.102 
 
On the effect the merger had on R&D, the study concluded that their analysis of 2955 
lines of business for the year 1977 provided no support for the hypotheses that “mergers 
permit intensification of R&D effort by blending innovating enterprises into larger 
corporations”.103 Lines of business originating from mergers had significantly lower 
company financed R&D to sales ratio than product lines with similar market shares in 
same industry but without merger history. 
 
Looking at the final aspects of long run performance improvement, the study opined that 
“analysis” of short run stock market reactions to merger announcements suggested that 
they may result in such improvement. The exact cause of short run stock price gains 
remained unclear. However, an analysis of stock prices two or three years after a merger 
cast doubt as to whether the combined returns to acquired and acquiring companies 
shareholders remained positive.104 
 
Healy, palepu and Ruback’s Study (1992)105 is also motivated by inability of stock price 
performance studies to determine whether takeovers created real economic gains or not to 
identify sources of such gains. For this purpose, it analyzed post-merger accounting data 
to test for changes in operating performance that resulted from mergers. The study used 
operating cash flows in place of accrual profits with industry performance as a bench 
mark to evaluated post merger performance. It analyzed 50 large acquisitions during the 
period January 1979 to June 1984 and concluded that merged firms showed significant 
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improvement in asset productivity relative to their industries, leading to higher operating 
cash flow returns. 
 
Further, the study also investigated into the possible correlation between merger related 
stock market performance and post-merger cash flows performance. It found a strong 
positive correlation between post-merger increase in operating cash flows and abnormal 
stock returns at the time of merger announcements. This indicated expectations of 
economic implications explained a significant portion of equity revaluation of merged 
firms. 
 
Accounting Studies Conducted Elsewhere 
Hoshino’s Study (1982)106 analyzed the performance of corporate in Japan using 
accounting ratios. It conducted two tests on the performance of mergers. The first test 
compared the financial ratios before and after merger and the second test compared the 
performance of merging firms with non merging firms. The analysis led to the following 
conclusions: 
 
1. There was a difference in the financial performance both before and after merger 
in fifteen corporate mergers examined in the study. After the merger, net worth in total 
liabilities and assets, debt equity ratio the turnover ratio and net profit to total liabilities 
and assets, ratio were worse than before the merger. An improvement was found only in 
case of current ratio. 
2. There was no clear distinction between merging and non-merging firms in the 
same industry. 
3. The comparison between ninety merging firms and forty eight non-merging 
firms showed that the two group’s financial performance could be distinguished with 
clear adverse effect mergers on net worth to total liabilities and assets ratio. 
  
Sharma and Ho’s Study (2002)107 examined the operating performance of a sample of 
thirty six firms involved in acquisitions in Australia occurring between 1986 -1991, both 
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years inclusive. Using matched firms to control for industry and economy wide factors, 
the following hypotheses have been tested empirically. 
 
1. Operating performance in the post-acquisition period is greater than operating 
performance in the pre-acquisition period. 
2. There are no significant differences in post- acquisition operating performance 
between conglomerate and non- conglomerate acquisitions 
3.     There are no significant differences in post – acquisition operating performance for 
firms using different methods of acquisition financing. 
 
The results of the study based on eight different performance indicators  (being four 
accrual and four cash flow performance measures) revealed decline or no gain in 
operating performance following an acquisition. The various performance indicators used 
in this study explained that inconsistencies in prior research could be attributed to 
differences in performance indicators used to capture synergistic benefits. The study also 
found that the type of acquisition (conglomerate and non-conglomerate) and the form of 
acquisition financing (cash, share or a combination) do not significantly influence post- 
acquisition performance. Similarly, size of the acquisition and the payment of premium 
(goodwill) do not influence post-acquisition performance. While the results of study are 
not consistent with synergy theory underlying corporate acquisitions, they are interpreted 
to be consistent with the agency (acquisitions resulted in lower post acquisition 
performance but increased firm size), the hubris and the financial motivation hypothesis 
(acquirers had higher levels of leverage than acquirees, though not statistically 
significant). 
 
To conclude, the evidence of merger’s effect on profitability reveals no distinct pattern. 
While few studies report profit increases following mergers (Cosh, Hughes and Singh 
1980, Muller, 1980), the preponderance of evidence in UK and US point towards no 
increase and probably some decline in the profitability of merged firms after merger.108  
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3. Performance Measures Based on Share Price and                              
Accounting Data 
 
Newbound’s Study (1970)109 examined a sample of two hundred and twenty three merger 
events in UK over a period of two years 1967-68 in respect of their share price behavior. 
The study measured biddings and target company’s share prices four weeks before the 
bid against their year’s high and concluded relative weakness in share price performance 
of target firms as compared to that of bidding firms. The analysis was carried out for all 
the three types of takeovers classified in the study according to the opposition to 
takeovers namely, 
 
1.   Uncontested takeover (where directors of the target firm did not any opposition in 
public). 
2.  Contested by directors (directors of the target firm were seen opposing/contesting the 
bid). 
3.   Contested by third parties (where some vigorous but undisclosed contests were seen).  
It was found that in each type of takeover, the mean of target firm’s share prices lower 
than the mean of bidding firm’s share prices. The study concluded that target firms, in 
any type of takeover were on average, relatively weaker in terms of share prices than the 
associated target firms. Further this study also analyzed the operation of the enlarged 
firms for first five years after takeover in terms of financial indicators of growth namely, 
profits, sales, dividend yields, rate of return on capital employed, earnings per share and 
price earning ratio. The main aim was to determine what rates of growth were required to 
justify price paid for target firms. In majority of cases, required rate of growth on five 
year view was more than double than what had been achieved or in some cases, it even 
seemed unattainable. Also, investigations showed that firms should takeover only those 
firms whose share stand on a price earning ratio lower than its own. 
 
Reid’s Study (1968)110 investigated a sample of four hundred and seventy eight US firms 
picked from fortune’s list of five hundred largest industrial corporations for the year 
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1951. The study utilized three measures characterized as reflecting the interests of 
mergers, namely,  
 
1. Growth in sales 
2. Growth in assets 
3. Growth in employment   
 
And three measures reflecting the interest of stock holders namely, 
1) Growth in market value of shares 
2) Growth in ratio of net income to total assets  
3) Growth in ratio of net income to sales 
 
The study found that growth rates in three measures reflecting manager’s interest were 
favorable for conglomerates as compared with other companies, while conglomerates 
performed less effectively in measures reflecting stockholders interest. Thus, it concluded 
that more actively merging firms and firms that diversified to a greater extent in their 
merger activity, scored high on criteria relating to manager’s interest and low on criteria 
to stockholders interest. 
 
However, the conclusions of the study were at variance with its own data. In the detailed 
industry analysis, the results of the performance measures were either not significant or 
significant in opposite direction for ten or more of the fourteen industries for each of his 
six measures. This suggested that it was grater weighing of small number of industries 
that produced results for his total sample. 
 
 To sum up, “not all mergers are unsuccessful … there are many examples of successfully 
merged companies, without proving that they would not have been even more successful 
without any merger. But on average, there is no evidence that mergers have conferred any 
general benefit on the company. The large firms tends to experience a falling rate of 
return on capital employed, and the merged firm, after the initial stock exchange 
excitement, larger acquirers a lower investment rating.”111 This fact that merger do not 
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seem to benefit acquirers as shown by many studies could be because acquiring firms 
seek mergers for many reasons. Many firms mention motivations of mergers as a means 
to achieve possible economies of scale, synergies, and greater efficiencies in managing 
assets. Thus, there is contradictory evidence of mergers being a means of empire building 
by managers. If mergers were undertaken for true underlying motivations they could 
benefit acquirers but in average statistics, these are cancelled out by mergers undertaken 
for less benign reasons. 
 
Financial characteristics of Merger Participants  
The literatures on mergers and acquisitions contains several research studies that estimate 
the factors leading to firms being taken over by examining the difference between the 
firms acquired and firms not acquired and also acquirers and acquirees in terms of their 
financial characteristics. The purpose of such an investigation is to reach to some 
conclusions on why and how acquirers choose their victims. A summary of findings of 
some of the studies under taken in UK in terms of financial characteristics of acquirees 
and acquirers is given in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5 respectively which have been adapted 
from study of Firth (1976)112 by Cooke (1980).113 While Table 3.4 summarizes the 
financial characteristics of acquirees as concluded by various researchers in UK, Table 
3.5 summarizes the same results of acquirers. In both the tables problems like differing 
definitions of variables analysed and different dates on which analyses have been done 
are faced. 
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Table: - 3.4 
The financial Characteristics of Acquirees: Summary of Research Findings in UK 
Financial 
Characteristics  114 
 
New 
Bond 
115 
(1970) 
Singh 
(1971) 
116 
Buckley 
(1972) 
117 
Tzoannos 
&Samuels 
118 
(1972) 
Kuehn 
(1975) 
119 
Firth 
(1976) 
120 
Meek 
(1977) 
121 
1.Profitibality 
Low Average High 
        .       .       .         .      .        . 
2.Dividend 
performance 
Low Average 
High 
                
        . 
        
       
   . 
   
3Valuation 
Ratio Low 
Average High 
  
. 
 
    . 
 
      . 
   
      . 
    
  . 
 
4. Price earning Ratio Low 
Average High 
  
. 
   
  . 
 
   . 
   
     . 
 
5.  Gearing  Low  Average 
High 
     
  .      .       .       . 
 
6.  Liquidity  Low  Average 
High 
   
   . 
 
     . 
       .       .      .   
7.  Growth  in  Net  Assets 
Low Average High 
    
     . 
     
 
     . 
 
 
     . 
 
 
 
Source: Terrence E. Cooke (1980), op.cit. pp.51 
Profitability of acquires has been calculated in all studies except New bound (1970). The 
evidence suggests that victims tend to be those whose profitability may be described as 
low. The only exception to this is the study by Meeks (1977) who found the profitability 
of victim to be average. 
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As far as dividend policy is concerned, only Tzoannos and Sammuals (1972) and Firth 
(1976) have looked at this variable in a merger context separately since information 
content of a dividend is already included in measures of profitability as well as poor 
dividend performance. 
 
The valuation ratio attempts to measure the degree of over and under utilization of net 
assets of the victim and is calculated by dividing hare price by net assets per share. New 
bound (1970)122 found that “this ratio did not offer any explanation of incidence of 
mergers “whereas Buckly (1972)123 found that “the variable provided good signals for 
identifying potential victims”.  
 
With respect to price earning ratios, all the studies calculating this variable found that 
target companies are lower than average. Since the capitalization rate depends upon 
growth prospects and risk attributes, victims generally have low P/E ratios and low 
valuation ratios. Firth (1976)124 concluded that acquisitions are not in general made with 
the aim of improving initial earning per share. 
 
Gearing has proved to be unstable variable with these studies, suggesting that low, 
average or even high levels of gearing were prevent. 
 
Liquidity ratio was calculated in most of the studies but there was no significant 
difference between victim and control groups. Only Kuehn (1975)125 found that victims 
tended to have lower levels of liquidity. Belkaoui (1978)126 in his study of Canadian 
takeovers found that working capital to total assets ratio was the single best variable 
indicating likelihood of company becoming subject of takeover. 
 
Three of the studies looked at size of victims and all came to the conclusion that they 
were smaller than non taken over firms.  
With respect to financial characteristics of acquiring companies, the evidence in 
inconclusive. Table 3.5 summarizes the research findings in UK. The acquirer is usually 
one with average or above average profitability, with high dividend payouts and high 
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growth rates. The other ratio did not potray any consistent pattern. In addition, no 
significant relationship has been established between financial ratio of acquirer and 
acquirees.    
Table 3.5 
The Financial Characteristics of Acquirers: Summary of Research Findings 
 in UK 
Financial 
Characteristics 
Singh 
(1971) 
Tzoannos 
Samuels 
Kuehn 
(1975) 
Firth 
(1976) 
Meeks 
(1977) 
1. Profitability 
    Low 
    Average 
    High 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
. 
2.Dividend Payout 
   Low 
   Average 
   High 
 
. 
 
 
 
. 
            
 
 
 
 
. 
  
3.Valuation ratio 
    Low 
    Average 
    High 
   
 
 
. 
  
4.Price Earning Ratio 
   Low  
   Average 
   High 
  
 
. 
  
 
. 
 
5.Gearing  
    Low  
    Average 
    High 
  
 
. 
  
 
. 
 
 
6.Liquidity 
   Low 
   Average 
   High 
 
. 
    
7.Growth in Net Assets 
   Low  
   Average 
   High 
   
 
 
. 
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A later study by Rege (1984)127 on Canadian data, investigating the possibility of locating 
takeover targets using five variables concluded as follows: 
 
“The results indicated that the pre-takeover measurement of five variables were not 
useful in discriminating between the three categories of firms. Perhaps this was because 
the management of taking over firms was more interested in the expected levels of these 
variables and these expectations affected the major entrepreneurial perception of value of 
the firm. Ratio based on published accounting information may not be adequate proxies 
for the expectations of entrepreneur in takeover situations” 128 
 
Apart from UK based studies, some studies in US also explicitly tried to predict the firms 
that could be acquired in terms of their financial characteristics. Important ones include 
those of Monroe and Simkovitz (1971)129 and stevans (1977) who used discriminant 
analysis to study the financial attributes of acquired firms. Monroe and Simkovitz’s 
Study (1971) examined takeover targets for the year 1968 and concluded that acquired 
firms (relative to non acquired firms) were smaller, had low price earning ratios, lower 
dividend payouts and lower growth in equities. However Steven’s Study (1973)130 found 
that neither dividend payout nor price earning ratios seemed to be important variables. 
The study, however, claimed that a discriminant model based on financial characteristics 
of acquired firms provided useful classification. 
 
Specifically investigating a sample of forty acquired firms (which were acquired in 1966) 
and forty non acquired firms (matched by size to the acquired), this study developed a 
dicriminant model that demonstrated 70% classification accuracy (between acquired and 
none acquired). The same model was also able to classify with 67.5% accuracy between a 
set of acquired and non acquired firms in subsequent years. The major difference between 
acquired and non acquired firms was that acquired firms used significantly less debts than 
non acquired firms. Some evidence of more liquidity for acquired firms was also present. 
In following table results are summarized. 
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Table: - 3.6 
Steven’s Ratios for 40 Acquired firms and 40 Non Acquired Firms 
 
Measurement 
 
 
 
 
 
Ratio Significant in 
Discriminant 
Model 
Means 
Acquired Non 
Acquired 
Profitability EBIT/Sales yes 0.0883 0.104 
 
Liquidity Net working 
capital/Total assets 
Yes 0.4066 0.3459 
Activity Sales/Total Assets Yes 1.41 1.36 
Indebtness Total 
Liabilities/Total 
Assets 
Yes 13.77 22.31 
Dividend Policy Cash dividend/Net 
income 
No 0.37 0.34 
Stoke value Price/EPS 
 
No 15.0 17.5 
 
These studies were followed by another similar study by Harris, Stewart and Carleton 
(1980)131 that used profit analysis132 for the same objective. They developed samples of 
different sizes of acquired firms in two separate time periods 1974-75 and 1976-77 to 
check for changes through time. The sample consisted of sixty one firms acquired in 
1976 and 1977, a sample of forty five firms acquired in 1974 and 1975 and a sample of 
approximately twelve hundred non acquired firms. The financial characteristics of only 
acquired firms were analysed to measure the probability of acquisitions as given in Table 
3.7. 
 
 The following conclusions have been drawn:  
1. Statistical models (profit) to estimate probability of acquisition did achieve 
statistical significance. These models indicated that smaller firms and firms with lower 
price earning ratio were more likely to be acquired. Other factors (for example, liquidity 
and indebtness) had effects that changed over time. 
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2.   Despite this statistical significance (99% level) only a very small portion of 
factors contributing to acquisition was captured by the statistical models based upon only 
acquired firms characteristics. 
 
3. Empirical studies to predict merger targets must be careful in selecting sample of 
firms to be investigated. It was important to keep the ratio of acquired to non acquired 
firms in sample approximately equal to the ratio found in the firm population.  
 
Table: - 3.7 
Merger Motives, Variables and Hypotheses 
 Motives       Variables     Hypotheses 
1. Finance   
    1.Economies in 
     obtaining funds 
    (Financial leverage) 
a) Long  term 
Debt/Total assets 
b) Long  term 
Debt/Total assets 
c) Interest  on 
coverage ratio 
Acquired  firms  use  less 
financial  leverage  than 
non acquired firms. 
2. Corporate liquidity  Net working capital/Total assets Acquired  firms are more 
liquid than non acquired 
firms. 
3Tax saving  Tax losses carry forward.  Acquired  firms  have 
different  tax  loss  carry 
forward  position  than 
non acquired firms. 
4. Profitability  a) Return on assets
b) Return on equity 
Acquired  firms  differ 
from non acquired  firms 
in terms of profitability. 
5. Diversification  a)  Variability  of  returns  to  Firms  diversify  via 
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stockholder 
b) Variability of corporate returns
merger. 
6.  Earnings  per  share 
manipulation 
Price  per  share/  Earnings  per 
share 
Acquired  firms  have 
lower  P/E  ratios  than 
non acquired firms. 
 
 
 
2. Miscellaneous     
 
  1. Managerial   Growth in sales  Firms  use  mergers  as 
means  to  further 
growth. 
    2 .Assorted motives.    Size   Acquired  firms  are 
smaller  than  non 
acquired firms. 
   3. Valuation   Book  value  per  share/  Market 
value per share 
Acquired  firms  have 
different valuation ratios 
than non acquired firms. 
 
Palepu’s Study (1986)133 investigated a sample of one hundred and sixty three firms 
acquired in the period 1971-79 and a random sample of two hundred and fifty six firms 
that were not the mining and manufacturing industry. Both samples were listed on either 
New York or American Stock Exchange. The study found that firms with a mismatch 
between growth and resource were more likely to be taken over. These were firms with 
high growth (measured by average sales growth), low liquidity (measured by ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets) and high leverage and firms with low growth, high liquidity 
and low leverage. The results also indicated that poor performance (measured by net of 
market returns in the four years before the acquisition) was significantly related to 
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probability of takeover. Accounting measures of past performance such as return on 
equity were unrelated to probability of take over. 
 
Time Series Analysis of Aggregate Merger Activity 
The study of merger activity is of long standing to economists as well as financial 
community. Reference to merger activity in American industry generally acknowledges 
three major mergers waves. The first one occurred during the turn of the century, the 
second one during 1920’s and the third one during 1960s. Currently, the United States 
seems to be in the midst of fourth merger wave. Stigler (1950)134 described the second 
merger wave as being “mergers for oligopoly” in contrast with the earlier “mergers for 
monopoly” movement, increased market power through consolidation and corporate 
concentration and operating economies of scale were identified as motives for mergers 
during these two waves. Horizontal mergers (i.e. mergers between direct competitors)   
were relatively more important during the first merger wave which began shortly after 
end of World War second came to be known as conglomerate merger wave because of its 
emphasis on mergers between unrelated firms or firms seeking product extension 
objectives. 
 
While many researchers have been engaged in the study of mergers in US, empirical 
examination of changes in aggregate merger activity has been limited both as to type and 
time period covered. 
  
Weston Study (1953)135 examined annual merger data for the period between the two 
world wars. Employing multiple regression analysis, the study found that mergers were 
significantly and positively related to security prices and wholesale commodity prices but 
were not significantly related to industrial production levels. 
 
Nelson,s Study (1959)136 looked at quarterly merger data stretching from 1895 through 
1956 with primary focus on the years 1895 – 1920. The study explored number of 
hypotheses concerning the origin and motives underlying the mergers of the period. It 
 193
rejected the propositions that mergers were a consequence of slow down in growth of US 
economy or decreases in transportation costs. 
 
The study found that achievement of market power and the development of securities 
market played a major role in encouraging the mergers. The results (both in terms of 
number and market capitalization) gave a significant positive correlation between 
mergers and levels of industrial production. The same results were obtained on an 
extended analysis to cover the complete period from 1895 to 1954. In a follow up study 
which extended aggregate merger data through 1962, Nelson conclude that merger 
activity exhibited a positive and highly consistent response to change in business activity 
(measured as business cycle). 
 
Similar to the efforts made by this study, Westons Study (1961)137 also examined annual 
changes in merger activity during the interwar period (between World War first and 
second). Using a multiple regression model, the study found merger activity to be 
significantly related to stock prices but not significantly related to industrial production 
activity. 
 
Steiner’s Study (1975)138 used multiple regression analysis to explain annual merger 
actively (in terms of number and value) from 1949 through early 1970s. For the years 
1949-71, the study found that both, GNP and change in level of security prices had 
significant positive influences but prime rate of interest had positive but insignificant 
effect. When year 1972 was added to the analysis, the results were reversed i.e. change 
insecurity price variable became insignificant and prime rate of interest showed 
significant positive effect. 
Beckenstein’s Study (1979)139 examined annual data on merger numbers and values for 
the years 1949-75. Using multiple regression analysis on number of variables, the study 
found that only nominal level of security price and nominal interest rate had consistently 
significant effects but the interest rate effects were consistently positive.  
Chung and Weston’s Study (1982)140 employed multiple regression analysis to explore 
determinants of annual number of large conglomerate mergers. The study found that 
 194
these mergers were positively and significantly related to the difference between yields 
on lower and higher grade corporate bonds, ratio of short and long term corporate yields 
and the rate of growth of GNP. However, mergers were negatively related to rate of 
return on corporate bonds. When Tonin’s q141 was used instead of last two variables, the 
results were significant and positive. 
 
Melicher, Ledolter and Antonio’s Study (1983)142 empirically examined quarterly merger 
data between 1947 and 1977. Their results indicated a weak relationship between merger 
activity and economic conditions with changes in industrial production and business 
failures lagging behind changes in merger activity. However, the results of correlation 
analysis and multiple time series model indicated that changes in stock prices and bond 
yield could be used to forecast future changes in recorded merger activity. To the extent 
that merger negotiations began about two quarters before consummation, increased 
merger negotiation activity seemed to reflect expectation of more receptive and possibly 
less costly capital market conditions in the form of higher stock prices and lower interest 
rates. 
 
Shugrat and Tollison’s Study (1984)143 analyzed annual merger data for the years 1895-
1920 and 1947-1979. The study did not explicitly test wave hypotheses but the results 
conclude that merger series could be described as generated by a “white noice process 
with a possible drift and rejected the characteristic of merger data as occurring in waves. 
 
Guerard’s Study (1985)144 examined quarterly merger data for the years 1895-1950 and 
using the procedure similar to Milicher, Ledolter and Antonio’s (1983)145 conclude that 
mergers were positively related to stock prices but unrelated to level of industrial 
production. 
 
Becketti’s Study (1986)146 used quarterly data on the number and value of mergers from 
1960 through 1985. Using ordinary least square regression, and emphasizing on legged 
values of explanatory variables, the study found that mergers and acquisitions were in 
general influenced, positively by security prices negatively by real interest rates, 
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positively by general level of debt in the economy and negatively by real GNP. However, 
the statistical influences of these results were not strong, except for the influence on 
GNP. 
 
Globe and White’s Study (1988)147 empirically examined the determinants of merger 
activity over the past thirty five years. The study developed hypotheses concerning the 
economic factor that explained the pattern of mergers and acquisitions subjected these 
hypotheses to econometric tests on post war merger data. The results were consistent with 
the earlier empirical finding that security prices had positive effect on mergers. The study 
offered a more specific test of wave hypotheses for time series pattern of mergers was 
consistent with a wave characterization. 
 
To sum up, in a period of last thirty years, the literature devoted to time series analysis of 
mergers and acquisitions has not been very extensive. A few variables have consistently 
appeared as potential explanatory influences of determinants of merger activity, namely, 
measure of economic activity (like GNP or industrial production), interest rates (on bond 
yield) and security prices. Measures of economic activity and security prices have found 
to be positively related to merger activity in most of the studies where as interest rates has 
shown conflicting relationship with merger activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDIES CONDUCTED IN INDIA 
Kaveri’s Study (1986) 
 
The first pioneering attempt in India to measure the success of company mergers was 
made by Kaveri (1986)148 in context or revival of corporate sickness. This study 
conducted as in-depth analysis of nine specific cases of mergers that took place during 
the years 1975-84 (in which seven mergers took place within the group and two outside 
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the group). It attempted to measure the effectiveness of mergers by comparing actual 
performance of mergers vis-à-vis various expectations laid down in respect of mergers. 
The expectations along with their conclusions (*) are as follows: 
 
1. Revival of sickness is possible through mergers: (which is measured through 
sales). 
• During the post-merger period, sick companies were able to raise sales but 
whether rise was significant or not was debatable. 
2. Mergers are advantageous to healthy companies also. 
• Healthy companies continued to be healthy after merger but degree of 
improvement in health varied from case to case. 
3. Mergers provide sick companies to expand / diversify / modernize business 
activities. 
• Revival measures of improvement in technology, diversification, expansion, 
changing market strategy etc. Were found satisfactory though varied in most of the cases. 
4. Performance of sick companies during post-merger period must be better than 
projected performance if there had not been a merger. 
• In five out of nine cases, actual performance was no way nearer to projected 
performance. It could be possible that revival measures initiated merger might not have 
been completed by then. Some more time might be required to gain full benefits of 
mergers. 
5. With mergers, sick companies contribute to aggregate strength of healthy 
companies. 
• Sick companies did contribute to the total strength (measured in terms of total 
sales of healthy companies, though the contribution varied from case to case depending 
upon the size of merger. Bigger the size of merger, greater would be the contribution of 
sick company to total sales of healthy company after merger. 
6. Merger produces positive effect on the share values of merged companies. 
• The fluctuating share prices in most cases followed an upward trend after merger 
i.e. merger proposal was welcomed by shareholders of healthy companies. However, it 
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would be a worthwhile exercise to understand the behavior of share prices during the 
entire process of merger which generally takes two-three years to complete. 
7. During the post merger period, bank borrowing should decline when the merged 
company becomes financially stronger. 
• Bank borrowings declined during the post-merger period due to better 
performance of merging and merged companies in eight out of nine cases. Hence, 
bankers’ interest was safeguarded in these cases. 
 
Singh and Kumar’s Study (1994) 
Singh and Kumar (1994) 149 analyzed the role played by BIFR in the revival of sock 
industrial units through the medium of mergers. With the help of three case studies, they 
concluded that rehabilitation of sick company by merging with the health company is the 
most effective way of their rehabilitation. All the three cases (namely Kothari General 
Food Corporation Ltd. With Brooke Bond India Ltd., Challapalli Sugars Ltd. With KCP 
Ltd. And Sewa Paper Lid. With Ballarpur Industries Ltd.) could be termed as successful 
mergers and BIFR seemed to have fulfilled its assured objective of revival of sick 
companies. Another conclusion drawm was that tax implications were singularly the most 
inviting feature for healthy company to merge with sick company. 
 
Yadav, Jain and Jain’s Study (1994) 
Yadav, Jain and Jain (1994)150 carried out an assessment of profitability of mergers by 
looking at the mergers synergy i.e. comparing sum of pre-merger values of various 
attributes (like cost ratios, earnings and profit ratio, return on investment asset ratios ect.) 
of merged companies with post-merger value of combined companies. 
 
Their sample consisted of four Indian companies, two of which had merged with Indian 
companies while the other two merged with multinationals. The performance of these 
companies was analyzed over a period of three years before merger and three years after 
the merger. The hypothesis tested was to see if mergers with multinationals were more 
successful than with Indian companies. The in depth investigation of the following issues 
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was carried out the help of various statistical techniques like ratio analysis, trend analysis 
act. 
 
1. Are profits adequate? 
2. What is the rate of return on total assets? 
3. What is the rate of return to equity holders? 
4. What is earning per share? 
5. What amount is paid as dividends? 
 
The cases analyzed in the study indicated that growth had been achieved by all the 
companies involved in the merger whether Indian or multinational but it was more in case 
of latter. Looking at earning per share I was found that post-merger EPS in MNCs was 
more than their Indian counterparts. In fact, in one Indian case it had decreased. As 
regards dividends, again percentage increase was more in case of MNCs, while Indian 
companies had maintained a constant dividend. On the issue of expenses, there was no 
clear trend. One case of both categories showed rising trend after merger and the other in 
both showed downward trend. 
 
Mandal’s Study (1995) 
Mandal (1995)151 critically reviewed merger gains that emerged out of various economic 
categories of mergers (for example horizontal, vertical, conglomerate and co generic). 
The study also quantified tax benefits arising out of corpora rate mergers to the acquiring 
company and the extent of such benefits towards the revival of a sick company. The 
study used nineteen merger cases to investigate into the merger motives, means of 
payment, exchange ratio, success and failure of mergers and quantum of tax benefits. The 
various hypotheses tested along with their conclusions are as follows: 
 
!.    Equity based merger is an essential product of management strategy to grow without 
embarking on cash reserve. 
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Empirical verification of this hypothesis was conducted on the sample nineteen cases for 
a five year post- merger time frame. The following conclusions were drawn: 
    
a) Means of payment chosen in Indian merger case could be explained 
using the theorem of preservation of access to capital market for future growth, structural 
exchange for tax benefit and willingness of shareholders of Target Company to share 
merger synergy.  
b) Exchange of equity was found in 90.01% cases, in 5% cases equity 
shareholders of targets were discharged by preference shares and in 4.99% cases by 
debentures. 
 
c) Preference share of Target Company was exchanged using equity shares, 
preference shares, debentures and cash. Mostly preference shares and debentures of the 
acquiring company were used to discharge preference shares of the target. 
 
 
d) There was no definite pattern of change in equity share capital of 
acquiring company due to merger. 
 
e) Mostly, reserves and surpluses of merged company increased as a result 
of merger and in most of the cases, leverage ratios had also increased. 
  
 
 
 
2. Conglomeration helps to reduce business risk. 
 
Empirical examination of two cases of conglomerates (out of nineteen cases) opined that 
risk reduction through acquisition was not a general phenomenon in India. However, 
generalizations on the basis of just two case studies could not be done. 
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3. In India, merger has been chosen as easy route for corporate growth by way of 
acquisition of sick company. 
 
Out of empirical examination of ten case studies in this regards, six cases were of loss 
making target companies. Three out of these six cases became profitable division of 
acquiring company in the post-merger period. In two cases, satisfactory performance of 
losing target was achieved very quickly, while in one case, it took eight years to revive 
financial health if sick target. Thus, it could not be concluded that merger as an easy route 
for corporate growth by way of acquisition of sick company. 
 
4. Revival of financial health of sick transferor company is possible through merger 
with a financially sound company. 
  
This is overlaps with the third hypothesis. In three cases, losing targets became 
contributory to the overall profits in the post-merger period. The other two cases showed 
satisfactory performance and one case took eight years to losing target was possible 
through merger although it was not an easy route. This supported the effectiveness of tax 
incentive scheme u/s 72 A of Income Tax Act and justified the BIFR approach to merger 
of a sick company with a profitable one. But this was not a general rule. 
 
Sankar and Rao’s Study (1999) 
Sankar and Rao’s study (1999)152 empirically examined the success or failure of takeover 
as a strategy of turning around a sick unit. The study also analyzed the implications of 
takeovers from the financial point of view with the help of certain parameters like 
liquidity, leverage, profitability and other parameters. To attain these objectives, the 
following hypotheses were tested on a sample of eight merger cases sanctioned by BIFR. 
 
1. When a company was taken over for turnaround, it achieved better liquidity, 
better solvency and improved profitability after the takeover. 
 201
2. When a company was taken over, the taken over company with the support of 
the taking over company expanded or modernized its business activities in the process of 
turning around. 
 
The finding of study validated these hypotheses. The conclusions that emerged were that 
the takeovers could be successfully used to turnaround a sick company. Another 
observation of the study was that units which had turned around after takeover were those 
which were taken over by reputed management group. Therefore, it is concluded that if a 
sick company is taken over by a healthy company with good management who make 
serious attempts, it is possible to turn around such sick companies successfully. 
Beena’s Study (2000) 
Beena (2000)153 carried out an analysis on the nature of mergers in terms of their 
management during the period 1990-95 on a selected sample of forty five merger cases. 
The results showed that thirty one cases were horizontal mergers and remaining divided 
equally among vertical and conglomerate mergers. This suggested that merger movement 
during the early 1990s showed the dominance of mergers between firms with related 
management, though there were signs of increased role of mergers between unrelated 
companies or those under different management. 
 
Further, it was found that merger was not a route to growth, but was predominantly 
financed through resources acquired from a buoyant market share. The study argued that 
though the merger movements in early 1990s might have contributed to an increased in 
asset concentration at firm level (asset growth was not in more than 20% of sample 
cases), it had not contributed to an increased in concentration in terms of relatives shares 
of business groups. 
 
The study also analyzed some of financial motives for mergers to see if any of these 
could explain the merger wave of 1990s. Using a sub sample of thirty three out of forty 
five sample cases, statistical test of Wilcoxon-rank paired test was conducted to see if 
there was any significant difference in the financial characteristics of acquiring and 
acquired firms. The results did not suggest any significant differences amongst them 
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although the shareholder profit in the acquiring firms was significantly different from the 
acquired firm. 
 
Besides relative profitability another significant issues analyzed was whether mergers 
were a means by which profit making firms absorbed loss making ones, either in order to 
expand at lower cost or garner tax benefits available for such mergers. The results 
showed that only 22% of the total acquiring firms which were earning profits were 
involved in mergers with loss making firms in order to reap tax benefits or expand at low 
cost. 
 
Another issue analyzed on a sub sample of twenty five merger cases was the extent of 
changes in the shares in total equity of those holding the controlling block in the 
acquiring firms as a result of merger. Of the twenty five acquired firms, eleven firms 
were foreign owned and rest were domestic. As a result of these acquisitions through 
merger, the share of major controlling block increased in the merged company as 
compared with the acquiring firm in eighteen out of twenty five cases. In the remaining 
seven cases where there was reduction in shareholding of major controlling block, two 
were mergers between firms belonging to unrelated management. This evidence 
suggested that, one of the financial motives for mergers and why it occurred generally in 
related firms was the need for mergers and why it occurred generally in related firms was 
the need for the business group to increase its controlling block in order to guard against 
a takeover. 
 
Again, on a sub-sample of thirty nine out of forty five sample cases, impact of 
profitability was assessed in term of various variables (like rate of return on capital 
employed, profit margin, shareholders profit, gearing ratio dividend per share ect.). The 
results showed mixed evidence on profitability. However, wilcoxon matched pairs signed 
ranks test showed no significant difference in rate of return and profits between the 
periods before and after the merger. However, the trend on average gearing ratio showed 
a decline significant in 69% of cases and returns on shareholders equity showed an 
improvement in 69% of acquiring firms. These trends suggested hat desire to improve 
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financial position of the firm through a viable capital structure could be one of motives of 
merger. 
 
Finally, an analysis of effects of mergers on shareholders gains was carried out on a sub 
sample of twenty acquiring firms out of sample of forty five firms in terms of share price 
data. The results suggested that on an average, a majority of acquiring firms went through 
a period of share prices rises prior to merger, then experienced a fall in their share prices 
on the announcement of merger and this continued for two – three yeas after merger. This 
confirmed the earlier evidence that majority of merger cases were characterized by pre-
merger buoyancy in share prices of acquiring firms. Once mergers occurred, their prices 
showed a bearish trend because of intervening phase of process of revamp and 
restructuring and consequentially share price decline in post-merger period. 
 
Ravindra P. Purohit’s study (2000) 
Ravindra P. Purohit (2000)154 stated, the dynamics of globalization is now a major force 
in shaping development in countries. The basic reasons behind this globalization are 
rapid advances in and convergence of information and communication technology. 
Increasing availability of capital at global level has also played major role.  
 
 
Vardhana Pawaskar’s study (2001) 
Vardhana Pawaskar (2001)155 stated the impact of mergers on corporate performance. It 
compares the pre and post merger operating performance of the companies involved in in 
merger to study their financial characteristics. Also the effect on merger induced 
monopoly profits is identified by looking at persistence of profits. This is by taking 36 
cases of merger from 1992 to 1995, it is seen that there are no significant differences in 
the financial characteristics of the two companies involved in merger. The merger seems 
to lead to financial synergies and one- time growth. The regression analysis shows that 
there is no significant increase in the post merger profits.  
 
Anupaag Saxena and Naresh Grandhy’s study (2001) 
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Anupaag Saxena and Naresh Grandhy (2001)156 carried out study on payments in merger 
activity are usually made in cash, in stock or in different shades of a mix of both. This 
study is an attempt to demystifying the strategic intent behind each of these models of 
payments and designs a conceptual framework that would help decision makers to 
evaluate which method they should choose in an acquisition. This study is to show the 
advantages and disadvantages of various options, both to the acquirer and the acquired. 
Another important area covered by this study considering contextual background of the 
Indian legal framework, the accounting and tax implications. In the and however, any 
merger boils down to numbers and for anybody involved in merger, the main aim is to 
atleast be aware of the risk. So it can be reduced up to possible level, if can not be 
eliminated in total. 
  
Arindam Ghosh and Brataai Das’s study (2003) 
Arindam Ghosh and Brataai Das (2003)157  carried study on this subject and stated that a 
transaction involving two or more companies in the exchange of securities and only one 
company remain in existence is called merger. Merger results in number of advantages to 
both the companies. There are three types of merger. The reason of merger is mainly to 
reduce the competition, economies of large scale and tax benefits. 
 
Macchi and Menon’s  study (2004) 
Hetal K. Machhi and Preeti V. Menon (2004)158 stated the in this competitive global 
business world Merger has become essential requirement for a company to run a business 
with profit. The main reasons for Merger are increase in market share, use of modern 
technology and maximizing profit etc. The merger wave has spread in India. The actual 
merger wave in India started after 1994. The number of good and reputed companies has 
gone for merger in domestic as well as in international market. Merger leads a very big 
question “Will company will do well after merger action”. 
 
ICFAI Group159 stated that procedure for merger and amalgamation is different from 
takeover and amalgamation is different from takeover. Merger and amalgamation are 
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regulated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 whereas takeovers are 
regulated under the Substantial Acquisition of Shares and takeovers Regulations. 
 
Vijay Shrimali and Karunesh Saxena’s study (2004) 
Vijay Shrimali and Karunesh Saxena (2004)160 stated, due to the imminent 
implementation of WTO Guidelines with effect from July 2005, it was become 
mandatory for business organization to strengthen their R&D base. Consequently, the 
size of the business organization matters most, merger and acquisition have, therefore, 
become order of the day, an attempt has been made in the paper to provide a theoretical 
framework of M&A, various examples of merger and acquisition in the world market and 
finally, the economic advantage of M&A have been outlined. 
 
Seema Narzareth’s study (1999) 
Seema Narzareth (1999)161 stated, corporate restructuring is the most powerful tool 
available for those companies, which are in dire straits. The most possible thing for these 
companies is to ‘restructure” their operations so that performance may improve. Some of 
the steps include hiving-off of the subsidiaries, merging loss-making units with profitable 
ones, demerger of company etc, among others. But how practicable are merger and other 
ways of restructuring? Are they really working? Of the merger in Indian corporate sector 
since last two years, none can highlight that mantra of corporate strategy by mergers is 
working. 
 
R.G Bhatnagar’s study (2002) 
R.G Bhatnagar (2002)162 in his study said that as Indian economy precedes with 
globalization process the Indian corporate and financial sector are left with no choice, but 
to consolidate the stand up to global competition. This lead the consolidation through 
mergers has become the trend across the globe. 
 
A number of benefits will accrue to the Indian financial sector and to the Indian economy 
as whole. Due to merger banks would definitely be in a better position to diversify their 
operations and thereby reduce their risks.    
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After merger, banks are likely to become strong with better earning capacity. This will 
enable banks to further strengthen their capital base. The strong capital base will in turn 
banking sector to take up new and diversified activities. This may be financing equity 
underwriting, distribution of investment, and insurance products, issuing of asset based 
securities, etc. Further, merging activities in banking sector is bound to reduce overhead 
cost by rationalizing branch locations and avoiding duplications. 
 
Bailout mergers and linking of small and weak banks to the stronger ones may not serve 
to create any competitive edge for the merged activity. Merger is not a panacea to the 
problem of weak banks, while it may make sense for some weak banks to be merged, it 
must bust be realized that some may have to winded up. 
 
One of the major obstacles to the consolidation in banking sector is labor law. This is 
particularly relevant for public sector banks which continue to be overstaffed. A working 
group of prime minister’ task force on administrative and legal simplifications suggested 
recently that there should be adequate provisions for industry to shed surplus manpower 
after payment of reasonable compensation. 
 
Another aspect, which requires attention is information, flows to the investors. The SEBI 
created to protect the interest of the investors particularly, the smaller ones, must devise a 
monitoring mechanism to ensure that gaps in information flows do not affect the 
shareholders of the banks concerned. When two banks of contrasting corporate culture 
are merged, brining harmony and a sense of identity are other issues that have to be 
sorted out. 
Joydeep Biswas ‘s study(2004) 
Joydeep Biswas (2004)163 in his study on recent trend of merger in the Indian private 
corporate sector. Corporate restructuring in the form M&A has become a natural and 
perhaps a desirable phenomenon in the current economic environment. In the tune with 
the worldwide trend, M&A have become an important conduit for FDI inflows in India in 
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recent years. In this paper it is argued that the Greenfiled FDI and cross-border M&As 
are not alternatives in developing countries like India. 
   
CONCLUSION 
Although there is a plethora of research literature on mergers and acquisitions, most of 
the studies have been done for the efficient markets of the developed world especially US 
and UK. In India, very limited research has been done on this burning topic. Books 
available are in plenty but they are mostly theory based. None of the few studies 
conducted in India have explored the performance of mergers and acquisitions 
empirically in terms of their motives and their effect on shareholders value. The present 
study makes an attempt to fill these voids and aims to investigate the financial 
performance of mergers and acquisitions that have taken place during 1999-2000.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter includes the historical evolution of corporate performance metric 
popularized by Stern Stewart of US, namely Economic value added (EVA) and its twin, 
Market value added (MVA). After giving the rationale of its use and its superiority over 
other performance metrics like Earning Per Share (EPS) & Return On Net Worth 
(RONW), the detailed theoretical methodology regarding its computation has been 
discussed. 
 
CONCEPT OF EVA 
The onset of liberalization and globalization of the Indian economy over the ten years has 
resulted in shift of the corporate goals from socio-economic focus to an increasing 
shareholders value. Therefore, the present day need is to choose the right metrics that 
would help to measure organizational progress in meeting the above mentioned strategic 
goal. Although there are few traditional performance metrics like balance sheet measures 
(namely, rate of return, shareholders’ profit, earning per share) and market driven 
measures (namely, market capitalization, price earning ratio), these are subject to certain 
deficiencies. Balance Sheet based measures are veiled in accounting anomalies that 
generally measure notional profit, not real ones. And market driven measures are prone to 
volatility of the bourses. The need is for a mix and match measure that factor in a 
market’s assessment of a company’s value. At the same time, it should be a real measure 
of its financial performance extracted from its financial statements. 
 
Thus, corporate world’s need for a tool to measure value creation has been filled with the 
emergence of a new concept namely, EVA. It has been redefined and popularized by US 
based Stern Stewart & Company. It is an attempt to resolve the need for a performance 
measure that is highly correlated to the shareholders wealth and responsive to the actions 
of the company’s managers. Shareholder value is considered as an essential measure of 
the corporate performance. It is an accurate reflection of the quantum of incremental 
value a company generates for shareholders after accounting for its cost of operations, 
which include the cost of capital. The number of companies that have adopted EVA 
worldwide is startling. Stern Stewart Management Services (the founders of EVA) claim 
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that more than four hundred companies globally are using EVA. Fortune magazine has 
termed it as today’s hottest financial idea with underlying scope of getting hotter. 
Management Guru Peter Drucker has described EVA as a vital measure that reflects all 
the dimensions by which management can increase value. EVA is the financial measure 
that comes closer than any other measure in capturing true economic profit of an 
enterprise. 
 
To elaborate, EVA is the same as what economists call as economic profit. In business, 
revenue comes from customers and is distributed among the shareholders. Suppliers are 
paid for their goods and services and employees for their services. Depreciation amount 
is deducted from revenue as it results in loss of the value of assets. Creditors are paid 
interest while loans and taxes are paid to the government. Ultimately, shareholders are 
also paid a return. The shareholder’s return is not the usual dividend payment, but it is the 
return commensurate with the risk undertaken by them by investing money in the 
business. It is the earning that the shareholders could have earned by investing in similar 
risk profile investments i.e. they have to be paid their opportunity cost of capital. This 
differentiates EVA from the accounting model as the accounting model does not 
acknowledge the cost of equity. After paying to all whatever is left out from revenue is 
know as EVA. EVA is thus the residual income. As shareholders are the owners of the 
business, the residual income adds to their wealth. 
 
 The current demand for adopting EVA is based on a simple i.e. you cannot know 
whether your enterprise is creating value for your shareholders until you subtract cost of 
the capital from income. To the extent EVA is positive; the firm is adding value for its 
shareholders. But if a firm’s EVA is negative, the firm is destroying value even though it 
may be reporting a positive or growing earning per share (EPS) or return on investment 
(ROI). This means that if a firm wants to have an attractive investment, it has to have a 
return that would exceed other investment options with a similar risk. Though EVA just 
reiterates the basic tenet behind any enterprise, it is not just any other metric for the firm. 
It is a framework for complete financial management and compensation system. It can 
 224
guide every decision a company makes that can a corporate culture and help produce 
greater wealth for shareholders, customers and themselves. 
 
While creating value for the shareholders is an objective measure of corporate 
performance, the measure of creation of wealth for the company as a whole is also 
equally important. The best measure for this is another value add measure, namely, 
Market Value Added (MVA). MVA is an absolute measure of wealth creation obtained 
by subtracting the economic capital of an organization (book capital after perfect measure 
of a company’s ability to create wealth but is as volatile as any market index and so, can 
be calculated for the company as a whole only. 
 
EVA on the other hand is the most accurate measure of economic performance of the 
company and can be calculated at the level of divisions and product lines. So, while EVA 
of a company is the excess of its return on capital over its cost of capital, MVA is the 
difference between company’s total market value and its capital employed. In mature 
markets, MVA of a company is equal to the net present value of all future EVAs. In 
countries like India where markets are not efficient, MVA is volatile with no 
mathematical link with EVA. 
 
In a nutshell, EVA can be described as: 
 
1. Most accurate value based measure of financial performance. 
A registered trademark redefined and popularized by US based                              
Stern Stewart & Company. 
2. Concept, a variation of residual income. 
3. Concept, practically the same as economic profit. 
A measure indicating amount of shareholder wealth created or destroyed during 
each year. 
4. A framework of complete financial management and incentive 
                   compensation. 
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ACCOUNTING PROFIT VERSUS ECONOMIC PROFIT    
According to conventional accounting concepts, business income is measured by 
matching revenues by costs. It is a purely monetary concept. In such a system, ones sales 
revenues are determined; various costs are divided between present and future. The 
present costs or expenses are charged against revenues and appeared in the income 
statement and future costs are treated as deferred expenditure and hence appeared as 
assets in Balance Sheet to charge against revenues in later years. The accounting concept 
lays more emphasis on objectivity and accuracy through the use of certain conventions, 
principals and accounting standards. 
 
Economic profit is also a concept that was established long ago, as is understood by the 
writings of Alfred Marshall over hundred years ago.   
                
“When a man is engaged in business, his profits for the year are the excess of his receipts 
from his business. The difference between value of stock of the plant, machinery etc. at 
the end and beginning of the year is taken as part of his outlay, accordingly as there has 
been an increase or decrease of value. What remains of his profits after deducting interest 
on his capital at the current rate...... is generally called his earnings of the undertaking or 
management.”   
 
Today, this concept has been developed in every principle of economic text. The idea of 
economic profit is the basis of capital budgeting techniques of net present value and 
internal rate of return which can be found in finance texts over past thirty years. The cost 
of capital is the return required by suppliers of capital. Cost reflects both, the time value 
of money and compensation for risk – the more risk associated with the firm, greater is 
the firm’s cost of capital. Factoring in the cost of capital tells us whether accounting 
profit is sufficient to keep suppliers i.e. creditors and owners from moving their funds 
elsewhere. The cost capital in these cases is referred as “minimum acceptable return” or 
“minimum revenue required”. Profit is defined as earnings in the excess of cost of the 
capital. Economic concept, thus, basically deals with the real terms instead of only 
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monetary terms as is the case of accounting concept. Summary, of the difference between 
accounting profit and economic profit is given below.     
 
Table4.1 
Differences between Accounting Profit & Economic Profit. 
 
Sr. 
No 
Accounting Profit Economic Profit 
1. Based on theory of accountancy, profit is 
calculated as book as perceived by the 
accountants as per accounting standards.  
Based on theory of value and utility of 
economics, profit is worked out as per 
the perception of an economist. 
2. Accounting profit is affected by one time 
irregular adjustments. 
For calculating economic profit, one 
time adjustment as discounted by 
market is considered. 
3. Depreciation is based on adhoc rates. Depreciation is based on market value 
and economic assets. 
4. Expected losses and expenses are provided 
for on adhoc basis. 
Expected losses and expenses are 
provided for as per market perception. 
5. Considers monetary transactions only.  Considers non-monetary transactions 
by  
6.   Change in earnings not considered on 
account of external/internal factors unless 
ascertainable. 
Changes in earnings are considered on 
account of external/ internal factors 
even though not ascertainable.  
7. Does not consider cost of capital. Considers cost of capital. 
 
CALCULATION OF EVA 
The value based performance measure, namely, EVA, introduced by Stern Stewart & 
Company is an incarnation of Residual Income concept. They defined “EVA as an 
estimate of true economic profit, the amount by which earnings exceed or fall short of 
required minimum rate of return investors could get by investing in other securities of 
comparable risk.” It is the net operating profit minus the appropriate charge for the 
opportunity cost of capital invested in an enterprise (both debt and equity). The capital 
charge is the most distinctive and an important aspect of EVA. Under conventional 
accounting, most of the companies appear profitable. However, many are actually 
destroying shareholder value because the profits they earn are less than their cost of 
capital. EVA corrects this error by explicitly recognizing that when managers employ 
capital, they must pay for it. By taking all capital costs into consideration, including cost 
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of equity, EVA shows the amount of wealth a business has created or destroyed in each 
reporting period. 
 
Expressed as a formula, EVA for a given period can be written as: 
 
          EVA = NOPAT – COST OF CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
                   = NOPAT - WACC X CE 
 
Where 
NOPAT   :  Net Operating Profit After Taxes but before financing costs 
 
WACC    :   Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
 
CE            :  Capital Employed 
 
OR equivalently, if rate of return is defined as NOPAT/ CAPITAL EMPLOYED then, it 
turns into a more revealing formula. 
 
EVA = (RATE OF RETURN – COST OF CAPITAL) X CAPITAL                              
EMPLOYED 
Where,  
 
RATE OF RETURN =   NOPAT/ Capital Employed 
 
CAPITAL EMPLOYED   : Total of balance sheet – Non interest        
                                               Bearing current liabilities (NIBCL) in the     
                                               Beginning of the year 
 
COST OF CAPITAL       : Cost of equity x proportion of equity in  
                                              Capital + Cost of debt x proportion of debt in  
                                               Capital (1- tax). 
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If, Return on Investment is defined as above after taxes, EVA can be presented with the 
following familiar terms: 
                                EVA    = (ROI – WACC) x CAPITAL EMPLOYED 
 
Where  
 CAPITAL EMPLOYED: Net fixed assets – Revenue reserve – Capital  
                                              Work in progress + Current assets –Funds  
                                               Deployed outside business – NIBCL 
 
STEPS IN COMPUTING EVA 
 Various steps in computing EVA are as follows: 
 
(1)  Calculation of NOPAT : 
NOPAT refers to amount of profit remaining of the business after tax and adding back 
interest payments. It can be calculated as per accounting concept after making necessary 
adjustments for certain for non- operating incomes and expenses. 
                                       NOPAT = PBIT (nnrt) (1-T) 
                                        Where, 
                                        PBIT (nnrt) Profit before Interest and Taxes  
                                        (Net of non recurring transactions)      
                                         
                                          T= Effective tax rate 
                                           
                                                                Tax paid 
                                           T=        -------------------------- 
                                                            Profit before tax 
(2) Calculation of capital employed: 
In calculation of EVA capital employed refers to economic capital, which means 
economic value of funds invested in a business. It consists of total amount in circulation 
and total amount of borrowings or debts raised. 
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Stewart defined capital employed as company’s net asset at the beginning of the year 
after following three adjustments: 
 
(i)  Marketable securities and construction in progress are subtracted. 
(ii) Present value of non- capitalized leases is added to net property , plant and 
machinery 
(iii) Certain equity equivalent reserves are added to assets. For example: 
(a)   Bad debts reserve is added to receivables. 
(b)   Last in first out (LIFO) reserve is added to inventory. 
(c)   Cumulative amortization of goodwill is added back to goodwill. 
Research and Development (R&D) expenses is capitalized as long term asset and 
depreciated over five years. 
(e) Cumulative unusual losses/gains after taxes are considered to long term investment. 
(3) Calculation of Cost of Capital: 
It defined as the weighted average cost of both equity capital and debt. It is the weighted 
average of both the specified costs with weights equal to proportion of each in total 
capital. The tax shield of the debt is adjusted with the cost of debt: 
  
 Cost of capital = Cost of equity*solvency ratio*cost of debt 
                                    *(1-solvancy ratio)*(1-tax) 
Solvency ratio defines the proportion of both equity capital and debt separately in total 
capital: 
 
                                                  Equity capital 
                Solvency ratio =   -------------------------  
                                                   Total capital 
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The calculation of an average cost includes solvency ratio. Solvency ratio generally 
changes according to business cycles and changes in other factors. Financial theory 
suggests that when solvency changes, the cost of equity and debt shift so much that 
WACC itself does not change. When solvency or debt-equity ratio decreases, risk of 
equity increases. So, when relative proportion of debt from capital increases, return on 
equity become more fluctuating and therefore true cost of equity capital increases. Also, 
lenders demand premium at high rate on debt when leverage increases. So when solvency 
ratio decreases, both the cost of equity and debt increase and vice-versa. The increase in 
the cost of equity and debt cancel out the decrease in WACC, caused by bigger relative 
proportion of a cheaper debt capital. Hence, the change in WACC is zero. 
 
This change in leverage not affecting WACC can be considered from expected returns 
angle also. WACC reflects the expected return of capital with similar risky business 
because opportunity cost i.e. the expected return of capital with similar risky business 
because of opportunity cost i.e. expected risk on similar risky investments. If change in 
leverage does not affect the expected return on investment (expected ROI), then WACC 
does not change, changing only liability side of the balance sheet i.e. replacing equity 
capital with debt capital does not affect the expected return on assets but decreased 
solvency raises expected ROI because an increased financial leverage raises reruns on the 
equity capital and risk of equity capital as well.. Also, expected return on stock market 
does not depend on how investors finance their investments. For an individual investor, 
the expected return changes if he uses more financial leverage i.e. debt with his 
investments although this can not affect return for whole investment. Changing leverage 
changes the return and risk of equity and debt capital but it can not influence the expected 
return of whole investment. It merely allocates risk and return new manner. However, if 
tax shield of debt is considered, when leverage increases, increase tax shield from debt 
will decrease WACC to some extent. Therefore, increasing leverage might decrease 
WACC slightly. On the other hand, if leverage decreases too much, then the increased 
probability of bankruptcy and cost attached to it increases WACC. 
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(4) Calculation of Cost of Debt: 
Cost of debt refers to the average rate of interest the company pays for its debt 
obligations. To calculate cost of debt, the company’s interest payments are measured 
against the total borrowings and then adjusted for taxes. 
               
                                            Interest expenses (1-t) 
              Cost of Debt =    ----------------------------------   
                                             Total borrowings 
                  
  Tax:  
                                                    Tax Paid                      
 Effective tax rate     =         ---------------------------                                
                                                  Profit before Tax 
 
(5) Calculation of Cost of Equity: 
For computation of cost of equity, Stern Stewart & Co. (founders of EVA concept) 
recommended the use of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). This model holds that 
firm’s equity costs is the composition of risk free rat of return for a stock plus premium 
representing the volatility of share prices. 
   
Broadly, 
 
Cost of equity   =   Risk free + Specific risk premium  
                  Ke      =    Rf    + B (Equity risk premium) 
                            =    Rf     + B (Market rate - Risk free rate) 
                             =   Rf      + B (Rm- Rf) 
1)     Rf    :   Risk free return 
Normally, 364 days Treasury Bill rates are considered risk free. Treasury securities are 
highly liquid and free of default risk. Interest rates on these securities are used to measure 
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the risk free rate. It serves as a bench mark from which cost of risky security is 
calculated.  
 
2)    B (RM –Rf)  :  Specific risk premium 
Specific risk premium is the product of level of risk and compensation per unit of risk. 
More specifically, it refers to premium required by he investors to invest in specific 
company. It is the multiple of equity risk premium of the company in which the investors 
want to invest their money and it’s Beta (B). 
 
a)  Equity risk premium is the excess return over and above risk free rate that the 
investors demand for holding risky security. It is calculated as the difference of market 
rate of return and risk free rate (Rm- Rf). 
b) Beta (B) is the risk free co-efficient which measures the volatility of a given script 
of a company with respect to volatility of market. It is a measure of responsiveness of 
company’s shares due to changes in economic factors (micro and macro both) of the 
economy. It is calculated by comparing return on a share to return in the stock market. 
Mathematically, beta is the statistical measure of volatility.  It is calculated as covariance 
of daily return on stock market indices and the return on daily share prices of a particular 
company, divided by variance of return on daily stock market indices. While considering 
market index, broad based index must be considered. 
     Simply calculated, 
1.   The market expected rate of return (Rm) is normally given as growth rate of 
market index: 
                                                       T0day’s index- Yesterday’s index 
                   Rm              =         ---------------------------------------------------- 
(Independent Variable)                           Yesterday’s Index 
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2. The Security Return 
Dependent Variable          =      Today’s index – Yesterday’s index 
                                                      ----------------------------------------------- 
                                                              Yesterday’s index 
 
The statistical method of estimating this kind of dependence of one variable on the other 
is known as simple linear regression. Once the security and market returns of a long 
period have been computed to get a large number pairs of returns, the regression 
technique can be used to estimate Beta. 
 
6. Calculation of quantum of Value Addition 
 
If NOPAT exceeds cost of capital employed, it will be construed that an organization has 
created value for the shareholders during the period of operation or vice versa.                  
             NOPAT- Cost of capital employed = Value Addition 
                                                  
ISSUES RELATING TO CALCULATION OF EVA 
Calculation of EVA is totally different from Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). 
 
The first major departure is to recognize the full cost of capital. Accountants generally 
treat cost of equity to be free.  EVA calculation recognizes that equity has a cost, hence 
subtracts if from profits. Also, EVA solves the problems of GAAP accounting by 
converting accounting earnings to economics earning and accounting capital to economic 
capital. The result is a NOPAT figure (net operating profits after taxes) that gives a much 
truer picture of funds contributed by shareholders and lenders. The major issue involved 
in computation of EVA is to decide on which adjustments to make to GAAP accounts. 
Stern Stewrt has identified 164 adjustments to GAAP and to internal accounting 
treatments, all of which can improve the measure of operating profits and capital. Any 
change in accounting adjustment will give a different EVA. According to Ehrbar (1998), 
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if all EVA are considered as running along a spectrum (as shown in chart the one at the 
extreme left is called basic EVA. 
      
 Chart:- 4.1 
                         THE EVA SPECTRUM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is the EVA that would be computed using unadjusted GAAP operating profits and 
GAAP balance sheet.  Basic EVA is an improvement on regular accounting earnings 
because it recognizes that equity capital has a cost, but all other problems with GAAP 
remain. Moving to the right, is the disclosed EVA which Stern stewart use in their 
published EVA rankings Disclosed EVA is computed by making about ten to twelve 
standard adjustments to publicly available accounting policy available accounting data. It 
is better than basic EVA. Next, is what most companies need , a custom tailored 
definition of EVA peculiar to each company’s organizational structure, business mix 
strategy and accounting policies. This is the EVA that is assumed to optimally balance 
the trade off between simplicity (the ease with it captures true economic profit). Then, 
finally, at the extreme right is the true EVA, which is the most theoretically correct and 
the accounting data (these run into a huge number) and using precise cost of capital for 
each business unit in a corporation. 
 
Various types of adjustments to be made to NOPAT and capital include treatment of such 
things like timing of expense and revenue recognition, passive investment in marketable 
securities, securitized assets and other off balance sheet financing, restructuring, inflation, 
inventory valuation, book keeping reserves, bad debt recognition, intangible assets, taxes, 
pension, post retirement expenses, marketing expenses, goodwill and other accounting 
issues ect. Some avoid mixing stocks and flows. Then, there are some adjustments which 
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convert GAAP accrual items to cash-flow basis while the others convert GAAP cash-
flow items to additions to capital. 
 
These and many other like adjustments complicate the calculation of EVA. Most of the 
organizations do not maintain in-depth data required for these adjustments and even if the 
data is maintained, computation is not possible without professional consultants help. 
Also, many of these adjustments may not be palatable and may differ among consultants. 
Thus, out of detailed 164 adjustments, only a few major ones are practically carried out to 
convert GAAP based accounting profit and capital to economic profit and capital. These 
are given in Table 4.2 :       
 
                                                    Table 4.2 
Broad Adjustments to be made to Capital and NOPAT 
      ADD TO CAPITAL  ADD TO NOPAT 
Equity equivalents  Increase in equity equivalents. 
Deferred tax reserves  Increase in deferred tax reserves 
LIFO reserves    Increase in LIFO reverses
Cumulative goodwill amortization  Goodwill amortization 
Unrecorded goodwill  Increase in capitalized intangibles 
Capitalized  intangibles  (R&D)  Cumulative 
unusual gains/losses 
Increase in other reserves unusual gains or 
losses 
REDUCE FROM CAPITAL  REDUCE FROM NOPAT 
Cash and marketable security  Any finance income in the form  of interest 
Non interest  + 
+bearing current Liabilities   
Interest expenses
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ADJUSTMENT RATIONALE 
Capital 
 
1. Cash and marketable securities 
These represent discretionary investment of funds not required on day to day 
operations. 
2. Non interest bearing current liabilities ( NIBCL) 
The financing cost associated with paying suppliers and employees with some 
delay are already included in the cost of goods sold. Hence, these costs are 
excluded from capital. 
3. Present value of operating leases 
As long as asset being leased is required in business, the lease is capitalized and 
considered as debt, hence as an asset. 
4 LIFO Reserves 
Under the LIFO method, cost of recently acquired and used raw materials are 
charged to production while costs of earlier purchases are accumulated. So, LIFO 
reporting generally understates the inventory. During period of rising prices, 
companies’ saves taxes by adopting LIFO system of inventory valuation. 
Economic reality suggests that inventory should be valued at replacement cost. 
Rather, keeping in view the large number of items in large companies., it is 
suggested tat inventory be valued at weighted average cost for EVA calculations 
as separately identifying each batch may not be practically feasible. Hence, for 
calculating EVA, LIFO system of valuation is changed to first in first out (FIFO) 
system by adding the difference to capital and NO PAT. 
   5.    Bad debt reserve 
Management must be held accountable for bad debts and so add back to capital. 
6. New R&D expense 
GAAP requires companies to immediately charge all outlays for R&D. But these 
expenses may not be truly revenue in nature. EVA treatment considers R&D as an 
asset, hence to be capitalized (add current outlays to the balance sheet as an asset) 
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and amortized (charge a position against earning each year) over the period during 
which benefits of successful R&D project will be reaped. 
 
7        Deferred tax reserves 
GAAP earning statements generally report book taxes which are not the same as 
taxes actually paid by the company. Accumulation of this difference of 
accounting provision of taxes and tax actually paid is called reserve for deferred 
taxes. These are to be added back to capital.  
 
8.     Cumulative after tax gains or losses 
Any successful or unsuccessful investment which gives rise to loses or gains should 
be recognized in capital calculation. 
 
NOPAT 
1. Interest expense on operating lease. 
Since EVA determines profits before financing costs, an estimate of the interest 
component is subtracted from operating costs. 
 
2. Interest on LIFO reserves 
This backs out the excess consumption created by LIFO accounting. However, if 
weighted average costing method is folled, no adjustment will be required to be 
made. 
3. Change in bad debt reserve 
By considering change in bad debts in earings, NOPAT accurately reflects the 
timings of cash receipts and disbursements. 
4. increase in net capitalized R&D 
Since investment in R&D is treated as an asset and capitalized, depreciation on the 
same has to be treated as an expense or it has to be amortized over the appropriate 
period. The average useful life of R&D for all industries is generally considered as 
five years which is the amortization period that Stern Stewart have used. 
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5. Increase in deferred tax reserves 
Deferred tax reserves arise due to difference in the timing of recognition of 
revenues and expenses for financial reporting as against reporting for tax purposes. 
It is an accumulation of the difference between accounting provision of taxes and 
tax amount actually paid under the head “Reserve for deferred taxes”. NOPAT is to 
be adjusted for tax actually paid instead of any provisions.  
6. Other incomes 
Ay non finance income or expense not included in operating expenses and not part 
of unusual loss or gain in the capital calculation is included to reflect the real 
operating costs. However, in Indian context, this component would be included in 
the “Miscellaneous income? Expenses” head. Hence, miscellaneous income after 
reducing finance income should be considered.  
 
Apart from these broad adjustments, similar other adjustments that can distort the 
accounting profits and capital employed figures are made to achieve the following 
objectives: 
i) To produce an EVA figure that is closer to cash flows and subject to less distortions 
of accrual accounting. 
ii) To remove arbitrary distinction between investments in intangible assets which are 
capitalized and intangible assets which tend to be written off as incurred. 
iii) To correct biases caused by accounting depreciation. 
iv) To prevent amortization or write off of goodwill. 
v) To bring all off-balance sheet items such uncapitalised leases and securitized 
receivables back into balance sheet to avoid mixing of operating and financing decisions. 
 
However, each company’s EVA has to be tailored specifically to its needs, so which 
adjustments would give the best results cannot be defined. Also, certain conditions need 
to be fulfilled for enabling computation of adjusted EVA namely, 
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(i)  The necessary data is available. 
(ii) The amounts of adjustments are significant. 
(iii) The adjustments are understandable to the operating managers. 
(iv) The adjustments can be made completely and left unchanged for a period of three 
years. 
(v) The adjustments align calculated EVA more closely with market                              
value of the firm 
 
So, for the Indian corporate sector, accounting adjustments to GAAP profit are largely 
non existent or inapplicable; due to frequent fluctuation in interest rates and relatively 
high volatility in Indian capital markets than capital markets in developed economies. 
Moreover, there is an incomplete grip of the regulators on the capital market to enhance 
its efficiency and difficulty in ascertaining risk premium because of short history of 
Indian capital market that has become active only in the last decade. 
 
USEFULNESS OF EVA 
The EVA method can be used in areas like valuation, mergers and acquisitions, capital 
budgeting, equity research ect.. But its best use is in corporate strategy making and 
management compensation setting. In EVA model, total business can be divided in to 
small units and each manager is held responsible for unit’s EVA. Based on performance, 
management may divest those businesses which have consistently negative EVA invest 
in positive EVA projects. As unit manager’s compensation is related to yearly EVA 
figure and its growth, it’s ensuring better management. Each employee’s bonus gets 
related to EVA generated by him. Thus, whole company is geared up for shareholder’s 
value maximization. EVA, thus, ensures capital allocation efficiency. Usefulness of EVA 
is concluded as below. 
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1. EVA is closely related to Net Present Value (NPV). It is theoretically 
linked to corporate finance theory that value of firm will increase if you opt for positive 
NPV projects. 
2. It makes the top managers responsible for a measure that they have more 
control over (the return on capital and the cost of capital are affected by their decisions) 
rather than the one that they feel they cannot control (the market price per share).  
3. It is influenced by all the decisions that the managers have to make within 
a firm the investment decision and the dividend decisions affect the return on capital 
(dividend decisions affect it indirectly through cash balance) and the financing decisions 
affect the cost of capital. 
4. EVA as a performance measure is also gaining grounds because of its 
unbiasness towards any of stakeholders (for example equity holders, debt managers, 
management, suppliers of materials and services, employees and customers). Proponents 
of EVA argue that EVA is a superior measure as compared to other measures due to the 
following reasons: 
I) It is near to the real cash flows of the business entity. 
II) It has higher correlation with the market value of the firm 
III) It is easy to calculate and understand. 
IV)        It’s application to employee’s compensation lead to the alignment of 
managerial interest with those of the shareholders. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION OF EVA 
EVA has been implemented successfully and used as an important tool in the following 
areas: 
1. Valuation 
Leading investment firm such as First Boston, Goldman Sashes, Merrylynch and Mogan 
Stanley in U.S. and Banque Paribas flemming in Europe are using EVA as a primary 
valuation tool. In India, NIIT is the first company to adopt EVA from Stern Stewart & 
Co. as a measure of corporate performance followed by Infosys Technologies, Godrej 
Industries. 
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2. Acquisitions 
In one of the largest acquisition in recent years, AT&T used EVA method to decide on $ 
126 billion purchase of McCAW Cellular. The ball Corporation rejected acquisition of 
Eastman Kotak unit because it failed the EVA test for creating value.Heekin Can Inc 
assed the EVA test and so, was acquired. 
3. Strategic Decision Making 
International Business Machine (IBM) applied EVA to evaluate strategic plans for the 
key Latin American markets such as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. At Georgia Pacific, 
strategic focus shifted from profit creation to value creation.   
4. Operational Improvement 
Briggs and Stratton realized that its return on capital was poor and getting lower. They 
restructured their operations and adopted EVA as a way of focusing manager’s attention 
on how they were employing capital. EVA is, now the firms’ benchmark for product 
introduction, equipment purchases, process improvements ect. 
5. Product Line Discontinuation 
EVA helped Coca Cola to identify and sell those businesses that failed to recover cost of 
capital. Perfect Data Corporation and Incstar both discontinued unprofitable product lines 
based on EVA analysis. 
6. Incentive Compensation 
Compensation of supervisors and managers above certain salary in Coke is linked to 
EVA. At Transamerica, 100% of annual bonuses of Chief Executive Officers (CEO’s) 
and Chief Finance Officers (CFO’s) is based on EVA. In India, at NIIT, Infosys 
Technologies and Godrej Soaps, EVA linked compensation plan has been adopted.                      
7. Cost of Capital Focus 
Dow Chemicals used EVA to shed light on cost to run business and return a positive 
economic profit. Deere and Company used EVA to focus management on the value 
drivers of its business and the true cost of its asset base. AT&T changed its focus from 
income statement earnings to a broader view that included balance sheet. SPX, a 
Michigan based corporation, large manufacturer of specialty tools and parts for auto 
industries used EVA framework to concentrate on cost of capital in every phase of 
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company’s work. They discovered lots of assets which were uselessly employed in 
business. 
8. Working Capital Focus 
Quaker Oats used EVA to account for large dollar amount tied up in finished goods and 
packaging materials inventory. Morrison Restaurants used EVA to focus on management 
and its receivables. 
 
EVA AND TRADITIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
EVA is a standardized accounting process independent of balance sheet approach. It is a 
potential financial tool for continued economic growth of organization and all its 
constituents. This approach ensures that growth is not sacrificed at the cost of short term 
results. Conceptually, EVA is superior to accounting profits as a measure of value 
creation because it recognizes the cost of capital and the riskiness of firms operations. 
Further EVA can be constructed in a way that maximizing any accounting profit of 
accounting rate of return leads to undesired outcome. Benefits of EVA as compare to 
conventional performance measures are summarized as under: 
 
EVA AND DISCOUNTING CASH FLOW (DCF) MODEL 
Determination of value of the company is very important. Discounting Cash Flow (DCF) 
and Net Present Value (NPV) models have been used very widely over the years to 
determine the value with which to discount the future free cash flows to the present value. 
Also, DCF approach has been considered as an important tool in analyzing mergers and 
acquisitions. However, in EVA model, value of a company can be determined. 
Mathematically, EVA gives the same results in valuation as DCF or NPV models, which 
have been for long acknowledged as theoretically best tools from shareholders’ 
perspective. Both measures include opportunity cost of capital, take into account time 
value of money and do not suffer from any accounting distortions. However, NPV and 
DCF model are not relevant in performance evaluation since they are exclusively based 
on cash flows. A benefit of discounting EVA with free cash flow is the additional insight 
it provides being a period by measure. EVA also imposes an added accountability for 
capital over only enforces capital discipline and accountability at the initial approval of 
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capital expenditure. Further, benefit is derived from power of commonality and focus in 
using EVA as single financial measure for budgeting, capital planning, performance 
evaluation and incentive compensation. 
 
NPV of a project provides a standard for assessing its contribution to value and also can 
be used to compare relative value among a selection of investment opportunities. The 
conventional procedure for calculating NPV involves discounting of projects forecast 
with free cash flows. Typically, as initial investment is made, cash flow is negative. 
Then, as benefits are realized, cash flows become positive. The discounting to present 
value indicates whether project benefits offset initial investment and provide value to 
investors. 
 
Problem with free cash flow approach is that, once invested, the new capital is mixed 
with all other assets on the balance sheet. After that, rarely does the management look 
back to assess whether actual returns are in line with forecasts used to justify the project. 
Also free cash flow as a single period measure cannot be used in post investment audits, 
since it mixes profits and investments and forgets about early investment. As a result 
accountability is lost. 
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Table 4.3 
Differences between EVA and DCF/NPV Models 
 DCF/NPV Model EVA Model 
1. These are generally employed to analyze 
the attractiveness of an acquisition activity 
or when to divest from business. 
This is a measure of past and current 
performance. EVA for past 
performance can be used for trend 
analysis. 
2. These measures do not take into account 
opportunity cost of capital i.e. expected 
return to stakeholders. They consider 
dividend payment only when paid.  
This measure takes into consideration 
opportunity cost of capital 
irrespective of cash flows. 
3. Manager’s compensation cannot be tied to 
DCE/NPV because these are measures of 
future expected performance. 
Manager’s compensation can be tied 
to achieve EVA as it is a measure of 
current and past performance. 
4. These measures do not help in coordinated 
working in an enterprise. 
This measure results in coordinated 
working in an enterprise. 
5. These measures do not indicate whether 
shareholder value is created or not. 
EVA indicates the amount of 
shareholders value created or eroded 
during a particular period. 
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Example: 
Assume, a project with an initial investment of Rs. 1oo is expected to create a perpetual 
free cash flow (FCF) of Rs. 12 every year. Depreciation is charged at 10% straight line 
method and the same amount is reinvested which makes net operating profit after axes 
(NOPAT) and FCF same. Let cost of capital be assumed at 10%. Values given by both 
these methods are given underneath in Table 4.4: 
 
Table 4.4 
Valuation of Business: EVA and DCF Models    
  Year       O           1             2      Infinite 
   FCF   (100)         12      12      !2 
NOPAT          12      12       12 
ROIC          12%       12%        12% 
WACC           10%        10%      10% 
ROIC- 
WACC 
         2%           2%         2% 
EVA             2               2            2 
 
In DCF model 
Value       =         12/ 0. 1 = 120 
Net Present Value (NPV)   = 120 -    100 = 20 
 
IN EVA Model 
MVA   =   2 / o.1 = 20 
Value =   100 + 20 = 120 
 
Both models give identical results but each has some inherent advantages over the other. 
EVA model tells us how much value is added in better strategic decision making and 
communication with shareholders. Moreover, Eva method gives warning signals if major 
part of valuation comes from terminal values. This makes EVA a better tool in capital 
budgeting and corporate strategy making. On the other hand DCF model tells about the 
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cash in hand situation. Managers can use this information to plan the use of excess cash 
or borrow capital from the market to meet shortages. This makes DCF a better tool in 
asset liability management, financial restructuring and working capital management. 
EVA, as pointed out earlier, tells management instantly whether capital management. 
EVA, as pointed out earlier, tells management instantly whether value has been added or 
not without discounting it, A growing Eva figure shows better management.    
 
EVA and Earning Per Shares (EPS) 
Earning Per share (EPS) is a measure relevant to only shareholders. It is prone to 
accounting distortions and also, does not capture risk factor associated with business. The 
measure simply tells the shareholders how much each share has earned for them. This 
means that if the opportunity cost per share is reduced from EPS, it would give them 
EVA per share and a mush better idea of whether the company is creating value or 
destroying it. EPS, in isolation, cannot give any information on value creation. EPS can 
be increased, simply by investing more capital in business. If additional capital is equity 
capital is debt only, EPS will rise if rate on return on invested capital is more than cost of 
debt only. In reality, however, invested capital is generally mix of debt and equity and 
EPS will increase if rate of return on additional capital is somewhere between cost of 
debt and zero. Therefore, it is completely inappropriate measure of corporate 
performance.  
 
Example 
Assume, profits available for equity shareholders of a company for the years 2006, 2007, 
2008 were Rs. 150 lakes and Rs. 200 lakhs respectively. The subscribed capital of the 
company has remained constant at Rs. 1000 lakhs (100 lakhs share of Rs.10 each). The 
opportunity cost of capital has also remained constant at 18.50%. If EPS is looked in 
isolation, performance trend would appear as given in Table 4.5 
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                                                          Table 4.5 
Performance Trends:  With EPS 
         Years                    2006   2007   2008 
Earning for equity 
Shareholders 
  100 lacs   150 lacs   200lacs 
No. of equity shares    100lacs 100lacs   100lacs 
EPS  Rs.1. 00 Rs.1.50   Rs.2.00 
The above trend shows that the performance of company is improving each year. There is 
no indication of whether value of firm is being created or not. 
If opportunity cost is brought into the picture performance would look as given in Table 
4.6 
Table 4.6 
Performance Trend:  With EVA 
Years  2006   2007    2008 
EPS  1.OO   1.50    2.OO 
% RETURN ON 
CAPITAL OF Rs. 
10.0 
1o%  15%  2o% 
Opportunity cost of 
capital 
18.50 %   18.50 18.50 
 EVA -8.50 %   -3.5%    1.5 % 
 
The above trend shows that company’s performance is improving but in the last two 
years, if has destroyed value. Only in the year 2008, it had added value. 
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EVA and Return on Investment (ROI) 
Rate of return on capital is quite common and a relatively good performance measure. 
Different companies calculated this return in different ways and call it with different 
names like Return on Investment (ROI), Return on invested capital (ROIC), Return on 
capital employed (ROCE), Return on net assets (RONA), Return on assets (ROA) ect. 
The main short coming in all these measures is that the maximizing rate of return does 
not necessarily maximize the return to shareholders. As a relative measure and without 
risk component, ROI fails to steer operations completely. Therefore, capital can be 
misallocated on the basis of ROI. Firstly, ROI ignores the definite requirement that the 
rate of return should be at least equal (if not more) to cost of capita. Secondly, ROI does 
not recognize that shareholders wealth is not maximized when rate of return is 
maximized. Shareholders want the firm to maximize the absolute return over and above 
the cost of capital and not of capital just because the expected return is less than the 
present return. Cost of capital is a much more important hurdle rate than company’s 
current rate of return. 
 
In the corporate control, in spite of differences between EVA and ROI, they both go hand 
in hand. The former stresses on impact on shareholders wealth and the latter tell about 
rate of return. ROI cannot be abandoned since it is a very good and illustrative measure 
about rate of return. However, decisions cannot be based on ROI since maximizing rate 
of return does not matter when aim is to maximize return to shareholders.   
 
EVA and Return on Net worth (RONW) 
Rate of return on equity (ROE) or net worth (RONW) is again a function of returns the 
company’s products and projects generate, irrespective of its cost of capital. ROE suffers 
from the same shortcoming as ROI. Risk component is not included and hence, there is 
no comparison. The level of RONW does not tell the owners if company is creating 
shareholders wealth or destroying it. With ROE, this shortcoming is much more than ROI 
for simply increasing leverage can increase financial risk. As ROI, RONW is also an 
informative measure but it should not guide the operations. 
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Thus, all accounting based rate of returns (ROI, ROE, RONA, RONW, ROIC ect.) fail to 
assess true or economic return of a firm because they are based on historical asset values, 
which in turn, are distorted by inflation and other factors. Stewart defined EVA as after 
tax return on beginning capital. EVA is like a corporate nervous system. It enables 
organization is to add to its shareholders value and EVA is an accurate measure of 
incremental annual shareholder value generated by a company. BY using EVA to 
evaluate options, a company chooses strategies that result in maximum addition to 
shareholder value. This makes EVA an ideal tool for equity analysis. Also, since EVA 
standardizes financial information, it provides common platform for comparison of 
companies across the globe. EVA has thus, taken the best of residual income concept, 
eliminated the worst of accounting practices and emerged as a reliable performance 
metric. 
 
Superiority of EVA as a measure of rate of return is summarized as follows: 
 
.     A performance measure that can be maximized as an objective. 
.    It can be used as a metric to evaluate capital budgeting proposals (it is the only 
measure of both, performance evaluation and strategic decision making). 
.     It integrates effect of profitability and growth into the same measure.  
.     It simplifies the concept of profitability which was earlier complex with traditional 
measures. 
.      It unifies the goal of companies and their shareholders. 
.     It has good correlation with market capitalization (not yet demonstrated in India). 
 
MARKET VALUE ADDED 
EVA is aimed to be a measure of the wealth of shareholders. According to this theory, 
earning a return greater than the cost of capital increase value of company while earning 
less than the cost of capital decreases the value. For listed companies, Stewart defined 
another measure that assesses if the company has created shareholder value or not. If the 
total market value of a company is more than the amount of capital invested in it, the 
company has managed to create shareholder value. However, if market value is less than 
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capital invested, the company has destroyed shareholder value. The difference between 
the company’s market value and book value is called  
Market Valued Added or MVA. 
Simply stated, 
 
Market Value Added (MVA) =   Market value -      Capital    invested 
                                                      Of the company       in the company 
 
Where, 
Market value: - For a public listed company it is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding x share price + book value of debt (since market value of debt is generally 
not available).     
 
Capital invested: - It is the book value of investments in the business made up of debt and 
equity. 
Effectively, the formula becomes 
MVA =       Market value of equity -   Book value of equity 
 
 
According to Stewart, MVA tells us how much value company has added to or subtracted 
from its shareholders investments. Successful companies add their MVA and thus, 
increase the value of capital invested in the company. Unsuccessful companies decrease 
the value of capital originally invested in the company. Whether a company succeeds in 
creating MVA (increasing shareholder value) or not, depends on its rate of return. If a 
company’s rate of return exceeds its cost of capital, the company will sell on stock 
markets with premium compared to the original capital and thus, have positive MVA.   
On the other hand, companies that have rate of return smaller than their cost of capital, 
sell with discount compared to the original capital invested in the company. Whether a 
company has positive or negative MVA depends on the level of rate of return compared 
to the cost of capital. All this applies to EVA also. Stewart has defined relationship 
between EVA and MVA. 
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVA AND MVA 
When a business earns a rate of return higher than its cost of capital, EVA is positive. In 
other words, investors are earning more than their investment in that business than they 
could elsewhere. In response, investors bid up share prices, increasing the value of their 
business and driving up its MVA. Similarly, investors discount the value of businesses 
that earn a return below their cost of capital. Thus, in a way, EVA drives MVA as is 
shown in chart 4.2. 
             Chart:- 4.2 
EVA DRIVES MVA 
 
 Positive EVA – Value Creation          Negative EVA – Value Creation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Thus, MVA is an estimate made by the investors of the net present value of all current 
and expected future investments in the business. In other words, it can be said that MVA 
is same as NPV and can be calculated as the present values of all future EVAs. Similarly, 
it can be the present value of future free cash flows, because discounted EVA and 
discounted free cash flows are mathematically equivalents. 
From the definition of MVA, the value of firm can be expressed as 
Market Value        =           Capital + MVA of firm 
 
However, MVA is the present value of all future EVAs. Therefore, the value of the firm 
can be expressed as sum of its capital; current EVA capitalized as perpetuity and the 
present value of all the expected future EVA improvements.   
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Market Value =   Capital + Value of current EVA as perpetuity + Present value of 
expected EVA Improvement. 
 
Since, market value is dependent on market implications of all future performance, 
market values are sensitive to the changes in current EVA as well as expected EVA 
improvement. This results in an interesting problem for the managements. They need to 
decide the level of focus on generating current results and future prospects. The solution 
seems to be clear. Management must focus on producing best results today a while 
making significant efforts for future simultaneously. The stress has to be on long term 
and short term perspective both. Relationship between MVA and EVA is reflected in 
Chart:- 4.3. 
 
Chart:- 4.3 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EVA AND MVA 
 
 
Current level of EVA 
 
 
In a nutshell, relationship between EVA and MVA can be summarized as follows: 
1.     The relationship between EVA and MVA is more complicated than the one 
between EVA and he firm value. 
2. MVA of a firm reflects not only expected Eva of assets in place but also expected 
EVA from future projects. 
3. To the extent that the actual EVA is smaller than expected EVA, the market value 
can decrease even if EVA is higher. 
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MVA is, thus, in a way best performance measure because it focuses on cumulative value 
added or lost on invested capital. It is the difference between the capital investors have 
put in business (cash in) and the value they could get by selling their claims (cash out). It 
is a focus on wealth in dollar or rupees rather than rate of return in percentage. It, 
therefore, recognizes all value adding investments even if than original rate of return. 
 
PROBLEMS WITH EVA AS PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
A better understanding of the concept of EVA requires understanding of the problems it 
faces in measuring operating performance of the company. No performance measure is 
perfect. Likewise, EVA has its weaknesses and it is for the companies to realize that 
EVA is not the ultimate truth and it does not always tell the amount of shareholders value 
created or destroyed. Table gives the overview of these measurement problems faced by 
the companies in computation of EVA. 
             Table 4.7  
                                    Some Measurement Issues in EVA 
Sr. 
No. 
Measurement  Issues  
1. How to measure the capital invested in assets in place: 
 Many firms use book value of capital invested. To the degree that book 
values reflect accounting choice made over time, this may not be true. 
 In case where firms alter their capital invested through their operating 
decisions (for example, by using operating leases), the capital and after 
tax operating income have to be adjusted to reflect true capital invested. 
2. How to measure return on capital: 
 Again, the accounting definition of return on capital may not reflect the 
economic return on capital. 
 In particular, the operating income has to be cleansed of any expenses 
which are really capital expenses (in the sense that they create future 
values). One example would be R&D. 
 The operating income also has to be cleanse of any cosmetic or 
temporary effects. 
 254
3. How to estimate cost of capital: 
 DCF valuation assumes that cost of capital is calculated using market 
values of debt and equity. 
 If it is assumed that both assets in place and future growth are financed 
using the market value mix, the EVA should also be calculated using the 
market value. 
 Instead, if the entire debt is assumed to be correct by assets in place, the 
book value debt ratio will be used to calculate cost of capital. Implicit is 
then the assumption that as the firms grow, its debt ratio will come close 
to book value debt ratio. 
                              
 
In addition to these measurement problems, EVA computation is subject to two 
limitations: 
1.     Wrong Period sing 
EVA is poor in period sing returns of a single investment for. It under – estimates the 
return in the beginning and over-estimates at the end of the period. The companies in the 
growth phase or business units with heavy new investments are likely to have current 
negative EVA although their true rate of return may be good and so long term 
shareholders wealth added (TRUE long term EVA) would be positive. This is the main 
criticism of EVA being a short term performance measure. 
 
2. Distortions caused by inflation, asset structure. 
EVA, on an average, is also a poor estimator of true underlying rate of return because 
historical asset values cannot describe accurately the current value of assets tied into the 
business. Being distorted by inflation and different depreciation schedules ect. Historical 
values distort EVA and ROI also. As ROI fails (on an average) to estimate the true return, 
so periodic EVA fails to estimate the value added to shareholders. 
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Distortions of EVA are more pronounced in cyclic businesses where peaks and valleys 
feature in EVA figures. Further, projects in infrastructure, new product launches with 
high gestation period have negative initial EVA figure through NPV of the project may 
be positive. Thus, it gives wrong signals about the aggregate company performance. 
However, industries with lots of current assets (instead of fixed assets and with short 
investment period e.g. banking, food and beverages, personal computers, retailing and 
publishing ect.) do not get affected by these pitfalls since current assets represent the 
majority of total amount of assets; so value of assets would be close to current value of 
capital tied into the business. 
 
To cope with distortions and eliminate this problem, DE Villiers (1997) suggests using 
the current value of assets instead of book value. The extent of this problem depends very 
heavily on the assets structure (how relatively big are the proportions of current, 
depreciable and non depreciable assets) and on the average project duration. Thus, the 
extent and direction of this problem can be estimated. The EVA targets can be adjusted 
accordingly, although it is not an easy task. Also, this problem is generally small though 
it does not require too many adjustments. EVA can be and has been successfully applied 
in many companies without any special adjustment to capital base (Birchard 1996). This 
is also the way the companies have calculated their ROI for decades without massive 
criticism. So far, this distortion in ROI has been widely ignored although the theoretical 
weakness in using historical values in calculating ROI has been acknowledged.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of these shortcomings, EVA has turned out to be a better shareholder’s 
performance measure than the traditional accounting based performance metrics. In fact, 
EVA is regarded as the most accurate measure of shareholder value creation around the 
world. It is an accurate reflection of the quantum of incremental value a company 
generates for its shareholders after accounting for its cost of operations including cost of 
capital. Since creating shareholders value is the basic objective of every organization, 
hence the present study has employed this metric for analyzing post-merger performance 
of merged firms.                                              
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INTRODUCTION:-  
This chapter deals with the analysis of companies and at industry level using tools like 
RONW, MVA and EVA for selected companies of post and pre merger period is given as 
below: 
                        Table:- 5.1 RONW AND INTRA COMPANY COMPARISON 
 
Sr 
No. COMPANY  RONW 
      POST PRE 
      2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
1 Ultramarine & Pigments Ltd 21.57 8.56 11.41 5.49 14.43 16.04 16.39 
2 Crompton Greaves Ltd 21.83 6.63 1.03 -24.16 -38.78 4.20 3.93 
3 Areva T&D India Ltd 9.67 4.00 -1.32 -1.86 1.15 -6.68 2.53 
4 BPL Ltd -21.86 -50.09 5.88 13.24 19.57 22.41 23.19 
5 Samtel Color Ltd 6.47 10.65 14.69 19.52 23.03 -10.85 -8.45 
6 TRF Ltd 8.48 -1.15 24.18 9.43 15.52 4.75 34.78 
7 GMR 10.41 8.04 4.66 3.15 17.65 28.28 18.10 
8 Dharamsi Morarji Chemicals 
Co Ltd 
-16.49 0.70 2.92 2.14 7.49 8.58 12.56 
9 Khatian Fertilizer 13.63 -2.19 -6.51 -6.67 3.94 27.10 34.31 
10 Zenith Infotech Ltd 2.82 0.50 -19.11 3.42 7.93 52.27 NA 
11 Tata Infotech Ltd(merged) 24.35 14.82 10.75 15.09 7.51 29.45 28.92 
12 B & A Ltd -5.13 -15.11 0.76 2.20 4.18 0.90 9.20 
13 Max India Ltd 3.94 -11.81 1.88 0.98 7.07 92.74 6.80 
14 Emami Paper Mills Ltd 3.58 1.84 0.58 -1.64 1.80 1.52 NA 
15 Bayer CropScience Ltd 10.20 14.57 17.57 11.96 8.53 6.18 12.52 
16 PSL Ltd 16.71 9.09 19.31 NA 11.58 10.22 13.02 
17 
Ratnamani Metals & Tubes 
Ltd 10.28 6.80 6.52 6.73 6.33 8.89 11.69 
18 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd 21.97 12.49 21.70 19.21 10.63 22.61 26.97 
19 NHN Corporation Ltd NA 615.14 -32.82 -19.30 0.85 0.04 0.56 
20 Sical Logistics Ltd 7.58 3.02 1.86 14.25 18.21 18.38 16.06 
21 Arvind Products Ltd -4.54 0.94 -51.07 -105.98 -16.03 15.38 13.33 
22 Bhilwara Spinners Ltd -219.12 -94.47 
-
881.82 -36.92 -33.71 -20.76 9.79 
23 RSWM Ltd 10.39 5.32 3.29 5.30 7.89 5.53 11.95 
24 Shyam Telecom Ltd 0.24 0.14 4.91 8.40 2.70 NA 6.48 
25 DPIL Ltd -12.62 1.26 3.16 4.54 16.34 0.20 -203.77 
26 Rossell Tea Ltd -10.58 -9.50 -6.66 3.69 5.18 9.52 20.81 
27 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 70.10 75.82 20.83 34.15 -108.05 2.63 1.05 
28 Twilight Li-Taka Pharma Ltd -18.57 52.75 196.51 -193.57 -26.87 -4.84 -38.72 
29 
Sun Pharmaceuticals 
Industries Ltd 28.50 34.00 31.98 31.25 26.55 22.18 25.24 
30 SRHHL Industries Ltd 2.74 3.08 2.71 2.74 3.93 4.99 4.53 
31 NLC Nalco India Ltd 35.71 36.61 10.93 -3.26 20.27 20.93 15.51 
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32 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd 13.83 21.70 31.53 26.12 13.86 13.48 14.33 
33 Roto Pumps Ltd 3.10 -8.51 -9.43 -19.07 NA 0.09 1.45 
34 GHCL Ltd 13.08 21.15 21.53 10.30 8.71 16.97 21.13 
35 DLF Ltd 11.16 9.26 12.83 11.63 24.80 28.64 NA 
36 Repro India Ltd 12.93 18.12 9.37 20.57 20.76 15.17 NA 
37 Finolex Cables Ltd 5.49 4.73 11.24 12.32 12.97 10.90 9.33 
38 
Hindustan Organic Chemicals 
Ltd 204.90 -37.01 -38.10 -18.54 -38.93 -5.73 -1.36 
39 Tata Coffee Ltd 11.12 14.06 7.00 10.46 21.44 24.73 23.84 
40 Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd 18.13 12.94 5.60 54.01 9.97 10.44 20.36 
41 Pidilite Industries Ltd 243.26 234.98 206.54 190.02 376.94 304.98 222.88 
42 TTK Healthcare Ltd 6.20 46.29 30.09 -70.06 41.15 40.76 77.73 
43 HBL Power Systems Ltd 8.51 10.57 12.82 17.38 19.79 42.15 29.07 
44 Carol Info Services Ltd NA 2.49 5.07 -8.45 -4.88 16.76 12.32 
45 Todays Writing Products Ltd 13.42 6.77 15.98 24.27 29.99 22.89 25.93 
46 Jindal Poly Films Ltd 19.34 12.70 13.87 4.95 3.92 9.97 6.15 
47 
Gujarat Perstorp Electronics 
Ltd 23.44 11.73 18.74 4.50 11.75 11.34 26.35 
48 Berger Paints (India) Ltd 23.68 20.14 20.86 20.16 18.59 21.00 NA 
49 Hindustan Unilever Ltd 57.23 82.87 48.38 53.94 52.67 50.90 47.62 
50 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 38.62 33.58 20.18 9.46 7.77 18.45 27.60 
51 Bright Brothers Ltd -11.38 -11.61 -23.05 -1.79 3.46 8.61 8.90 
52 Ion Exchange (India) Ltd 1.99 1.84 4.82 -5.12 -3.59 4.26 9.96 
53 
Hindustan Fluoro Carbons 
Ltd 22.29 13.00 8.46 7.44 20.28 15.48 70.53 
54 IFGL Refractories Ltd 21.09 8.03 2.23 0.67 4.30 0.20 0.34 
55 Pix Transmission Ltd 4.48 1.48 0.73 7.03 13.35 9.74 NA 
56 Zenith Computers Ltd 6.61 2.32 1.31 5.14 10.44 7.85 6.79 
 
1 RONW AND INTRA COMPANY COMPARISON 
The technique of cluster analysis has been followed for the next measure of value 
addition, RONW for different group of companies. 
 
Group I 
A set off sixteen companies in this case have shown improvement in profitability in terms 
of RONW in the four post merger years. The companies which have shown marked 
improvement include NLC Nalco India limited, Jindal Poly Films Limited, and Jubilant 
Organosys Limited. 
There are other companies which have shown an increasing trend, though not very 
significant. These include Emami Paper Mills Limited. 
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Group II 
     Twelve companies get categories in this group showing decrease in profits    according to 
the traditional measure of value addition in the four post merger years. Companies have 
shown significant deterioration in profitability in post-merger period includes BPL 
Limited, Dharamsi Morarji Chemicals Co Limited, and DLF Limited. 
 
Some other companies’ shows decrease in profitability over the post merger years which 
is however; not very significant includes B&A Limited, Shyam Telecom Limited and 
Tata Coffee Limited. . 
 
Group III 
 
A majority of Twenty eight belongs to this group indicating no impact of mergers on 
profitability in subsequent post-merger years. Some companies have shown marked 
improvement in profitability from first to second year which gets lost in the third year. To 
name a few companies all belong to this category. TRF Limited, Bayer CropScience 
Limited PSL Limited. 
 
Further, there are few companies which have shown no trend in post merger years thus 
signifying no effect, whatsoever of mergers on profitability. 
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2. MVA AND INTRA-COMPANY COMPARISON 
The observations with this measure of value addition are given below: 
                   Table:- 5.2 MVA AND INTRA-COMPANY COMPARISON 
 
Sr 
No. COMPANY  MVACE 
      POST PRE 
      2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
1 Ultramarine & Pigments Ltd -8.24 -30.54 -26.04 -31.92 103.54 -31.47 -18.86 
2 Crompton Greaves Ltd 62.55 -16.77 -17.00 -17.04 -14.60 -30.24 -28.40 
3 Areva T&D India Ltd -20.27 -38.56 -44.12 -44.30 -18.77 31.78 26.21 
4 BPL Ltd -133.28 -21.81 -34.79 -39.84 -0.18 68.13 16.98 
5 Samtel Color Ltd -4.51 -21.01 -16.23 -28.28 -3.20 -17.43 -23.23 
6 TRF Ltd -14.06 -41.43 -55.99 -54.97 -41.95 -14.66 -15.40 
7 GMR -26.71 -45.79 -26.11 -25.54 -19.28 -34.73 -31.32 
8 Dharamsi Morarji Chemicals 
Co Ltd 
-17.91 -30.62 -28.18 -34.22 -35.49 -33.53 -27.25 
9 Khatian Fertilizer -43.56 -50.20 -34.71 -37.82 -65.24 -50.44 NA 
10 Zenith Infotech Ltd -49.02 -69.63 -34.57 -42.46 460.83 -200.00 NA 
11 Tata Infotech Ltd(merged) 218.83 35.26 94.69 39.17 326.37 1196.12 714.05 
12 B & A Ltd -20.05 -31.88 -41.07 -41.12 -44.72 -38.73 -24.39 
13 Max India Ltd -27.17 -46.73 -33.03 -46.96 38.12 -6.30 62.60 
14 Emami Paper Mills Ltd -43.31 -43.52 -41.60 -82.39 -28.06 -26.80 NA 
15 Bayer CropScience Ltd 191.19 257.69 40.50 27.88 3.86 58.86 101.98 
16 PSL Ltd 10.36 -14.31 -20.09 - -37.18 -17.13 -113.54 
17 
Ratnamani Metals & Tubes 
Ltd -39.36 -58.62 -46.86 -54.26 -54.35 -55.31 -38.74 
18 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd 44.03 -5.32 2.38 -17.06 -17.94 -7.67 16.19 
19 NHN Corporation Ltd NA 131.96 48.50 74.47 -71.67 -105.07 -95.78 
20 Sical Logistics Ltd -18.18 -21.84 -16.88 -20.75 -19.81 -19.08 -20.41 
21 Arvind Products Ltd -74.44 -90.98 -92.58 -88.82 -194.90 1201.61 1403.08 
22 Bhilwara Spinners Ltd 2.64 -3.59 0.84 -14.14 -16.98 -19.87 -25.41 
23 RSWM Ltd -28.65 -35.53 -38.35 -41.07 -32.59 -34.30 -26.37 
24 Shyam Telecom Ltd 5.88 -47.44 -8.12 50.32 975.47 NA -16.09 
25 DPIL Ltd 27.70 23.93 -53.77 -55.46 -58.15 -96.35 -9.04 
26 Rossell Tea Ltd -43.70 -54.07 -60.47 -72.29 -85.92 -98.73 -93.21 
27 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 506.01 113.03 4.53 -25.48 -13.48 -40.63 -52.90 
28 Twilight Li-Taka Pharma Ltd 40.07 19.54 16.62 9.56 7.83 -4.52 -16.45 
29 
Sun Pharmaceuticals 
Industries Ltd 550.54 294.12 500.74 451.86 652.17 136.00 54.94 
30 SRHHL Industries Ltd -61.45 -67.14 -69.68 -82.54 -58.28 -50.94 -50.53 
31 NLC Nalco India Ltd 209.94 249.05 67.57 150.11 353.46 583.17 396.14 
32 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd 274.33 314.90 578.46 440.30 694.13 423.72 184.34 
33 Roto Pumps Ltd -60.45 -61.90 -67.29 -56.75 -64.56 -62.66 -60.17 
34 GHCL Ltd -1.96 -13.19 -24.89 -42.10 -40.71 -32.84 -12.49 
35 DLF Ltd -53.63 -92.67 -81.43 -55.14 -40.69 -34.50 NA 
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36 Repro India Ltd -47.75 -43.55 -53.59 -52.05 -45.70 -40.98 NA 
37 Finolex Cables Ltd -24.64 -39.26 -15.27 -9.04 51.77 16.12 -26.53 
38 
Hindustan Organic Chemicals 
Ltd 42.86 -4.65 -13.03 -27.84 -31.58 -39.93 -42.81 
39 Tata Coffee Ltd -0.45 -29.40 -15.21 7.44 56.99 51.40 171.42 
40 Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd 0.10 -26.29 -43.52 -56.24 -32.68 -22.06 -31.05 
41 Pidilite Industries Ltd 129.50 90.44 65.56 101.96 231.43 170.39 41.83 
42 TTK Healthcare Ltd -35.56 -38.41 -37.58 -46.76 -11.07 -17.93 -20.70 
43 HBL Power Systems Ltd -49.30 -48.74 -48.01 -46.34 -59.54 -53.63 -31.05 
44 Carol Info Services Ltd NA -43.71 -42.55 -42.45 -34.03 286.99 1.78 
45 Todays Writing Products Ltd 35.54 -40.10 -7.51 38.04 120.26 -2.23 -20.33 
46 Jindal Poly Films Ltd -0.57 -49.76 -59.22 -60.51 -43.24 -28.35 -20.70 
47 
Gujarat Perstorp Electronics 
Ltd 156.87 91.73 71.59 59.76 186.38 170.52 84.34 
48 Berger Paints (India) Ltd 103.56 10.48 17.65 42.78 70.65 33.06 NA 
49 Hindustan Unilever Ltd 796.57 1135.63 1062.32 1613.25 1759.62 2233.48 1607.14 
50 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 255.65 15.41 -10.20 -22.31 -20.66 -14.68 -5.41 
51 Bright Brothers Ltd -23.91 -24.30 -19.75 -30.85 -33.55 -13.85 -15.48 
52 Ion Exchange (India) Ltd -39.35 -45.56 -46.06 -42.18 -38.29 -41.38 -31.28 
53 
Hindustan Fluoro Carbons 
Ltd 188.24 130.37 114.88 106.31 92.98 69.17 64.21 
54 IFGL Refractories Ltd 21.03 -44.89 -59.48 -55.78 -66.25 -33.23 -37.69 
55 Pix Transmission Ltd -30.57 -29.63 -30.80 -38.86 -40.70 -23.54 NA 
56 Zenith Computers Ltd -17.95 -42.15 -13.99 -18.27 71.29 29.41 -34.58 
 
Group I 
This group includes only six companies indicate an increase in value addition to 
shareholders in terms of their market’s assessment but increase in most cases is very 
significant. Companies like all add positive value to shareholders which has increased 
subsequently in post merger years. In a grup remaining companies shows value addition 
in first post-merger years in negative but has decreased each year indicating an 
improvement in value addition. This group includes Twilight li-taka pharma Limited, 
Matrix Laborites, Hindustan Unilever Limited, Roto Pumps Limited, Rossell Tea 
Limited.  
 
Group II 
This group has Ten companies again exhibit the same trend. Few companies started with 
positive value in first year which reduced subsequently. Some companies started with 
negative values which increased in post-merger years. This group includes companies 
like Dr Reddys Laboratories, Tata Coffee Limited, Today’s Writing Products Limited. 
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Group III 
The last group with maximum number of twenty three companies shows that mergers 
have no effect on market’s assessment of company’s value thus not showing any clear 
increasing or even decreasing trend in post- merger years. The companies included in this 
list are GMR Industries Limited, Sical Logistics Limited, Bright Brothers Limited, Zenith 
Computers. 
 
 
3.      EVA AND INTRA COMPANY COMARISON 
EVA has been computed for all sample companies for three post merger years to see 
whether shareholder value has improved in the post-merger period i.e. has shareholder 
value addition improved in each passing year after the merger since it is generally 
believed that it takes a year or to start getting these benefits. The year- wise analysis has 
been summarized as follows:  
                       Table:- 5.3 EVA AND INTRA COMPANY COMARISON 
Sr 
No. COMPANY  EVACE 
      POST PRE 
      2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 
1 Ultramarine & Pigments Ltd -0.02 -2.69 -1.90 -2.88  - -1.31 -1.19 
2 Crompton Greaves Ltd -0.37 -7.28 -9.24 -13.78 -19.20 -8.41 -8.77 
3 Areva T&D India Ltd -12.44 -16.65 -20.95 -20.07 -17.88 -22.84 -14.46 
4 BPL Ltd -75.86 -18.90 -7.25 -5.46 -2.20 -0.84 0.75 
5 Samtel Color Ltd -5.91 -3.78 -2.42 -1.09 0.66 -9.02 -9.17 
6 TRF Ltd -6.85 -13.66 2.12 -9.82 -3.81 -8.21 6.24 
7 GMR -6.56 -8.78 -6.34 -6.72 -2.72 2.54 -1.58 
8 Dharamsi Morarji Chemicals 
Co Ltd 
-9.10 -7.69 -6.46 -7.84 -7.23 -6.56 -4.57 
9 Khatian Fertilizer -4.76 -12.76 -13.40 -13.95 -11.54 2.56 NA 
10 Zenith Infotech Ltd -20.12 -22.37 -20.33 -14.02 -19.27 -239.48 NA 
11 Tata Infotech Ltd(merged) 2.89 -6.57 -10.06 -6.15 -12.86 7.66 6.25 
12 B & A Ltd -19.74 -26.35 -23.76 -25.15 -25.46 -29.38 -23.77 
13 Max India Ltd -13.48 -23.45 -14.84 -16.98 -17.89 57.64 -8.04 
14 Emami Paper Mills Ltd -1000.19 -903.19 -887.90 -1532.29 -6659.83 
-
5453.51 NA 
15 Bayer CropScience Ltd -7.34 -4.85 -1.53 -2.80 -3.94 -4.76 -3.05 
16 PSL Ltd -2.25 -5.73 -1.06 NA -5.59 -1.39 -10.53 
17 
Ratnamani Metals & Tubes 
Ltd -9.32 -10.79 -9.78 -10.79 -10.79 -8.48 -5.90 
18 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd 0.13 -4.29 0.01 -1.38 -6.22 0.42 2.11 
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19 NHN Corporation Ltd NA -106.48 -32.66 -26.61 -14.89 -22.68 -20.18 
20 Sical Logistics Ltd -4.41 -5.01 -4.77 -3.01 -2.47 -2.37 -3.24 
21 Arvind Products Ltd -3.04 -2.34 -7.56 -20.58 -23.07 -0.65 -0.96 
22 Bhilwara Spinners Ltd -5.92 -9.41 -5.12 -9.66 -11.10 -10.45 -3.61 
23 RSWM Ltd -5.27 -7.14 -8.02 -8.02 -6.26 -7.02 -3.93 
24 Shyam Telecom Ltd -20.25 -18.80 -13.52 -10.93 -13.94 NA 21.51 
25 DPIL Ltd -19.64 -7.06 -9.93 -9.48 -4.06 -20.64 -20.39 
26 Rossell Tea Ltd -13.43 -16.17 -17.11 -12.97 -14.13 -11.96 -0.77 
27 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 27.86 38.93 -0.51 6.18 -39.36 -12.35 -13.71 
28 Twilight Li-Taka Pharma Ltd 0.00 -8.61 -15.41 -18.52 -8.53 -7.00 -22.56 
29 
Sun Pharmaceuticals 
Industries Ltd 5.82 13.02 10.69 7.56 1.22 -2.90 3.05 
30 SRHHL Industries Ltd -13.33 -13.40 -14.36 -16.40 -12.48 -9.80 -10.29 
31 NLC Nalco India Ltd 7.91 5.80 -7.04 -15.02 -1.10 -0.72 NA 
32 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd -8.10 0.08 12.02 3.23 -6.12 -6.98 -6.20 
33 Roto Pumps Ltd -14.19 -22.02 -22.42 -29.48 -17.89 -17.44 -16.56 
34 GHCL Ltd -5.46 -0.31 -0.05 -6.99 -7.98 -2.94 -0.29 
35 DLF Ltd -5.61 -11.46 -7.17 -5.52 1.29 1.45 NA 
36 Repro India Ltd -4.16 -1.53 -6.57 -0.55 -0.40 -2.65 NA 
37 Finolex Cables Ltd -11.97 -12.31 -8.70 -8.08 -7.01 -8.72 10.23 
38 
Hindustan Organic Chemicals 
Ltd -28.83 -11.78 -16.50 -14.46 -24.61 -14.83 -13.14 
39 Tata Coffee Ltd -7.51 -5.47 -9.84 -8.79 -0.21 2.46 1.55 
40 Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd -2.11 -4.21 -10.82 24.51 -5.62 -5.60 -0.67 
41 Pidilite Industries Ltd -1.65 0.22 -1.53 0.39 0.55 0.47 -1.47 
42 TTK Healthcare Ltd -8.30 -8.17 -9.42 -16.42 -7.46 -8.33 -5.60 
43 HBL Power Systems Ltd -8.06 -6.79 -5.45 -2.61 -1.56 18.44 5.43 
44 Carol Info Services Ltd NA -14.81 -9.88 -17.89 -12.86 -4.73 -1.14 
45 Todays Writing Products Ltd -5.69 -9.97 -3.90 2.51 8.02 1.28 7.57 
46 Jindal Poly Films Ltd -6.84 -9.83 -8.78 -12.07 -9.56 -4.80 -5.84 
47 
Gujarat Perstorp Electronics 
Ltd -2.85 9.08 2.07 10.24 10.30 9.55 -3.98 
48 Berger Paints (India) Ltd 1.59 -1.34 -0.70 -1.19 -2.26 -0.66 NA 
49 Hindustan Unilever Ltd 20.11 34.64 28.59 34.33 31.64 29.04 22.46 
50 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 5.82 3.20 -0.61 -4.10 -4.95 -1.94 1.08 
51 Bright Brothers Ltd -9.48 -9.81 -13.46 -8.38 -8.38 -6.66 -7.59 
52 Ion Exchange (India) Ltd -11.33 -11.62 -10.17 -13.81 -14.11 -11.67 -8.12 
53 
Hindustan Fluoro Carbons 
Ltd -1.25 11.25 15.13 15.09 1.26 4.26 -39.35 
54 IFGL Refractories Ltd -0.46 -10.78 -15.00 -15.31 -16.57 -13.83 -13.51 
55 Pix Transmission Ltd -6.45 -7.66 -8.21 -7.22 -4.54 -4.38 NA 
56 Zenith Computers Ltd -8.55 -10.35 -10.37 -7.66 -6.14 -7.07 -8.09 
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Group I 
The set of twelve companies belonging to this group show an increasing trend of 
shareholder value addition in the post-merger period by showing decreased value erosion 
from first post-merger year to the forth indicating an improvement in value addition in 
the subsequent years. like Zenith Infotech Limited, Arvind Products Limited, NLC Nalco 
India Limited, IFGL Refractories 
 
Group II 
      In this group of ten companies indicating decrease in value addition from first post-
merger year or increase in negative value of EVA in subsequent years of merger. Khaitan 
Fertilizer Limited, Hindustan Organic Chemicals Limited, Gulf Oil Corporation Limited. 
 
Group III 
      Sample companies in this group, indicating no influence of mergers on shareholders’ 
value addition has the maximum number of thirty four companies belonging to it. There 
are companies which have shown significant deterioration in the second post merger year 
itself with improvement in the third year. Companies includes in this group are 
Ratnamani Metal & Tubes Limited, Max India Limited, Balaramapur Chini Mills 
Limited, Finolex Cables Limited.  
 
Table:- 5.4 
Intra Company Analysis with Value Added Metrics: Summary of Results 
    RONW MVA EVA 
GROUP No. of 
Companies 
% 
No. of 
Companies 
% 
No. of 
Companies 
% 
GROUP I 16 28.27 23 41.07 12 21.43 
GROUP II 12 21.43 10 17.86 10 17.86 
GROUP III 28 50.00 23 41.07 34 60.71 
TOTAL 56 100 56 100 56 100 
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INTER-COMPANY ANALYSIS WITH RONW MVA AND   EVA  
After post-merger assessment of value addition within companies, an investigation has 
been conducted to measure variations across companies for all the three value added 
metrics for average post merger period. In this case also, technique of cluster analysis has 
been applied by: 
 
1) Ranking the companies by all three value added metrics separately in 
descending order. 
2) Classifying companies with similar values into broad clusters or groups. 
3) Examining these groups and explaining them. 
 
The below table gives the average value addition in the post merger period by all three 
value added metrics, namely EVA, RONW and MVA along with their respective 
rankings. A perusal of the rankings in the table reveals the following groups: 
 
GROUP I: Companies with Value Addition in Post – Merger Years 
 
This group consists of with positive values indicating that such companies have added to 
shareholders value in the post merger period. 
 
Group II: Companies with Value Erosion in Post-Merger Years 
 
This group consists of companies with negative value indicating that these companies 
have eroded value in the post-merger period. 
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Table:- 5.5 
INTER COMPANY ANALYSIS WITH RONW,MVA & EVA 
Sr. 
No. COMPANY 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE EVACE 
POST RANK PRE RANK POST RANK PRE  RANK POST RANK PRE RANK 
1 Ultramarine & Pigments Ltd 11.76 24 15.62 24 -24.18 29 17.74 20 -1.87 12 -1.28 15 
2 Crompton Greaves Ltd 1.33 41 -10.22 51 2.94 17 -24.41 32 -7.67 29 -12.13 45 
3 Areva T&D India Ltd 2.62 40 -1.00 50 -36.81 38 13.07 22 -17.53 49 -18.40 51 
4 BPL Ltd -13.21 54 21.73 14 -57.43 51 28.31 18 -26.87 54 -0.76 12 
5 Samtel Color Ltd 12.83 20 1.24 47 -17.51 24 -14.62 26 
 
-3.30 17 -5.85 29 
6 TRF Ltd 10.24 27 18.35 19 -41.61 42 -24.00 31 -7.05 23 -1.93 19 
7 GMR 6.56 33 21.34 15 -31.04 32 -28.45 34 -7.10 24 -0.59 11 
8 
Dharamsi Morarji Chemicals Co 
Ltd -2.68 48 9.54 32 -27.73 31 -32.09 39 -7.77 30 -6.12 30 
9 Khatian Fertilizer -0.43 45 21.78 13 -41.57 41 -57.84 53 -11.22 41 -4.49 26 
10 Zenith Infotech Ltd -3.09 49 30.10 7 -48.92 47 130.42 10 -19.21 51 -129.37 55 
11 Tata Infotech Ltd(merged) 16.25 14 21.96 12 96.99 8 745.51 3 -4.97 21 0.35 9 
12 B & A Ltd -4.32 50 4.76 40 -33.53 35 -35.95 42 -23.75 53 -26.20 54 
13 Max India Ltd -1.25 47 35.54 4 -38.47 39 31.47 17 -17.19 48 10.57 2 
14 Emami Paper Mills Ltd 1.09 42 1.66 45 -52.71 50 -27.43 33 
-
1080.89 56 
-
6056.67 56 
15 Bayer CropScience Ltd 13.58 19 9.08 33 129.32 7 54.90 14 -4.13 18 -3.91 23 
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Sr. 
No. COMPANY 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE EVACE 
POST RANK PRE RANK POST RANK PRE  RANK POST RANK PRE RANK 
16 PSL Ltd 15.04 17 11.61 29 -8.01 21 -55.95 52 -3.01 14 -5.84 28 
17 Ratnamani Metals & Tubes Ltd 7.58 31 8.97 34 -49.78 49 -49.47 49 -10.17 35 -8.39 40 
18 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd 18.84 12 20.07 16 6.01 16 -3.14 23 -1.38 11 -1.23 14 
19 NHN Corporation Ltd 140.77 2 0.49 49 84.98 11 -90.84 55 -55.25 55 -19.25 52 
20 Sical Logistics Ltd 6.68 32 17.55 22 -19.41 25 -19.77 28 -4.30 20 -2.69 21 
21 Arvind Products Ltd -40.16 55 4.23 43 -86.71 56 803.26 2 -8.38 32 -8.23 38 
22 Bhilwara Spinners Ltd 
-
308.08 56 -14.90 52 -3.56 20 -20.75 29 -7.53 28 -8.39 39 
23 RSWM Ltd 6.08 34 8.45 35 -35.90 37 -31.09 38 -7.11 25 -5.74 27 
24 Shyam Telecom Ltd 3.42 37 4.59 41 0.16 18 479.69 4 -15.88 47 3.78 5 
25 DPIL Ltd -0.92 46 -62.41 56 -14.40 23 -54.51 51 -11.53 42 -15.03 48 
26 Rossell Tea Ltd -5.76 51 11.84 28 -57.63 52 -92.62 56 -14.92 46 -8.95 41 
27 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 50.22 4 -34.79 55 149.52 5 -35.67 41 18.11 2 -21.81 53 
28 Twilight Li-Taka Pharma Ltd 9.28 28 -23.48 54 21.45 14 -4.38 24 -10.63 40 -12.70 46 
29 
Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries 
Ltd 31.43 5 24.66 10 449.32 2 281.03 7 9.27 4 0.46 8 
30 SRHHL Industries Ltd 2.82 39 4.49 42 -70.20 54 -53.25 50 -14.37 45 -10.86 42
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Sr. 
No. 
COMPANY 
 
 
 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE EVACE 
POST RANK PRE RANK POST RANK PRE  RANK POST RANK PRE RANK 
31 NLC Nalco India Ltd 20.00 11 18.90 18 169.17 4 444.26 5 -2.09 13 -0.91 13 
32 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd 23.29 8 13.89 26 402.00 3 434.07 6 1.81 7 -6.43 32 
33 Roto Pumps Ltd -8.48 52 0.51 48 -61.60 53 -62.47 54 -22.03 52 -17.30 49 
34 GHCL Ltd 16.52 13 15.60 25 -20.53 26 -28.68 36 -3.20 16 -3.74 22 
35 DLF Ltd 11.22 25 26.72 8 -70.72 55 -37.59 44 -7.44 27 1.37 6 
36 Repro India Ltd 15.25 15 17.96 20 -49.24 48 -43.34 46 -3.20 15 -1.52 17
37 Finolex Cables Ltd 8.44 29 11.07 31 -22.05 27 13.79 21 -10.26 36 -1.83 18 
38 Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd 27.81 6 -15.34 53 -0.67 19 -38.11 45 -17.89 50 -17.53 50 
39 Tata Coffee Ltd 10.66 26 23.34 11 -9.40 22 93.27 11 -7.90 31 1.27 7 
40 Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd 22.67 9 13.59 27 -31.49 33 -28.60 35 1.84 6 -3.96 24 
41 Pidilite Industries Ltd 218.70 1 301.60 1 96.86 9 147.89 8 -0.64 10 -0.15 10 
42 TTK Healthcare Ltd 3.13 38 53.21 2 -39.58 40 -16.57 27 -10.58 39 -7.13 35 
43 HBL Power Systems Ltd 12.32 23 30.33 6 -48.10 46 -48.07 48 -5.73 22 7.43 3 
44 Carol Info Services Ltd -0.30 44 8.07 37 -42.90 44 84.91 12 -14.19 44 -6.24 31 
45 Todays Writing Products Ltd 15.11 16 26.27 9 6.49 15 32.57 16 -4.26 19 5.62 4 
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Sr. 
No. COMPANY 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE EVACE 
POST RANK PRE RANK POST RANK PRE  RANK POST RANK PRE RANK 
46 Jindal Poly Films Ltd 12.71 22 6.68 39 -42.51 43 -30.76 37 -9.38 34 -6.74 33 
47 Gujarat Perstorp Electronics Ltd 14.60 18 16.48 23 94.99 10 147.08 9 4.64 5 -7.13 35 
48 Berger Paints (India) Ltd 21.21 10 19.80 17 43.62 13 48.83 15 -0.41 9 -1.46 16 
49 Hindustan Unilever Ltd 60.60 3 50.39 3 1151.94 1 1866.75 1 29.42 1 27.72 1 
50 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 25.46 7 17.94 21 59.64 12 -13.59 25 1.08 8 -1.94 20 
51 Bright Brothers Ltd -11.96 53 6.99 38 -24.70 30 -20.96 30 -10.28 37 -7.54 37 
52 Ion Exchange (India) Ltd 0.88 43 3.54 44 -43.29 45 -36.98 43 -11.73 43 -11.30 44 
53 Hindustan Fluoro Carbons Ltd 12.80 21 35.43 5 134.95 6 75.46 13 10.05 3 -11.28 43 
54 IFGL Refractories Ltd 8.01 30 1.61 46 -34.78 36 -45.72 47 -10.39 38 -14.64 47 
55 Pix Transmission Ltd 3.43 36 11.55 30 -32.47 34 -32.12 40 -7.38 26 -4.46 25 
56 Zenith Computers Ltd 3.85 35 8.36 36 -23.09 28 22.04 19 -9.23 33 -7.10 34 
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RONW AND INTER COMPANY COMPARISON 
This empirical analysis study has been done with the traditional measure of profitability 
(RONW) and the following observations are made. 
 
Group I 
 Grouping companies according to traditional measure of shareholder wealth creation 
(RONW) resulted in 43 companies (rank1-43) falling in the first group with the range of 
218.70 crores (by Pidilite Industries, which got the first rank) to 0.88 crores (by ION 
Exchange co. limited with 43 rank).In between, again there are companies like Dr. 
Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Gulf oil corporation Ltd., Hindustan Unilever Ltd., Hindustan 
Organic Chemicals Ltd..All showed positive returns to shareholders. 
 
Group II 
     13 companies (from 44 to56) belonged to this group which revealed negative value for 
average post merger period ranging from -0.30crores (by carol Info Services) to -
308.08crores (by Bhilwara Spinners.)  In between, there were companies like Arvind 
Products Ltd., Bright Brothers Ltd., Rossell Tea Ltd, Roto Pumps Ltd.All of which has 
resulted in loses for their shareholders in the post merger period.   
 
MVA AND INTER COMPANY COMPARISON 
 
This measure of market’s assessment of value addition to shareholders in the post merger 
period has again grouped sample companies into following two categories: 
 
Group I 
18 Companies from rank 1to 18 belong to this group with positive shareholder value 
addition ranging from 1151.94 crores ( by Hindustan Unilever Ltd.getting the first rank) 
to 0.16 crores (by Shayam Telecom Ltd.) Some other companies which have added to 
shareholder value include NLC Nalco Limited, Bayer crposcience Ltd., Tata Infotech 
Ltd. ( merged),Matrix Laboratories Ltd., etc 
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Group II 
      From19 to 56 fall in this category of value erosion as a result of merger as per market’s 
assessment in post merger period. The values range from -0.67crores (by Hindustan 
Organic Chemicals Ltd.) to -86.71crores (by Arvind Products Ltd.) companies like Areva 
T&D India Ltd.,Rossell Tea Ltd., SRHHL Industries Ltd.,DLF Ltd., etc   all fall in this 
category. 
 
 
EVA AND INTER COMPANY COMPARISON 
Average economic value added (EVA) has been computed for the post merger period for 
all selected companies to see which companies have added value for their shareholders 
after mergers and which have destroyed it. Following classification has been done based 
on empirical results. 
 
Group I 
This group consists of only 8 companies (by rank1to8) only out of the companies selected 
which have revealed positive value addition in terms of EVA. The shareholder value 
addition has been in the range of 29.42 crores ( by  Hindustan Unilever Ltd., which got 
first rank) to 1.08 crores (by Jubilant Organosys Ltd., which got 8rank ) In between, there 
were other companies like  Matrix Laboratories lLtd., Sun Pharmaceutical Industry Ltd., 
Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd., Gujarat Perstorp Elctronics Ltd., Etc. 
 
Group II 
      All rest of the companies from rank 9 to 56  belong to this group with the negative value 
addition in the post merger period. The range of value erosion has been from -0.41 crores 
to (By berger paints Ltd.) to tune of  -1080.89 crores (by Emami Paper Mills Ltd.) In 
between there are companies like B&A Ltd., BPL Ltd., NHN Corporation LTD., Dr. 
Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., etc. which have resulted in value erosion in the post merger 
period. 
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The summary of results of inter company analysis with these value added metrics is 
presented below in. 
  
Table:- 5.6 
Inter Company Analysis with Added Metrics; Summary of Results 
 
Group  Ranks  RONW  %  Ranks  MVA  %  Ranks  EVA  % 
I  1 – 43  43  76.79  1 – 18  18  32.14  1 ‐ 8  8  14.29
II  44 ‐56  13  23.21  19 ‐56  38  67.86  9 ‐ 56  48  85.71
Total    56  100    56  100    56  100 
 
 
Industry wise Classification and analysis with RONW, MVA and EVA   
An attempt has been made to make inter industry comparison of post merger performance 
of selected companies in terms of value added metrics: RONW, MVA and EVA. Industry 
wise classification has been done by all fifty six companies into ten sub groups. 
Measuring and analyzing performance of merged companies at industry level gives 
useful insight. The industrial variations in value added metrics has also been analyzed 
using cluster analysis by: 
 
1. Ranking industries by all these metrics in descending order. 
2. Classifying industries with similar values into broad groups 
3. Examining these groups and explaining them. 
The below table gives the average aggregate value addition in the post merger period by 
all the industries by all three value added metrics, namely RONWS,MVA and EVA along 
with their respective ranking. Perusals of ranking in table--- reveal the following two 
distinct groups.   
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Table:- 5.7  
INTER INDUSTRY COMPARISION USING RONW, MVA AND EVA  
                              
Sr. 
No. INDUSTRY No.Co. 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE EVACE 
POST RANK PRE RANK POST RANK PRE RANK POST RANK PRE RANK 
1 Chemicals, Petrochemicals 8 42.57 2 49.80 1 51.15 3 78.65 5 -3.27 2 -5.68 3 
2 Electric, Electronics, 
Computer-Hardware 
9 4.59 7 12.62 6 -17.11 7 96.23 4 -11.64 8 -18.63 9 
3 Fertilizers,pesticides 3 3.49 8 13.47 5 20.00 5 -11.68 7 -7.71 5 -4.84 2 
4 Packaging 4 5.44 6 15.86 2 -4.88 6 27.96 6 -11.42 6 -7.38 4 
5 Phamaceuticlas 6 22.31 3 8.18 8 160.36 1 104.97 3 0.80 1 -8.56 7 
6 Steel,Engineering 4 9.86 5 15.07 3 -32.61 9 -39.47 9 -6.83 3 -4.19 1 
7 Textiles 3 -114.06 10 -0.74 9 -42.06 10 250.47 1 -7.67 4 -7.45 5 
8 Tea-Coffee 3 1.33 9 -9.08 10 -27.15 8 -17.95 8 -11.45 7 -7.57 6 
9 Trading 2 73.72 1 9.02 7 32.78 4 -55.30 10 -29.78 9 -10.97 8 
10 Miscelleneous 14 9.99 4 13.82 4 51.48 2 151.83 2 -82.70 10 -434.74 10 
  Total 56 59.23   128.03   191.97   585.71   -171.67   -510.00   
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RONW AND INTER INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
Same analysis has been carried out with this traditional measure of profitability and the 
following observations have been made. 
 
Group I  
With this traditional measure of profitability of shareholder value addition (RONW), 9 
industries ( from rank1to 9 ) get categorized in this group with positive values ranging 
from 73.72 crores ( by Tading Industries, With first rank) to 1.33 crores (by Tea-coffee 
Industries) other industries includes Chemicals and Petrochemicals, Electric, Electronics, 
Computer-hardware all have resulted in gains for shareholders in post merger period. 
     
Group II  
The only remaining industry is Textiles with losses of -114.06 crores in post merger 
period get categorized in this group.  
 
MVA AND INTER INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
This measure of market’s assessment of value addition to shareholders has again grouped 
all industries in to following two categories. 
 
Group I 
5 industries (from rank 1 to 5) gets qualified in this group with positive shareholder value 
addition in the post merger period ranging from 160.36 crores ( by Pharmaceutical  
Industries, with the first rank) to 20.00  crores( by Fertilizers Industries) Than there are 
other industries adding to shareholder value which includes  Chemicals & 
petrochemicals, Trading, etc. 
 
Group II  
      Remaining 5 industries resulted in negative values for shareholders. The range of value 
erosion is -4.88 crores (by packing industry) to -42.06 crores (by textile industry). 
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EVA AND INTER INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 
Average EVA has been calculated for for each industry after grouping all selected 
companies into – groups to see which industries have resulted in value addition to their 
shareholders after mergers and which have destroyed it. The following results have 
emerged. 
 
Group I  
This group consists of only one industry namely pharmaceutical. The positive 
shareholder value addition in the average post merger period is 0.80 crores.   
 
Group II 
     The remaining 9 industries falling (from 2 to 10) in this group with negative EVAs 
indicating value erosion for shareholders in post merger period. 
 
Value erosion for these industries has been in the range of -3.27 crores (by chemical 
industry) to -82.7 crores (by miscellaneous), In between other industries like chemical & 
petrochemical, steel & engineering, textiles, etc.    
 
 Table:- 5.8 
Inter Industry Analysis with Added Metrics; Summary of Results 
 
Group  Ranks  RONW  %  Ranks  MVA  %  Ranks  EVA  % 
I  1 ‐ 9  9  90 1 – 5 5 50 1 1  10
II  10  1  10  6 ‐ 10  5  50  2 – 10  9  90 
Total    10  100    10  100    10  100 
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INTRA- INDUSTRY ANALYSIS WITH RONW, MVA AND EVA 
After examining net gain or loss in terms of value addition for an industry as whole, it is 
further investigated whether within an industry with net gain or loss, are their any 
variations in terms of real gainers or losers i.e are there any value creators in industries 
which have on the whole not faired well or vice versa. Table gives the results of 
classification of all selected companies into ten broad categories along with average mean 
for each industry for all three values added metrics. More descriptive analysis based on 
above table has also been completed. For this purpose correlation analysis has been used 
to establish the relationship between these three values added metrics within industry to 
get an insight into the variation in the performance vis-à-vis three metrics. Results of 
correlation between various values added metrics RONW, MVA and EVA for all 
industries are summarized in below table: 
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Table:- 5.9 
INTRA INDUSTRY COMPARISION USING RONW,MVA & EVA 
Sr. 
 No. COMPANY 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE  EVACE 
POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE 
I CHEMICALS,PETROCHEMICALS 
1 Berger Paints (India) Ltd 21.21 19.80 43.62 48.83 -0.41 -1.46 
2 Hindustan Fluoro Carbons Ltd 12.80 35.43 134.95 75.46 10.05 -11.28 
3 Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd 27.81 -15.34 -0.67 -38.11 -17.89 -17.53 
4 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 25.46 17.94 59.64 -13.59 1.08 -1.94 
5 NLC Nalco India Ltd 20.00 18.90 169.17 444.26 -2.09 -0.91 
6 Pidilite Industries Ltd 218.70 301.60 96.86 147.89 -0.64 -0.15 
7 SRHHL Industries Ltd 2.82 4.49 -70.20 -53.25 -14.37 -10.86 
8 Ultramarine & Pigments Ltd 11.76 15.62 -24.18 17.74 -1.87 -1.28 
  TOTAL 340.55 398.44 409.18 629.22 -26.14 -45.40 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 42.57 49.80 51.15 78.65 -3.27 -5.68 
II ELECTRIC,ELECTRONICS,COMPUTER-HARDARE 
1 Areva T&D India Ltd 2.62 -1.00 -36.81 13.07 -17.53 -18.40 
2 BPL Ltd -13.21 21.73 -57.43 28.31 -26.87 -0.76 
3 Crompton Greaves Ltd 1.33 -10.22 2.94 -24.41 -7.67 -12.13 
4 Finolex Cables Ltd 8.44 11.07 -22.05 13.79 -10.26 -1.83 
5 HBL Power Systems Ltd 12.32 30.33 -48.10 -48.07 -5.73 7.43 
6 Samtel Color Ltd 12.83 1.24 -17.51 -14.62 -3.30 -5.85 
7 Tata Infotech Ltd(merged) 16.25 21.96 96.99 745.51 -4.97 0.35 
8 Zenith Computers Ltd 3.85 8.36 -23.09 22.04 -9.23 -7.10 
9 Zenith Infotech Ltd -3.09 30.10 -48.92 130.42 -19.21 -129.37 
  TOTAL 41.35 113.57 -153.99 866.03 -104.76 -167.65 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 4.59 12.62 -17.11 96.23 -11.64 -18.63 
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Sr. 
 No. COMPANY 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE  EVACE 
POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE 
III FERTILIZERS,PESTICIDES 
1 Bayer CropScience Ltd 13.58 9.08 129.32 54.90 -4.13 -3.91 
2 Dharamsi Morarji Chemicals Co Ltd -2.68 9.54 -27.73 -32.09 -7.77 -6.12 
3 Khatian Fertilizer -0.43 21.78 -41.57 -57.84 -11.22 -4.49 
  TOTAL 10.46 40.40 60.01 -35.03 -23.12 -14.52 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 3.49 13.47 20.00 -11.68 -7.71 -4.84 
IV PACKAGING 
1 B & A Ltd -4.32 4.76 -33.53 -35.95 -23.75 -26.20 
2 Gujarat Perstorp Electronics Ltd 14.60 16.48 94.99 147.08 4.64 -7.13 
3 Jindal Poly Films Ltd 12.71 6.68 -42.51 -30.76 -9.38 -6.74 
4 Max India Ltd -1.25 35.54 -38.47 31.47 -17.19 10.57 
  TOTAL 21.74 63.45 -19.53 111.84 -45.68 -29.50 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 5.44 15.86 -4.88 27.96 -11.42 -7.38 
V PHARMACEUTICALS 
1 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd 23.29 13.89 402.00 434.07 1.81 -6.43 
2 GHCL Ltd 16.52 15.60 -20.53 -28.68 -3.20 -3.74 
3 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 50.22 -34.79 149.52 -35.67 18.11 -21.81 
4 Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd 31.43 24.66 449.32 281.03 9.27 0.46 
5 TTK Healthcare Ltd 3.13 53.21 -39.58 -16.57 -10.58 -7.13 
6 Twilight Li-Taka Pharma Ltd 9.28 -23.48 21.45 -4.38 -10.63 -12.70 
  TOTAL 133.88 49.09 962.17 629.79 4.78 -51.35 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 22.31 8.18 160.36 104.97 0.80 -8.56 
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Sr. 
 No. COMPANY 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE  EVACE 
POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE 
VI STEEL,ENGINEERING 
1 GMR 6.56 21.34 -31.04 -28.45 -7.10 -0.59 
2 PSL Ltd 15.04 11.61 -8.01 -55.95 -3.01 -5.84 
3 Ratnamani Metals & Tubes Ltd 7.58 8.97 -49.78 -49.47 -10.17 -8.39 
4 TRF Ltd 10.24 18.35 -41.61 -24.00 -7.05 -1.93 
  TOTAL 39.42 60.27 -130.44 -157.87 -27.33 -16.74 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 9.86 15.07 -32.61 -39.47 -6.83 -4.19 
VII TEXTILES 
1 Arvind Products Ltd -40.16 4.23 -86.71 803.26 -8.38 -8.23 
2 Bhilwara Spinners Ltd -308.08 -14.90 -3.56 -20.75 -7.53 -8.39 
3 RSWM Ltd 6.08 8.45 -35.90 -31.09 -7.11 -5.74 
  TOTAL -342.17 -2.21 -126.17 751.42 -23.02 -22.35 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE -114.06 -0.74 -42.06 250.47 -7.67 -7.45 
VIII TEA.COFFEE 
1 DPIL Ltd -0.92 -62.41 -14.40 -54.51 -11.53 -15.03 
2 Rossell Tea Ltd -5.76 11.84 -57.63 -92.62 -14.92 -8.95 
3 Tata Coffee Ltd 10.66 23.34 -9.40 93.27 -7.90 1.27 
  TOTAL 3.98 -27.24 -81.44 -53.86 -34.35 -22.71 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 1.33 -9.08 -27.15 -17.95 -11.45 -7.57 
IX TREADING             
1 NHN Corporation Ltd 140.77 0.49 84.98 -90.84 -55.25 -19.25 
2 Sical Logistics Ltd 6.68 17.55 -19.41 -19.77 -4.30 -2.69 
  TOTAL 147.44 18.04 65.57 -110.60 -59.55 -21.94 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 73.72 9.02 32.78 -55.30 -29.78 -10.97 
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Sr. 
 No. COMPANY 
AVERAGE RONW AVERAGE MVACE AVERAGE  EVACE 
POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE 
X MISCELLENEOUS             
1 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd 18.84 20.07 6.01 -3.14 -1.38 -1.23 
2 Bright Brothers Ltd -11.96 6.99 -24.70 -20.96 -10.28 -7.54 
3 Carol Info Services Ltd -0.30 8.07 -42.90 84.91 -14.19 -6.24 
4 DLF Ltd 11.22 26.72 -70.72 -37.59 -7.44 1.37 
5 Emami Paper Mills Ltd 1.09 1.66 -52.71 -27.43 -1080.89 -6056.67 
6 Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd 22.67 13.59 -31.49 -28.60 1.84 -3.96 
7 Hindustan Unilever Ltd 60.60 50.39 1151.94 1866.75 29.42 27.72 
8 IFGL Refractories Ltd 8.01 1.61 -34.78 -45.72 -10.39 -14.64 
9 Ion Exchange (India) Ltd 0.88 3.54 -43.29 -36.98 -11.73 -11.30 
10 Pix Transmission Ltd 3.43 11.55 -32.47 -32.12 -7.38 -4.46 
11 Repro India Ltd 15.25 17.96 -49.24 -43.34 -3.20 -1.52 
12 Roto Pumps Ltd -8.48 0.51 -61.60 -62.47 -22.03 -17.30 
13 Shyam Telecom Ltd 3.42 4.59 0.16 479.69 -15.88 3.78 
14 Todays Writing Products Ltd 15.11 26.27 6.49 32.57 -4.26 5.62 
  TOTAL 139.80 193.54 720.71 2125.56 -1157.80 -6086.37 
  INDUSTRY AVERAGE 9.99 13.82 51.48 151.83 -82.70 -434.74 
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Table:- 5.10 
INDUSTRY WISE CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Sr. 
 No. COMPANY 
RONW & MVA  MVA & EVA  EVA & RONW 
POST PRE POST PRE POST PRE 
I CHEMICALS,PETROCHEMICALS 0.27 0.22 0.67 0.47 0.12 0.41 
II ELECTRIC,ELECTRONICS,COMPUTER-HARDARE 0.59 0.32 0.54 -0.01 0.91 -0.31 
III FERTILIZERS,PESTICIDES 0.98 -0.70 0.91 0.53 0.80 0.24 
IV PACKAGING 0.60 0.39 0.85 0.33 0.91 0.61 
V PHARMACEUTICALS 0.51 0.24 0.58 0.48 0.99 0.76 
VI STEEL,ENGINEERING 0.77 0.88 0.96 0.86 0.84 0.99 
VII TEXTILES -0.71 0.34 0.75 -0.46 -0.06 0.68 
VIII TEA.COFFEE 0.79 0.44 0.90 0.84 0.98 0.85 
IX TREADING 1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00 -1.00 1.00 
X MISCELLENEOUS 0.84 0.71 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.26 
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OBSERVATIONS 
 
Chemicals & Petrochemicals 
Out of the sample companies selected for the study there are eight companies has undergone 
for merger during 99-00 in Chemicals & Petrochemicals industries. In respect of traditional 
measure RONW in this industry are relatively stable with average 42.57 with few extreme 
gainers or losers.   
 
In respect of value addition in terms of market assessment most of the companies in this 
industry have been gainers in post merger period with an average of 51.15 crores. The 
average value addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is 
resulted in value erosion with on an average -3.27 crores. However, companies like 
Hindustan Fluoro Carbans Ltd.and Jubilant Organosys Ltd. in post merger period with 
contribution of 10.05 crores and 1.08 crores respectively.   
 
The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 0.27 & 0.22 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.67 & 0.47 and between RONW and 
EVA is 0.12 & 0.41. 
 
Electric, Electronics, Computer-Hardware 
Out of the sample companies selected for the study there are nine companies has undergone 
for merger during 99-00 in electric, electronics and computer –hardware industries. In respect 
of traditional measure RONW in this industry are relatively positive with average 4.59 with 
few extreme losers. 
   
In respect of value addition in terms of market assessment most of the companies in this 
industry have been losers in post merger period with an average of -17.11 crores. The 
average value addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is 
resulted in value erosion with on an average -104.76 crores. 
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The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 0.59 & 0.32 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.54 & -0.01 and between RONW and 
EVA is 0.91 & -0.31. 
 
Fertilizers, pesticides 
There are three companies has undergone for merger during 99-00 in fertilizers and 
pesticides industries. In respect of traditional measure RONW in this industry are relatively 
positive with average 3.49.   
 
In respect of value addition in terms of market assessment all the companies in this industry 
have been gainers in post merger period with an average of 20.00 crores. The average value 
addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is resulted in value 
erosion with on an average -7.71 crores.   
 
The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 0.98 & -0.70 for post and 
pre merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.91 & 0.53 and between RONW 
and EVA is 0.80 & 0.24. 
 
 
Packaging 
There are four companies has undergone for merger during 99-00 in packaging industries. In 
respect of traditional measure RONW in this industry are relatively poor with average 5.44. 
 
In respect of value addition in terms of market assessment all the companies in this industry 
have been losers in post merger period with an average of -4.88 crores. The average value 
addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is resulted in value 
erosion with on an average -11.42 crores.   
 
The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 0.60 & 0.39 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.85 & 0.33 and between RONW and 
EVA is 0.91 & 0.61. 
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Pharmaceuticals 
Out of the sample companies selected for the study there are six companies has undergone 
for merger during 99-00 in pharmaceutical industry. In respect of traditional measure RONW 
in this industry are relatively stable with average 22.31 with few extreme gainers or losers.   
 
In respect of value addition in terms of market assessment most of the companies in this 
industry have been extreme gainers in post merger period with an average of 160.36 crores. 
The average value addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is 
resulted in little improvement with on an average -0.80 crores. However, companies like 
Matrix laboratories and Sun pharmaceuticals ltd. in post merger period with contribution of 
18.11 crores and 9.27 crores respectively.   
 
The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 0.51 & 0.24 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.58 & 0.48 and between RONW and 
EVA is 0.99 & 0.76. 
 
Steel & Engineering 
There are four companies has undergone for merger during 99-00 in steel and engineering 
industries. In respect of traditional measure RONW in this industries are relatively poor with 
average 9.86. 
   
In respect of value addition in terms of market assessment all the companies in this industry 
have been without major change in post merger period with an average of -32.61 crores. The 
average value addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is 
resulted in value erosion with on an average -6.83 crores.   
 
The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 0.77 & 0.88 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.96 & 0.86 and between RONW and 
EVA is 0.84 & 0.99. 
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Textiles 
There are three companies have undergone for merger during 99-00 in Textile industry. In 
respect of traditional measure RONW in this industry is negative with average -114.06  In 
respect of value addition in terms of market assessment most of the companies in this 
industry have been extreme losers in post merger period with an average of -42.06 crores. 
The average value addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is 
resulted in value erosion with on an average -7.67 crores.    
 
The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is -0.71 & 0.34 for post and 
pre merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.75 & -0.46 and between RONW 
and EVA is -0.06 & 0.68. 
 
Tea-Coffee 
There are three companies have undergone for merger during 99-00 in Tea- coffee industry. 
In respect of traditional measure RONW in this industry is relatively stable with average 
9.86.  In respect of value addition in terms of market assessment most of the companies in 
this industry have been without major change in post merger period with an average of -
32.61 crores. The average value addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post 
merger period is resulted in value erosion with on an average -6.83 crores.   
  
The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 0.79 & 0.44 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.90 & 0.84 and between RONW and 
EVA is 0.98 & 0.85. 
 
Trading 
There are two companies undergone for merger during 99-00 in trading industry. In respect 
of traditional measure RONW and market assessment in terms of MVA in this industry is 
relatively good positive with average 73.72 and 32.78 respectively. The average value 
addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is resulted in value 
erosion with on an average -29.78 crores.    
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The correlation coefficients of this between RONW and MVA is 1.00 & 1.00 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA -1.00 & 1.00  and between RONW and 
EVA is -1.00 & 1.00. 
 
Miscellaneous 
There are fourteen companies undergone for merger during 99-00 in various industry like 
sugar, construction etc. In respect of traditional measure RONW and market assessment in 
terms of MVA in this industry is relatively positive with average 9.99 and 51.48 respectively. 
The average value addition in terms of EVA for all the companies in post merger period is 
resulted in value erosion with on an average -82.70 crores.    
 
The correlation coefficient of this between RONW and MVA is 0.84 & 0.71 for post and pre 
merger period, while that of between MVA and EVA 0.13 & 0.11 and between RONW and 
EVA is 0.18 & 0.26. 
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REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
In order to analyze data of post and pre merger period a statistical tool is useful and provides 
better understanding. To study the impact of merger on shareholders value creation we have 
carried out the regression analysis on Indian corporate sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Where, 
DE = Debt Equity Ratio 
CR = Current ratio 
GR = Gearing Ratio 
OE = Operating Expense 
PM = Profit Margin 
ROCE = Return on Capital Employed 
ER = Expense Ratio 
RONW = Return on Net Worth 
SG = Firm Acquired by Same Group 
BIFR = Acquired firm was under BIFR 
T = Period 
α is intercept, β1, and β2 are regression coefficients, and  € is the error. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Pre-Merger Model: 
EVA = αi  + β1 DEi,t + β2  CRi,t + β3 GRi,t + β4 OEi,t + β5 PMi,t + 
β5 ROCEi,t + β6 ERi,t + β7 RONWi,t + β8 SG + β9 BIFR + € i,t 
Post-Merger Model: 
EVA = αi  + β1 DEi,t + β2  CRi,t + β3 GRi,t + β4 OEi,t + β5 PMi,t + 
β5 ROCEi,t + β6 ERi,t + β7 RONWi,t + β8 SG + β9 BIFR + € i,t 
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Table:- 5.11:- Independent & Dependent variables 
Sr. No. Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
  Pre Merger Post Merger 
1 Debt Equity -1.20 
(-0.28) 
-2.189 
(-1.131) 
2 Current Ratio -5.63 
(-0.92) 
-0.756 
(-0.176) 
3 Gearing Ratio 0.25 
(1.43) 
0.077 
(0.505) 
4 Operating Expenses 0.06 
(14.69)* 
0.097 
(18.518)* 
5 Profit Margin 12.53 
(0.46) 
-150.027 
(-4.083)* 
6 ROCE 125.69 
(2.26)** 
270.153 
(3.755)* 
7 Expense Ratio -4.79 
(-23.50)* 
-29.135 
(-29.175)* 
8 RONW -0.02 
(-0.22) 
-0.027 
(-0.431) 
9 Same Group -6.73 
(-0.74) 
-5.600 
(-0.520) 
10 BIFR 8.01 
(0.76) 
28.646 
(2.198) 
11 R2 0.86 0.87 
12 Adj.R2 0.85 0.86 
13 F 92.99* 140.99* 
 
Note: 
1. t-statistics are given in parenthesis; 
2. * denotes significant at 99% level of confidence. 
3. ** denotes significant at 95% level of confidence. 
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Looking at empirical results we can say that expense ratio of the firm is significantly and 
negatively related to pre and post merger’s share holders value creation. It means higher 
expenses lead to lower share holder’s value which is according to the theory of finance. We 
also find that operating expenses of the firm is positively related to EVA and also significant 
at 1% level in firm’s pre and post mergers performance. ROCE of the firm is significantly 
also positively correlated to EVA in pre and post mergers financial performance of firm. 
While Debt equity, Current Ratio, and RONW are negatively correlated with shareholders 
creation capacity of the firm. It can be said that increase in Debt equity, Current Ratio, and 
RONW will leads to decrease in EVA. While evaluating the impact of acquirer of firm and 
scheme of merger as dummy variable are not significant. But acquirer in same group is 
negatively correlated with EVA.  
 
In pre-merger regression analysis results shows that the value of R2 is 0.86, which shows that 
the sample regression explain 86% of aggregate data. The overall model is also significant 
with adjusted R2 value of 0.85. So, it can be concluded that the model applicable to Indian 
corporate.  
 
Regression result of post merger indicates the vale of R2 and adjusted R2 value are 0.87 and 
0.86 which is significant at 1% level. So model is fit for study. 
 
The classical finance theory said that firm’s shareholders value creation is based on firms 
earning ability and firms return on its net worth. On the basis of our regression research we 
have proved that the firm’s shareholders value creation is highly dependent on Operating 
expenses, Profit market, ROCE and Expense ratio.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In case of any business shareholders value maximization being recognized as the most 
important goal, performance evaluation of fifty six selected companies which have 
undergone mergers during the 1999-2000 has been done using value added metrics EVA and 
MVA and the traditional value added measure metric RONW. The following conclusions 
have been drawn based on empirical results and their analysis: 
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1. From the analysis of companies for four cross sectional post merger years, it was found 
that 81 % of companies resulted in value erosion in terms of EVA with decreasing or no 
trend over the four merger years. Only 19% of sample companies revealed positive value 
addition with increasing trend in post merger years.  
 
2. The traditional measure of estimation of value for shareholders, namely RONW revealed 
results with EVA. Only 28% companies showed increasing trend of value in post merger 
period. The remaining 72% of companies failed to deliver value after mergers. 
 
3.    With regards to market’s assessment of company’s value in post merger period, 67% of 
companies revealed positive post merger values in the first year indicating that companies 
gained from mergers in terms of appreciation in their stock value. Only 14% of these 
companies however, exhibited an increasing trend over four years which was very 
significant. Number of companies benefited maximum in terms of share holder value 
appreciation in the post merger period. But in most of the companies, however, appreciation 
in stock value gained immediately after mergers was lost in the subsequent years. 
 
4. Inter companies analysis carried on with average post merger computed values of EVA 
revealed value erosion in case of 81% of companies. Only 19% of companies gained values 
for their shareholders, the important ones being Berger paints Ltd, Emami Paper Mills Ltd., 
B&A Ltd., BPL Ltd., NHN Corporation LTD., Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., etc. which 
have resulted in value erosion in the post merger period. .This indicates that the null 
hypothesis that mergers do not result in value addition to shareholders has been accepted and 
alternate hypothesis that merger result in value addition to shareholders has been rejected. As 
regards the other measure of value addition, i.e. MVA, the result was almost50% 
 
5.  The result of inter company analysis with RONW showed all most opposite findings. As 
per this measure, 77% of companies added value for their shareholders after mergers 
indicating that mergers are profitable. Only 23%   of companies resulted in value erosion. 
 
 292
6. Results of inter industry analysis revealed that most of industries on the whole (9 out of 
10) lost shareholder value in the post merger period in terms of EVA. Only one industry 
gained positive value for their shareholders .However in terms of other value added metrics, 
MVA and traditional measure RONW, the results were reverse   Pharmaceutical  Industries, 
Fertilizers Industries and other industries adding to shareholder value which includes 
Chemicals & petrochemicals, Trading, etc. industries gained value in terms of appreciation in 
post merger period.  
 
7. Merger has been spread over various industries. Over all, as compared to other 
industry groups, companies in chemicals, petrochemicals, electric and electronics have had 
relatively higher involvement in merger activity. 
 
8. These results are also corroborated by correlation co- efficient calculated between 
these measures for all industries separately. In industries like steel, engineering, tea and 
coffee shows significantly high correlation has been revealed between the new values added 
metric EVA and traditional metric RONW. For other industries this relationship is low and 
insignificant. As far as association between economic efficiency of industry and its market 
assessment is concerned, in case of industries like chemical, petrochemicals, electric, 
electronics and computer industries it has emerged significant. For the rest of the industries 
economic performance does not seem to drive market value. However, no significant 
correlation was observed between MVA and RONW in most of the industries. 
 
9. Thus, in this chapter, post-merger performance of sample merged companies has 
been evaluated in terms of shareholders value additions. 
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CHAPTER – VI 
SUMMARY, FINDINGS & SUGGESTIONS 
 
Till the early nineties, Indian economy functioned in a controlled and regulated environment. 
With the reforms initiated by the government (namely, amendment in MRTP Act, 1969 to 
facilitate expansion of an enterprise, amendment in FERA, 1973 to permit direct foreign 
investment and abolition of industrial licensing in most of the industries.), the economy 
transitioned from “controlled” to market driven and competitive environment. This 
liberalization of the earlier state controlled sluggish economy forced Indian industries to 
undergo the process of restructuring in order to gain competitive strength, both in domestic 
and export market. 
 
The present business environment is characterized by globalization, opening up of economy, 
would wide competition, expanding markets, fast changing technologies, never ending need 
for finance and necessity of diversification etc. The Indian Corporate World, while benefiting 
from decontrol and deregulation has begun to feel the effect of these competition, Indian 
corporate are changing their strategic focus and restructuring their businesses by adopting 
tools like mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances. Now, small is no longer beautiful in 
the field of business, trade and commerce. The focus is on larger business establishments to 
achieve efficiencies and to stand up against global in challenges and world wide competition 
by availing economies of scale. This has resulted in “Merger Wave” in India and abroad. 
Various business establishments and multinationals are expanding by means of mergers and 
acquisitions. 
 
A number of studies have been carried out on this burning topic abroad especially in the 
developed capital markets of U.S. and U.K. These studies have covered various aspects, vis., 
a) financial performance evaluation of the merged firms using share price data and 
accounting data, b) Motives of mergers and their empirical investigation, c) examination of 
financial characteristics of merged and merging firms and d) Determination of aggregate 
merger activity. 
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M & As being relatively less popular phenomenon in India has not received much attention 
of researchers. The present study is aimed at examining the M&A activity in India during the 
post-liberalisation period in terms of its financial performance. An attempt has also been 
made to evaluate the pre- and post-merger performance. 
 
This concluding chapter of the study is mainly devoted to the discussion of its main findings. 
The chapter is divided into four sections.  Recapitulates the methodology followed in the 
study. Next part enumerates the main findings of the study, its conclusion and summarized in 
last part of this chapter followed by suggestions for further research. 
 
OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study had the following objectives: 
1.  To evaluate the post-merger performance of merged firms using the value added 
metrics namely EVA, MVA and RONW. 
2. To identify the motives of mergers and acquisitions as avowed in the merger schemes 
and to assess if motives as avowed in the scheme have been fulfilled of not. 
3. To evaluate the pre-and post-merger financial performance of merged firm’s vis-à-vis 
the influence of motives’ variables such as: 
       a) Profit maximization 
       b)  Growth  
       c) Tax Consideration 
       d) Diversification 
       e) Leverage 
For achieving these objectives, the study focused on three main aspects, vis.,) evaluation of 
post-merger performance in terms of value addition to shareholders, b) examination of 
motives as avowed in the merger schemes and c) pre-and post-merger motives’ analysis. It is 
reiterated that methodology followed for each of these aspects was different. It is therefore 
useful to briefly recapitulate the methodology followed in the study. In the first aspect, post-
merger performance of companies which merged during the year 1999-2000 was analyzed in 
terms of value addition to shareholders. For this purpose, value added metrics namely EVA, 
MVA and RONW were computed for three post-merger years for a sample of two hundred 
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and twenty three companies whose financial data was derived from CMIE. Further, inter-firm 
analysis and inter-industry analysis were conducted using the correlation analysis. 
The second aspect was related to an in-depth pre-and post-merger financial analysis in terms 
of motives of merger to assess if, motives as avowed in the merger schemes have been 
achieved or not. Five variables were defined as motives of mergers, namely, profitability, tax 
advantage, and growth of assets. These variables were empirically calculated with the help of 
ratios for the sample of fifty six merged firms for a period of three years preceding the 
merger and compared with value of these variables motives on value addition to shareholders 
in the post-merger period was also established. 
The following null hypotheses were tested in the study: 
1. Mergers and acquisitions do not result in value addition to existing shareholders                       
2. Merger in India is not predominantly horizontal. 
3. There is no difference between pre- and post-merger performance of merged companies 
under the study period. 
4. Synergy in profits, acquisition of market share, tax consideration and diversification, all do 
not result in value addition to existing shareholders. 
5. There is no significant difference in the value addition to the existing shareholders due to 
Growth and Leverage. 
6. Motives as avowed in the merger schemes have not been affected after mergers. 
 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY. 
With the transition of Indian economy to a competitive and market driven environment, 
M&A activity has gained momentum, both, in terms of number and volume. Shareholder 
value addition and survival of the fittest are the buzz words. 
 
The corporate sector has increasingly resorted to consolidations in the form of mergers in 
order to achieve motives of increased synergies and economies scale, achieve global 
competitive strength, acquire better marketing and financial advantages, diversify and reduce 
earnings’ variations, increasing domestic share, enhance production capacities and capture 
fast growing markets abroad. 
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The findings of the study are discussed under three major heads, vis., a) post-merger 
performance evaluation in terms of value addition of shareholders, b) merger scheme 
analysis and c) competitive pre-and post-merger motives’ analysis. 
Post-merger Performance Evaluation. 
As stated earlier, post-merger performance of fifty six sample merged firms was examined 
with the help of value added metrics, namely, EVA, RONW, and MVA. Statistical 
techniques of clusture analysis were employed to analyse and interpret the results. The null 
hypothesis that mergers do not result in value addition to shareholders has been accepted and 
alternate hypothesis that mergers add to shareholders’ value has been rejected. The findings 
of the analysis are summarised in five categories as follows: 
 
1.        Intra-company Analysis. 
1) Cross sectional analysis of sample merged firm in terms of EVA revealed that 79% of 
the firms resulted in value erosion for its shareholders with decreasing, or no visible trend in 
three post-merger years. Only 21% of firms exhibited positive value for shareholders who 
increased in these years. Zenith Infotech Limited, Arvind Products Limited, NLC Nalco 
India Limited, IFGL Refractories were few companies gained in post merger period  
2) Similar analysis carried on with the traditional tool of measuring shareholder value, 
namely, RONW revealed almost similar results. Only 28% of firm exhibited increasing trend 
of value addition in post-merger years. The major gainers in terms of this measure were NLC 
Nalco India limited, Jindal Poly Films Limited, and Jubilant Organosys Limited. were few 
firms that gained  in post-merger years . 
3) As regards to shareholder value addition in terms of markets’ assessment of it’s stoke 
value, 59% of firms revealed positive value in the first post-merger year. This indicated that 
good number of companies gained from mergers in terms of appreciation of their stoke value. 
However, only 17% of these firms exhibited a significant increase in the subsequent post-
merger years. Twilight li-taka pharma Limited, Matrix Laborites, Hindustan Unilever 
Limited, Roto Pumps Limited, Rossell Tea Limited. appreciation in post-merger period. For 
others, stoke value gained immediately after mergers were lost in subsequent years. 
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2. Inter-company Analysis 
1) Result of inter-firm analysis based on comparison of average values of EVA in the 
post-merger period revealed value erosion to the shareholders in case of 85% of sample 
firms. Only 15% of the firms gained shareholder value, the important achievers were   
Hindustan Unilever Ltd., Jubilant Organosys Ltd., and  Matrix Laboratories Ltd. 
2) The results of inter-firm analysis with the measure of RONW revealed almost reverse 
findings. As per this traditional measure, 77% of the firms gained value for their shareholders 
in the post-merger period indicating that mergers are profitable. Only 23% of firms were 
found to be non profitable. The major gainers with this measure were Pidilite Industries, ION 
Exchange co. limited, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd., Gulf oil corporation Ltd., Hindustan 
Unilever Ltd., Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd. 
3) With regard to market’s assessment of appreciation in shareholder value, comparison 
amongst firms revealed that 67% of firms gained stoke value in the post-merger period and 
33% of sample firms had lost it. Few companies like Hindustan Unilever Ltd.by Shayam 
Telecom Ltd., NLC Nalco Limited, Bayer cropscience Ltd., Tata Infotech Ltd. 
(merged),Matrix Laboratories Ltd., etc 
 
3. Inter-industry Analysis 
1) Comparison of post-merger performance of merged firms belonging to different 
Industry with average EVA figures revealed that in most of the industries(nine out of ten), 
shareholder value is lost. Only pharmaceutical industry sector gained positive value for their 
shareholders. 
2) Similar analysis with RONW revealed almost opposite results. As per measure, 
merged firms in nine out of ten industries gained Trading Industries, Tea-coffee Industries, 
Chemicals, Petrochemicals, Electric, Electronics, Computer-hardware all have resulted in 
gains for shareholders in post merger period. Only merged companies in Taxtile industry was 
unprofitable. 
3) Value addition in terms of markets’ appreciation of shareholder’s stoke was revealed 
for merged firms in five out of ten industries with MVA as the value added metric.  
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4. Intra-Industry Analysis. 
1) M&A activity has been spread across various industry groups. Maximum number of 
mergers occurred in chemical and pharmaceutical industry in the last decade constituting 
almost 14% of our sample followed by electro, electric equipment, and electronics with nine 
companies in most of them. However, tea and trading industries had two to four companies 
falling in this sector merged.. 
2) Significant variations also emerged in value addition to shareholders by merged firms in 
these industries in terms of three value added metrics, namely, EVA, RONW and MVA. 
While the results revealed almost similar quantum of value addition in terms of EVA and 
RONW, the results for EVA and MVA were reverse. Companies in industries like electrical 
equipment, electronics, computer, fertilizers, textiles packings and engineering industries, all 
revealed value erosion in terms of EVA. In terms of MVA. 
3) The variation in quantum of value addition in terms of EVA and RONW and EVA 
and MVA are also corroborated by the coefficients of correlations computed between these 
variables for merged firms belonging to each separately. In industries like general 
engineering, electro electric equipment, electronics, tea, coffee, textiles, trading and   
engineering, correlation coefficients between new values added metric, EVA and traditional 
measure, RONW is very high and significant at 1% level of significance. In case of chemical 
and pharmaceuticals, textiles correlation coefficients between EVA and MVA are also highly 
significant at 1% level of significant. 
 
Merger Scheme Analysis 
The causes or motives of mergers as elucidated in the merger schemes of fifty six sample 
companies have been extensively scrutinized by tabulating them and then pattern regarding 
the types of merger have been traced. The findings that emerge in terms of type of merger 
suggests null hypothesis that mergers are not predominantly horizontal has been rejected ane 
alternate hypothesis that mergers are predominantly horizontal has been accepted. The 
summarized findings are as follows. 
1) An in-depth security of merger schemes revealed that the prime motives are to afford 
greater synergies with economies of scale, better administration, expanded capital base, 
better leverage, operational improvement and consequent cost savings, improve market share 
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and achieve market dominance, achieve diversification, thus enhance growth prospects by 
product extension and market extension. Few mergers are undertaken for revival of sick 
companies and claim tax benefits in return. 
2) It is further found that firms were making their efforts to consolidate in few chosen 
areas, thus stressing on horizontal from of mergers. A good number, almost 45% of sample 
firms are merger events of horizontal type, followed by mergers for revival of sick units as 
part of restructuring exercise constituting 24% of the sample. These results suggest that firm 
prefer horizontal mergers rather than conglomerate and vertical integration. 
3) Large number of mergers has also been undertaken in India at the behest of Board for 
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction for revival of sick companies. Most of these mergers, 
however, belong undertaken primarily to protect group reputation and the process, claim tax 
benefits available under section 72A of Income Tax, 1961.     
4) In significant number of merger cases (almost 50%), it is found that both, the merged 
and merging firms belonged to the same group thus indicating predominance of within- 
group mergers. 
 
SUMMARY  
The following summaries have been drawn from the study: 
1. Mergers are not value creating strategies only. They, in fact take place for more than 
one objective. As is evident, from intensive security of merger schemes, the reasons include 
the desire and need for horizontal growth, vertical combinations, expand capital bases, get 
tax shelter or increase tax efficiency, correct leverage imbalances, achieve economies of 
scale through improvement of operations, reduced costs etc. There is, however, no body of 
research which suggests the relative importance of each of these motives. Several of them are 
generally present in each merger case. 
2. Predominance of mergers seen to be either in the same product line (horizontal 
mergers) or within a business group (within group mergers). These patterns suggest that firm 
have attempted to consolidate in similar product lines. This also implies that over 
diversification resulting from earlier business strategies are being corrected. The regulated 
regime of pre-reform period often made companies within group complete with each other 
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for market share. The economic reforms of nineties have created a liberalised environment 
for rectifying such mistakes.  
3. Most of the mergers that took place in India during this last decade seemed to have 
followed the consequences of mergers of US during the same period. The results of mergers 
in India corroborate the conclusions of research work in US with most of the mergers not 
being profitable. However, most of the mergers are taking place in India to grow in size to be 
able to withstand international competition which they have been exposed to in the post-
liberalisation regime. 
4. With regard to economic efficiency and depending upon the extent of compatability 
and complimentarily between merged firms, merger activities should lead to economies of 
scale and scope. Whether a merger is successful or not depends to what extent thee benefits 
are achieved. Each merger is a unique marriage and thus generalizations may not be possible. 
However, broadly, the result of the various analyses conducted in the study concludes that 
mergers have not resulted in any significant improvement in the performance of merged 
firms.  
5. The fall in profitability immediately after merger may be justified by attributing this fall 
to various adjustment lags and rises associated with merger activities. Also, it can be hoped 
that after a reasonable time period when all adjustments have been made, this fall would be 
reversed. It does, however, raise some doubts as to the sustainability of these mergers in 
particular, and M&A activities in general in our economy. 
6.     Looking at empirical results we can say that expense ratio of the firm is significantly 
and negatively related to pre and post merger’s share holders value creation. It means higher 
expenses lead to lower share holder’s value which is according to the theory of finance. We 
also find that operating expenses of the firm is positively related to EVA and also significant 
at 1% level in firm’s pre and post mergers performance. ROCE of the firm is significantly 
also positively correlated to EVA in pre and post mergers financial performance of firm. 
While Debt equity, Current Ratio, and RONW are negatively correlated with shareholders 
creation capacity of the firm. It can be said that increase in Debt equity, Current Ratio, and 
RONW will leads to decrease in EVA. While evaluating the impact of acquirer of firm and 
scheme of merger as dummy variable are not significant. But acquirer in same group is 
negatively correlated with EVA.  
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7.     In pre-merger regression analysis results shows that the value of R2 is 0.86, which 
shows that the sample regression explain 86% of aggregate data. The overall model is also 
significant with adjusted R2 value of 0.85. So, it can be concluded that the model applicable 
to Indian corporate.  
Regression result of post merger indicates the vale of R2 and adjusted R2 value are 0.87 and 
0.86 which is significant at 1% level. So model is fit for study. 
The classical finance theory said that firm’s shareholders value creation is based on firms 
earning ability and firms return on its net worth. On the basis of our regression research we 
have proved that the firm’s shareholders value creation is highly dependent on Operating 
expenses, Profit market, ROCE and Expense ratio.  
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH   
The area of mergers and acquisitions has been extensively researched in many developed 
nations especially in UK. However, not much work has been done in this area in India. The 
present study is a comprehensive attempt to empirically analyze the financial performance of 
mergers which have taken place in the year i.e. 1999-2000. But, there are some areas of 
research which could not be taken up in the study. It would be worthwhile for the future 
researchers to investigate these areas. These areas are listed below:  
1. The present study has made in-depth analyses of corporate mergers in India. However, 
M&A activity taking place in India is not limited to corporate mergers alone as there are 
number of other activities like takeovers, spin offs, management buyouts, demergers etc. In 
fact, internationally, the term mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is now used to cover all 
transactions relating to the sale and purchase of subsidiaries, divisions, brands, assets and 
entire company1. Hence, research in this associated areas needs to be taken up. 
2. The study has assessed success or failure of mergers in financial terms. Human aspect of 
mergers has not been touched. Gauging the success of mergers through this aspect could be 
another area of research. 
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3. Rehabilitation of sick companies by the means of merger under the aegis of BIFR has been 
covered as one of the motives of mergers. A studies specifically covering merger cases 
sanctioned by BIFR for their rehabilitation could be taken a viz-a-viz other rehabilitation 
schemes to find out which measures are better for revival of sick companies. 
 
4. Long run success of mergers can be analysed by taking a longer time period, say five to 
seven post-merger years. For this, however, one would have to wait for few years to get the 
relevant data as most of the mergers in India have taken place only in past few years.      
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ANNEXURE -  A 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS - PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Sr.
No.
Name of Company Year Net 
Sale 
PBIT PBT ROG-Total 
Assets 
ROG- 
PBIDT 
D/E CA/CL Gearing 
Ratio 
Operating
Exps. 
Profit 
Margin
ROCE Expense
Ratio 
               
1 Ultramarine & Pigments 
Ltd 
2004 54.06 12.17 11.46 0.32 81.00 0.26 1.16 17.14 39.17 0.21 0.25 0.72 
  2003 53.14 5.41 3.99 -8.91 -23.80 0.46 1.18 3.81 44.96 0.08 0.10 0.85 
  2002 77.21 8.25 5.90 -2.82 22.91 0.54 1.48 3.13 67.09 0.08 0.15 0.87 
  2001 83.67 6.40 3.51 12.22 -23.68 0.45 1.46 2.44 77.75 0.04 0.11 0.93 
  2000 90.12  9.23  7.34  7.27  ‐1.34  0.38  1.28  4.88  81.02  0.08 0.18 0.90 
  1999 75.44 9.42 7.11 11.64 13.39 0.43 1.38 4.08 67.88 0.09 0.19 0.90 
  1998 61.97 8.32 6.01 3.85 12.02 0.47 1.35 3.60 49.86 0.10 0.19 0.80 
               
2 Crompton Greaves Ltd 2004 1695.58 129.07 89.52 0.07 16.40 1.06 1.13 2.94 1586.09 0.05 0.20 0.94 
  2003 1520.85 103.55 37.20 -7.96 15.33 1.25 1.15 1.42 1468.20 0.02 0.12 0.97 
  2002 1498.35 84.76 6.63 11.07 98.43 1.65 1.08 0.73 1413.73 0.00 0.09 0.94 
  2001 1268.42 17.72 -73.16 -22.40 76.73 2.06 1.18 -0.99 1238.63 -0.06 0.02 0.98 
  2000 1525.49  ‐21.92  ‐146.57  3.25  ‐77.65  1.62  1.33  ‐0.18  1523.64  -0.10 -0.02 1.00 
  1999 1559.71 119.07 24.12 4.23 10.67 1.19 1.31 1.25 1435.91 0.02 0.10 0.92 
  1998 1464.71 109.49 20.62 11.97 -8.81 0.95 1.30 1.23 1335.91 0.01 0.09 0.91 
3 Areva T&D India Ltd               
  2004 555.50 24.89 20.18 16.05 17.08 0.09 1.47 4.59 533.68 0.04 0.13 0.96 
  2003 455.96 19.05 12.53 -1.99 93.42 0.16 1.46 2.92 427.28 0.03 0.11 0.94 
  2002 380.92 3.97 -4.11 15.24 -18.05 0.20 1.48 2.02 379.56 -0.01 0.02 1.00 
  2001 351.03 4.95 -2.75 -9.51 -19.91 0.24 1.40 1.10 339.17 -0.01 0.03 0.97 
  2000 368.83 9.79 1.96 3.64 73.79 0.27  1.28 1.08 359.49 0.01 0.05 0.97 
  1999 388.88 -0.72 -9.51 -8.83 -51.46 0.28 1.25 0.76 445.25 -0.02 0.00 1.14 
  1998 477.61 17.09 7.63 6.71 4.54 0.27 1.25 2.03 NA 0.02 0.08 NA 
               
4 BPL Ltd             
  2004 963.67 -69.01 -74.11 -18.86 66.93 2.49 1.42 -51.65 596.29 -0.08 -0.06 0.62 
  2003 1186.59 -67.82 -289.57 -5.26 -101.85 1.87 1.59 -0.31 884.39 -0.24 -0.04 0.75 
  2002 1509.00 163.71 42.20 20.60 10.63 1.23 1.95 1.35 929.63 0.03 0.10 0.62 
  2001 1850.70 152.32 90.15 16.62 -10.43 0.96 2.20 2.45 1393.68 0.05 0.11 0.75 
  2000 1850.70  179.65  118.84  12.25  10.49  0.81  1.78  2.95  1652.53  0.06 0.17 0.89 
  1999 1785.50 164.96 113.98 23.28 16.29 0.93 1.75 3.24 1652.18 0.06 0.18 0.93 
  1998 1608.08 144.72 92.27 8.31 50.33 1.18 1.61 2.76 1418.08 0.06 0.19 0.88 
 
Sr.
No.
Name of Company Year Net 
Sale 
PBIT PBT ROG-Total 
Assets  
ROG- 
PBIDT 
D/E CA/CL Gearing 
Ratio 
Operating
Exps. 
Profit 
Margin
ROCE Expanse
Ratio 
        
5 Samtel Color Ltd 2004 803.42 59.38 15.17 -3.95 -12.89 1.60 0.59 1.34 735.22 0.02 0.13 0.92
  2003 758.34 78.29 31.59 10.80 13.38 2.01 0.67 1.68 697.11 0.04 0.14 0.92
 2002 600.69 80.81 46.04 37.50 1.93 1.59 0.89 2.32 481.17 0.08 0.15 0.80
 2001 564.49 80.59 45.57 23.00 0.42 1.20 1.19 2.30 496.67 0.08 0.18 0.88
 2000 569.79 80.61 40.10 21.46 99.83  1.72 1.03 1.99 473.61 0.07 0.22 0.83
 1999 436.35 32.85 -9.81 0.43 76.59 2.42 0.96 0.77 388.21 -0.02 0.10 0.89
 1998 266.42 16.82 -8.47 5.81 -24.03 2.11 1.04 0.79 251.50 -0.03 0.05 0.94
        
6 TRF Ltd 2004 169.80 8.08 5.29 18.62 138.21 0.96 1.51 3.56 158.17 0.03 0.10 0.93
 2003 132.27 2.44 -0.94 23.88 -74.72 0.64 1.32 0.66 136.85 -0.01 0.04 1.03
 2002 122.22 14.48 12.54 19.44 61.99 0.29 1.20 3.63 115.31 0.10 0.25 0.94
 2001 125.74 7.96 5.02 -21.05 -21.59 0.27 1.16 2.98 113.40 0.04 0.22 0.90
 2000 127.07 10.67 6.34 18.31 10.87  0.73 1.16 2.03 113.94 0.05 0.22 0.90
 1999 188.14 9.43 2.97 -45.22 -47.71 1.06 1.14 1.46 113.70 0.02 0.17 0.60
 1998 149.82 19.50 11.78 21.54 30.42 1.33 1.10 1.71 163.79 0.08 0.35 1.09
        
7 GMR 2004 246.11 30.14 16.30 -8.26 -17.20 1.08 1.01 2.45 218.82 0.07 0.09 0.89
 2003 239.93 38.29 13.87 34.30 35.64 1.18 0.99 1.65 192.63 0.06 0.15 0.80
 2002 155.46 27.75 3.65 2.37 11.04 1.80 1.31 0.77 148.03 0.02 0.11 0.95
 2001 143.27 23.59 2.66 8.34 -19.30 1.84 1.64 0.89 139.70 0.02 0.09 0.98
 2000 113.83 32.85 15.30 95.47 67.23  1.65 1.63 1.08 108.29 0.13 0.13 0.95
 1999 67.42 21.70 15.46 42.69 51.14 1.34 1.60 1.38 59.95 0.23 0.16 0.89
 1998 89.37 13.90 7.15 26.01 26.96 1.13 1.67 2.06 78.15 0.08 0.16 0.87
  
        
8 Dharamsi Morarji 
Chemicals Co Ltd 
2004 178.09 -4.10 -16.00 -1.82 -80.23 1.92 1.00 -0.34 176.08 -0.09 -0.03 0.99
 2003 223.92 14.62 0.45 -3.34 54.77 1.71 1.08 0.75 202.99 0.00 0.08 0.91
 2002 198.73 8.87 -8.49 0.26 -42.45 1.68 1.42 0.42 180.29 -0.04 0.05 0.91
 2001 246.18 18.38 1.88 -6.43 -5.24 1.51 1.72 0.63 224.98 0.01 0.08 0.91
 2000 276.35 20.31 6.35 24.57 17.38  1.27 1.48 1.45 260.32 0.02 0.10 0.94
 1999 263.62 17.52 6.78 9.17 -8.85 1.03 1.38 1.63 234.79 0.03 0.12 0.89
 1998 229.61 20.42 9.68 7.78 -31.72 1.01 1.42 1.90 212.01 0.04 0.15 0.92
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9 Khaitan Chemicals & 
Fertilizers Ltd 
2004 192.84 16.87 11.94 12.26 95.52 0.77 1.15 3.42 181.45 0.06 0.20 0.94
  2003 125.79 6.77 0.52 -7.45 57.50 0.85 1.21 1.08 116.50 0.00 0.09 0.93
 2002 162.43 2.63 -4.55 -5.02 -16.67 0.94 1.32 0.52 141.03 -0.03 0.03 0.87
 2001 116.29 4.42 -3.36 -8.71 -34.35 0.96 1.38 0.57 113.25 -0.03 0.04 0.97
 2000 108.39 9.19 2.41 57.61 ‐16.58  1.14 1.42 1.36 94.91 0.02 0.09 0.88
 1999 90.16 12.84 7.11 47.15 69.90 1.82 1.43 2.24 80.96 0.08 0.21 0.90
 1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
        
10 Zenith Infotech Ltd 2004 285.49 1.14 1.07 NA 75.28 0.00 6.46 16.29 17.21 0.00 0.04 0.06
  2003 212.85 0.42 0.39 NA -113.51 0.00 8.25 14.00 6.13 0.00 0.01 0.03
 2002 191.84 -7.00 -7.01 NA -309.87 0.00 10.47 -221.00 19.29 -0.04 -0.18 0.10
 2001 233.64 2.13 1.88 NA -40.19 0.01 8.33 8.52 17.61 0.01 0.04 0.08
 2000 17.74 4.21 4.18 NA 95.90  0.02 5.42 140.33 10.55 0.24 0.08 0.59
 1999 204.00 2.56 2.55 NA 0.00 0.00 2.33 256.00 8.45 0.01 0.55 0.04
 1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
             
        
11 Tata Infotech Ltd(merged) 2004 596.80 61.29 60.98 ‐2.07 111.00 0.02 1.91 197.71 521.01 0.10 0.25 0.87
  2003 457.63 22.61 21.72 0.22 22.65 0.08 1.88 25.40 431.95 0.05 0.11 0.94
 2002 478.58 13.30 12.06 5.40 -46.46 0.12 1.83 10.73 442.14 0.03 0.06 0.92
 2001 511.47 37.14 34.14 17.50 67.09 0.11 2.00 12.38 472.86 0.07 0.19 0.92
 2000 421.77 15.18 12.21 13.02 ‐52.95  0.12 2.02 4.67 406.46 0.03 0.09 0.96
 1999 390.51 55.91 53.57 25.37 29.67 0.16 1.88 23.89 329.17 0.14 0.31 0.84
 1998 324.95 44.67 43.08 40.25 50.93 0.11 2.04 28.09 277.91 0.13 0.32 0.86
  0.00
12 B & A Ltd 2004 12.33 -0.88 -4.61 1.14 -92.49 2.24 0.71 -0.24 44.81 -0.37 -0.02 3.63
  2003 10.87 2.49 -1.48 14.94 -17.81 1.56 0.80 0.63 39.97 -0.14 0.06 3.68
 2002 9.56 3.43 0.19 12.56 7.95 1.16 1.09 1.05 32.07 0.02 0.08 3.35
 2001 10.52 3.20 0.58 -1.27 -18.41 0.93 1.26 1.25 27.46 0.06 0.08 2.61
 2000 26.07 4.09 1.01 6.04 36.57  0.85 1.28 1.33 22.20 0.04 0.11 0.85
 1999 8.58 2.83 0.20 6.11 -45.48 0.74 1.22 1.10 19.98 0.02 0.08 2.33
 1998 8.27 5.79 2.15 -15.88 47.93 0.73 1.08 1.59 17.39 0.26 0.18 2.10
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13 Max India Ltd 2004 115.22 39.26 21.43 7.98 -257.03 0.34 1.03 0.99 121.04 0.19 0.06 1.05
   2003 145.55 -36.03 -62.31 -14.76 -187.67 0.35 0.99 -1.37 190.39 -0.43 -0.06 1.31
  2002 150.80 20.18 3.38 8.65 17.40 0.31 1.51 -0.08 154.42 0.02 0.03 1.02
  2001 102.58 19.18 7.38 5.60 -49.08 0.21 3.63 -0.74 130.01 0.07 0.03 1.27
  2000 70.24 49.66 42.19 152.92 ‐72.29 0.20  4.73 1.34 77.10 0.60 0.08 1.10
  1999 93.96 190.57 178.94 4.46 427.33 0.48 2.30 1.99 79.69 1.90 0.80 0.85
  1998 87.77 30.13 10.61 -4.71 57.14 0.80 1.26 0.84 73.52 0.12 0.13 0.84
         
14 Emami Paper Mills Ltd 2004 121.31 4.35 3.59 -1.38 0.22 1.31 1.37 5.72 5463.90 0.03 0.05 45.04
   2003 114.28 3.59 0.74 7.00 -12.25 1.33 1.66 1.19 5946.18 0.01 0.04 52.03
  2002 121.09 5.47 0.25 -2.78 -22.88 1.25 2.28 1.05 5784.31 0.00 0.06 47.77
  2001 114.51 4.93 -0.74 599.32 1509.76 1.26 2.58 0.78 5496.81 -0.01 0.05 48.00
  2000 23.19 0.75 0.75 ‐1.76 ‐6.82 2.60  2.94 1.09 4763.91 0.03 0.06 205.43
  1999 20.57 0.85 0.05 0.00 0.00 2.73 3.06 1.08 3802.00 0.00 0.07 184.83
  1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
     
15 Bayer CropScience Ltd 2004 661.48 63.56 52.40 6.02 -7.16 0.61 1.37 5.70 640.00 0.08 0.19 0.97
   2003 873.56 66.94 47.21 80.24 64.01 1.13 1.35 4.96 761.25 0.05 0.14 0.87
  2002 577.06 46.32 27.78 4.58 8.14 1.85 1.31 3.10 568.56 0.05 0.20 0.99
  2001 650.97 42.51 16.24 -6.93 9.63 2.27 1.42 1.88 590.79 0.02 0.18 0.91
  2000 549.59 38.66 9.56 5.81 4.97 2.40  1.42 1.14 939.34 0.02 0.13 1.71
  1999 545.58 36.77 8.54 11.98 -13.65 2.28 1.36 1.35 514.33 0.02 0.14 0.94
  1998 479.26 43.76 16.15 13.20 3.24 2.10 1.30 1.58 450.35 0.03 0.17 0.94
   
16 PSL Ltd 2004 824.26 79.69 38.50 24.61 43.25 1.22 1.30 1.93 766.94 0.05 0.21 0.93
  2003 365.51 51.06 17.22 22.33 -23.00 1.20 1.45 1.51 331.66 0.05 0.14 0.91
   2002 623.75 70.21 37.14 30.41 70.72 0.95 2.08 2.12 550.88 0.06 0.20 0.88
  2001 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  2000 258.06 39.99 20.02 9.86 18.73 0.68  3.37 2.00 231.25 0.08 0.16 0.90
  1999 147.85 30.50 16.02 143.43 81.92 0.52 2.94 2.11 129.89 0.11 0.13 0.88
  1998 83.95 16.42 13.90 0.96 7.22 0.32 1.94 6.52 58.17 0.17 0.16 0.69
 
Sr.
No.
Name of Company Year Net 
Sale 
PBIT PBT ROG-Total 
Assets  
ROG- 
PBIDT 
D/E CA/CL Gearing 
Ratio 
Operating
Exps. 
Profit 
Margin
ROCE Expense
Ratio 
  
17 Ratnamani Metals & Tubes 
Ltd 
2004 118.71 9.22 6.27 20.14 46.56 0.35 1.03 3.13 100.02 0.05 0.18 0.84
  2003 84.72 5.54 3.24 13.56 2.95 0.41 1.07 2.41 80.92 0.04 0.13 0.96
 2002 71.02 5.33 3.02 7.28 -3.42 0.44 1.32 2.31 61.66 0.04 0.12 0.87
 2001 76.75 5.88 3.07 4.74 13.45 0.41 1.65 2.09 68.99 0.04 0.12 0.90
 2000 49.64 5.15 2.62 11.30 ‐9.70  0.45 1.66 2.04 44.92 0.05 0.11 0.90
 1999 53.61 6.21 2.84 -11.88 -7.86 0.59 1.53 1.84 42.23 0.05 0.13 0.79
 1998 59.60 6.95 3.79 57.67 56.66 0.72 1.56 2.20 53.04 0.06 0.14 0.89
  
18 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd 2004 693.15 99.36 79.36 35.41 78.67 1.69 1.11 4.97 685.67 0.11 0.12 0.99
  2003 565.02 51.25 37.42 16.66 -23.00 1.22 0.95 3.71 503.49 0.07 0.09 0.89
 2002 485.47 74.20 56.51 6.74 -9.67 1.03 1.00 4.19 411.45 0.12 0.17 0.85
 2001 555.54 83.43 52.41 1.41 48.41 1.13 1.31 2.69 438.51 0.09 0.16 0.79
 2000 367.71 53.34 23.63 31.90 ‐18.39  1.19 1.45 1.80 349.88 0.06 0.10 0.95
 1999 277.91 72.37 46.26 8.80 -2.81 1.24 1.46 2.77 217.66 0.17 0.18 0.78
 1998 299.34 75.75 45.75 11.02 55.13 1.43 1.35 2.53 265.88 0.15 0.20 0.89
  
  
19 NHN Corporation Ltd 2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  2003 3.75 -16.61 -17.43 -68.62 373.86 1.51 0.99 -20.26 17.99 -4.65 -1.98 4.80
 2002 41.43 -5.85 -7.03 -15.70 169.67 0.47 1.24 -4.96 41.22 -0.17 -0.25 0.99
 2001 22.90 -3.12 -3.78 -25.88 -167.78 0.40 1.21 -4.73 17.13 -0.17 -0.11 0.75
 2000 21.69 0.53 0.22 12.48 190.32  0.40 1.14 1.52 19.74 0.01 0.02 0.91
 1999 4.70 0.03 0.01 36.02 12.73 0.31 0.90 1.50 11.13 0.00 0.00 2.37
 1998 27.16 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.76 2.00 33.27 0.00 0.01 1.22
    
20 Sical Logistics Ltd 2004 1084.83 71.19 5.91 -8.56 -3.86 2.83 1.26 1.08 1000.99 0.01 0.13 0.92
  2003 1119.26 76.25 2.79 0.60 -5.41 3.15 1.23 1.10 1024.22 0.00 0.13 0.92
 2002 1220.12 83.82 5.73 -10.91 -24.50 3.03 1.22 0.53 1140.22 0.00 0.15 0.93
 2001 2060.11 113.49 32.88 14.05 3.67 2.77 1.27 1.27 1952.41 0.02 0.16 0.95
 2000 1840.20 108.29 35.45 10.52 16.89  2.75 1.28 1.49 1745.20 0.02 0.17 0.95
 1999 1699.82 93.31 30.76 67.25 66.65 2.68 1.29 1.49 1636.97 0.02 0.16 0.96
 1998 776.06 52.95 23.29 43.17 28.11 1.84 1.30 1.79 732.54 0.03 0.14 0.94
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21 Arvind Products Ltd 2004 351.67 26.79 -2.07 1.68 -8.09 2.68 0.91 0.94 304.53 -0.01 0.07 0.87
  2003 381.59 32.13 0.45 -8.27 229.91 2.92 0.93 1.03 317.68 0.00 0.08 0.83
 2002 163.17 0.04 -24.11 -6.17 -68.28 2.62 0.93 0.00 154.62 -0.15 0.00 0.95
 2001 538.80 -6.84 -88.29 -16.45 343450.00 1.75 0.93 -0.08 490.55 -0.16 -0.01 0.91
 2000 442.10 25.10 ‐27.50 59492.44 343450.00  1.42 0.92 0.48 395.59 -0.06 0.04 0.89
 1999 0.02 0.02 0.02 -15.60 0.00 7.86 6.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00
 1998 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 7.67 3.00 0.00 NA 1.00 0.02 NA 
  
22 Bhilwara Spinners Ltd 2004 102.86 2.76 -4.20 -6.36 -23.09 18.42 0.86 0.40 94.01 -0.04 0.05 0.91
  2003 91.34 4.63 -3.14 16.79 -11.05 21.93 0.78 0.60 93.97 -0.03 0.08 1.03
 2002 89.12 5.64 -2.77 -13.19 8.21 8.84 0.82 0.67 86.45 -0.03 0.11 0.97
 2001 98.50 5.01 -4.25 1.44 11.14 4.11 1.01 0.54 91.13 -0.04 0.08 0.93
 2000 83.11 4.13 ‐5.32 ‐8.96 63.02  3.27 1.16 0.44 76.03 -0.06 0.06 0.91
 1999 71.65 1.85 -4.38 -4.53 -54.16 2.59 1.42 0.30 67.09 -0.06 0.02 0.94
 1998 90.60 7.42 2.91 18.81 3.42 2.06 1.56 1.65 80.85 0.03 0.09 0.89
    
23 RSWM Ltd 2004 633.41 35.43 18.38 7.76 7.30 1.26 1.31 2.08 544.01 0.03 0.09 0.86
  2003 448.99 30.70 5.64 -0.91 3.13 1.23 1.19 1.20 401.87 0.01 0.08 0.90
 2002 437.78 30.92 2.23 -5.63 -16.03 1.12 1.33 1.08 360.05 0.01 0.08 0.82
 2001 457.97 45.46 10.32 -1.94 -10.67 1.11 1.57 1.29 395.24 0.02 0.11 0.86
 2000 423.67 54.83 14.96 ‐10.21 12.07  1.35 1.58 1.38 364.23 0.04 0.13 0.86
 1999 401.15 49.58 10.89 16.19 3.04 1.50 1.56 1.28 333.87 0.03 0.10 0.83
 1998 403.29 53.63 22.45 8.72 12.13 1.47 1.64 1.72 327.40 0.06 0.13 0.81
    
24 Shyam Telecom Ltd 2004 14.57 2.81 0.84 34.49 -34.65 0.06 0.03 1.48 11.76 0.06 0.01 0.81
  2003 24.11 4.30 0.72 -11.70 -82.11 0.14 0.42 1.20 19.94 0.03 0.02 0.83
 2002 207.48 21.54 15.17 15.97 -15.02 0.24 0.99 3.38 194.97 0.07 0.09 0.94
 2001 208.29 26.54 18.62 20.86 48.12 0.31 1.94 3.35 188.33 0.09 0.11 0.90
 2000 103.57 16.75 4.95 176.57 46.70  0.52 2.21 1.42 83.61 0.05 0.07 0.81
 1999     NA      NA          NA          NA        NA     NA          NA           NA           NA           NA         NA          NA 
 1998 106.66 10.83 2.71 -3.45 -19.23 1.18 1.52 1.33 104.01 0.03 0.14 0.98
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25 DPIL Ltd 2004 21.37 0.26 -0.23 -24.52 -73.13 0.60 0.44 0.53 22.15 -0.01 0.01 1.04
   2003 32.37 1.33 0.45 -36.32 136.47 0.80 0.62 1.51 32.68 0.01 0.04 1.01
  2002 39.80 -0.53 -1.18 -3.81 -72.49 0.85 0.91 -1.25 43.00 -0.03 -0.01 1.08
  2001 34.42 2.13 1.93 6.20 -60.98 1.09 0.93 10.65 35.01 0.06 0.03 1.02
  2000 60.58 6.85 5.95 117.17 431.54 1.09  0.82 6.57 58.77 0.10 0.10 0.97
  1999 30.36 1.02 0.05 310.44 -651.85 1.02 0.91 1.04 29.99 0.00 0.03 0.99
  1998 12.01 -0.72 -1.08 -0.10 -181.82 2.59 0.45 -2.00 12.75 -0.09 -0.12 1.06
     
26 Rossell Tea Ltd 2004 36.23 -3.50 -7.24 2.93 228.00 1.19 1.02 -0.94 40.06 -0.20 -0.05 1.11
   2003 31.16 -1.76 -5.78 28.54 -70.70 0.90 1.10 -0.44 32.24 -0.19 -0.03 1.03
  2002 19.36 -3.10 -4.64 0.98 -164.32 0.58 1.88 -2.01 18.99 -0.24 -0.06 0.98
  2001 35.30 3.12 1.37 10.66 15.03 0.41 2.61 1.78 32.02 0.04 0.07 0.91
  2000 29.06 2.81 2.03 34.70 ‐20.09 0.19  2.88 3.60 27.48 0.07 0.07 0.95
  1999 28.73 3.90 3.77 -0.51 -50.12 0.05 3.60 30.00 25.83 0.13 0.13 0.90
  1998 28.86 8.31 8.23 50.34 195.24 0.05 3.06 103.88 22.71 0.29 0.28 0.79
     
27 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 2004 534.75 168.31 147.94 69.59 36.91 1.21 1.16 8.26 410.66 0.28 0.44 0.77
   2003 399.03 124.23 95.47 373.53 1057.97 1.22 1.39 4.32 266.60 0.24 0.53 0.67
  2002 91.50 9.82 7.64 75.16 59.86 1.00 1.31 4.50 89.48 0.08 0.24 0.98
  2001 53.77 6.24 4.36 15.06 -242.00 1.46 1.34 3.32 56.23 0.08 0.23 1.05
  2000 39.43 ‐5.73 ‐8.38 ‐7.75 ‐257.73 1.14  1.45 ‐2.16 45.56 -0.21 -0.25 1.16
  1999 36.27 2.58 0.47 56.38 69.52 0.66 1.85 1.22 34.13 0.01 0.09 0.94
  1998 27.51 1.57 0.17 0.47 29.86 0.43 2.06 1.12 26.12 0.01 0.07 0.95
     
28 Twilight Li-Taka Pharma 
Ltd 
2004 54.75 4.71 0.42 24.84 60.33 0.00 0.75 1.10 54.81 0.01 0.16 1.00
   2003 56.56 2.55 -1.92 -7.66 65.00 0.00 0.72 0.57 51.83 -0.03 0.09 0.92
  2002 48.45 1.16 -3.38 10.28 29.41 0.00 0.75 0.42 49.46 -0.07 0.04 1.02
  2001 43.12 0.73 -3.31 -4.79 84.78 7.51 0.78 0.18 40.65 -0.08 0.03 0.94
  2000 28.95 0.49 ‐1.22 5.75 ‐73.71 4.00  0.86 0.15 29.35 -0.04 0.02 1.01
  1999 82.39 2.42 -0.27 44.16 -480.43 2.59 0.96 0.90 89.88 0.00 0.09 1.09
  1998 26.43 -1.18 -2.49 27.98 -159.74 1.12 1.13 -0.71 32.75 -0.09 -0.07 1.24
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29 Sun Pharmaceuticals 
Industries Ltd 
2004 944.63 297.63 294.01 64.83 17.69 0.21 1.92 82.22 655.46 0.31 0.25 0.69
  2003 793.32 253.77 252.83 33.18 31.04 0.01 2.76 269.97 535.80 0.32 0.36 0.68
 2002 696.37 190.89 187.28 11.56 23.61 0.04 2.73 52.88 475.54 0.27 0.36 0.68
 2001 560.84 152.28 144.63 21.91 48.25 0.10 2.53 19.91 438.61 0.26 0.30 0.78
 2000 441.89 100.71 90.30 7.89 39.26  0.17 2.21 9.67 343.72 0.20 0.24 0.78
 1999 336.17 72.94 60.99 43.35 10.03 0.20 2.31 6.10 267.31 0.18 0.19 0.80
 1998 257.31 68.19 57.12 44.93 23.70 0.15 2.89 6.16 192.11 0.22 0.26 0.75
        
30 SRHHL Industries Ltd 2004 64.26 4.05 2.18 4.63 3.71 0.44 1.20 2.17 60.87 0.03 0.04 0.95
  2003 58.23 4.07 2.17 2.38 9.97 0.34 1.27 2.14 52.55 0.04 0.04 0.90
 2002 44.55 3.58 2.13 1.66 3.55 0.27 1.41 2.47 41.11 0.05 0.04 0.92
 2001 44.10 3.37 2.00 25.02 -3.43 0.41 1.32 2.46 40.20 0.05 0.04 0.91
 2000 38.11 3.80 1.97 30.08 0.16  0.71 1.12 1.79 33.67 0.05 0.05 0.88
 1999 39.06 4.16 1.82 5.29 -10.15 0.74 1.31 1.78 33.74 0.05 0.07 0.86
 1998 38.69 4.93 1.65 4.98 36.82 0.66 1.57 1.50 32.30 0.04 0.09 0.83
      
31 NLC Nalco India Ltd 2004 82.79 17.62 15.89 -6.38 38.25 1.01 1.51 10.18 64.95 0.19 0.36 0.78
  2003 64.54 11.79 9.01 0.71 32.71 0.86 1.22 4.24 50.60 0.14 0.22 0.78
 2002 56.44 8.18 6.80 5.79 98.06 0.60 1.10 5.93 45.55 0.12 0.13 0.81
 2001 58.66 3.17 0.49 -6.37 -62.41 0.62 1.04 1.18 53.53 0.01 0.05 0.91
 2000 56.89 13.02 12.55 55.36 17.22  0.33 1.41 27.70 41.88 0.22 0.22 0.74
 1999 49.11 11.05 10.78 20.54 52.73 0.04 2.41 40.93 37.84 0.22 0.34 0.77
 1998 35.72 7.06 6.83 11.20 -32.64 0.08 2.53 30.70 27.94 0.19 0.24 0.78
      
32 Dr Reddys Laboratories 
Ltd 
2004 1661.22 307.58 303.35 16.30 -23.84 0.02 3.73 72.71 1367.32 0.18 0.15 0.82
  2003 1513.61 437.21 431.16 26.00 -6.44 0.01 4.86 72.27 1085.66 0.28 0.24 0.72
 2002 1486.77 484.92 470.77 76.89 103.63 0.19 3.09 34.27 1051.34 0.32 0.33 0.71
 2001 912.76 218.93 175.55 55.75 171.64 0.56 1.69 5.05 697.31 0.19 0.24 0.76
 2000 437.90 83.17 66.82 17.30 16.29  0.35 2.03 5.09 346.28 0.15 0.14 0.79
 1999 379.42 72.60 59.76 27.88 17.77 0.24 2.63 5.65 311.05 0.16 0.15 0.82
 1998 298.54 63.72 53.34 9.58 38.49 0.19 2.62 6.80 227.08 0.18 0.16 0.76
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33 Roto Pumps Ltd 2004 13.94 0.69 0.21 0.97 143.14 0.40 1.54 1.33 12.65 0.02 0.05 0.91
  2003 12.24 -0.12 -0.64 -4.25 18.60 0.43 1.41 -0.23 12.11 -0.05 -0.01 0.99
 2002 9.59 -0.25 -0.85 -2.00 -162.32 0.42 1.41 -0.42 9.74 -0.09 -0.02 1.02
 2001 10.34 -1.43 -1.87 -5.14 -155.20 0.33 1.60 -3.25 11.59 -0.18 -0.10 1.12
 2000 11.02 0.48 0.01 ‐1.70 ‐12.59  0.32 1.71 1.02 10.13 0.00 0.03 0.92
 1999 12.40 0.60 0.01 -1.83 -21.86 0.36 1.69 1.02 10.99 0.00 0.04 0.89
 1998 12.81 0.92 0.18 -13.96 -26.51 0.44 1.57 1.24 11.29 0.01 0.06 0.88
      
      
34 GHCL Ltd 2004 460.45 56.94 41.28 7.68 -10.87 0.61 0.81 3.64 483.27 0.09 0.15 1.05
  2003 430.68 71.33 50.18 -1.60 -7.51 0.60 0.78 3.37 440.36 0.12 0.21 1.02
 2002 401.96 79.83 50.07 6.25 10.29 0.62 1.27 2.68 415.71 0.12 0.23 1.03
 2001 363.18 71.94 30.11 -7.25 15.98 0.70 2.32 1.72 378.36 0.08 0.16 1.04
 2000 332.83 59.48 25.18 19.67 ‐14.62  0.72 2.33 1.73 364.28 0.08 0.12 1.09
 1999 343.82 77.55 46.59 4.79 -3.25 0.66 2.07 2.50 356.84 0.14 0.19 1.04
 1998 299.63 78.93 53.21 13.56 2.05 0.68 2.06 3.07 301.93 0.18 0.21 1.01
      
35 DLF Ltd 2004 481.77 57.48 48.07 46.78 32.28 0.97 1.31 6.11 435.57 0.10 0.07 0.90
  2003 244.95 43.01 37.62 4.84 -25.90 0.13 1.09 7.98 256.99 0.15 0.14 1.05
 2002 280.03 57.19 37.18 -1.25 -18.09 0.30 1.10 2.86 294.82 0.13 0.19 1.05
 2001 129.61 68.22 31.34 0.97 -50.19 0.91 1.22 1.85 161.44 0.24 0.20 1.25
 2000 110.09 144.86 60.31 17.51 14.34  2.45 1.47 1.16 105.78 0.55 0.28 0.96
 1999 187.16 129.34 32.11 31.40 93.44 4.59 1.58 1.33 94.05 0.17 0.25 0.50
 1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  
36 Repro India Ltd 2004 81.21 6.76 4.93 27.23 -17.56 1.20 1.14 3.69 71.55 0.06 0.11 0.88
  2003 74.05 9.08 6.38 2.41 16.67 0.96 2.47 3.36 61.79 0.09 0.17 0.83
 2002 63.59 7.50 3.89 -3.18 -30.89 0.92 4.16 2.08 52.48 0.06 0.12 0.83
 2001 60.06 12.16 7.30 4.16 4.76 1.11 3.24 2.50 47.79 0.12 0.19 0.80
 2000 45.54 11.77 6.22 9.52 39.37  1.34 3.12 2.12 31.62 0.14 0.20 0.69
 1999 35.62 8.27 3.92 14.75 28.79 1.50 3.93 1.90 26.62 0.11 0.15 0.75
 1998 33.74 6.17 1.46 0.00 0.00 1.56 4.26 1.31 32.28 0.04 0.12 0.96
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37 Finolex Cables Ltd 2004 450.97 50.35 32.56 4.52 0.51 0.37 1.28 1.55 467.54 0.07 0.07 1.04
  2003 445.66 52.79 28.23 0.04 -31.25 0.29 1.46 2.03 380.45 0.06 0.07 0.85
 2002 574.57 88.80 72.44 29.14 -15.38 0.19 2.08 5.43 477.47 0.13 0.13 0.83
 2001 524.56 112.21 92.61 3.45 2.70 0.20 2.95 5.73 434.96 0.18 0.16 0.83
 2000 482.11 112.76 94.65 ‐17.34 7.79  0.21 2.33 6.23 393.91 0.20 0.17 0.82
 1999 383.01 109.73 86.02 0.60 -0.35 0.29 2.27 4.63 287.13 0.22 0.16 0.75
 1998 381.55 105.75 69.92 2.42 7.62 0.42 2.43 2.95 279.41 0.18 0.15 0.73
      
38 Hindustan Organic 
Chemicals Ltd 
2004 413.05 -78.39 -116.29 -32.32 -258.00 22.18 1.12 -2.07 489.10 -0.28 -0.21 1.18
  2003 399.27 3.67 -41.52 16.18 -285.60 3.17 1.45 0.08 378.91 -0.10 0.01 0.95
 2002 259.25 -45.43 -91.45 -2.11 -142.68 2.15 1.39 -0.99 273.31 -0.35 -0.08 1.05
 2001 349.20 11.73 -37.48 -7.99 -307.65 1.52 1.15 0.24 326.54 -0.11 0.02 0.94
 2000 359.66 ‐47.77 ‐94.70 ‐7.54 ‐149.22  1.02 1.15 ‐0.80 368.31 -0.26 -0.08 1.02
 1999 349.96 12.14 -20.00 -1.65 -18.33 0.78 1.30 0.38 331.77 -0.06 0.02 0.95
 1998 404.35 23.73 -5.09 4.12 32.37 0.68 1.40 0.82 381.22 -0.01 0.04 0.94
  
39 Tata Coffee Ltd 2004 176.30 26.92 21.99 15.24 1.24 0.45 1.23 5.46 164.94 0.12 0.12 0.94
  2003 165.14 26.30 20.26 2.76 15.96 0.45 1.08 3.26 139.10 0.12 0.13 0.84
 2002 174.20 21.50 13.17 8.34 -4.17 0.49 1.12 2.29 155.78 0.08 0.11 0.89
 2001 208.41 22.75 14.63 15.56 -43.08 0.31 1.46 2.48 186.51 0.07 0.12 0.89
 2000 213.94 45.37 39.67 69.41 49.34  0.21 1.52 7.96 166.94 0.19 0.32 0.78
 1999 110.09 30.78 26.48 3.79 -0.18 0.35 1.18 7.16 83.41 0.24 0.41 0.76
 1998 106.55 31.11 25.53 1.04 28.75 0.59 1.05 5.58 77.92 0.24 0.44 0.73
  
40 Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd 2004 372.04 38.64 27.99 -5.70 30.06 0.71 1.37 1.24 360.73 0.08 0.19 0.97
 2003 359.28 27.82 11.33 -11.88 32.77 0.87 1.44 1.41 342.81 0.03 0.13 0.95
 2002 223.45 21.89 9.79 87.93 -63.84 0.76 1.59 1.66 206.15 0.04 0.08 0.92
 2001 172.11 71.56 60.84 42.53 355.98 0.76 2.04 -0.33 179.45 0.35 0.46 1.04
 2000 151.91 13.46 5.68 9.40 8.98  1.14 1.90 1.73 141.65 0.04 0.12 0.93
 1999 142.57 12.85 5.57 5.57 -31.74 1.00 1.56 2.11 133.38 0.04 0.13 0.94
 1998 146.83 20.04 12.04 14.06 23.43 0.92 1.48 2.51 129.09 0.08 0.22 0.88
  
 
Sr.
No.
Name of Company Year Net 
Sale 
PBIT PBT ROG-Total 
Assets  
ROG- 
PBIDT 
D/E CA/CL Gearing 
Ratio 
Operating
Exps. 
Profit 
Margin
ROCE Expense
Ratio 
  
41 Pidilite Industries Ltd 2004 651.99 95.29 91.58 12.63 2.77 0.17 1.64 25.68 553.22 0.14 0.26 0.85
  2003 573.71 95.00 90.17 9.53 15.91 0.16 1.76 19.67 462.83 0.16 0.30 0.81
 2002 493.28 82.43 76.65 18.62 11.42 0.19 1.70 14.26 405.28 0.16 0.27 0.82
 2001 452.39 74.49 66.11 1.47 3.33 0.31 1.41 8.89 364.72 0.15 0.28 0.81
 2000 387.56 76.46 70.14 33.50 22.95  0.42 1.25 12.10 314.93 0.18 0.29 0.81
 1999 330.07 62.05 53.23 7.11 25.20 0.55 1.28 7.04 265.01 0.16 0.33 0.80
 1998 293.70 48.62 38.41 6.34 25.54 0.85 1.50 4.76 242.36 0.13 0.26 0.83
  
42 TTK Healthcare Ltd 2004 148.58 4.31 1.06 -8.87 -9.60 0.77 1.36 1.39 140.03 0.01 0.07 0.94
  2003 142.38 4.94 0.61 -5.30 525.00 0.82 1.44 1.14 137.91 0.00 0.08 0.97
 2002 119.63 -0.73 -8.84 -14.70 -81.60 1.08 1.44 -2.61 132.23 -0.07 -0.01 1.11
 2001 137.57 4.96 -4.44 15.84 -23.11 1.52 1.55 0.71 138.29 -0.03 0.05 1.01
 2000 106.43 7.56 2.62 8.54 ‐21.63  1.61 1.58 1.40 0.02 0.09 0.00
 1999 129.68 9.57 3.00 7.36 -15.47 1.35 1.35 1.46 118.42 0.02 0.14 0.91
 1998 119.92 11.49 6.04 15.30 24.03 1.29 1.58 2.11 113.94 0.05 0.18 0.95
  
43 HBL Power Systems Ltd 2004 174.74 19.23 12.46 2.20 -10.27 0.66 1.53 2.84 149.29 0.07 0.12 0.85
 2003 182.55 22.71 13.82 10.39 3.33 0.69 1.66 2.33 160.55 0.08 0.14 0.88
  2002 156.72 22.50 13.69 10.44 -6.89 0.70 1.79 2.55 134.39 0.09 0.15 0.86
 2001 157.71 24.91 15.90 8.68 20.98 0.78 1.77 2.76 132.22 0.10 0.18 0.84
 2000 129.17 20.97 13.99 213.43 60.17  0.76 1.71 3.00 111.80 0.11 0.17 0.87
 1999 57.97 13.84 11.62 94.87 135.50 0.49 1.73 6.23 45.63 0.20 0.39 0.79
 1998 27.67 5.71 4.70 41.35 120.86 0.46 1.56 5.65 23.00 0.17 0.37 0.83
  
44 Carol Info Services Ltd 2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  2003 33.78 -1.93 -9.05 -32.95 -87.18 0.31 2.13 0.77 51.12 -0.27 -0.01 1.51
 2002 140.38 30.69 3.54 -10.54 182.17 0.64 1.49 -0.01 224.80 0.03 0.06 1.60
 2001 188.15 -0.77 -27.31 1.24 -55.08 0.58 1.63 -0.03 175.29 -0.15 0.00 0.93
 2000 199.75 15.61 ‐14.60 ‐45.27 ‐79.50  0.46 1.71 0.31 186.44 -0.07 0.03 0.93
 1999 823.45 142.99 109.94 18.22 93.81 0.43 2.23 4.33 680.23 0.13 0.14 0.83
 1998 387.75 73.58 73.58 30.34 10.35 0.29 3.44 0.00 316.71 0.19 0.09 0.82
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45 Todays Writing Products 
Ltd 
2004 82.07 8.95 6.19 -2.82 48.57 0.53 1.52 3.24 73.29 0.08 0.15 0.89
 2003 72.25 5.66 2.91 8.58 -17.42 0.61 1.37 2.06 66.24 0.04 0.10 0.92
 2002 78.31 7.66 5.53 21.95 2.18 0.56 1.31 3.60 74.58 0.07 0.16 0.95
 2001 77.91 7.87 6.82 104.55 75.96 0.39 1.27 7.50 70.92 0.09 0.21 0.91
 2000 50.40 4.36 3.96 41.50 68.37  0.16 1.22 10.90 45.66 0.08 0.28 0.91
 1999 26.57 2.49 2.43 52.67 6.91 0.06 1.45 41.50 26.50 0.09 0.22 1.00
 1998 25.95 2.43 2.41 12.95 95.04 0.00 1.90 121.50 23.54 0.09 0.27 0.91
    
46 Jindal Poly Films Ltd 2004 542.39 92.35 80.14 38.92 53.20 0.41 0.70 7.56 425.47 0.15 0.15 0.78
 2003 395.98 52.66 40.85 15.43 -2.96 0.32 0.83 4.46 337.88 0.10 0.11 0.85
 2002 368.60 56.24 40.78 -2.07 45.55 0.40 1.23 3.64 287.13 0.11 0.13 0.78
 2001 348.22 31.85 13.44 4.57 25.69 0.77 1.61 1.73 298.24 0.04 0.06 0.86
 2000 307.84 28.35 8.56 21.44 ‐11.37  1.31 1.53 1.43 271.15 0.03 0.06 0.88
 1999 241.30 36.61 15.28 9.23 25.50 1.67 1.55 1.72 191.15 0.06 0.09 0.79
 1998 233.46 27.06 8.77 3.87 18.51 1.68 1.76 1.48 196.99 0.04 0.07 0.84
    
47 Gujarat Perstorp 
Electronics Ltd 
2004 4.27 -5.24 -6.37 -32.84 -3663.64 0.00 0.72 -4.64 6.78 -1.49 -0.37 1.59
 2003 12.35 -1.18 -2.44 -15.62 -116.92 0.00 1.06 -0.94 11.51 -0.20 -0.06 0.93
 2002 14.57 -1.94 -3.44 -15.16 -128.51 0.00 1.15 -1.29 15.45 -0.24 -0.08 1.06
 2001 24.74 0.99 -0.71 5.96 456.10 0.00 1.04 0.58 24.22 -0.03 0.04 0.98
 2000 16.38 ‐0.85 ‐3.30 2.65 ‐327.78  0.00 0.97 ‐0.35 14.74 -0.20 -0.03 0.90
 1999 4.77 -0.81 -2.81 0.96 -70.00 0.00 0.92 -0.41 4.77 -0.59 -0.03 1.00
 1998 4.90 -1.85 -5.79 20.32 -233.33 0.00 0.62 -0.47 8.15 -1.18 -0.07 1.66
    
48 Berger Paints (India) Ltd 2004 670.61 64.55 61.42 13.04 22.38 0.22 1.85 20.62 611.12 0.09 0.29 0.91
 2003 582.28 51.01 45.23 1.25 17.50 0.36 1.69 8.83 523.71 0.08 0.25 0.90
 2002 524.95 43.19 34.62 -1.85 8.57 0.57 1.56 5.04 478.51 0.07 0.19 0.91
 2001 490.38 41.84 32.92 15.58 19.98 0.61 1.60 4.69 449.68 0.07 0.18 0.92
 2000 437.99 35.48 27.03 5.20 6.70  0.62 1.67 4.20 402.97 0.06 0.18 0.92
 1999 365.67 34.36 24.56 46.13 13.01 0.60 1.57 3.51 355.93 0.07 0.18 0.97
 1998 299.84 31.42 24.41 17.28 8.15 0.63 1.47 4.48 324.19 0.08 0.26 1.08
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49 Hindustan Unilever Ltd 2004 9931.51 1614.98 1485.00 -5.18 -26.43 0.75 0.90 12.42 8763.67 0.15 0.45 0.88
 2003 10108.37 2234.74 2167.98 4.24 1.07 0.30 0.94 33.47 8492.54 0.21 0.58 0.84
 2002 9952.18 2200.37 2191.19 11.48 10.18 0.02 1.02 239.69 8180.41 0.22 0.59 0.82
 2001 10633.70 1974.13 1966.39 17.40 17.11 0.04 0.96 255.06 9092.04 0.18 0.63 0.86
 2000 10584.27 1678.24 1665.09 12.35 17.55  0.06 0.94 127.62 9056.17 0.16 0.65 0.86
 1999 10133.51 1410.33 1387.94 17.08 25.94 0.12 1.04 62.99 9055.78 0.14 0.62 0.89
 1998 9461.83 1120.99 1091.71 23.61 30.95 0.15 1.05 38.29 8497.57 0.12 0.57 0.90
    
50 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 2004 858.52 135.22 97.89 15.56 24.28 2.38 1.08 3.62 706.20 0.11 0.22 0.82
 2003 696.94 110.96 64.13 24.06 40.05 2.87 1.16 2.37 588.17 0.09 0.20 0.84
 2002 585.37 70.76 21.61 7.51 17.59 2.61 1.26 1.44 504.98 0.04 0.16 0.86
 2001 544.07 61.16 12.98 5.53 17.65 2.38 1.30 1.31 479.62 0.02 0.12 0.88
 2000 406.70 51.96 10.53 21.63 ‐6.98  2.20 1.42 1.25 348.94 0.03 0.11 0.86
 1999 319.19 58.17 23.05 2.97 2.68 2.12 1.54 1.66 247.19 0.07 0.15 0.77
 1998 286.50 58.14 31.00 35.05 14.83 1.75 1.40 2.14 229.97 0.11 0.17 0.80
    
51 Bright Brothers Ltd 2004 122.56 5.44 -3.19 -7.81 -3.82 2.29 1.47 0.63 109.75 -0.03 0.07 0.90
 2003 124.35 4.76 -4.97 -6.68 2.21 2.18 1.34 0.49 109.94 -0.04 0.06 0.88
 2002 116.57 4.35 -6.10 -2.36 -33.33 2.09 1.26 0.33 105.78 -0.05 0.05 0.91
 2001 114.23 11.28 -0.47 -6.12 -16.09 2.21 1.25 0.95 93.53 0.00 0.13 0.82
 2000 130.23 14.52 0.93 26.81 48.26  2.44 1.28 1.04 106.95 0.01 0.15 0.82
 1999 77.06 9.82 2.06 5.44 15.79 2.49 1.28 0.34 69.16 0.03 0.13 0.90
 1998 87.55 9.25 1.96 18.76 68.10 2.33 1.23 1.27 75.64 0.02 0.13 0.86
  
    
52 Ion Exchange (India) Ltd 2004 197.13 15.41 2.64 -3.22 0.70 0.77 1.73 1.24 178.48 0.01 0.09 0.91
 2003 177.69 15.47 2.92 5.66 -11.56 0.74 1.61 1.23 161.82 0.02 0.09 0.91
 2002 166.59 18.27 5.75 2.18 49.08 0.73 1.59 0.91 149.20 0.03 0.11 0.90
 2001 153.36 9.98 -4.69 -6.80 4.02 0.78 1.76 0.68 146.96 -0.03 0.06 0.96
 2000 165.40 10.09 ‐3.95 ‐2.98 ‐30.44  0.67 2.02 0.76 156.03 -0.02 0.05 0.94
 1999 158.92 16.35 5.55 6.07 -28.92 0.53 2.05 0.82 151.89 0.03 0.08 0.96
 1998 164.79 25.11 15.40 18.78 9.00 0.47 2.07 2.59 146.00 0.09 0.14 0.89
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53 Hindustan Fluoro Carbons 
Ltd 
2004 21.21 -6.24 -10.13 -14.90 -426.81 0.00 0.54 -1.60 33.44 -0.48 -0.29 1.58
 2003 22.37 -0.35 -4.59 3.79 -50.00 0.00 0.59 -0.08 31.06 -0.21 -0.01 1.39
 2002 29.52 1.05 -2.60 1.83 -16.62 0.00 0.53 0.29 35.92 -0.09 0.04 1.22
 2001 29.29 1.60 -2.08 -6.22 359.72 0.00 0.48 0.43 35.17 -0.07 0.06 1.20
 2000 21.83 ‐0.98 ‐5.25 ‐9.13 ‐73.91  0.00 0.49 ‐0.23 33.78 -0.24 -0.04 1.55
 1999 20.62 1.08 -3.19 -1.51 -263.31 0.00 0.81 0.25 23.81 -0.15 0.04 1.15
 1998 18.70 -3.37 -12.28 -9.62 -153.31 0.00 2.35 -0.38 30.98 -0.66 -0.11 1.66
    
54 IFGL Refractories Ltd 2004 93.05 14.17 13.57 20.73 40.97 0.23 1.73 23.62 75.70 0.15 0.28 0.81
 2003 74.14 6.57 6.03 18.81 225.25 0.27 2.12 12.17 62.39 0.08 0.15 0.84
 2002 45.38 1.79 0.86 0.64 -4.76 0.31 2.37 2.77 40.53 0.02 0.04 0.89
 2001 44.80 1.89 0.26 -9.09 -28.08 0.37 2.06 1.33 42.97 0.01 0.04 0.96
 2000 44.22 3.23 1.02 68.88 102.78  0.48 2.03 1.46 40.80 0.02 0.06 0.92
 1999 19.52 1.44 0.04 -2.79 -27.64 0.55 2.38 1.04 17.61 0.00 0.05 0.90
 1998 25.21 2.40 0.08 -11.73 -20.08 0.62 2.10 1.01 21.45 0.00 0.07 0.85
    
55 Pix Transmission Ltd 2004 72.81 7.72 1.80 5.68 15.09 1.72 1.41 1.30 60.70 0.02 0.11 0.83
 2003 60.54 6.68 0.92 6.34 15.43 1.65 1.47 1.16 50.22 0.02 0.10 0.83
 2002 50.07 6.12 0.77 11.98 -4.10 1.34 1.74 1.14 41.67 0.02 0.10 0.83
 2001 49.19 7.17 1.94 -0.93 -13.19 1.16 1.45 1.37 39.87 0.04 0.12 0.81
 2000 44.70 8.93 3.83 16.85 4.35  1.44 1.04 1.75 34.58 0.09 0.15 0.77
 1999 59.65 8.92 2.19 13.03 245.00 1.74 1.39 1.33 51.31 0.04 0.17 0.86
 1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
    
56 Zenith Computers Ltd 2004 285.49 6.38 3.37 17.91 113.30 0.82 1.49 2.12 250.83 0.01 0.08 0.88
 2003 212.85 3.21 1.11 59.65 -27.11 0.89 1.59 1.53 184.41 0.01 0.04 0.87
 2002 191.84 4.97 0.63 21.08 -43.68 0.97 1.64 1.15 168.33 0.00 0.06 0.88
 2001 233.64 9.33 2.35 ‐36.03 -32.17 1.00 1.52 1.34 200.53 0.01 0.11 0.86
 2000 221.56 12.84 5.30 1.99 16.08  0.99 1.40 1.70 189.20 0.02 0.14 0.85
 1999 204.00 11.60 3.53 31.63 15.34 0.95 1.39 1.51 175.41 0.02 0.14 0.86
 1998 175.94 9.89 3.03 30.21 50.83 0.86 1.52 1.50 156.35 0.02 0.13 0.89
 
ANNEXURE – B 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS – RONW, MVA AND EVA ANALYSIS
sr.no. Name of company Year 
Net 
worth PAT 
Mkt. 
Cap. 
Total 
Debt 
Cap. 
Empl. 
Tax 
Rate COCE NOPAT 
1 Ultramarine & Pigments Ltd 2004 42.46 9.16 38.33 5.70 48.16 0.22 9.74 9.71 
  2003 37.27 3.19 20.86 14.83 52.10 0.37 8.96 4.09 
  2002 36.36 4.15 21.22 18.99 55.35 0.24 9.65 5.94 
  2001 38.97 2.14 21.17 21.97 60.94 0.39 10.19 3.90 
  2000 38.11  5.50  90.00  12.44 50.60  0.25 9.67 6.92 
  1999 34.36 5.51 19.80 15.17 49.54 0.23 9.22 7.30 
  1998 30.62 5.02 22.50 12.44 43.06 0.16 8.55 6.95 
           
2 Crompton Greaves Ltd 2004 324.49 70.83 806.76 333.65 658.14 0.08 110.21 107.39 
  2003 424.62 28.17 269.18 459.22 883.84 0.01 161.51 94.07 
  2002 399.35 4.13 240.90 570.71 970.06 0.00 168.39 82.26 
  2001 302.78 -73.16 125.43 591.16 893.94 0.00 161.14 17.72 
  2000 377.92  ‐146.57  200.58 809.56 1187.48 0.00 211.29 -21.92 
  1999 551.08 23.12 187.52 691.19 1242.27 0.04 215.20 114.13 
  1998 547.31 21.52 217.25 614.73 1162.04 -0.04 216.22 114.27 
           
3 Areva T&D India Ltd 2004 174.60 16.88 137.42 13.79 188.39 0.10 43.92 21.11 
  2003 163.35 6.54 91.55 15.15 178.50 0.09 43.49 12.48 
  2002 156.81 -2.07 76.19 37.14 193.95 0.00 44.29 6.01 
  2001 147.79 -2.75 65.82 23.73 171.52 0.00 42.08 4.95 
  2000 150.45  1.73  115.42 48.08 198.53 0.12 42.02 8.64 
  1999 142.47 -9.51 202.38 32.32 174.79 0.00 42.35 -0.72 
  1998 151.97 3.84 204.97 50.28 202.25 0.50 37.85 8.60 
           
4 BPL Ltd 2004 338.69 -74.04 97.47 857.01 1224.04 0.00 84.49 -68.94 
  2003 428.43 -214.58 110.21 1240.21 1716.98 0.00 324.88 7.17 
  2002 644.93 37.90 155.40 951.14 1644.41 0.10 259.08 147.03 
  2001 613.14 81.15 190.58 752.91 1447.72 0.10 206.25 137.11 
  2000 547.33  107.13  595.55 486.47 1083.80 0.10 184.02 161.95 
  1999 462.79 103.73 1092.77 414.32 927.11 0.09 157.31 150.13 
  1998 368.95 85.57 492.23 406.55 775.50 0.07 128.75 134.21 
 
sr.no. Name of company Year 
Net 
worth PAT 
Mkt. 
Cap. 
Total 
Debt 
Cap. 
Empl. 
Tax 
Rate COCE NOPAT 
5 Samtel Color Ltd 2004 193.31 12.50 170.96 251.31 444.62 0.07 82.82 53.50 
  2003 187.65 19.99 73.21 359.82 547.47 0.04 85.29 64.69 
  2002 174.49 25.64 93.17 367.33 541.82 0.09 69.26 57.16 
  2001 212.93 41.57 96.21 247.09 460.02 0.09 78.00 73.52 
  2000 162.03  37.31  151.04 203.32 365.35 0.07 72.74 75.00 
  1999 90.42 -9.81 33.66 232.01 322.43 0.00 62.22 32.85 
  1998 100.23 -8.47 23.87 228.45 328.68 0.00 46.97 16.82 
           
6 TRF Ltd 2004 39.17 3.32 28.60 43.53 82.70 0.52 9.82 4.66 
  2003 37.47 -0.43 11.58 30.19 67.66 0.00 11.48 2.95 
  2002 38.63 9.34 12.65 18.70 57.33 0.10 10.09 11.08 
  2001 33.39 3.15 10.59 2.08 35.47 0.37 9.07 4.99 
  2000 31.82  4.94  10.45 15.67 47.49 0.22 10.26 8.31 
  1999 26.92 1.28 18.81 27.48 54.40 0.57 8.61 4.06 
  1998 26.68 9.28 18.02 29.56 56.24 0.21 11.85 15.36 
           
7 GMR 2004 106.64 11.10 61.88 187.36 327.44 0.06 43.26 24.06 
  2003 101.29 8.14 24.32 117.11 258.09 0.15 51.34 28.99 
  2002 75.29 3.51 24.59 158.56 251.40 0.04 43.26 26.69 
  2001 84.53 2.66 26.75 177.64 271.42 0.00 41.21 23.59 
  2000 81.87  14.45  53.90 162.39 253.51 0.06 36.28 31.03 
  1999 51.70 14.62 16.60 77.90 132.60 0.13 17.26 20.05 
  1998 38.95 7.05 11.76 47.85 86.80 0.01 15.08 13.71 
           
8 
Dharamsi Morarji Chemicals Co 
Ltd 2004 34.81 -5.74 12.15 97.99 138.80 0.00 20.73 6.16 
  2003 58.76 0.41 11.16 112.44 181.20 0.09 27.78 13.32 
  2002 59.85 1.75 11.57 125.20 195.05 0.00 32.47 19.11 
  2001 74.34 1.59 11.64 134.23 218.57 0.15 32.20 15.54 
  2000   22.32 121.40 206.31 0.12 30.70 17.94 
  1999 70.65 6.06 23.48 75.76 146.41 0.11 24.88 15.66 
  1998 68.06 8.55 31.30 66.85 134.91 0.12 24.21 18.04 
 
sr.no. Name of company Year 
Net 
worth PAT 
Mkt. 
Cap. 
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Debt 
Cap. 
Empl. 
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Rate COCE NOPAT 
9 
Khaitan Chemicals & Fertilizers 
Ltd 2004 47.33 6.45 12.66 35.67 83.00 0.09 14.72 10.93 
  2003 42.51 -0.93 2.67 33.69 76.20 0.02 15.32 5.20 
  2002 43.46 -2.83 11.79 39.08 82.54 0.01 16.50 4.27 
  2001 50.40 -3.36 11.74 49.55 99.95 0.00 18.68 4.42 
  2000 53.76  2.12  0.00 50.74 104.50 0.12 17.59 8.08 
  1999 23.43 6.35 8.22 36.88 60.31 0.11 10.19 11.47 
  1998 11.98 4.11 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
           
10 Zenith Infotech Ltd 2004 32.30 0.91 15.10 0.00 32.30 0.08 12.95 5.89 
  2003 37.88 0.19 11.50 0.00 37.88 0.08 11.43 2.95 
  2002 37.89 -7.24 23.11 0.00 37.89 0.11 13.11 4.42 
  2001 47.61 1.63 26.53 0.00 47.61 0.08 15.58 8.62 
  2000 50.44  4.00  180.21 1.25 51.69 0.05 17.68 12.26 
  1999 4.63 2.42 0.00 0.00 4.63 0.10 15.93 10.38 
  1998 NA NA NA NA NA 0.10 14.88 8.91 
           
11 Tata Infotech Ltd(merged) 2004 244.27 59.48 746.60 0.29 244.56 0.08 53.12 59.77 
  2003 205.53 30.46 280.66 9.02 214.55 -0.27 45.59 31.59 
  2002 190.62 20.50 385.70 21.00 211.62 -0.44 43.01 22.28 
  2001 175.86 26.54 249.14 24.54 200.40 0.22 40.37 28.87 
  2000   740.07 12.32 173.79 0.01 37.87 15.07 
  1999 156.41 46.06 2065.66 24.37 180.78 0.14 35.84 48.07 
  1998 118.72 34.33 1107.40 19.74 138.46 0.20 26.95 35.60 
           
12 B & A Ltd 2004 11.31 -0.58 2.49 31.79 43.10 0.00 11.83 3.15 
  2003 15.82 -2.39 1.86 29.06 44.88 0.00 13.12 1.58 
  2002 18.39 0.14 1.73 24.30 42.69 0.26 12.16 2.53 
  2001 19.12 0.42 3.44 19.31 38.43 0.28 11.91 2.32 
  2000 20.35  0.85  3.65 17.48 37.83 0.16 12.95 3.44 
  1999 20.02 0.18 6.53 16.84 36.86 0.10 12.78 2.55 
 
sr.no. Name of company Year 
Net 
worth PAT 
Mkt. 
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Cap. 
Empl. 
Tax 
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13 Max India Ltd 2004 472.48 18.61 303.94 173.15 645.63 0.07 118.75 35.17 
  2003 450.94 -53.26 150.47 144.02 594.96 0.00 123.82 -26.98 
  2002 504.20 9.46 282.49 186.72 690.92 1.86 94.54 -5.05 
  2001 522.46 5.13 224.03 129.16 651.62 0.30 121.21 13.33 
  2000 526.23  37.20  689.49 93.11 619.34 0.12 120.41 43.79 
  1999 190.28 176.47 175.49 46.88 237.16 0.01 52.63 187.94 
  1998 126.03 8.57 271.50 106.35 232.38 0.19 43.03 24.34 
           
14 Emami Paper Mills Ltd 2004 40.80 1.46 0.00 53.24 94.04 0.09 1236.95 294.77 
  2003 40.70 0.75 0.00 53.66 94.36 0.16 1213.66 369.00 
  2002 39.67 0.23 0.00 53.01 92.68 0.07 1309.76 463.01 
  2001 45.16 -0.74 0.00 52.89 98.05 0.13 1302.28 462.44 
  2000 3.34  0.06  0.00 8.23 11.57 0.18 1194.57 401.72 
  1999 3.28 0.05 0.00 8.96 12.24 -0.45 1234.64 567.13 
  1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
           
15 Bayer CropScience Ltd 2004 258.43 26.36 1027.40 77.61 336.04 0.44 62.14 32.60 
  2003 241.97 35.26 1149.06 226.38 468.35 0.71 58.15 41.07 
  2002 88.10 15.48 183.07 147.57 235.67 0.48 28.61 25.04 
  2001 76.65 9.17 150.52 156.65 233.30 0.58 27.69 20.28 
  2000 85.27  7.27  96.22 211.37 296.64 0.24 40.57 29.40 
  1999 81.58 5.04 237.57 189.51 271.09 0.41 34.31 21.70 
  1998 80.10 10.03 324.40 178.87 258.97 0.38 34.47 27.18 
           
16 PSL Ltd 2004 167.53 28.00 205.45 204.74 372.27 0.27 66.34 58.11 
  2003 161.96 14.72 111.23 197.82 359.78 0.07 66.53 46.22 
  2002 160.36 30.97 90.15 189.09 349.45 0.17 62.26 58.55 
  2001 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  2000 150.01  17.37  58.16 106.91 256.92 0.13 48.52 34.70 
  1999 144.20 14.74 115.16 92.96 237.16 0.08 30.41 28.06 
  1998 79.01 10.29 21.21 22.80 101.81 0.26 17.52 12.16 
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17 Ratnamani Metals & Tubes Ltd 2004 39.48 4.06 20.57 13.04 52.52 0.11 11.17 6.69 
  2003 31.91 2.17 6.20 11.66 43.57 0.19 8.75 4.02 
  2002 30.50 1.99 8.43 13.65 44.15 0.21 8.43 3.83 
  2001 34.93 2.35 8.76 15.11 50.04 0.23 9.71 4.50 
  2000 33.32  2.11  7.65 13.10 46.42 0.19 9.24 4.15 
  1999 31.96 2.84 5.39 16.08 48.04 0.23 9.52 5.45 
  1998 28.49 3.33 9.89 19.54 48.04 0.12 8.94 6.11 
           
18 Balrampur Chini Mills Ltd 2004 275.33 60.48 577.92 533.81 809.14 0.08 78.07 78.95 
  2003 236.31 29.51 209.52 329.10 565.41 0.08 63.88 42.23 
  2002 218.48 47.41 229.92 224.20 442.68 0.08 63.68 63.72 
  2001 249.37 47.91 164.09 262.73 517.10 0.09 83.57 76.27 
  2000 218.05  23.18  157.74 298.01 541.06 0.02 81.92 52.32 
  1999 191.33 43.26 161.24 218.64 409.97 0.06 66.01 67.68 
  1998 159.60 43.05 220.24 214.96 374.56 0.06 63.38 71.28 
           
19 NHN Corporation Ltd 2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  2003 -2.84 -17.47 18.05 11.22 8.38 0.00 0.21 -16.65 
  2002 15.45 -5.07 27.94 7.83 23.28 0.00 4.52 -3.89 
  2001 19.69 -3.80 42.24 8.54 28.23 -0.01 4.92 -3.14 
  2000 23.51  0.20  0.00 8.82 32.33 0.09 5.37 0.48 
  1999 23.33 0.01 0.00 9.95 33.28 0.00 5.07 0.03 
  1998 10.66 0.06 0.00 0.47 11.13 0.00 2.37 0.12 
           
20 Sical Logistics Ltd 2004 127.38 9.66 48.66 384.55 535.93 0.12 54.11 29.20 
  2003 118.01 3.56 15.58 450.41 593.87 0.05 49.47 20.13 
  2002 112.26 2.09 30.33 438.70 577.41 0.83 35.83 5.17 
  2001 151.06 21.52 40.39 526.77 706.83 0.35 72.33 52.07 
  2000 142.86  26.01  55.14 462.53 639.39 0.27 77.81 62.65 
  1999 130.66 24.02 57.50 438.80 589.46 0.22 68.76 57.20 
  1998 94.63 15.20 35.60 272.57 387.20 0.35 49.53 36.98 
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21 Arvind Products Ltd 2004 45.59 -2.07 70.03 13.04 375.51 0.00 38.72 26.79 
  2003 47.66 0.45 14.57 11.66 410.19 0.00 41.99 32.13 
  2002 47.21 -24.11 0.00 13.65 433.82 0.00 34.36 0.04 
  2001 83.31 -88.29 0.00 15.11 473.87 0.00 99.47 -6.84 
  2000 171.59  ‐27.50  0.00 13.10 559.09 0.00 89.71 25.10 
  1999 0.13 0.02 0.00 16.08 1.18 2.00 0.03 0.02 
  1998 0.15 0.02 0.00 19.54 1.30 0.00 0.03 0.02 
           
22 Bhilwara Spinners Ltd 2004 1.36 -2.98 2.82 52.46 53.82 0.00 7.25 3.98 
  2003 4.34 -4.10 2.42 52.51 56.85 0.00 8.71 3.67 
  2002 0.33 -2.91 0.82 49.92 50.25 0.00 8.48 5.50 
  2001 11.51 -4.25 1.64 54.70 66.21 0.00 11.75 5.01 
  2000 15.78  ‐5.32  2.42 57.58 73.36 0.00 12.86 4.13 
  1999 21.10 -4.38 4.09 62.94 84.04 0.00 10.79 1.85 
  1998 26.57 2.60 4.43 60.57 87.14 0.11 9.78 6.63 
           
23 RSWM Ltd 2004 177.50 18.45 68.59 224.01 404.01 0.06 54.90 34.41 
  2003 164.19 8.74 30.91 209.41 373.60 0.04 59.69 32.91 
  2002 158.16 5.20 18.99 204.02 376.68 -0.12 69.38 37.24 
  2001 188.95 10.01 29.12 218.69 424.64 0.03 78.63 44.09 
  2000 184.60  14.56  50.40 234.82 436.42 0.03 82.41 53.36 
  1999 176.59 9.76 36.78 297.82 491.41 0.10 76.55 44.44 
  1998 171.88 20.54 60.34 251.13 423.01 0.09 65.70 49.07 
           
24 Shyam Telecom Ltd 2004 195.70 0.47 207.85 7.18 202.88 0.37 43.57 1.71 
  2003 195.24 0.27 89.36 15.35 210.59 0.40 44.37 2.41 
  2002 195.44 9.59 175.81 40.33 235.77 0.18 47.51 14.83 
  2001 194.83 16.37 313.47 52.73 247.56 0.12 49.10 23.33 
  2000 164.97  4.45  2349.92 59.02 223.99 0.10 46.29 15.06 
  1999 NA NA NA NA NA 0.10 46.29 15.06 
  1998 33.01 2.14 21.74 44.19 77.20 NA NA NA 
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25 DPIL Ltd 2004 16.16 -2.04 23.97 3.88 20.04 2.17 2.92 -2.62 
  2003 19.03 0.24 32.17 17.31 36.34 0.00 5.00 1.12 
  2002 42.03 1.33 0.00 31.47 73.50 0.00 9.74 1.98 
  2001 42.54 1.93 0.00 40.30 82.84 0.00 9.40 2.13 
  2000 28.16  4.60  0.00 39.81 70.56 0.23 7.44 5.30 
  1999 19.78 0.04 0.00 15.42 35.20 0.20 5.05 0.82 
  1998 0.53 -1.08 0.00 5.33 5.86 0.00 0.47 -0.72 
           
26 Rossell Tea Ltd 2004 24.57 -2.60 0.00 37.23 65.80 -0.01 9.94 1.16 
  2003 27.17 -2.58 0.00 33.78 64.95 0.00 10.76 1.44 
  2002 29.59 -1.97 0.00 20.75 50.34 0.00 7.94 -0.43 
  2001 32.25 1.19 0.00 15.27 47.52 0.13 8.50 2.71 
  2000 31.06  1.61  0.00 10.65 41.71 0.21 7.34 2.23 
  1999 29.94 2.85 0.00 0.65 30.59 0.24 6.57 2.95 
  1998 28.02 5.83 0.00 2.04 30.06 0.29 6.12 5.89 
           
27 Matrix Laboratories Ltd 2004 177.76 124.61 1741.56 207.51 385.69 0.08 57.30 143.36 
  2003 98.98 75.05 255.70 130.68 232.24 0.06 49.01 102.09 
  2002 21.51 4.48 23.04 18.98 40.49 0.21 6.38 6.21 
  2001 12.30 4.20 5.95 14.77 27.07 0.04 4.47 6.01 
  2000 7.95  ‐8.59  4.42 14.82 22.77 -0.03 4.44 -5.87 
  1999 15.99 0.42 6.15 13.07 29.61 0.11 5.46 2.31 
  1998 14.34 0.15 2.95 7.19 21.53 0.12 4.34 1.39 
           
28 Twilight Li-Taka Pharma Ltd 2004 -3.07 0.57 8.30 31.70 28.63 -0.36 6.39 6.39 
  2003 -3.64 -1.92 1.74 31.76 28.12 0.00 4.92 2.55 
  2002 -1.72 -3.38 2.86 28.68 26.96 0.00 5.41 1.16 
  2001 1.71 -3.31 4.25 26.45 28.16 0.00 5.65 0.73 
  2000 4.54  ‐1.22  6.56 20.46 25.00 0.00 2.69 0.49 
  1999 5.79 -0.28 4.80 20.82 26.61 -0.04 4.04 2.51 
  1998 6.43 -2.49 3.60 10.77 17.20 0.00 2.90 -0.98 
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29 
Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries 
Ltd 2004 844.11 240.60 6027.17 312.25 1171.82 0.03 189.44 244.11 
  2003 680.52 231.41 2521.60 9.24 705.46 0.06 151.47 232.29 
  2002 535.62 171.28 3131.55 0.17 535.79 0.07 119.23 174.65 
  2001 432.61 135.18 2530.11 35.71 501.04 0.07 107.80 142.33 
  2000 315.16  83.66  2960.64 48.62 412.86 0.07 88.43 93.30 
  1999 266.17 59.04 755.97 67.03 383.38 0.03 79.99 70.61 
  1998 222.32 56.12 366.87 40.80 263.12 0.02 58.96 67.00 
           
30 SRHHL Industries Ltd 2004 66.48 1.82 8.60 29.88 96.36 0.08 16.10 3.54 
  2003 64.66 1.99 4.54 27.36 92.02 0.06 15.76 3.77 
  2002 68.73 1.86 5.63 18.35 87.08 0.08 16.21 3.20 
  2001 66.78 1.83 2.62 19.82 94.03 0.09 17.31 3.08 
  2000 44.28  1.74  7.65 30.91 79.43 0.12 12.11 3.36 
  1999 33.44 1.67 4.51 27.39 60.83 0.08 9.38 3.82 
  1998 31.76 1.44 5.10 21.00 52.76 0.13 9.73 4.30 
           
31 NLC Nalco India Ltd 2004 28.70 10.25 136.00 20.04 48.74 0.31 7.41 11.45 
  2003 22.21 8.13 165.00 31.27 53.48 0.35 6.61 9.94 
  2002 39.45 4.31 80.00 21.74 61.19 0.49 9.24 5.02 
  2001 35.61 -1.16 124.20 23.22 58.83 3.37 1.36 -7.50 
  2000 37.25  7.55  200.00 21.95 59.20 0.40 8.34 7.83 
  1999 31.92 6.68 212.50 0.97 32.89 0.38 7.07 6.85 
  1998 27.46 4.26 142.50 1.58 29.04 0.38 6.08 4.40 
           
32 Dr Reddys Laboratories Ltd 2004 2047.02 283.20 7452.67 58.22 2105.24 0.07 446.72 287.15 
  2003 1806.92 392.09 7014.59 28.76 1835.68 0.09 396.32 397.58 
  2002 1457.99 459.65 8400.75 13.82 1471.81 0.08 328.33 472.61 
  2001 553.20 144.47 3940.06 375.43 928.63 0.18 155.36 180.17 
  2000 435.17  60.32  4269.13 174.65 609.82 0.10 108.89 75.08 
  1999 383.89 51.76 2283.44 110.97 494.86 0.13 94.16 62.88 
  1998 340.87 48.84 1081.45 60.87 401.74 0.08 83.23 58.34 
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33 Roto Pumps Ltd 2004 9.04 0.28 1.58 3.58 12.62 -0.10 2.56 0.81 
  2003 8.58 -0.73 0.78 3.48 12.06 -0.13 2.63 -0.15 
  2002 9.01 -0.85 0.00 4.13 13.14 0.00 2.75 -0.25 
  2001 9.86 -1.88 1.71 3.78 13.64 -0.01 2.80 -1.44 
  2000 11.73  0.00  1.71 3.35 15.08 1.00 2.78 0.00 
  1999 11.73 0.01 1.71 4.23 15.96 0.00 3.39 0.60 
  1998 11.73 0.17 2.09 4.29 16.02 0.06 3.52 0.87 
           
34 GHCL Ltd 2004 230.04 30.09 222.99 153.14 383.18 0.27 61.17 41.50 
  2003 218.97 46.31 173.54 118.64 337.61 0.08 66.88 65.83 
  2002 212.30 45.71 114.23 139.20 351.50 0.09 73.09 72.88 
  2001 263.15 27.11 80.66 163.53 436.68 0.10 96.74 64.77 
  2000 255.81  22.28  86.26 212.00 477.81 0.12 87.84 52.63 
  1999 246.66 41.85 117.96 157.59 404.25 0.10 81.16 69.66 
  1998 225.51 47.66 178.11 153.93 379.44 0.10 71.82 70.70 
           
35 DLF Ltd 2004 317.82 35.48 0.00 561.10 878.92 0.25 75.81 42.54 
  2003 283.91 26.30 0.00 22.42 306.33 0.33 65.04 29.93 
  2002 260.31 33.39 0.00 46.08 306.39 0.14 73.60 50.68 
  2001 233.00 27.09 0.00 99.92 332.92 0.14 82.28 58.97 
  2000 208.88  51.81  0.00 303.37 512.25 0.14 117.81 124.44 
  1999 88.75 25.42 0.00 425.74 514.49 0.21 96.17 102.39 
  1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
           
36 Repro India Ltd 2004 28.00 3.62 0.00 35.96 63.96 0.20 7.51 5.08 
  2003 25.27 4.58 0.00 28.04 53.31 0.23 7.55 6.67 
  2002 34.03 3.19 0.00 28.70 62.73 0.18 10.32 6.15 
  2001 32.14 6.61 0.00 32.12 64.26 0.09 11.35 11.01 
  2000 26.40  5.48  0.00 32.84 59.24 0.12 10.60 10.37 
  1999 23.07 3.50 0.00 33.22 56.29 0.11 8.87 7.38 
  1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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37 Finolex Cables Ltd 2004 538.62 29.56 359.59 187.99 726.61 0.06 133.20 46.26 
  2003 522.87 24.72 241.05 203.57 726.44 0.09 135.53 47.15 
  2002 586.86 65.94 479.73 122.37 709.23 0.07 142.18 81.18 
  2001 588.77 72.51 527.46 104.76 693.53 0.22 142.70 87.86 
  2000 544.64  70.65  892.84 118.96 663.60 0.25 131.32 84.17 
  1999 568.94 62.02 681.84 112.56 681.50 0.28 140.16 79.11 
  1998 520.95 48.62 330.13 198.19 719.14 0.30 0.00 73.53 
           
38 
Hindustan Organic Chemicals 
Ltd 2004 -72.46 -148.47 124.97 445.33 372.87 0.00 22.23 -110.57 
  2003 112.20 -41.52 86.23 436.15 548.35 0.00 69.46 3.67 
  2002 155.58 -59.27 82.19 413.38 568.96 0.00 79.67 -13.25 
  2001 202.12 -37.48 45.81 355.01 557.13 0.00 92.93 11.73 
  2000 243.23  ‐94.70  54.23 322.44 565.67 0.00 99.54 -47.77 
  1999 349.17 -20.00 91.96 282.20 631.37 0.00 107.67 12.14 
  1998 375.58 -5.09 94.32 281.34 656.92 0.00 110.06 23.73 
           
39 Tata Coffee Ltd 2004 153.77 17.10 152.38 78.41 232.18 0.19 37.25 21.09 
  2003 143.68 20.20 85.17 54.50 198.18 0.11 36.47 25.59 
  2002 130.51 9.14 101.01 69.40 199.91 0.17 35.16 16.07 
  2001 129.87 13.58 142.16 58.02 187.89 0.07 35.63 21.12 
  2000 121.80  26.12  183.62 20.63 142.43 0.34 30.10 29.87 
  1999 57.75 14.28 95.10 16.76 74.51 0.46 14.81 16.60 
  1998 49.80 11.87 171.18 21.01 70.81 0.54 13.37 14.46 
           
40 Gulf Oil Corporation Ltd 2004 126.34 22.91 126.56 78.13 204.47 0.14 36.50 32.08 
  2003 118.41 15.32 54.09 96.80 215.21 0.09 40.63 30.34 
  2002 137.43 7.70 49.60 130.79 274.09 0.08 42.16 18.86 
  2001 101.17 54.64 26.00 55.31 156.48 0.10 31.51 64.27 
  2000 50.94  5.08  16.40 59.88 110.82 0.11 17.98 12.04 
  1999 48.08 5.02 26.88 52.51 100.59 0.10 16.96 11.58 
  1998 48.08 9.79 19.64 43.52 91.60 0.19 16.90 16.29 
 
sr.no. Name of company Year 
Net 
worth PAT 
Mkt. 
Cap. 
Total 
Debt 
Cap. 
Empl. 
Tax 
Rate COCE NOPAT 
41 Pidilite Industries Ltd 2004 25.24 61.40 749.12 56.23 365.93 0.32 69.51 63.92 
  2003 25.24 59.31 550.23 41.64 312.72 0.33 61.88 62.56 
  2002 25.24 52.13 446.75 43.50 304.58 0.22 61.01 56.67 
  2001 25.24 47.96 499.25 45.09 261.81 0.27 52.96 54.04 
  2000 12.62  47.57  808.27 78.97 292.41 0.32 50.45 51.86 
  1999 12.24 37.33 543.15 53.83 221.63 0.30 42.48 43.52 
  1998 12.24 27.28 232.56 77.96 218.94 0.29 37.75 34.53 
           
42 TTK Healthcare Ltd 2004 6.61 0.41 12.49 24.94 59.49 0.08 8.56 3.41 
  2003 6.61 3.06 8.59 29.13 64.57 0.31 11.75 6.04 
  2002 6.38 1.92 8.87 34.04 75.24 0.00 18.14 10.03 
  2001 6.38 -4.47 0.00 55.31 96.82 -0.01 19.57 4.99 
  2000 5.03  2.07  20.67 51.75 80.73 0.21 11.57 5.97 
  1999 5.03 2.05 16.57 40.93 69.37 0.32 12.05 6.54 
  1998 5.03 3.91 14.74 35.22 63.00 0.35 10.97 7.44 
           
43 HBL Power Systems Ltd 2004 101.81 8.66 20.07 62.92 164.73 0.17 27.62 14.26 
  2003 97.39 10.29 20.07 69.49 166.88 0.20 28.14 17.36 
  2002 90.04 11.54 20.07 60.33 150.37 0.17 26.75 18.82 
  2001 81.17 14.11 20.07 59.93 141.10 0.11 25.55 22.11 
  2000 67.06  13.27  20.07 55.55 122.61 0.05 21.13 19.89 
  1999 22.73 9.58 9.17 12.51 35.24 0.18 6.75 11.41 
  1998 11.18 3.25 6.42 4.15 15.33 0.31 3.12 3.95 
           
44 Carol Info Services Ltd 2004 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
  2003 321.40 8.00 139.81 14.96 336.36 0.00 76.64 15.12 
  2002 311.26 15.78 87.18 183.20 494.46 0.00 94.94 42.93 
  2001 330.87 -27.96 93.56 227.90 558.77 -0.02 99.23 -0.79 
  2000 372.95  ‐18.19  112.19 181.39 559.34 -0.25 119.90 19.45 
  1999 630.65 105.69 3366.11 312.22 1002.37 0.04 181.58 137.46 
  1998 574.52 70.79 712.77 247.94 862.46 0.04 133.48 70.79 
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45 Todays Writing Products Ltd 2004 39.63 5.32 59.95 18.32 57.95 0.11 11.04 7.79 
  2003 35.13 2.38 14.15 21.28 56.41 0.11 10.05 4.83 
  2002 29.85 4.77 26.60 18.39 48.24 0.08 8.41 6.73 
  2001 25.71 6.24 35.98 12.60 38.31 0.09 6.52 7.20 
  2000 13.07  3.92  29.45 2.62 15.69 0.01 3.22 4.32 
  1999 10.44 2.39 10.21 1.11 11.55 0.02 2.32 2.45 
  1998 9.10 2.36 7.25 0.00 9.10 0.01 1.97 2.66 
           
46 Jindal Poly Films Ltd 2004 288.89 55.86 430.23 194.20 627.57 0.08 105.02 67.14 
  2003 241.98 30.73 122.17 129.13 480.59 0.07 86.96 41.67 
  2002 237.26 32.91 62.81 94.34 441.08 0.07 89.36 47.27 
  2001 249.30 12.34 33.38 179.02 517.80 0.08 90.18 29.24 
  2000 208.92  8.18  42.08 259.25 491.65 0.04 69.18 27.09 
  1999 137.76 13.73 39.80 239.76 388.55 0.10 51.35 32.90 
  1998 128.20 7.88 60.47 241.23 380.46 0.10 46.55 24.31 
           
47 Gujarat Perstorp Electronics Ltd 2004 -27.17 -6.37 0.00 41.51 14.34 0.00 -4.75 -5.24 
  2003 -20.80 -2.44 0.00 41.10 20.30 0.00 -3.24 -1.18 
  2002 -18.36 -3.44 0.00 43.41 25.05 0.00 -2.47 -1.94 
  2001 -15.77 -0.71 0.00 42.01 26.24 0.00 -1.71 0.99 
  2000 ‐28.09  ‐3.30  22.13 54.63 26.54 0.00 -3.63 -0.85 
  1999 -24.78 -2.81 20.75 52.13 27.35 0.00 -3.36 -0.81 
  1998 -21.97 -5.79 0.00 48.02 26.05 0.00 -0.81 -1.85 
           
48 Berger Paints (India) Ltd 2004 185.97 44.03 408.17 38.72 224.69 0.29 42.83 46.24 
  2003 165.92 33.42 188.51 38.50 204.42 0.27 40.53 37.64 
  2002 150.48 31.39 190.91 76.25 226.73 0.08 40.92 39.31 
  2001 141.35 28.49 233.82 90.14 231.49 0.13 38.78 36.21 
  2000 127.50  23.70  265.04 73.33 200.83 0.12 35.50 31.11 
  1999 112.50 23.63 174.82 76.03 188.53 0.04 34.31 33.06 
  1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
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49 Hindustan Unilever Ltd 2004 2092.04 1197.34 31587.22 1471.12 3563.16 0.17 561.08 1305.77 
  2003 2138.05 1771.79 45058.56 1704.31 3842.36 0.18 517.24 1826.43 
  2002 3658.20 1769.74 40006.81 58.30 3716.50 0.20 798.73 1777.06 
  2001 3043.02 1641.31 49229.84 83.74 3126.76 0.19 664.64 1647.60 
  2000 2487.55  1310.09  45409.38 111.61 2599.16 0.21 548.55 1320.44 
  1999 2102.10 1069.94 49403.25 177.27 2279.37 0.23 472.09 1087.20 
  1998 1691.96 805.71 33131.93 264.31 1956.27 0.26 387.73 827.32 
           
50 Jubilant Organosys Ltd 2004 207.67 80.21 1722.20 421.00 628.67 0.06 80.67 115.16 
  2003 143.27 48.11 220.93 412.91 556.18 0.08 75.19 91.31 
  2002 117.03 23.62 68.60 334.67 451.70 -0.03 76.91 74.02 
  2001 141.28 13.36 39.13 351.31 497.59 -0.03 82.64 62.95 
  2000 132.76  10.31  49.42 325.05 462.81 0.02 72.03 50.87 
  1999 124.73 23.01 75.88 262.47 392.20 0.00 65.19 58.07 
  1998 105.21 29.04 86.72 236.26 341.47 0.06 50.65 54.46 
           
51 Bright Brothers Ltd 2004 19.33 -2.20 4.07 51.32 73.50 0.00 13.61 6.43 
  2003 21.54 -2.50 4.44 54.10 77.99 0.00 15.08 7.23 
  2002 24.03 -5.54 9.61 55.73 82.11 0.00 16.34 4.91 
  2001 26.23 -0.47 0.00 59.16 87.71 0.00 19.81 11.28 
  2000 26.86  0.93  0.00 68.18 97.36 0.00 21.81 14.52 
  1999 20.44 1.76 11.27 55.13 76.57 0.15 13.28 8.39 
  1998 19.66 1.75 10.46 49.61 70.27 0.11 13.26 8.26 
           
52 Ion Exchange (India) Ltd 2004 98.68 1.96 30.28 71.84 170.52 0.04 33.89 14.20 
  2003 97.61 1.80 20.69 79.51 177.12 0.08 32.94 13.32 
  2002 96.82 4.67 21.61 63.70 160.52 0.09 32.73 16.12 
  2001 91.56 -4.69 15.70 74.49 166.05 0.00 34.82 9.98 
  2000 110.07  ‐3.95  33.78 83.55 193.63 0.00 38.19 10.09 
  1999 128.00 5.45 48.33 76.45 204.87 -0.05 40.78 18.19 
  1998 124.93 12.44 67.93 57.31 182.24 0.19 35.22 20.28 
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53 Hindustan Fluoro Carbons Ltd 2004 -45.44 -10.13 0.00 66.69 21.25 0.00 -5.94 -6.24 
  2003 -35.31 -4.59 0.00 62.34 27.03 0.00 -3.40 -0.35 
  2002 -30.72 -2.60 0.00 57.86 27.14 0.00 -2.54 1.50 
  2001 -27.97 -2.08 0.00 54.31 26.34 0.00 -2.37 1.60 
  2000 ‐25.89  ‐5.25  0.00 52.17 26.28 0.00 -1.33 -0.98 
  1999 -20.61 -3.19 0.00 50.02 29.41 0.00 -0.19 1.08 
  1998 -17.41 -12.28 1.96 47.60 30.18 0.00 5.14 -3.37 
           
54 IFGL Refractories Ltd 2004 40.83 8.61 50.88 9.79 50.62 0.27 9.27 9.05 
  2003 37.10 2.98 16.09 7.84 44.94 0.05 8.54 3.49 
  2002 36.72 0.82 8.48 11.94 48.66 0.05 8.83 1.71 
  2001 35.90 0.24 8.48 10.40 46.30 0.08 9.27 1.74 
  2000 19.06  0.82  8.10 16.35 52.01 0.20 9.49 2.60 
  1999 20.43 0.04 9.91 10.76 31.19 0.00 5.82 1.44 
  1998 20.39 0.07 8.28 11.74 32.13 0.13 6.42 2.08 
           
55 Pix Transmission Ltd 2004 26.09 1.17 4.90 45.23 71.32 0.08 11.10 6.63 
  2003 24.92 0.37 5.49 42.41 67.33 0.09 10.65 5.63 
  2002 24.54 0.18 5.29 39.29 63.83 0.08 10.24 5.11 
  2001 26.90 1.89 5.43 32.37 61.15 0.03 11.32 6.99 
  2000 25.01  3.34  4.44 32.12 59.01 0.13 10.29 7.79 
  1999 18.38 1.79 6.30 32.93 51.31 0.18 9.54 7.29 
  1998 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
           
56 Zenith Computers Ltd 2004 47.02 3.11 32.20 33.78 80.80 0.89 10.49 3.43 
  2003 43.90 1.02 9.37 40.46 84.36 1.89 7.62 -0.85 
  2002 42.77 0.56 31.04 36.71 79.48 6.89 -16.31 -25.00 
  2001 42.22 2.17 25.62 45.96 88.18 2.97 -4.62 -11.58 
  2000 48.48  5.06  111.46 45.10 93.58 1.42 7.30 1.87 
  1999 40.24 3.16 63.31 42.87 83.11 2.29 -1.68 -7.22 
  1998 40.23 2.73 14.71 33.57 73.80 2.26 0.03 -5.94 
 
